The Impact of Environmental Regulation on Productivity and Exports: A Firm-Level Evidence from China

Abstract

This paper investigates the influence of environmental regulation on firm performance, as captured by firm productivity and firm exports. We first construct a Melitz-style model investigating the causal effects of environmental regulation on firm productivity and firm exports, and then test the theoretical predictions using firm-level data over the period 2005–2009. The theoretical and empirical investigation suggests that environmental regulation promotes firm productivity slightly with a lagged effect, has a harmful impact on firm exports, and has a U-shaped relationship with firm exports. China is to the far left of the inflection point, but this U-shaped relationship is not present at firms in clean industries and clean regions.     

Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance

We use a well-developed dynamic panel generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator to alleviate endogeneity concerns in two aspects of corporate governance research: the effect of board structure on firm performance and the determinants of board structure. The estimator incorporates the dynamic nature of internal governance choices to provide valid and powerful instruments that address unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity. We re-examine the relation between board structure and performance using the GMM estimator in a panel of 6,000 firms over a period from 1991 to 2003, and find no causal relation between board structure and current firm performance. We illustrate why other commonly used estimators that ignore the dynamic relationship between current governance and past firm performance may be biased. We discuss where it may be appropriate to consider the dynamic panel GMM estimator in corporate governance research, as well as caveats to its use.     

地方政府环境规制与企业迁移行为——基于中国工业企业数据库样本的成本视角

基于微观企业成本视角,利用中国工业企业数据库12年间524205家企业的面板数据,实证检验地方政府环境规制对企业迁移行为的影响,以及企业研发创新与迁移成本对地方政府环境规制与企业迁移行为间关系的调节作用。结果显示：地方政府环境规制强度与企业迁移行为呈正相关关系;企业研发创新和迁移成本均负向调节了地方政府环境规制强度和企业迁移行为的关系,且调节作用在不同地区以及不同类型企业中存在异质性。     

Headline Impression Management in the Earnings Press Releases of TSX Venture Exchange Firms*

This paper explores firms traded on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) Venture Exchange and their voluntary disclosure practices by focusing on earnings press releases (EPRs). We compare the characteristics of EPR issuers and non-issuers and investigate how the former group uses headline impression management in their EPRs to highlight firm performance. More precisely, we examine emphasis and tone management techniques in the headlines of over 1,300 EPRs by TSX Venture Exchange (TSX-V) firms. Our results show that the main determinants of the EPR disclosure choice are the achievement of positive revenue, an increasing trend in firm market value, and industry type. We find that EPR issuers reinforce and repeat positive results in the headlines of EPRs and use positive tone management to highlight positive financial performance. Our results confirm the association between firm performance and strategic placement of performance results, while illustrating that the strength of this association varies by industry and by EPR characteristics such as EPR length and numerical intensity. Overall, this paper sheds light on TSX-V firms, their disclosure practices, and potential violations of recommendations from regulators regarding avoiding exaggerated or promotional language in press releases.     

How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from China's Privatization Experience

The effect of government ownership on firm performance remains a controversial issue, especially in a transitional economy like China. Government ownership is typically viewed as adversely affecting firm performance. This study of that of Mainland China's privatization experience indicates the opposite. No matter whether it is in the form of state ownership or legal person ownership, government ownership has a positive impact on partially privatized state-owned enterprises. However, this relationship is nonlinear and shows an inverted U-shape. Given the situation of highly indebted, non-performing state-owned enterprises, we argue that too much government control is indeed bad for enterprises. But too little government ownership may not be good either. It might mean a lack of the government's political support and business connections, which are valuable and necessary to vitalize performance.     

Corporate fraud culture: Re‐examining the corporate governance and performance relation

We analyse the corporate governance and performance relation, when conditioning on corporate fraud, for fraud firms during 2000 – 2007. Fraud firms are identified as either self‐ reported fraud events, or subject to regulatory investigation. We use the inverse Mills ratio procedure to account for firms' (unobservable) fraud culture in the dynamic system GMM model of the performance‐ governance relation. We find that corporate governance is an endogenously determined characteristic that has no causal impact on firm performance when conditioning on fraud. Fraud is a significant regulatory event but its overall economic impact at the firm level is highly variable.     

Stock market liquidity and firm value

This paper investigates the relation between stock liquidity and firm performance. The study shows that firms with liquid stocks have better performance as measured by the firm market-to-book ratio. This result is robust to the inclusion of industry or firm fixed effects, a control for idiosyncratic risk, a control for endogenous liquidity using two-stage least squares, and the use of alternative measures of liquidity. To identify the causal effect of liquidity on firm performance, we study an exogenous shock to liquidity—the decimalization of stock trading—and show that the increase in liquidity around decimalization improves firm performance. The causes of liquidity's beneficial effect are investigated: Liquidity increases the information content of market prices and of performance-sensitive managerial compensation. Finally, momentum trading, analyst coverage, investor overreaction, and the effect of liquidity on discount rates or expected returns do not appear to drive the results.     

Top management turnover,firm performance and government control: Evidence from China's listed state-owned enterprises

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is highly controlled by government. We also find that the negative turnover–performance relationship is stronger when the SOE is directly held by the central or local government, holding a monopolistic position in a local economy or in a strategic/regulated industry. The results indicate that the market-based corporate governance mechanism that disciplines top executives as a result of poor performance is not only used in Chinese SOEs, but is used more frequently when the governance control of SOEs is more intense. Our findings support the notion that government control strengthens rather than weakens the turnover–performance governance mechanism. Our additional analysis shows that this complementary effect is stronger in regions that lack pro-market institutions, such as investor protections and a functioning capital market.     

Earnings co-movements and earnings manipulation

This study develops a theory that predicts the lower the degree to which firms’ earnings are correlated with the industry the greater the probability a firm will issue a biased signal of firm performance. The theory provides for causal predictions in our empirical tests in which we examine the probability a firm will be subject to an Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release (AAER). The empirical findings provide support for the theory, even after controlling for various predictive variables from the literature, indicating the degree of earnings co-movements with the industry is in fact a causal factor in managers decisions to bias earnings reports. We further illustrate that low co-movement firms are less conservative than high co-movement firms, which provides an application of our theory to a broader setting. Overall, we provide both a theory and an empirical validation of the theory helping to discipline the thinking about earnings management and allowing for causal relations to be uncovered.     

Does environmental labeling exacerbate heavily polluting firms’ financial constraints? Evidence from China

The Chinese Ministry of Environmental Protection has enacted an environmental policy that restricts the investment activities of heavily polluting firms by increasing their financial constraints. In this paper, we examine the impact of environmental labeling on firms’ financial constraints. We document that the financial constraints of heavily polluting firms increase more than those of other firms after the issuance of environmental labeling. The debt and equity financing channels of heavily polluting firms are restricted, with smaller bank loans and less equity issuance in the future. The effect is stronger in firms that make a smaller contribution to the local government’s gross domestic product, receive greater media coverage, and are located in heavily polluted provinces. The environmental regulation is effective in increasing the environmentally friendly practices and decreasing the performance growth of heavily polluting firms. Our findings not only contribute to the growing literature on the factors influencing financial constraints, identifying the effects of non-monetary factors on financial constraints, but also provide more evidence for the underlying mechanism of efficient environmental policy. Our results also provide practical suggestions for investors and institutions on evaluating firms and for regulatory authorities on further implementing environmental policy.     

Offshore operations and bank loan contracting: Evidence from firms that set up subsidiaries in offshore financial centers

We examine the effects of a multinational firm's subsidiary operations in offshore financial centers (OFCs) on bank loan contracting terms. Using a propensity score matched cross-country sample of firms with and without OFC subsidiaries, we find that firms with OFC subsidiaries receive less favorable loan terms than firms without OFC subsidiaries. The results from a difference-in-differences analysis and an analysis of a firm's mutation from a non-OFC firm to an OFC firm support the causal effect of offshore operations on the unfavorable loan terms. Furthermore, focusing on firms with OFC subsidiaries, we find that the intensity of offshore operations affects loan terms unfavorably. We also find that the unfavorable effect is more pronounced for more opaque firms and for firms that are headquartered in countries or jurisdictions with weaker legal enforcement. Our findings indicate that banks view offshore operations of borrowers as a credit risk-increasing factor.     

The effect of government quality on corporate cash holdings

We use China as a laboratory to test the effect of government quality on cash holdings. We build on, and extend, the existing literature on government expropriation and its interaction with firm-level agency problems by proposing a financial constraint mitigation argument. We find that firms hold less cash when local government quality is high, which is not consistent with the state expropriation argument, but supports the financial constraint mitigation argument. A good government lowers the investment sensitivity to cash flows and cash sensitivity to cash flows, decreases cash holdings more significantly in private firms, and improves access to bank and trade credit financing. We also test and find support for Stulz's (2005) model on the interaction between government and firm agency problems.     

Understanding the relationship between founder–CEOs and firm performance

We use instrumental variables methods to disentangle the effect of founder–CEOs on performance from the effect of performance on founder–CEO status. Our instruments for founder–CEO status are the proportion of the firm's founders that are dead and the number of people who founded the company. We find strong evidence that founder–CEO status is endogenous in performance regressions and that good performance makes it less likely that the founder retains the CEO title. After factoring out the effect of performance on founder–CEO status, we identify a positive causal effect of founder–CEOs on firm performance that is quantitatively larger than the effect estimated through standard OLS regressions. We also find that founder–CEOs are more likely to relinquish the CEO post after periods of either unusually low or unusually high operating performances. All in all, the results in this paper are consistent with a largely positive view of founder control in large US corporations.     

Insider ownership, ownership concentration and investment performance: An international comparison

This article makes two important contributions to the literature on the incentive effects of insider ownership. First, it presents a clean method for separating the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative entrenchment effect, which can be applied to samples of companies from the US and any other country. Second, it measures the effects of insider ownership using a measure of firm performance, namely a marginal q, which ensures that the causal relationship estimated runs from ownership to performance. The article applies this method to a large sample of publicly listed firms from the Anglo-Saxon and Civil law traditions and confirms that managerial entrenchment has an unambiguous negative effect on firm performance as measured by both Tobin's (average) q and our marginal q, and that the wealth effect of insider ownership is unambiguously positive for both measures. We also test for the effects of ownership concentration for other categories of owners and find that while institutional ownership improves the performance in the USA, financial institutions have a negative impact in other Anglo-Saxon countries and in Europe.     

Performance and governance in microfinance institutions

We examine the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance in microfinance institutions (MFI) using a self-constructed global dataset on MFIs collected from third-party rating agencies. Using random effects panel data estimations, we study the effects of board and CEO characteristics, firm ownership type, customer-firm relationship, and competition and regulation on an MFI’s financial performance and outreach to poor clients. We find that financial performance improves with local rather than international directors, an internal board auditor, and a female CEO. The number of credit clients increase with CEO/chairman duality. Outreach is lower in the case of lending to individuals than in the case of group lending. We find no difference between non-profit organisations and shareholder firms in financial performance and outreach, and we find that bank regulation has no effect. The results underline the need for an industry specific approach to MFI governance.     

The causal effect of board size in the performance of small and medium-sized firms

Empirical studies of large publicly traded firms have shown a robust negative relationship between board size and firm performance. The evidence on small and medium-sized firms is less clear; we show that existing work has been incomplete in analyzing the causal relationship due to weak identification strategies. Using a rich data set of almost 7000 closely held corporations we provide a causal analysis of board size effects on firm performance: We use a novel instrument given by the number of children of the chief executive officer (CEO) of the firms. First, we find a strong positive correlation between family size and board size and show this correlation to be driven by firms where the CEO’s relatives serve on the board. Second, we find empirical evidence of a small adverse board size effect driven by the minority of small and medium-sized firms that are characterized by having comparatively large boards of six or more members.     

The Decision to Privatize: Finance and Politics

We investigate the influence of political and financial factors on the decision to privatize government‐owned firms. The results show that profitable firms and firms with a lower wage bill are likely to be privatized early. We find that the government delays privatization in regions where the governing party faces more competition from opposition parties. The results also suggest that political patronage is important as no firm located in the home state of the minister in charge is ever privatized. Using political variables as an instrument for the privatization decision, we find that privatization has a positive impact on firm performance.     

环境污染曝光与公司价值——理论机制与实证检验

环境污染及其治理问题日益被全社会所重视。在此背景下,本文实证考察企业环境污染曝光是否影响公司价值以及影响机制。以发生于2005-2015年间的71起上市公司环境污染曝光事件为样本,本文研究发现:上市公司环境污染事件曝光当天,市值平均下跌1.51%。进一步分析发现:公司在污染事件曝光后,更容易受到政府的环保监管和处罚,且更难获得银行债务融资;并且,环保监管与债务融资的变化与污染事件窗口期公司股票的累计超额报酬率显著相关,表明投资者对于环境污染给公司造成的不利后果具有理性预期并相应地做出了负面反应。此外,2010年政府环保政策趋严后,污染事件曝光后政府监管力度的上升和债务融资的减少都更为明显;在公众环保需求高的地区,污染事件曝光后政府环保监管力度上升更显著。总之,本文的研究表明,环境污染事件曝光会降低公司价值,且政府监管力度上升和债务融资困难是环境污染曝光降低公司价值的两个重要作用机制。本文揭示了环境污染曝光对公司价值的负面影响以及影响的机制和异质性,对于当前的环境治理和经济转型具有较好的政策启示意义。     

Motivating high‐impact innovation: Evidence from managerial compensation contracts

We investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation and firm innovation and find that long‐term incentives in the form of options, especially unvested options, and protection from managerial termination in the form of golden parachutes are positively related to corporate innovation, and particularly to high‐impact, exploratory (new knowledge creation) invention. Conversely, non‐equity pay has a detrimental effect on the input, output and impact of innovation. Tests using the passage of an option expensing regulation (FAS 123R) as an exogenous shock to option compensation suggest a causal interpretation for the link between long‐term pay incentives, patents and citations. Furthermore, we find that the decline in option pay following the implementation of FAS 123R has led to a significant reduction in exploratory innovation and therefore had a detrimental effect on innovation output. Overall, our findings support the idea that compensation contracts that protect from early project failure and incentivize long‐term commitment are more suitable for inducing high‐impact corporate innovation.     

Executive compensation and non-financial risk: An empirical examination

Executives face potentially severe (non-financial) personal risks if firm environmental performance is below industry best practice. We examine the relation between CEO compensation and the non-financial risk associated with environmental exposure, and how use of environmental performance as an explicit determinant of compensation affects this relation. We find evidence that CEOs are compensated for exposure to environmental risk, even after controlling for financial risk. We also find that this premium is reduced when the CEO has greater opportunities to improve the firm’s environmental performance.