R&D Accounting and the Tradeoff Between Relevance and Objectivity

We use a simulation model for a pharmaceutical R&D program to examine the tradeoff between objectivity and relevance of accounting information under various methods of R&D reporting. A simple capitalization rule, similar to the successful-efforts method of capitalizing oil and gas exploration costs, provides a stronger relation between accounting information and economic values than immediate expensing of R&D outlays or capitalizing the full cost of outlays. The superior relevance of this "successful-efforts" method persists even when earnings management is widespread.     

An Instructional Case Comparing the Accounting Policies and Financial Results of Online Retailers

In the role of financial analyst for a venture capital firm, you are assigned the responsibility of evaluating two online retailers who have applied for financing to build a distribution center in western Canada. Based on your developing knowledge of Canadian accounting standards for private enterprises (ASPE), you evaluate the financial reporting policies and financial results of the two companies to identify the company that is best suited for your firm's support. Through this case, you will refine your understanding of ASPE and you will exercise your reasoning and analytical skills.     

Capitalized customer acquisition costs and earnings quality: A case study of PhotoWorks,Inc

This case examines issues related to accounting method choice, earnings management, and earnings quality. Specifically, the case examines a company (PhotoWorks, Inc.) that chose the less conservative approach of capitalizing and then amortizing a certain type of advertising expenditure rather than expensing the costs as incurred. The primary purpose of this case is to illustrate the role of judgment in accounting method choice and how it provides potential opportunities for earnings management. The case also allows students to explore the multi-dimensional nature of financial reporting decisions and to develop a greater appreciation for how their accounting coursework relates to important “real-world” issues. After completing this case, students should be able to do the following: (1) describe factors that are involved in accounting method choice and support the appropriateness of an accounting method choice based on a search of the accounting standards; (2) understand and evaluate the effects of accounting method choice on the financial statements; (3) describe the conflicting motivations managers face when deciding on financial accounting methods versus tax accounting methods; (4) explain what is meant by earnings management, factors that motivate managers to manage earnings, methods they can use to manage earnings, and how earnings management affects earnings quality; and (5) describe the role of auditors in analyzing a company’s accounting method choices and in assessing the quality of a company’s earnings.     

Accounting for expenditure on software development for internal use

The methods accepted by Australian, International, U.S. and U.K. Accounting Standards for the treatment of expenditure on software development are inconsistent, and permissive. A host of methods for recording capitalized software in terms of those standards is identified by reference to an illustrative case study. It is questionable whether many in-house developed software applications satisfy the professionally endorsed definition of 'asset'. Moreover, even if accounting standards significantly reduce the range of options for capitalizing expenditure on software development, there would still be many values which could be assigned to capitalized software. That suggests that those 'measures' are not reliable, so that it would be inappropriate initially to recognize software expenditure as an 'asset'. It is contended that expensing all outlays on software development as they are incurred (accompanied by reporting that expenditure as a line item in statements of financial performance, and expanded disclosures in notes) is likely to provide a clearer and more useful report on business operations than the alternative of capitalization, amortization and subsequent assessments of whether or not recorded values should be adjusted for 'impairment'.     

The effect of management incentives and cross-listing status on the accounting treatment of R&D spending

This paper investigates the effect of management incentives and cross-listing status on the accounting treatment of research and development (R&D) spending for a sample of Canadian hi-tech and biopharmaceutical firms. U.S. GAAP adopts an immediate expensing rule for all R&D spending except for software development costs for which technological feasibility has been established. Contrary to the U.S., Canadian and international standard setters recommend capitalization if development costs meet certain criteria. Because those criteria are largely based on management judgment, capitalization of R&D spending is an accounting choice that can be used for income manipulation or signaling.Using a logit model, we examine how the decision to capitalize R&D spending is influenced by the cross-listing status and several other key firm characteristics that are well documented in the accounting literature. We find that the probability of capitalizing R&D spending increases for cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms in the software industry. The probability of capitalizing R&D spending also increases for firms that are more leveraged, more mature, and have higher level of cash flows from operations. However, the probability of capitalizing R&D spending decreases for larger corporations, firms with more concentrated ownership and highly profitable firms. Overall our results indicate a preference for Canadian firms in the software industry to emulate U.S. accounting practices for R&D spending. They also suggest that firms use the decision to capitalize or expense R&D spending as an earning management tool to either meet debt covenants or to smooth income.     

The Whip Cancer Walk: A case of real earnings management in the nonprofit sector

The Whip Cancer Walk case is designed for students currently learning about nonprofit accounting. Based on a real scenario, you are introduced to an organization that reports only the net proceeds from a series of fundraising walks, instead of both the funds raised and the related costs. The case explores the applicable accounting standards and asks you to consider the appropriate accounting treatment. In this case, you will be asked to consider how the accounting treatment of the walks affects the reported financial numbers, and as a result the rating received from Charity Navigator and the ability to pass the Better Business Bureau’s standards for accountability.     

Reliability of R&D capitalization: Evidence from ex post impairment in China

Unlike prior studies that investigate research and development (R&D) accounting as a dichotomous choice between capitalizing vs. expensing, this study identifies low-reliability R&D capitalization by the occurrence of ex post impairment of capitalized R&D costs. I find that low-reliability capitalization is associated with higher discretionary accruals but fails to signal future innovation, whereas normal capitalization without subsequent impairment lacks earnings aggressiveness and predicts future innovation positively, compared to expensing firms. Next, this study shows that Big 4 and industry specialist auditors improve reliability by notably decreasing the likelihood of low-reliability R&D capitalization. The results remain robust after controlling for R&D investment intensity and potential endogeneity in the capitalization decision. Additional tests show that managers strategically time the recognition of impairment for big-bath and earnings-smoothing purposes, and that analyst coverage does not help differentiate between low-reliability and normal R&D capitalization. Collectively, this paper increases our understanding of R&D accounting and auditing and contributes to the debate on the reliability of R&D capitalization.     

Depreciation Rules and the Relation between Marginal and Historical Cost

The reported cost of a product frequently contains historical cost components that reflect past investments in productive capacity. We examine a setting wherein a firm makes a sequence of overlapping capacity investments. Earlier research has identified particular accrual accounting (depreciation) rules with the property that, on a per unit basis, the historical cost of a product captures precisely its marginal cost. Relative to this benchmark, we investigate and characterize the direction and magnitude of the bias in reported historical cost that results from alternative depreciation rules, including in particular straight‐line depreciation in conjunction with partial direct expensing. In addition, we demonstrate that for a reasonable range of parameter specifications the resulting bias is rather small. Finally, we apply our framework to two specific settings. First, in a regulatory context, we establish the extent to which the accounting profit margin is indicative of a firm's pricing power in the product market. Second, we model an internal control scenario in which a manager's performance is evaluated using residual income, and identify the distortions in investment levels that result from the use of alternative depreciation rules.     

股权激励会计处理及其经济后果分析——以伊利股份为例

本文结合《企业会计准则第11号——股份支付》的相关规定,以伊利股份为例研究股权激励费用化的会计处理及其经济后果。研究结果表明,股权激励的费用化将对上市公司的业绩产生影响,且股权费用摊销集中程度的不同,对公司产生的影响也不同。股票市场对股权激励费用化的会计处理及公司业绩的变化有负向反应,而且反应的程度与激励费用对公司业绩的影响成正比。同时股权激励设计有福利之嫌,股权激励费用化的会计处理有可能导致上市公司修改其股权激励的方案。     

For the last time: stock options are an expense

Should stock options be recorded as an expense on a company's income statement and balance sheet, or should they remain where they are, relegated to footnotes? The extraordinary boom in share prices during the Internet bubble made critics of option expensing look like spoilsports. But since the crash, the debate has returned with a vengeance. And no wonder: The authors believe the case for expensing options is overwhelming. In this article, Nobel Iaureate Robert Merton, one of the inventors of the Black-Scholes option-pricing model; his coauthor on the classic textbook Finance, Zvi Bodie; and Robert Kaplan, creator of the Balanced Scorecard, examine and dismiss the principal claims put forward by those who continue to oppose options expensing. They demonstrate that stock-option grants do indeed have real cash-flow implications that need to be reported. They show that effective ways certainly exist to quantify those implications. They detail the distortions that relegating stock-option accounting to footnotes creates. And they show why reporting option costs should in no way hamper young companies in their efforts to provide incentives. Options are indeed a powerful incentive, the authors agree, and failing to record a transaction that creates such powerful effects is economically indefensible. Worse, it encourages companies to favor options over alternative incentive systems. It is not the proper role of accounting standards, the authors argue, to distort executive and employee compensation by subsidizing one particular form of compensation and no other. Companies should choose compensation methods according to their economic benefits--not the way they are reported.     

Contagion of accounting methods: evidence from stock option expensing

I examine how a firm’s accounting methods can be influenced by the choices of other firms, which I label contagion. I model accounting method choice as a combination of intrinsic propensities to adopt a method and contagion effects. I predict contagion of accounting methods occurs for two reasons: (1) adoption decisions of other firms are informative for the adoption decision, and (2) prior adoptions change the net benefits of the decision. I test these predictions in the stock option expensing setting where firms had the choice to use the intrinsic or fair value method. Using a firm-level diffusion model, I document evidence consistent with my predictions.     

Fair Value Accounting and Stewardship*

Current standards define fair value as the market price at which an asset could be sold or a liability could be settled in the normal course of business. Setting aside measurement issues, assessing the relevance of exit values has intensified in recent years as fair value becomes a pervasive component of accounting regulation. The current debate about accounting measurement is framed in terms of making a choice between fair value and historical cost. In this article I argue that this is not a correct framing of the issues; knowledge of fair value alone cannot help investors to evaluate stewardship, because they would not know how much resources the management had sacrificed to obtain that fair value. To properly evaluate stewardship, investors need both types of information, historical cost and fair value.Using this information, a rate‐of‐return‐like index of stewardship quality is proposed. This commentary concludes with a statement about three significant drawbacks of relying solely on fair value accounting.     

What drives firms' decisions to lobby and determinants of their lobbying positions: Evidence from firms' comment letter submissions during FASB's stock option expensing proposal in 2004

I examine what drives firms' decisions on whether or not to lobby and, if so, whether to oppose or support FASB's 2004 option expensing proposal. Given that the accounting treatment in place and the political climate were different in 2004 than in 1993, it becomes interesting to examine whether the incentives driving managerial lobbying process have changed. Indeed, in contrast to prior research that finds top managers' option compensation being the main incentive to oppose option expensing in 1993, firms' closeness to debt constraints is the main incentive to oppose option expensing in 2004. I also find that firms that are smaller, that are in an industry with peers who have lobbied, that have board interlocks with firms that have lobbied, and that have higher board independence are more likely to self-select to lobby. While prior accounting lobbying research has examined firms' decisions to lobby and firms' decision on their lobbying positions independently, this study improves on prior research methodology by using a two-level nested logit model and examines both decisions.     

Modeling Accounting Workplace Interactions with Text‐to‐Video Animation

This article describes a new pedagogical tool, text‐to‐video animation software, that accounting instructors can adopt to easily generate quality videos that address a variety of accounting learning objectives. Although this tool can be used to enhance traditional pedagogical methods, such as case analysis and discussion, it can also be used to address accounting learning objectives not currently addressed by traditional pedagogical methods. This article outlines the benefits of adopting and using this tool in financial and managerial accounting courses, and encourages further study of its effectiveness.     

Expensing options solves nothing

The use of stock options for executive compensation has become a lightning rod for public anger, and it's easy to see why. Many top executives grew hugely rich on the back of the gains they made on their options, profits they've been able to keep even as the value they were supposed to create disappeared. The supposed scam works like this: Current accounting regulations let companies ignore the cost of option grants on their income statements, so they can award valuable option packages without affecting reported earnings. Not charging the cost of the grants supposedly leads to overstated earnings, which purportedly translate into unrealistically high share prices, permitting top executives to realize big gains when they exercise their options. If an accounting anomaly is the problem, then the solution seems obvious: Write off executive share options against the current year's revenues. The trouble is, Sahlman writes, expensing option grants won't give us a more accurate view of earnings, won't add any information not already included in the financial statements, and won't even lead to equal treatment of different forms of executive pay. Far worse, expensing evades the real issue, which is whether compensation (options and other-wise) does what it's supposed to do--namely, help a company recruit, retain, and provide the right people with appropriate performance incentives. Any performance-based compensation system has the potential to encourage cheating. Only ethical management, sensible governance, adequate internal control systems, and comprehensive disclosure will save the investor from disaster. If, Sahlman warns, we pass laws that require the expensing of options, thinking that's fixed the fundamental flaws in corporate America's accounting, we will have missed a golden opportunity to focus on the much more extensive defects in the present system.     

Structuring a tax efficient international operation

International taxation is rapidly increasing in importance in the U.S. business environment. As a student preparing for a career in public accounting or industry, it is vital that you have familiarity with key international tax issues. In this case, you will participate in a detailed tax-planning exercise involving a multinational corporation that is restructuring its tax operations. In the process, you will be exposed to a wide-ranging array of real-world tax issues: tax theory, source of income, transfer pricing, foreign tax credits, the foreign earned income exclusion and Subpart F income. The case also incorporates questions designed to help you explore the financial accounting implications of tax planning. The case consists of three tax modules and each module emphasizes two to three specific tax issues. Two of the modules also contain a subset of tax-related financial accounting questions. To complete the case successfully, you will be required to understand basic international tax theory, to engage in the tax research process and to apply your theoretical knowledge in analyzing complex business scenarios.     

Goodwill impairments and chief executive officer tenure

The purpose of this paper is to examine the tenure of the chief executive officers of publicly held companies and their corresponding goodwill impairment decisions. An opportunity for managers to manage earnings exists via the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) goodwill accounting rules. It is hypothesized that CEOs will recognize this impairment in the early years of their tenure because blame can be placed on prior management's acquisition decisions, expensing goodwill early will make future earnings look better, or an objective evaluation of the reporting unit increases impairments.     

Cultural differences and judgment in financial reporting standards

This instructional resource provides you with the opportunity to explore how cultural differences can impact financial reporting outcomes through the judgments accountants make when interpreting and applying accounting standards. It is intended to draw your attention and awareness to culture’s impact on financial reporting judgments since financial reporting is becoming increasingly international in scope. The instructional resource begins by discussing financial reporting standards and cultural differences and then moves into presenting three accounting scenarios. The three scenarios (lease classification, contingent liability, and revenue recognition) examine how applying accounting standards requires judgment and how cultural differences can influence accountants’ judgments and the resulting financial reporting outcomes. In each scenario, you have the opportunity to identify and consider how different cultural dimensions could impact cross-cultural financial reporting outcomes. The instructional resource content allows you to consider the challenges in using and applying a uniform set of global accounting standards that require judgment across cultures.     

What Explains the Valuation Difference between Intangible‐intensive Profit and Loss Firms?

Prior research suggests that loss firms are valued based on their abandonment/adaptation option values, while profit firms are valued as going concerns. However, conservative accounting treatment of expensing of R&D leads many R&D‐intensive firms to report losses even though they are not in financial distress. In this paper we investigate the difference in valuation of profit and loss firms that invest in intangibles, either through internal development (R&D) or purchases. The accounting treatment for internally developed intangibles is conservative in that US GAAP requires immediate expensing. Yet, it allows recognition of purchased intangibles. We find that in valuation of firms with high recognized‐intangible assets, book value has more prominence in loss firms than profit firms, while that is not the case for firms with high R&D expenditures. This suggests that their abandonment/adaptation option explains the difference in valuation between profit and loss firms with high recognized‐intangibles, while conservative accounting explains the valuation difference between profit and loss firms with high R&D intensity. This result suggests that recognition of intangibles in financial statements might mitigate the conservative bias in accounting numbers.     

Reporting of overhead variances: a cost management perspective

In this paper we argue that if cost management is the primary purpose of a costing system, as opposed to external reporting, then it is often appropriate to report overhead variances as a period cost, rather than prorating these variances to various accounts. Further, we argue that reporting variances as a period cost may be appropriate in some situations even if external reporting considerations underlie the design of the cost system. However, a review of the accounting treatment of overhead variances in major cost/managerial accounting textbooks indicates a clear preference for proration of overhead variances between product costs and period expenses, compared to reporting the entire variance as a period cost (expensing). Textbooks typically argue that proration is theoretically more correct and expensing is only acceptable where the variance is immaterial.