The value of Big 4 audits in Australia

Research suggests that equity markets value Big N audits over non‐Big N audits. Explanations include the information quality hypothesis, whereby Big N auditors increase information quality, and the insurance hypothesis, whereby investors value the deeper pockets of Big N auditors. Using client firms’ex ante cost of capital as the dependent variable, we investigate whether capital market participants differentially value Big 4 versus non‐Big 4 audits in Australia and whether the value of Big 4 audits in Australia changed as a result of the audit failures of 2001–2002. We find that Big 4 audits reduce the ex ante cost of equity capital until 2001, but not after 2001. We cannot dismiss the insurance hypothesis for the persistence of the loss beyond 2003 because of the establishment of liability caps, but the demise of the Big 4 audit value for 2001–2003 is consistent with the information quality hypothesis and does not support the insurance hypothesis.     

Discussion of “Evidence of differing market responses to beating analysts’ targets through tax expense decreases”

Gleason and Mills (2008, Review of Accounting Studies) extend prior research investigating whether investors detect obvious earnings management. They improve on previous efforts to answer this question by examining firms with a clear motivation to manage earnings and by investigating a specific earnings management tool. They investigate firms that fall short of analysts’ expectations when income tax expense is based on the third quarter effective tax rate but meet expectations by reducing the fourth quarter tax expense below predicted tax expense. Their results suggest that investors are sophisticated enough to identify a transparent earnings management tool and that they discount the fact that firms meet expectations using such an obvious tactic. Specifically, the authors find evidence suggesting that the reward for meeting analysts’ expectations is 86% lower when managers use the tax expense as an earnings management tool to meet expectations. The puzzling feature of their results is that, although it is diminished, investors still reward firms for meeting expectations when they can only do so through an apparently obvious manipulation of tax expense.     

Valuation implications of socially responsible tax avoidance: Evidence from the electricity industry

Prior literature suggests that firms may bear reputational costs associated with corporate tax avoidance, which could in turn reduce the net present value of firms’ tax planning strategies. However, these studies do not consider the fact that firms may have opportunities to avoid tax in socially responsible ways. We investigate the equity valuation implications of one form of socially responsible tax avoidance: claiming the renewable electricity production tax credit (PTC). We predict and find that investors more positively value tax savings generated from PTCs compared to other forms of corporate tax avoidance, consistent with the notion that socially responsible tax avoidance should not subject firms to reputational costs. Additionally, consistent with the role that CSR can play in enhancing a firm’s reputational capital, we find evidence of a spillover effect in which investors more positively value other sources of tax avoidance to the extent the firm also reduces its taxes in a socially responsible way. Our results demonstrate the importance for managers to consider socially responsible tax avoidance as a component of a firm’s tax planning portfolio and for policymakers to recognize the appeal of socially responsible tax strategies as the reputational consequences of tax avoidance become more prominent.     

Compliance with goodwill-related mandatory disclosure requirements and the cost of equity capital

Theory suggests that increased levels of corporate disclosure lead to a decrease in cost of equity via the reduction of estimation risk. We examine compliance levels with International Financial Reporting Standard 3 Business Combinations and International Accounting Standard 36 Impairments of Assets mandated goodwill-related disclosure and their association with firms’ implied cost of equity capital (ICC). Using a sample of European firms for the period 2008–2011, we find a median compliance level of about 83% and significant differences in compliance levels across firms and time. Non-compliance relates mostly to proprietary information and information that reveals managers’ judgement and expectations. Overall, we find a statistically significant negative relationship between the ICC and compliance with mandated goodwill-related disclosure. Further, we split the sample between firms meeting (or not) market expectations about the recognition of a goodwill impairment loss in a given year to study whether variation in compliance levels mainly plays a confirmatory or a mediatory role. We find the latter: higher compliance levels matter only for the sub-sample of firms that do not meet market expectations regarding goodwill impairment. Finally, our results hold only in countries where enforcement is strong.     

Social disclosure, financial disclosure and the cost of equity capital

We test the relation between financial and social disclosure and the cost of equity capital for a sample of Canadian firms with year-ends in 1990, 1991 and 1992. We find that, consistent with prior research, the quantity and quality of financial disclosure is negatively related to the cost of equity capital for firms with low analyst following. Contrary to expectations, there is a significant positive relation between social disclosures and the cost of equity capital. This positive relationship is mitigated among firms with better financial performance. We consider some biases in social disclosures that may explain this result. We also note that social disclosures may benefit the firm through its effect on organizational stakeholders other than equity investors.     

A note on foreigners’ trading and price effects across firms

We study the investment behavior of foreign investors in association with an equity market liberalization, and find a strong link between foreigners’ trading and local market returns. In the period following the liberalization, net purchases by foreign investors induced a permanent increase in stock prices, suggesting that local firms reduced their cost of equity capital. We also find a strong link between a firm’s fraction of foreign ownership and the magnitude of the cost reduction. Foreign investors seem to prefer large and well-known firms, and these firms realize the largest reduction in capital cost. Furthermore, our analysis suggests that foreigners increase their net holding in firms that have recently performed well. Analyzing foreigners’ performance, we find very little evidence of informed trading, suggesting that risk sharing is the most plausible explanation for the reduction of the cost of equity capital.     

Capital gains tax,supply‐driven trading and ownership structure: direct evidence of the lock‐in effect

This study investigates the effect of differential capital gains tax rates on investor trading and share prices in a unique market setting that facilitates the resolution of conflicting prior evidence of holding period tax incentives. In particular, we examine whether the concessionary tax treatment of long‐term capital gains increases the supply of shares that qualify for long‐term status, thereby causing downward price pressure. We find evidence of abnormal seller‐initiated trading following the 12‐month anniversary of listing for IPO firms that appreciate in price (‘winners’) and report no such evidence for firms that decline in price (‘losers’). Consistent with the tax concessions being greater for individual than institutional investors, we report that abnormal seller‐initiated trading is mitigated by higher levels of ownership by institutional investors. We also report limited evidence, for winners, of declining share prices upon qualifying for long‐term tax status.     

Accounting information,disclosure, and expected utility: Do investors really abhor uncertainty?

Investors are said to “abhor uncertainty,” but if there were no uncertainty they could earn only the risk‐free rate. A fundamental result in the analytical accounting literature shows that investors buying into a CARA‐normal CAPM market pay lower asset prices, gain higher ex‐ante expected returns, and obtain higher expected utility, when the market payoff has higher variance. New investors obtain similar “welfare” gains from risk under a log/power utility CAPM. These results do not imply that investors “abhor information.” To realize investors' ex‐ante expectations, the subjective probability distributions representing market expectations must be accurate. Greater payoff risk can add to investors' expected utility, but higher ex‐post(realized) utility comes from better information and more accurate ex‐ante expectations. An important implication for accounting is that greater disclosure can have the simultaneous effects of (i) exposing more fully or perceptibly firms' payoff uncertainty, thereby increasing new investors' expected utility, and (ii) improving market estimates of firms' payoff parameters (means, variances, covariances), thereby giving investors a better chance of realizing their expectations. Paradoxically, better information can be valuable to new investors by exposing more fully and more accurately the risk in firms' business operations and results–new investors maximizing expected utility want both more risk and better information.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

Corporate site visit and tax avoidance: The effects of monitoring and tax knowledge dissemination

This study examines how institutional investors' corporate site visits affect tax avoidance. Using quantile regressions, we find that corporate site visits decrease tax avoidance for firms at high levels of tax avoidance and increase tax avoidance for firms at low levels. The effect of corporate site visits on tax avoidance is stronger for firms subject to a weaker information environment, which suggests that institutional investors acquire additional firm-specific information via corporate site visits and play a more effective monitoring role. We also find that visitors who visited low-tax firms in prior years share tax-planning knowledge with high-tax firms which they visit in the current year. The effect of tax knowledge transfer is more pronounced when the visitors are from incumbent institutional shareholders. This study identifies corporate site visits as a channel via which institutional investors serve as monitors to managers and as facilitators of tax knowledge transfer.     

Controlling Shareholders’ Incentive and Corporate Tax Avoidance: A Natural Experiment in China

The split share structure reform removes a significant market friction in China's capital market by allowing previously non‐tradable shares to be freely tradable at market prices. Such a reform reduces the agency conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders as the former now care more about stock prices. We find that state‐owned firms, but not non‐state‐owned firms, significantly increased their tax avoidance activities after the reform. We attribute this differential effect to the dual role of the government as state‐owned firms’ controlling shareholder as well as the tax claimant. Further, this effect is more pronounced for state‐owned firms that are more likely to be influenced by the government prior to the reform. Finally, the reform reinforces a positive association between tax avoidance and firm value. Overall, our study suggests that when controlling shareholders are more concerned about stock prices, state‐owned firms engage more in tax avoidance activities to enhance firm value.     

Motives for and Effects of Asset Revaluation: An Examination of South Korean Data

Examining a sample of South Korean firms, of which 201 revalued assets and 899 did not during the period 2008–2009, we find that the average debt cost, equity cost, and weighted average cost of capital (WACC) are higher among the firms that revalued. Firms with higher equity costs and leverage are more likely to revalue and the propensity has a negative relationship with profitability, cash flow, and Tobin’s q. Firms that engage in revaluation experience reductions in all capital costs from year ?1 to +1, comparable to those among firms that did not revalue. Our results support both the information hypothesis and the debt-cost hypothesis.     

Incentives for corporate tax planning and reporting: Empirical evidence from Australia

This study extends prior research on the willingness of firms to significantly decrease their corporate taxes. It specifically examines the associations between corporate tax avoidance and the reported significant uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise and tax affiliations of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel. Based on a dataset of 200 publicly listed Australian firms over the 2006–2010 period (1000 firm years), we find that the reported uncertainty of a firm’s tax position, the tax expertise of its directors, and the performance-based remuneration incentives of its key management personnel are significantly positively associated with tax avoidance. Conversely, firms with board members who have at least one tax-related affiliation are significantly negatively associated with tax avoidance.     

Does international experience of managers bring financing benefits? Evidence from the cost of equity capital

Using a sample of Chinese firms, this study examines whether and how managers’ overseas experience affects a firm’s cost of equity capital. We document a negative association between managers’ overseas experience and the cost of equity capital. Mechanism analyses indicate that companies with returnee managers have better information quality and lower systematic risk; more institutional investors, media reports, and analysts following; and higher stock liquidity, all of which lead to a lower cost of equity capital. Further analyses show that chief executive officers (CEOs) with foreign experience have a more significant impact on the cost of capital than non-CEO managers with foreign experience and that managers’ overseas work experience has a more significant impact on the cost of capital than their overseas education. We also find that the impact of managers’ overseas experience is more pronounced when that experience is gained in common law countries compared to code law countries but weaker for state-owned enterprises and firms that are cross-listed or have foreign institutional investors. Overall, the results suggest that managers’ knowledge, skills, and ethical values imprinted from overseas experience, plus eyeball effects from media and analyst attention, can reduce the cost of equity capital.     

Understanding Investor Sentiment: The Case of Soccer

We examine the extent to which the stock market's inefficient responses to resolutions of uncertainty depend on investors’ biased ex ante beliefs regarding the probability distribution of future event outcomes or their ex post irrational reactions to these outcomes. We use a sample of publicly traded European soccer clubs and analyze their returns around important matches. Using a novel proxy for investors’ expectations based on contracts traded on betting exchanges (prediction markets), we find that within our sample, investor sentiment is attributable, in part, to a systematic bias in investors’ ex ante expectations. Investors are overly optimistic about their teams’ prospects ex ante and, on average, end up disappointed ex post, leading to negative postgame abnormal returns. Our evidence may have important implications for firms’ investment decisions and corporate control transactions.     

My global fund portfolio is not yours: the effect of home bias on European- and US-managed convertible bond fund exposures

This paper shows that global convertible bond funds (CBFs) and their resulting equity-bond exposures are regionally biased. Global bond fund managers display home bias, resulting in CBFs that are not only tilted towards the home market but also reflect the different bond-equity exposures of European and US convertibles. More specifically we find that global funds managed by a European asset management firm are more bond-like than global funds managed by a US-based asset manager. Hence, investors have to account for the asset management company's origin to avoid that the performance of the fund and its correlation with other assets is not in line with investor's ex ante expectations about globally managed portfolios. Our results also indicate that for investors of European-based CBFs this home bias has resulted in an ex post opportunity cost up to 1.38% per year, depending on the sample period.     

Institutional ownership and credit spreads: An information asymmetry perspective

Recent literature has documented a link between institutional equity ownership (IO) and cost of debt capital, and interpreted it as a corporate governance effect. However, institutional equity investors may also affect cost of debt through their influence on information asymmetry condition of firms. To distinguish between the two effects, we break down institutional investors into different groups: transient institutional investors (TRA who are sensitive to information asymmetry but unlikely to participate in corporate governance, and the dedicated ones (DED) who act oppositely. Based on a most up-to-date and comprehensive bond data spanning the past 20 years, we find that credit spreads narrow (widen) with an increase in equity ownership by TRA (DED). The effects are most prominent among short-term bonds, bonds with lower ratings, higher leverage and higher volatilities. The results persist after controlling for potential endogeneity and other information asymmetry measures, and are unlikely due to an asset substitution effect. Overall, our findings provide strong support for the effect of information asymmetry on credit spread, and highlight the importance of distinguishing various types of institutional investors.     

Anti-Mafia Police Actions,Criminal Firms,and Peer Firm Tax Avoidance

Mafia firms introduce distortions in the markets in which they operate, increasing the cost of doing business for peer firms. We investigate whether peers respond by increasing their tax avoidance and thus increasing funds available to compete with the Mafia firms. Using a sample of Italian anti-Mafia police actions that resulted in the removal of Mafia firms and a difference-in-differences approach, we find that peers reduce their tax avoidance following these actions. We further show that, following anti-Mafia police actions, peer firms improve their performance and increase capital investment while enjoying a reduction in the cost of raw materials. Overall, our results highlight the microlevel channels through which Mafia can affect firm outcomes and local economies.     

Asymmetric information consolidation and price discovery: Inferring bad news from insider sales

Due to the paucity of sources of negative firm‐specific information, US capital markets have more difficulty identifying and incorporating bad news into stock prices than they do good news. Even though insider selling is a potentially important proxy for undisclosed bad news, researchers have difficulty ex ante identifying information‐based sales due to an inability to separate liquidity‐motivated from information‐based insider trades. We hypothesize that when insiders in multiple firms sell shares of one firm in which they are insiders and at the same time buy shares of other insider portfolio firms, the sale is more likely to be information‐based, since the proceeds are reinvested. Conversely, when an insider sells one firm without purchasing others or sells multiple insider firms the sale is likely liquidity‐motivated. We find that insider sales identified as information‐based using this algorithm are followed by significant negative abnormal returns. Information‐based sales are also more likely to be associated with delistings, earnings declines and earnings restatements. Analysts are also more likely to revise their earnings forecasts downwards for these firms. It is thus possible to ex ante identify insider sales with information content. Our results will be of interest to investors and also to regulators designing insider trading rules.     

Political connections and the cost of equity capital

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms.