Leverage-based index revisions: The case of Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index

US firms added to the Dow Jones Islamic Market World Index, a leverage-based index, witness permanent positive price and liquidity effects, whereas excluded firms sustain negative price and liquidity effects but no decrease in the investor awareness. Included/excluded firms experience a significant drop/no change in the cost of equity. Among the deleted firms, those with an increase in debt level bear a more severe decrease in liquidity and institutional ownership, and an increased cost of equity than those firms without an increase in debt use. Conveying private information on changes in a firm's corporate strategy and operating environment, revisions by a leverage-based index are different from those by size-based indexes.     

CAPITAL STRUCTURE MANAGEMENT AS A MOTIVATION FOR CALLING CONVERTIBLE DEBT

Using a matched-pairs methodology, we present empirical evidence of systematic changes within a corporation that are associated with calls of convertible debt. We find that calling firms experience significantly greater growth than noncalling firms in the same industry, as measured by retained earnings and long-term debt. Also, the converted debt provides a significant source of new book equity, and calling firms issue significantly less other new equity. The pattern of growth in balance sheet accounts is consistent with the pecking order hypothesis and supports the notion that some firms call convertible debt to reduce their total cost of obtaining additional external financing. The evidence also shows that, on average, calling firms experience a significant decline in their leverage ratio based on book value but no significant change in their leverage ratio based on market value of equity. This is consistent with the call's being used as part of the firm's management of its capital structure.     

The Wealth Effects of Reducing Private Placement Resale Restrictions

Recently, the US Securities and Exchange Commission reduced resale restrictions on Rule 144 private placements from 12 months to 6 months with the intention of lowering the cost of equity capital for issuing firms. In Canada, similar regulatory changes were adopted several years ago, providing a unique opportunity to test the wealth effects of reducing private placement resale restrictions. We find that shortening resale restrictions reduces the liquidity portion of offer price discounts, and thus lowers the cost of equity capital for issuing firms, but has no significant effect on announcement‐period abnormal returns after controlling for issuer type. However, there is a fundamental shift in the types of firms making private placements of common stock after the legislation‐induced easing of resale restrictions. Specifically, we find that smaller firms and firms with greater information asymmetry are less likely to issue privately placed common stock after the legislative change, suggesting that the easing of resale restrictions reduces the costly signal that helps to overcome the Myers and Majluf (1984) underinvestment problem.     

Motives for and Effects of Asset Revaluation: An Examination of South Korean Data

Examining a sample of South Korean firms, of which 201 revalued assets and 899 did not during the period 2008–2009, we find that the average debt cost, equity cost, and weighted average cost of capital (WACC) are higher among the firms that revalued. Firms with higher equity costs and leverage are more likely to revalue and the propensity has a negative relationship with profitability, cash flow, and Tobin’s q. Firms that engage in revaluation experience reductions in all capital costs from year ?1 to +1, comparable to those among firms that did not revalue. Our results support both the information hypothesis and the debt-cost hypothesis.     

Does international experience of managers bring financing benefits? Evidence from the cost of equity capital

Using a sample of Chinese firms, this study examines whether and how managers’ overseas experience affects a firm’s cost of equity capital. We document a negative association between managers’ overseas experience and the cost of equity capital. Mechanism analyses indicate that companies with returnee managers have better information quality and lower systematic risk; more institutional investors, media reports, and analysts following; and higher stock liquidity, all of which lead to a lower cost of equity capital. Further analyses show that chief executive officers (CEOs) with foreign experience have a more significant impact on the cost of capital than non-CEO managers with foreign experience and that managers’ overseas work experience has a more significant impact on the cost of capital than their overseas education. We also find that the impact of managers’ overseas experience is more pronounced when that experience is gained in common law countries compared to code law countries but weaker for state-owned enterprises and firms that are cross-listed or have foreign institutional investors. Overall, the results suggest that managers’ knowledge, skills, and ethical values imprinted from overseas experience, plus eyeball effects from media and analyst attention, can reduce the cost of equity capital.     

Firm Value and the Quality of Sustainability Reporting in Australia

This paper investigates the relationship between firm value and the quality of Australian listed corporations’ sustainability reporting. We examine whether firms that make higher‐quality sustainability disclosures exhibit systematically higher equity prices, through either (or both) cost of capital or expected future performance effects. Using proprietary data obtained from a specialist responsible investment research firm, we document a significant negative association between quality sustainability reporting and the cost of equity capital for ASX 200 firms from 2003–2005, and a significant positive association between expected future performance and the quality of sustainability reporting. We also test for industry‐specific associations and find that our main results are driven heavily by the reporting behaviour of, and market response to, firms in environmentally sensitive industries.     

Tax avoidance and ex ante cost of capital

This study examines the association between tax avoidance and ex ante cost of equity capital. Based on prior research, we develop two proxies for investors’ expectations of tax avoidance and explore whether deviations from those expectations result in higher ex ante cost of equity capital. We find that the ex ante cost of equity capital increases with tax avoidance that is either below or above investor expectations and that the increase is larger for tax avoidance that exceeds investors’ expectations. We then examine whether firms that alter their future tax avoidance exhibit a lowering of their ex ante cost of equity capital and find that tax avoidance decreases (increases) from the prior year for firms that were above (below) investors’ expectations in the prior year. These results are consistent with the trade‐off suggested by the Scholes and Wolfson framework and reinforce the notion that balancing tax benefits and non‐tax costs is an important feature of firms’ tax planning.     

CEO Risk‐Taking Incentives and the Cost of Equity Capital

In this paper, we show that the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock prices (deltas) decrease the implied cost of equity capital while the sensitivities of an executive's wealth to changes in stock volatility (vegas) increase the implied cost of equity capital. Our findings demonstrate that shareholders understand the risks of firms’ future projects as embedded in executive compensation and price these risks into the cost of equity capital accordingly. The findings have strong implications for optimal executive compensation contract design, project evaluation and cost of capital estimation.     

The Effect of SOX Internal Control Deficiencies on Firm Risk and Cost of Equity

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) mandates management evaluation and independent audits of internal control effectiveness. The mandate is costly to firms but may yield benefits through lower information risk that translates into lower cost of equity. We use unaudited pre–SOX 404 disclosures and SOX 404 audit opinions to assess how changes in internal control quality affect firm risk and cost of equity. After controlling for other risk factors, we find that firms with internal control deficiencies have significantly higher idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and cost of equity. Our change analyses document that auditor-confirmed changes in internal control effectiveness (including remediation of previously disclosed internal control deficiencies) are followed by significant changes in the cost of equity that range from 50 to 150 basis points. Overall, our cross-sectional and intertemporal change test results are consistent with internal control reports affecting investors' risk assessments and firms' cost of equity.     

Evidence on the Trade-Off between Risk and Return for IPO and SEO Firms

Do the low long‐run average returns of equity issuers reflect underperformance due to mispricing or the risk characteristics of the issuing firms? We shed new light on this question by examining how institutional lenders price loans of equity issuing firms. Accounting for standard risk factors, we find that equity issuing firms' expected debt return is equivalent to the expected debt return of nonissuing firms, implying that institutional lenders perceive equity issuers to be as risky as similar nonissuing firms. In general, institutional lenders perceive small and high book‐to‐market borrowers as systematically riskier than larger borrowers with low book‐to‐market ratios, consistent with the asset pricing approach in Fama and French (1993) . Finally, we find that firms' expected debt returns decline after equity offerings, consistent with recent theoretical arguments suggesting that firm risk should decline following an equity offering. Overall, our analysis provides novel evidence consistent with risk‐based explanations for the observed equity returns following IPOs and SEOs.     

The competitive effects of S&P 500 Index revisions

Firms added to the S&P 500 Index gain a competitive advantage over their non‐S&P 500 industry competitors. They experience positive stock valuation effects at the expense of competitors. The inclusion is associated with both reductions in financial constraints and the cost of equity and increases in capital investment for the newly added firms. When the increase in capital investment is greater, they gain more market share and enjoy better valuation effects. Rivals’ share price responses are negatively related to the announcement effect of the newly added firm. Deletions from the index, however, do not have symmetric effects.     

Investability and Firm Value

We study how investability, or openness to foreign equity investors, affects firm value in a sample of over 1,400 firms from 26 emerging markets. We find that, on average, investability is associated with a 9% valuation premium (as measured by Tobin's q). This significant valuation premium persists in firm‐fixed effects regressions, although the magnitude and robustness of the premium is somewhat lower. Analysis of the components of Tobin's q shows that firms that become investable experience significant increases in both market values and physical investment. These effects are strongest for firms that face country‐level or firm‐level financial constraints prior to becoming investable.     

Compliance with goodwill-related mandatory disclosure requirements and the cost of equity capital

Theory suggests that increased levels of corporate disclosure lead to a decrease in cost of equity via the reduction of estimation risk. We examine compliance levels with International Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business Combinations and International Accounting Standard 36 Impairments of Assets mandated goodwill-related disclosure and their association with firms’ implied cost of equity capital (ICC). Using a sample of European firms for the period 2008–2011, we find a median compliance level of about 83% and significant differences in compliance levels across firms and time. Non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals managers’ judgement and expectations. Overall, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between the ICC and compliance with mandated goodwill-related disclosure. Further, we split the sample between firms meeting (or not) market expectations about the recognition of a goodwill impairment loss in a given year to study whether variation in compliance levels mainly plays a confirmatory or a mediatory role. We find the latter: higher compliance levels matter only for the sub-sample of firms that do not meet market expectations regarding goodwill impairment. Finally, our results hold only in countries where enforcement is strong.     

Voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from management earnings forecasts

This paper examines the directional effects of management earnings forecasts on the cost of equity capital. We find that forecasters of bad news experience a significant increase in the cost of equity capital in the month after their disclosure. Conversely, the cost of equity capital for good news forecasters does not change significantly in the same period. We also indicate that the magnitude of changes in the cost of capital for good news forecasters is significantly lower than that for bad news forecasters and non-forecasters, which suggests that investors may view good news forecasts less credible. Finally, we show that the effect of the subsequent earnings announcement on the cost of equity capital is preempted by the management forecasts for bad news firms, and that the combined effects of the management earnings forecasts and the earnings announcement are not significant for both good news and bad news forecasters. Our paper contributes to the literature by adding evidence on directional effects of voluntary disclosures and on long-term economic consequences of management earnings forecasts.     

THE COST OF CAPITAL,MACAULAY'S DURATION,AND TOBIN'S q

It is shown empirically that the cost of equity capital estimated from the dividend discount model and Tobin's q are negatively related. The theoretical relationship between these variables is exploited to determine alternative estimates of the cost of equity capital and Macaulay's duration without having to estimate the growth rate g in the conventional manner. This new approach can readily be implemented for large firms reporting SFAS No. 33 data.     

Does Earnings Quality Influence Corporate Social Responsibility Performance? Empirical Evidence of the Causal Link

The study examines the causal links between earnings quality and corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance using a large sample of United States (US) firms from 1992 to 2013. We first find that the association between earnings quality and CSR performance is positive and significant. We then test the flow of causality using Granger's (1969) lead–lag analysis to determine whether changes in earnings quality cause changes in CSR performance or vice versa. Our findings show that changes in earnings quality cause changes in a firm's CSR performance but not vice versa. Further analysis shows that earnings quality reduces the cost of equity capital for firms with higher CSR performance. These findings suggest that one plausible means by which firms with higher earnings quality can maintain better CSR performance is to reduce their cost of equity capital.     

Politically connected boards,family and business group affiliations,and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia

We investigate the effect of politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) on cost of debt and equity capital of listed companies in Indonesia which has established a two-tier corporate governance system. The results, based on 250 firms, suggest that companies with politically connected SBs experience lower cost of debt and equity capital, whereas politically connected BODs have no association with cost of either debt or equity. Furthermore, we find that family firms and firms belonging to business groups with politically connected SBs enjoy lower cost of debt and equity capital. Our main results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

Institutional Investment Horizons and the Cost of Equity Capital

We examine the influence of institutional investors’ investment horizons on a firm's cost of equity. We argue that the cost of equity will decrease in the presence of institutional investors with longer‐term investment horizons due to improved monitoring and information quality. Our empirical results demonstrate that the cost of equity declines in the presence of institutional investors with long‐term investment horizons, all else remaining equal. Our results indicate also that the monitoring role of long‐term institutional investors is more pronounced for firms with higher agency problems (poorly governed firms). Overall, our evidence suggests that when considering the influence of institutional investors, it is critical to account for institutional heterogeneity, which leads to new directions for future research.     

Short-selling and cost of equity: evidence from China

In this study, we take advantage of the gradual lifting of the short-selling ban in China and find that firms affected by the lifting of the ban experience a lower cost of equity. In addition, the affected firms also incur less earnings management, higher market liquidity and higher investment efficiency. Further evidence shows that firms’ cost of equity increases after their stocks are no longer eligible for short selling. Our inferences are robust to alternative measures of cost of equity, and to using a propensity score-matched sample. Our study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that short sellers play a monitoring role in the Chinese stock markets and sheds light on the benefits of short selling in emerging markets.