两阶段闭环供应链制造商直销渠道入侵策略研究

运用博弈方法构建由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两阶段供应链模型,研究有无再制造情形下制造商直销渠道的入侵策略和入侵时机问题。结果表明：无再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时,制造商不会开通直销渠道,否则会选择在第一阶段开通直销渠道;再制造情形下,在渠道竞争较弱且入侵将平分市场时制造商同样不会开通直销渠道,但竞争较弱且零售渠道占比较大时会选择在第二阶段开通直销渠道,否则其会在第一阶段开通直销渠道;无论是否进行再制造,制造商的渠道入侵都可能会损害零售商的利润,但是在竞争较强且零售渠道占比较大时渠道入侵却能使制造商和零售商均获益,且再制造情形下实现共赢的可能性更大。     

Retailers' choice of product variety and exclusive dealing under asymmetric information

This article considers vertical relations between an upstream manufacturer and a downstream retailer that can independently obtain a low‐quality, discount substitute. The analysis reveals that under full information, the retailer offers both varieties if and only if it is optimal to do so under vertical integration. However, when the retailer is privately informed about demand, it offers both varieties even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer only the manufacturer's product. If the manufacturer can impose exclusive dealing, then under asymmetric information it will do so and foreclose the low‐quality substitute even if under vertical integration it is profitable to offer both varieties.     

Oligopolistic markets with sequential search and production cost uncertainty

This article analyzes a sequential search model where firms face identical but stochastic production costs, the realizations of which are unknown to consumers. We characterize a perfect Bayesian equilibrium satisfying a reservation price property and provide a sufficient condition for such an equilibrium to exist. We show that (i) firms set on average higher prices and make larger profits compared to the scenario where consumers observe production costs, (ii) expected prices and consumer welfare can be non‐monotonic in the number of firms, and (iii) the impact of production cost uncertainty vanishes as the number of firms becomes very large.     

Search,learning, and tracking

In many search markets, some consumers search to learn both the price and their willingness-to-pay whereas others search only to learn prices. When a seller can track indicators of the likelihood that consumers already know their willingness-to-pay, I show that price discrimination reduces profits and welfare relative to uniform pricing if search costs are small, but may increase both if search costs are large. The analysis also applies to sequential search if learning causes the likelihood that consumers know their willingness-to-pay to depend on the search history.     

Do switching costs make markets more or less competitive? The case of 800‐number portability

Do switching costs reduce or intensify price competition if firms charge the same price to existing and new consumers? I study 800‐number portability to determine how switching costs affect price competition under a single price regime. AT&T and MCI reduced their toll‐free services prices in response to portability, implying that reduced switching costs increased competition. Despite rapid market growth, gains from higher prices to “locked‐in” consumers exceeded the incentives to capture new consumers. Prices on larger contracts dropped more, consistent with greater lock‐in for larger users. Price changes between portability's announcement and implementation are consistent with rational expectations.     

Prices and heterogeneous search costs

We study price formation in a model of consumer search for differentiated products in which consumers have heterogeneous search costs. We provide conditions under which a pure‐strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium exists and is unique. Search costs affect two margins—the intensive search margin (or search intensity) and the extensive search margin (or the decision to search rather than to not search at all). These two margins affect the elasticity of demand in opposite directions and whether lower search costs result in higher or lower prices depends on the properties of the search cost density.     

Ordered search

I present an ordered‐search model that, in contrast with random‐search models, yields an intuitively appealing equilibrium in which there is price dispersion, prices and profits decline in the order of search and consumers with lower search costs search longer and obtain better deals. These features of the search equilibrium hold regardless of whether consumers are informed of prices prior to searching.     

Intertemporal substitution and new car purchases

This article presents a dynamic demand model for motor vehicles. This approach accounts for the change in the mix of consumers over the model year and measures consumers' substitution patterns across products and time. I find intertemporal substitution is significant; consumers are more likely to change the timing of their purchase in reaction to a price increase rather than buy another vehicle in the same period. Further, I find automakers' use of large cash‐back rebates at the end of the model year, although boosting overall sales, induces large numbers of consumers to delay their purchases and so pay lower prices.     

Comparative advertising: disclosing horizontal match information

Improved consumer information about horizontal aspects of products of similar quality leads to better consumer matching but also to higher prices, so consumer surplus can go up or down, while profits rise. With enough quality asymmetry, though, the higher‐quality (and hence larger) firm's price falls with more information, so both effects benefit consumers. This occurs when comparative advertising is used against a large firm by a small one. Comparative advertising, as it imparts more information, therefore helps consumers. Although it also improves the profitability of the small firm, overall welfare goes down because of the large loss to the attacked firm.     

Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management

We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform, while the average manager's performance depends on the number of “noise allocators.” Small investors should remain uninformed, but large and sophisticated investors benefit from searching for informed active managers since their search cost is low relative to capital. Hence, managers with larger and more sophisticated investors are expected to outperform.     

Strategic price complexity in retail financial markets

There is mounting empirical evidence to suggest that the law of one price is violated in retail financial markets: there is significant price dispersion even when products are homogeneous. Also, despite the large number of firms in the market, prices remain above marginal cost and may even rise as more firms enter. In a non-cooperative oligopoly pricing model, I show that these anomalies arise when firms add complexity to their price structures. Complexity increases the market power of the firms because it prevents some consumers from becoming knowledgeable about prices in the market. In the model, as competition increases, firms tend to add more complexity to their prices as a best response, rather than make their disclosures more transparent. Because this may substantially decrease consumer surplus in these markets, such practices have important welfare implications.     

Consumer Preference for Meat in China: A Case Study of Beijing

We analyze Chinese consumer preferences for pork shoulder-cut attributes during the recent period of fluctuating food prices caused by production and market anomalies. Consumers were randomly sampled in Beijing, China. Results indicate that consumers place great importance on where they purchase pork products as well as on whether the animals are raised with organic feed. Whether pork is fresh or previously frozen does not appear to matter much to consumers. This may provide partial support for the Chinese government's policy of using frozen pork reserves to stabilize pork prices.     

Price sensitivity of the consumer-investor: Evidence from energy prices and mutual fund fees

This study documents a significant relation between changes in commodity prices and investors' price sensitivity in the market for mutual funds. Specifically, price sensitivity⸺defined as the negative relation between fund-level flows and a fund's cost of ownership⸺is more pronounced in periods when energy commodity prices increase sharply. Aggregate flows into actively managed funds relative to the cheaper passively managed funds decrease (increase) when energy prices rise (fall). The results furnish novel evidence supporting an integrated view of the representative “consumer-investor,” whose price sensitivity in choosing financial products is related to price shocks in household consumption goods.     

Social learning with differentiated products

Learning from friends is a key process by which consumers acquire information about available products. This article embeds social learning in a model of firms producing differentiated products. I consider how the structure of social relationships between consumers influences pricing and welfare. In particular, how a variety of characteristics of social networks ‐ distribution of friendships, homophily, clustering, and correlations between an individual's preferences and number of friends ‐ influence these outcomes. I also find conditions under which consumer awareness and the sensitivity of demand to prices are useful measures of the informational efficiency of markets.     

Provider performance reports and consumer welfare

A provider's performance report consists of his service average outcome and volume. The two variables depend on the provider's private quality type and current demand, but he can raise his average outcome by dumping vulnerable consumers. Prospective consumers infer providers' qualities from their reports. Performance reporting drives some providers to dump consumers when competition is intense, but it may not reveal providers' qualities when their average quality is high. Statistical adjustment aiming at making reports independent of consumer characteristics can lead to more dumping, less informative reports, or both. There is more dumping when volume information is withheld and less dumping when ratings information is coarse.     

Search platforms: showrooming and price parity clauses

We provide a model in which consumers search for firms directly or through platforms. Platforms lower search costs but charge firms for the transactions they facilitate. Platform fees raise the possibility of showrooming, in which consumers search on a platform but then switch and buy directly to take advantage of lower direct prices. In settings like this, search platforms like Booking.com have adopted price parity clauses, requiring firms to offer their best prices on the platform, arguing this is needed to prevent showrooming. However, despite allowing for showrooming in our model, we find that price parity clauses often harm consumers.     

Advertising as a search deterrent

This article examines a monopoly firm's incentive to disclose information through advertising when consumers can choose between buying immediately and searching for additional information. Because sales drop when search reveals low match values to consumers, the firm has an incentive to deter search. We show that partial information disclosure emerges as a useful tool for search deterrence when search costs are low. Informative advertising and consumer search can be viewed as complements in producing information. Although transparency policies reduce search expenditures and improve purchase decisions, whether they are socially desirable depends on the magnitude of search costs.     

基于VAR模型下粮食价格、农业生产成本与农民收入的实证研究

通过脉冲响应函数得出农业生产资料价格与粮食价格,同时上涨,部分或者完全抵消了粮食价格上涨以及国家试图提高农民收入、调节收入分配而出台的各项优惠政策对农民收入的增加效应。Granger因果检验说明粮食价格、农民收入分别是农业生产成本的Granger原因。为此,政府必须将农业生产资料价格的上涨幅度控制在合理区间,改善农村物流现状,规范农资市场的经营等。     

When Does a Merger Create Value? Using Option Prices to Elicit Market Beliefs

I introduce and test a method to identify market expectations about value creation in mergers. Post‐announcement market prices reflect beliefs about both merged and standalone firm values, and the likelihood of either outcome. Stock prices alone do not contain sufficient information to identify these latent beliefs. By adding exchange‐traded stock option data, I deliver a clear decomposition of observed value change into two parts: 1) value creation and 2) new information about standalone value. Previous research has struggled to disentangle the two. This decomposition provides a strong and practical measure of the market's expectations about value creation in a merger.     

Competitive cross‐subsidization

Cross‐subsidization arises naturally when firms with different comparative advantages compete for consumers with heterogeneous shopping patterns. Firms then face a form of co‐opetition, as they offer substitutes for one‐stop shoppers and complements for multi‐stop shoppers. When intense competition for one‐stop shoppers drives total prices down to cost, firms subsidize weak products with the profits made on strong products. Moreover, firms have incentives to seek comparative advantages on different products. Finally, banning below‐cost pricing increases firms' profits at the expense of one‐stop shoppers, which calls for a cautious use of below‐cost pricing regulations in competitive markets.