我国农地金融制度建设的经验教训与启示

我国的农地金融制度建设从1988年贵州湄潭县的农地金融制度试验开始,发展到目前遍地开花的农地使用权抵押贷款,经历了一个逐步成熟的发展过程。本文挑选浙江嘉兴的土地流转经营权抵押贷款和丽水的林权抵押贷款作为案例,将它与贵州湄潭农地金融制度的试验进行对比分析,试图为我国农地金融制度的构建提供有价值的参考。     

农地抵押贷款供需“双冷”的经济学分析

近年来,我国开展农地抵押贷款试点的区域越来越广,而农地抵押贷款的规模却没有明显增长,资金供需双方对农地抵押贷款的推行并不积极.本文深入探究了导致这一现象的原因,认为农地使用权作为抵押物的价值偏低,导致金融机构信贷供给的意愿不足;金融机构给予农地抵押贷款授信额过低,导致农户对农地抵押贷款的融资需求不足;同时,政府在农地抵押贷款的开展过程中也存在职能错位的现象,过多地干预了农地抵押行为,也是导致农地抵押贷款供需“双冷”的一个重要原因.     

农地经营权抵押贷款推广的制度框架探讨——基于武汉市涉农中小企业的调查

涉农中小企业融资困境约束了其发展,武汉农交所和武汉农商行联合推出的农地经营权抵押贷款为涉农企业融资带来了便利。调查发现,随着农地经营权抵押贷款试点的推进,农地经营权抵押权人从单一走向多元,抵押价值评估严格遵循开放式的土地经营权评估机制,抵押贷款多为短、中期,同时在利率及自有资金比例方面有相关的限制规定。要推广农地经营权抵押贷款这一新型金融产品,需要进一步完善配套的制度框架并细化成可操作的措施。建议要调整农地产权关系,实现农地经营权抵押贷款的合理化;完善法律法规,实现农地经营权抵押贷款的合法化;以配套政策措施和风险防范措施实现农地经营权抵押贷款的规范化。     

使用权抵押贷款融资模式的研究——以洪大典当行的店面使用权抵押贷款为例

尽管当前我国中小企业具有巨大的融资需求，然而由于信息的不对称、不完全性以及缺乏可抵押资产，银行谨慎甚至不愿对中小企业放贷。典当行利用自己低成本搜集客户企业信息的优势，开发出商铺使用权抵押贷款业务来满足客户的融资需求。使用权抵押贷款（而不是传统的所有产权抵押）在我国当前金融环境下构成了对商业银行信贷的有益补充。本文依据变现难易程度对使用权抵押贷款进行分类，给出了一个简单的使用权抵押贷款利率定价公式，并分析了贷款风险及其控制，最后还探讨了使用权抵押贷款推广问题。     

湖南农地金融信贷政策创新研究

党的十八大以来,以"两权"抵押贷款为重点的农地金融改革力度进一步加大。湖南省作为农业大省,在"两权"抵押贷款方面做了很多有益的探索。本文从湖南农地金融发展的实践出发,重点分析总结了2016年湖南11个县(市)纳入全国"两权"抵押贷款试点以来取得的实践经验,掌握推进"两权"抵押贷款工作中存在的问题和不足,在此基础上有针对性地提出政策建议。     

农村承包土地的经营权抵押贷款审计调查探索与实践

脱贫攻坚中如何借助多种金融手段提升金融助力乡村振兴,对赋深化和推动农村金融改革创新发展具有重要意义,呼和浩特中心支行组织开展农村承包土地(草牧场)的经营权抵押(简称农地抵押)贷款审计调查,对内蒙古自治区部分试点地区人民银行、地方政府及金融机构对农地抵押贷款政策贯彻落实情况深入审计调查,揭示了农地抵押重大政策贯彻落实存在的薄弱环节,提出了对策及建议。     

农户农地经营权抵押贷款行为对家庭福利的影响——基于辽宁省昌图县的调查

基于辽宁省昌图县972份农户的实地调查数据,对农户农地经营权抵押贷款行为对家庭福利的影响进行了分析。结果表明,目前农地抵押贷款供给不足,只有农村信用社为样本农户提供贷款;农户抵押的土地面积差异明显;农地抵押贷款金额随着抵押土地的面积增加呈现递增趋势,与传统金融产品相比,农地抵押贷款金额相对较高;贷款期限以中短期为主;贷款主要用于农业生产经营。进一步运用福利模型研究发现,农地抵押贷款对农户家庭年收入、农业收入、家庭年支出、生产经营支出和生活消费支出均具有显著正影响。     

农地抵押贷款的试点经验、实践障碍与对策建议——以甘肃西和县为例

文章以甘肃西和县为例介绍了农村承包土地经营权抵押贷款工作在西部欠发达县域的试点情况,总结了试点工作的成效与经验,分析了农地抵押贷款在实践中存在抵押物评估难、处置难、配套措施不完善、保障机制不健全等制度障碍,提出了进一步推广农地抵押贷款的对策建议.     

论我国农村土地金融制度建设

建立以土地抵押为特征的农村土地金融制度,对优化配置和合理利用农地资源,促进农业发展具有重要的现实意义。文章论述了农村土地金融制度建设应遵循的原则,提出了由农业发展银行“农地使用权抵押贷款部”和农村信用合作社“农地使用权抵押贷款办理处”组成的农村土地金融制度组织体系及运作设想。     

农村土地金融制度创新及政策建议

为完善农村金融服务组织体系,解决农民中长期贷款难问题和促进社会主义新农村建设,迫切需要进行以农村土地使用权抵押为核心的农地金融制度创新.为此,本文尝试提出我国农村土地金融制度设计,并提出相应的配套改革措施和政策建议.     

The emergence of information sharing in credit markets

We provide the first systematic empirical analysis of how asymmetric information and competition in the credit market affect voluntary information sharing between lenders. We study an experimental credit market in which information sharing can help lenders to distinguish good borrowers from bad ones. Lenders may, however, also lose market power by sharing information with competitors. Our results suggest that asymmetric information in the credit market increases the frequency of information sharing between lenders significantly. Stronger competition between lenders reduces information sharing. In credit markets where lenders may fail to coordinate on sharing information, the degree of information asymmetry, rather than lender competition, drives actual information sharing behavior.     

The Role of Soft Information in a Dynamic Contract Setting: Evidence from the Home Equity Credit Market

Credit underwriting is a dynamic process involving multiple interactions between borrower and lender. During this process, lenders have the opportunity to obtain hard and soft information from the borrower. We analyze more than 108,000 home equity loans and lines‐of‐credit applications to study the role of soft and hard information during underwriting. Our data set allows us to distinguish lender actions that are based strictly on hard information from decisions that involve the collection of soft information. Our analysis confirms the importance of soft information and suggests that its use can be effective in reducing overall portfolio credit losses ex post.     

Credit evaluation,information production,and financial intermediation

Financial intermediaries such as banks, saving and loan institutions, and insurance companies play a large and important role in highly developed economies. The economic significance of financial intermediaries results from their making arrangements between borrowers and lenders more efficiently than if these agents had to trade directly. The intent of this article is to provide a better understanding of the advantage that a financial institution has over an individual lender. This research treats intermediaries as producers of information in the credit evaluation process. The lender produces borrower information that revises the expected profit of the credit decision. Though the production of credit itself holds no economic advantage for institutions over individuals. The opportunity to produce information will provide economies of scale in lending and will help to explain the existence of financial intermediaries.     

Credit Default Swaps and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure

We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders.     

Tests of ex ante versus ex post theories of collateral using private and public information

Collateral is a widely used, but not well understood, debt contracting feature. Two broad strands of theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders. However, the extant empirical literature has been unable to isolate each of these effects. This paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in that it allows the researcher to have access to some private information about borrower risk that is unobserved by the lender. The data also include public information about borrower risk, loan contract terms, and ex post performance for both secured and unsecured loans. The results suggest that the ex post theories of collateral are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with short borrower–lender relations that are relatively unknown to the lender.     

授信风险视角下乡镇企业融资困境及其法律对策

对乡镇企业融资难的问题,可以结合我国现有法律有关规定,通过在合同中约定乡镇企业具体的资金用途、约定贷款人在危机时刻摆脱合同的终止权、引入授权额度框架协议、完善农村土地抵押流转的制度规范以及通过立法和政策的共同努力构建乡村系统信用等方式,有针对性地提高乡镇企业的融资能力,促进乡村经济更好、更快地发展.     

Informational Frictions and the Credit Crunch

In this paper, I estimate the magnitude of an informational friction limiting credit reallocation to firms during the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis. Because lenders rely on private information when deciding which relationship to end, borrowers looking for a new lender are adversely selected. I show how to separately identify private information from information common to all lenders but unobservable to the econometrician by using bank shocks within a discrete choice model of relationships. Quantitatively, these informational frictions appear to be too small to explain the credit crunch in the U.S. syndicated corporate loan market.     

农业供应链金融风险的主要特征与风险防范的基本原则

我国农业供应链突出表现为“集体化”、“现代化”和“生态化”,资金的安全性、流动性和信用程度都需要整体协同管控。交易成本和信息不对称决定了我国农业供应链以间接融资为主,其金融风险的特征主要表现为道德风险突出、整体风险难识别、可能引致区域系统性风险和行业系统性风险。因此,应当因地制宜确定农业供应链金融支持项目,并运用系统论原理控制农业供应链金融风险。     

Mortgage Contracts,Strategic Options and Stochastic Collateral

This paper offers a game-theoretic model for both the analysis and valuation of mortgage contracts in the context of an economy with complete information and complete contingent claims markets. We analyze the equilibrium strategy of the lender, who holds an option over the magnitude of mortgage credit extended per dollar of collateral offered, and the mortgagor, who holds options to default or prepay, in a class of intertemporal mortgage contracts collateralized by property evolving according to a random process which is common knowledge to both parties to the mortgage contract. Using continuous–time arbitrage valuation principles, we derive the value of the mortgage contract to both parties and show, through both analytical solutions and numerical simulations, that Markov perfect equilibria exist in which, among other properties, a lower flow of housing services accruing to the borrower, per dollar of initial house value, and a correspondingly lower rate of effective depreciation, will elicit a larger volume of funds offered by a lender; the amount of credit offered, the values of the contract to both lender and mortgagor, and the expected losses to both parties from costly bankruptcy are highly sensitive to the perceived volatility of the value of the property collateralizing the mortgage, even in an economy with complete markets or risk neutrality on the parts of lender and borrower; the upper limit on mortgage credit offered by a rational lender may be a small fraction of the current fair market value of the property, regardless of the contractual yield offered by the borrower, and will decrease, at each such yield, as bankruptcy costs or housing service flows increase; and under significant but plausible values for bankruptcy and costs of liquidating property under foreclosure, the flow of mortgage credit can become negatively related to the spread of the mortgage yield over the riskless rate, with the lender preferring a lower contractual yield to a higher one.     

转入土地、农户农业信贷需求与信贷约束——基于中国家庭金融调查(CHFS)数据的分析

农村土地流转是放活经营权、促进农村土地资源优化配置的重要一环。在土地流转和规模经营中,农户面临的融资问题至关重要。基于中国家庭金融调查2015年和2017年的微观数据,本文从转入土地的视角对农户融资问题进行了研究。结果表明,我国农户的农业信贷约束较为严重、信贷缺口较大。同时,转入土地这一行为对农户信贷造成了较大的影响,主要表现为:(1)转入土地这一行为显著增加了农户的农业信贷需求,但对非农信贷需求没有显著影响;(2)虽然相比未转入土地农户,转入土地的农户参与农业信贷的比例较高,但其面临的信贷约束更加严重;(3)转入土地农户的信贷金额满足度较低,信贷金额缺口也较大。进一步从土地规模来看,转入土地规模较大的农户其信贷需求更大,信贷约束与金额不满足度表现得更为明显。本文研究表明,土地流转过程中转入土地这一行为会导致农户面临更大的信贷约束问题,应持续加大对转入土地农户的金融支持力度,全面推进乡村振兴,加快农村现代化发展。