两阶段闭环供应链制造商直销渠道入侵策略研究

运用博弈方法构建由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两阶段供应链模型,研究有无再制造情形下制造商直销渠道的入侵策略和入侵时机问题。结果表明：无再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时,制造商不会开通直销渠道,否则会选择在第一阶段开通直销渠道;再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时制造商同样不会开通直销渠道,但竞争较弱且零售渠道占比较大时会选择在第二阶段开通直销渠道,否则其会在第一阶段开通直销渠道;无论是否进行再制造,制造商的渠道入侵都可能会损害零售商的利润,但是在竞争较强且零售渠道占比较大时渠道入侵却能使制造商和零售商均获益,且再制造情形下实现共赢的可能性更大。     

Resale price maintenance and collusion

The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it.     

Motomobile Motors: A live case project

Break-even analysis and the related variable-costing-based approach to forecasting are used by most automobile manufacturers for decisions involving the establishment (or deferral) of additional retail dealerships. These additional retail dealerships may be proposed in market surveys, conducted every three to five years, which include socioeconomic/demographic data and other non-financial information. The following case study uses tabular summaries of some actual data developed by a manufacturer to assist in the decision to seek a dealer to build and operate an additional retail outlet. It illustrates some of the actual information and decision processes used in support of (or opposition to) the manufacturer's recommendation to build and operate an additional retail outlet. By considering both financial analysis and non-financial analysis, students expand their understanding of break-even analysis to a real-world setting and may consider if non-financial information could change their recommendation.     

Upfront payments and exclusion in downstream markets

Although upfront payments are often observed in contracts between manufacturers and retailers, little is known about their competitive effects or the role retailers play in securing them. In this article, we consider a model in which two competing retailers make take‐it‐or‐leave‐it offers to a common manufacturer. We find that upfront payments are a feature of equilibrium contracts, and in all equilibria, only one retailer buys from the manufacturer. These findings support the claims of small manufacturers who argue that they are often unable to obtain widespread distribution for their products because of upfront payments.     

Customer account relationships and e-retail banking usage<Superscript>1</Superscript>

Financial institutions are actively developing new electronic banking products for their retail customers. To date, the market leaders have drawn a disproportionably higher share of e-retail banking customers. In response, smaller institutions have become quite active in exploring ways to participate profitably in online banking. A major influence is from a customer relationship management (CRM) perspective, where institutions try to limit the outflow of current customers and direct high-value customers to potential products from a multi-product service offering array. These efforts can succeed only if retail bank marketers focus the promotion of the new products and services that can utilise this channel toward those customers who are most likely to find them attractive. The first aim of this study was to examine the role that online and electronic banking play in defining the customer's primary financial relationship. The analysis of 701 retail customers of a financial institution presented in this study suggests that banks and other institutions are highly vulnerable to loss of customers to rivals with extensive online services. A second aim was to examine to what extent information on banking relationships is able to extend CRM analysis beyond that offered by typical demographic and income data. Current customer account relationships are found to be highly predictive of use of electronic services use in general. And, interest in the use of specific online services is related to differing customer relationships in addition to ordinary demographic and balance information. These findings can be useful for retail banking in identifying potential high-value users from a customer relationship management perspective.     

Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance

We present a model of vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers with nonlinear pricing strategies. Using home‐scan data on bottled water produced by manufacturers and sold by retail chains in France, we estimate a structural demand and supply model allowing for two‐part tariff contracts between manufacturers and retailers. Using price‐cost margins recovered from estimates of demand parameters, we select the best supply model by performing nonnested tests, and find that manufacturers use two‐part tariff contracts with resale price maintenance. We then perform counterfactual policy simulations that restrict the use of these vertical contracts and assess welfare effects under alternative scenarios.     

Controlling opportunism in vertical contracting when production precedes sales

In a make‐to‐stock vertical contracting setting with private contracts, when retailers do not observe each other's stocks before choosing their prices, an opportunism problem always exist in contract equilibria but public market‐wide Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) can restore monopoly power. However other widely used tools which do not fall under antitrust scrutiny and require only private bilateral contracts, such as buyback contracts, also allow the producer to fully exercise his monopoly power. We conclude that a more lenient policy toward RPM is unlikely to affect the producer's ability to control opportunism.     

Vertical restraints and horizontal control

This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the firm to acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts produce symptoms that are consistent with a variety of observed retail practices, including slotting fees paid to retailers by competitive suppliers, loss leadership, and predatory accommodation with below‐cost manufacturer pricing for the dominant brand(s). Applications are developed for supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand seeks to control the retail pricing of a supermarket's private label, and for convenience stores, where a gasoline provider seeks to control the retail pricing of an in‐store composite consumption good.     

Information Asymmetry and Dual Distribution in Franchise Networks

We examine whether a dual distribution system that uses both franchisor‐operated and franchisee‐operated outlets reduces a franchisor's information disadvantage when contracting with franchisee retailers. Using detailed qualitative and quantitative managerial data, we find persuasive evidence of the strategic use of performance information obtained from franchisor‐operated outlets to reduce information asymmetry and enhance contracting efficiency for franchisee‐operated outlets. We test whether the proximity of franchisor‐operated retail outlets to franchisee‐operated retail outlets reduces underpricing of quasi‐franchise contracts. Our results accord with the proposition that information asymmetry reduces contracting efficiency and are consistent with our prediction that a manufacturer can reduce intrinsic information asymmetry by maintaining franchisor‐operated outlets that are geographically proximate to the franchisee‐operated outlets, and that this improves the franchisor's pricing of franchising contracts. We conclude that dual distribution reduces the franchisor's information asymmetry and increases their contract pricing efficiency.     

How Do Anticipated Changes to Short‐Term Market Rates Influence Banks' Retail Interest Rates? Evidence from the Four Major Euro Area Economies

In this paper, we argue that banks anticipate short‐term market rates when setting interest rates on loans and deposits. In order to include anticipated rates in an empirical model, we use two methods to forecast market rates—a level, slope, curvature model, and a principal components model—before including them in a model of retail rate adjustment for four retail rates in four major euro area economies. Using both aggregate data and data from individual French banks, we find a significant role for forecasts of market rates in determining retail rates; alternative specifications with futures information yield comparable results.     

Patent pools,vertical integration,and downstream competition

Patent pools are commonly used to license technologies to manufacturers. Whereas previous studies focused on manufacturers active in independent markets, we analyze pools licensing to competing manufacturers, allowing for multiple licensors and nonlinear tariffs. We find that the impact of pools on welfare depends on the industry structure: whereas they are procompetitive when no manufacturer is integrated with a licensor, the presence of vertically integrated manufacturers triggers a novel trade‐off between horizontal and vertical price coordination. Specifically, pools are anticompetitive if the share of integrated firms is large, procompetitive otherwise. We then formulate information‐free policies to screen anticompetitive pools.     

Reliability and competitive electricity markets

We derive the optimal prices and investment program for an electric power system when there are price‐insensitive retail consumers served by load serving entities that can choose any level of rationing contingent on real‐time prices. We then examine the assumptions required for competitive electricity markets to achieve this optimal price and investment program and the implications of relaxing several of these assumptions. We analyze the interrelationships between regulator‐imposed wholesale market price caps and generating capacity obligations. The implications of potential network collapses for operating reserve requirements and whether market prices yield generation investments consistent with these reserve requirements are examined.     

Presidential Address: Issuers, Underwriter Syndicates, and Aftermarket Transparency

I model strategic interaction among issuers, underwriters, retail investors, and institutional investors when the secondary market has limited price transparency. Search costs for retail investors lead to price dispersion in the secondary market, while the price for institutional investors is infinitely elastic. Because retail distribution capacity is assumed to be limited for each underwriter‐dealer, Bertrand competition breaks down in the primary market and new issues are underpriced in equilibrium. Syndicates emerge in which underwriters bid symmetrically, with quantities allocated internally to efficiently utilize retail distribution capacity.     

Spatial competition in retail markets: movie theaters

Retail markets are extremely important, but economists have few practical tools for analyzing the way dispersed buyers and sellers affect the properties of markets. I develop an econometric model of retail demand in which products are location specific and consumers have preferences over both geographic proximity and other store and product characteristics. The model uses data on the observed geographic distribution of consumers within a market to (1) help explain observed variation in market shares and (2) affect predicted substitution patterns between stores. Using data from the U.S. cinema industry, I use the estimated model to evaluate the form of consumer transport costs, the effect of a theater's price and quality choices on rivals, the effects of geographic differentiation, and the nature and extent of market power.     

Selling banks is the same as selling soap: Applying fast-moving consumer goods best marketing practices to the banking industry in Central and Eastern Europe

Attempts to market financial services as fast-moving consumer goods products are rather rare in the traditional banking industry. eBanka, a small retail and SME bank in the Czech Republic, applied the FMCG marketing approach with great success. Long-time FMCG marketer, Petr Pistelak, explains the basic principles of FMCG marketing and shows how they were applied to triple the revenue of a small bank in less than three years, while bringing the once struggling bank into profitability.     

Returns to Retail Banking and Payments

The present paper examines the fundamental relationship between the country-level infrastructure of the retail payment market and overall bank performance. Using data from across 27 European markets over the period 2000–07, the results confirm that the performance of banks in countries with more developed retail payment service markets is better. This relationship is stronger in countries with a relatively high adoption of retail payment transaction technologies. Retail payment transaction technology itself can also improve bank performance, and evidence shows that heterogeneity in retail payment instruments is associated with enhanced bank performance. Similarly, higher usage of electronic retail payment instruments seems to stimulate banking business. We also show that retail payment services have a more significant impact on savings and cooperative bank performance, although they have a positive influence on the performance of commercial banks as well. Additionally, the findings reveal that the impact of retail services on bank performance is more pronounced through fee income, although their impact through interest income is also positive. Finally, an effective payment service market is found to be associated with higher bank stability. Our findings are robust to different regression specifications.     

Investor Sentiment and Pre-IPO Markets

We examine whether irrational behavior among small (retail) investors drives post‐IPO prices. We use prices from the grey market (the when‐issued market that precedes European IPOs) to proxy for small investors' valuations. High grey market prices (indicating overoptimism) are a very good predictor of first‐day aftermarket prices, while low grey market prices (indicating excessive pessimism) are not. Moreover, we find long‐run price reversal only following high grey market prices. This asymmetry occurs because larger (institutional) investors can choose between keeping the shares they are allocated in the IPO, and reselling them when small investors are overoptimistic.     

虚假广告的产生及其监控分析

虚假广告的产生来源于商家与消费者之间存在的信息不对称及信息搜寻存在成本,使得商家在发布虚假广告与信息时消费者往往不能正确地识别。虚假广告的存在导致市场中会出现柠檬市场的效应,使劣质产品占领了市场。基于博弈论的分析得到以下结论:政府对广告信息发布的监督概率与其对虚假广告与信息的发布者的惩罚因子具有替代性;如果制造商通过发布虚假信息所获取的利润越大,则政府越有必要提高其监督概率;政府的监督概率与发布虚假信息的成本成负相关的关系;如果制造商发布的虚假信息量越大,则政府越有必要提高其监督概率。     

Why the technology for low-cost saving products will make marketing the most important product differentiator: Lessons from the automotive industry

Low-cost saving products for consumers are widely seen as the future direction of the retail savings market. The question that must be asked, however, is whether this future is realistic given the technical and business issues that need to be overcome to deliver these products. If these issues can be overcome then it is necessary to wonder what the financial services industry will look like when selling lowcost products. This paper first looks at why low-cost products are a current area of focus for the retail savings industry and the forces that are driving this issue. It then provides an overview as to why there are significant process and technical obstacles to creating low-cost products, and how these could be overcome (as they have been in other industries) if cost reduction is to improve more than incrementally. It concludes with a discussion as to why, if these obstacles are overcome, marketing will be the discipline that will determine an organisation's success with these products. This paper will primarily consider the UK market as this is where the issue has the clearest focus.     

Assessing competition in the banking industry: A multi-product approach

This paper investigates the competitive aspects of multi-product banking operations. Extending Panzar and Rosse’s (1987) model to the case of a multi-product banking firm, we show that higher economies of scope in multi-product banking are associated with lower Panzar–Rosse measures of competition in the banking sector. To test this empirical implication and determine the impact of multi-production on market power, we use a new dataset on the Brazilian banking industry. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, we find that banks that offer classic banking products (i.e., loans and credit cards) and other banking products (i.e., brokerage services, insurance and capitalization bonds) have substantially higher market power than banks that offer only classic products. These results suggest a positive bias in the traditional estimates of competition in which multi-output actions are not considered.