新视角看中国证券期货市场

在证监会发布的《2005年证券期货相关审计市场分析》(以下简称《市场分析》)中,通过对上市公司审计意见的分析来概括反映上市公司的审计情况。在1361家上市公司2005年年报审计中,被出具了标准无保留意见审计报告的公司有1198家,被出具非标准无保留意见(指标准无保留意见外的其他意见,包括无保留+强调事项意见、保留意见及保留+强调事项意见、否定意见和无法表示意见中的一种)审计报告的公司共有163家。《市场分析》还从审计意见与披露时间、出具非标意见的事务所比例、非标意见的变化趋势、非标意见的行业分析、非标意见的地域分析等诸多方…     

2003年沪市非标审计意见分析

一、2003沪市审计意见概况 非标准无保留审计意见是指注册会计师出具的除标准无保留审计意见外的其他类型审计意见,包括带说明段的无保留意见、保留意见(含带说明段的保留意见)、无法表示意见和否定意见.截止2003年4月30日,沪市除红河光明和*ST丰华2家公司外,共有806家上市公司如期披露了2003年年度报告,59家公司被出具非标准审计报告,非标准审计意见的比例为7.3%:与2002年的9.55%相比,呈现下降的趋势.     

2010年会计师事务所整体执业质量明显提升

一、会计师事务所诚信执业,上市公司年报审计质量明显提高 按照上市公司有关管理规定,2010年1-4月会计师事务所共为1 774家上市公司出具了2009年年度审计报告.其中,标准无保留意见审计报告(即不附加说明段、强调事项段或任何修饰用语的无保留意见审计报告,以下简称标准报告)1655份,非标准审计报告(包括带强调事项段无保留意见的审计报告、保留意见的审计报告以及无法表示意见的审计报告,以下简称非标报告)119份.     

上市公司非标准审计意见的变化趋势分析

非标准审计意见是指除了标准审计意见之外的其他各种类型的审计意见,按外在形式可分为带强调事项段的无保留意见、保留意见、无法表示意见和否定意见.按照是否涉及持续经营不确定性问题,非标准审计意见又可以分为持续经营审计意见和非持续经营审计意见.本文通过对上市公司2006年到2010年被出具的非标准审计意见进行统计,分析了不同种类非标准审计意见近5年来的变化趋势     

独立性、胜任能力与持续经营有重大疑虑审计意见的表达方式

本文以2001-2008年间持续经营有重大疑虑审计意见为研究样本,并将全部样本区分为明确表达与隐含表达两组子样本,实证研究了持续经营有重大疑虑审计意见存在表达方式上差异的原因。结果表明：独立性越高的审计师,越倾向于出具明确表达的持续经营有重大疑虑审计意见;而胜任能力强的审计师,并没有比胜任能力弱的审计师更倾向于出具明确表达的持续经营有重大疑虑审计意见。进一步的分析发现,胜任能力强的审计师可以从审计市场上优先争取到优质客户,所以为客户出具明确表达的持续经营有重大疑虑审计意见的比例反而比胜任能力弱的审计师要低。如何引导和鼓励胜任能力强的会计师事务所更多地参与上市公司持续经营风险揭示,应当成为行业监管与引导的重点。     

企业集团审计师变更与审计意见购买

审计意见购买是学术界和监管部门都十分关注的话题,但以往研究多以单个上市公司为对象来研究审计师变更和审计意见购买,且国内外的经验研究一直未得到一致的结论。考虑到在新兴市场国家,企业集团是主要的企业组织形式,本文以企业集团作为一个整体进行研究,发现审计师对集团内任何一家上市公司出具非标准审计意见,可能导致集团内多家上市公司变更该事务所的审计业务;企业集团通过变更事务所能够实现审计意见改善。此外,变更对象不同,变更后果也不同,首次审计该集团业务的审计师更容易屈服于集团,更容易被收买。     

会计事务所组织形式、法律责任与审计质量——基于签字审计师个体层面的研究

本文从签字审计师个体层面研究了会计事务所组织形式对审计质量的影响。与有限责任制相比,特殊普通合伙制将审计法律责任与风险落实到了签字审计师个人,增加了审计师的违规成本,因此审计师可能会变得更加独立和谨慎。研究表明,同一签字审计师同年在特殊普通合伙制身份下比在有限责任制身份下更容易出具非标审计意见,其审计公司的盈余管理水平更低,审计质量更高。同时,我们还发现,事务所从有限责任制转变为特殊普通合伙制以后,相同签字审计师转制后出具非标审计意见的可能性更高,而且被审计公司的盈余管理水平更低,审计质量也明显提高。这些结果为我们判断2010年以来我国推动事务所转制为特殊普通合伙制的政策提供了直接的经验证据,表明特殊普通合伙制对审计师的审计行为产生了预期的政策治理效果,有助于事务所做强。     

审计收费、审计师变更与意见购买

实证研究表明,虽然变更审计师增加了上市公司年报被出具非标准审计意见和审计意见恶化的可能性,但是审计师变更更为显著地提高了审计意见改善的可能性;审计收费异常增加与被出具非标准审计意见和审计意见恶化的可能性负相关.公司管理层在一定程度上可以成功实现审计意见购买的动机.此外,异常审计收费、审计收费异常增加和异常降低与审计师变更之间不存在显著的交互效应.     

试论会计师事务所更换与治理

一、问题提出有足够的客户和业务是会计师事务所生存和发展的基础,失去了客户,会计师事务所就会面临生存危机。在实际工作中,当被审计单位对注册会计师出具的意见不满意或双方因分歧发生冲突时,企业管理当局往往通过更换会计师事务所和注册会计师达到购买审计意见的目的。西方会计学家实证研究证明,如果注册会计师在上个会计年度出具了保留意见、否定意见或无法表示意见的审计报告,在随后的年度企业越有可能更换会计师事务所。我国审计学者的实证研究也表明,这条规律在我国上市公司中同样存在。我国审计市场的问卷调查发现,实务界人士认为被…     

小额赢利、独立董事和审计鉴证

有关中国资本市场的研究揭示,微利公司更容易被出具非标准无保留意见,本文通过此类非标准意见的说明段,发现其涉及事项和独立董事关注的公司非正常治理结构明显重合。进一步的检验则揭示,独立董事比例的增加能够提升公司机会主义特征激发非标准审计意见的概率,聘入行业专家型的独立董事则有利于公司的营运能力激发标准的审计意见。结论表明独立董事在规避渎职风险的过程中,通过充分披露信息来避免过高的机会主义阻止成本,和审计鉴证发生了协同效应。     

股权结构 代理成本与外部审计需求

本文基于一个两时点大股东掠夺模型,考察了股权结构、代理成本与外部审计需求之间的关系。我们的模型分析结果表明,第一大股东持股比例与企业价值成U型曲线关系,而与外部审计需求成倒U型曲线关系。即:代理成本较高的上市公司更有可能聘请高质量的外部审计师,以降低代理成本,提高公司市场价值。我们以中国A股上市公司2001和2002年的数据,对上述结论进行了实证检验并得到支持,本文分析还表明,债务融资与外部审计在降低代理成本方面具有相互替代性。     

审计意见的决定因素：来自中国上市公司的证据

利用中国上市公司和相应会计师事务所2001—2003年的综列数据,本文研究了审计意见和会计师事务所规模、上市公司的风险和盈余管理等因素之间的关系。本文发现有破产风险的、进行盈余管理的或小规模的上市公司更可能得到非标准审计意见。如果它们又是大会计师事务所的客户,则得到非标意见的概率更大。本文不支持合资会计师事务所的审计质量更高的结论。     

The reaction of firm ex ante cost of equity capital to the resolution of shareholder class action lawsuits

Existing research provides evidence that providers of capital (banks, public debt, and equity) all increase the expected return on securities after the initiation of a shareholder lawsuit. Many of these lawsuits are dismissed or settled with trivial monetary penalties, which suggests that an across-the-board permanent increase in the cost of capital is misguided. After estimating the probable outcome of a shareholder lawsuit using only information available at the time the shareholder lawsuit is filed, we study the resolution of shareholder lawsuits to determine if market participants adjust their expected return after a case is resolved. We find an increase (decrease) in the ex ante cost of equity capital when there is a surprise settlement (dismissal), which is consistent with an efficient market. Further, we present evidence consistent with equity market participants monitoring the progress of shareholder lawsuits prior to resolution. Overall, our results suggest that firm ex ante cost of equity capital only changes after the resolution of a shareholder lawsuit if the outcome of the case is different than initially predicted.     

独立性威胁、审计委员会制约有效性:理论分析与实证研究

本文在理论上深入分析审计制度安排中独立性威胁现象及审计委员会制度对独立性威胁的制约作用之后,基于2002—2004年我国上市公司审计委员会设立的基本情况,以审计意见和事务所变更为反应变量,对审计委员会制约独立性威胁的有效性进行了实证研究。研究发现,设立审计委员会的公司更不易被出具非标准审计意见,说明审计委员会的设立并不能有效提高审计师的独立性,但这同时也是反映政策效应的结果,即规模较大的上市公司倾向于主动配合监管政策设立审计委员会。本文的研究还发现,审计委员会的设立并不能令审计师免于因出具令上市公司不满的审计意见而被改聘的结果,说明我国的审计委员会制度未能在制约独立性威胁方面发挥作用,该结论同时得到实践调查结果与补充检验的支持。据此,本文认为,我国审计委员会制度在制约独立性威胁方面的功能还有待于进一步落实。     

Expansions and Contractions of Major US Shopping Centers

We analyze the determinants of expansions and contractions of shopping centers using a unique dataset of property level data for shopping centers in eleven metropolitan areas over the period from 1995 through 2005. We find that shopping centers with large operating costs are less likely to expand and are more likely to contract. Higher expected revenue per square foot increases the likelihood of expansion and decreases the likelihood of contraction. For small shopping centers the decision to change gross leasable area (GLA) is largely driven by potential revenue, while the decision to change the number of stores is largely a function of cost. We find some support for Grenadier’s theory that a larger number of competitors reduces the value of option to wait and increases the likelihood of both expansion and contraction. The market share of competitors reduces the likelihood of increasing the number of stores as suggested by the theory of strategic positioning. Our hypotheses best explain contraction decisions of large shopping centers and expansion decisions of small shopping centers. We find that both expansions and contractions of GLA are less likely for large shopping centers in MSAs with greater uncertainty about real estate prices, indicating that the option to delay has value. Moreover, small centers are significantly less sensitive to cost and revenue; since small centers are likely to have greater idiosyncratic risk than large; this provides indirect evidence for a significant delay option.     

Estimating the long-run user cost elasticity

The user cost elasticity is a parameter of central importance in economics. If the supply curve for capital is upward sloping (as is more likely in a large economy like the U.S.) and shocks to demand are important (as they are likely to be over the business cycle), estimates of the user cost elasticity that rely on high-frequency movements in the variables will tend to be biased. Applying cointegration techniques to a small, open economy yields an estimate of the long-run user cost elasticity that is about 75% larger (in absolute value) than the best existing estimate.     

Barriers to entry to the big firm audit market: Evidence from market reaction to switches to second Tier audit firms in the post-sox period

The US Government Accountability Office (GAO) studied concentration in the audit market and found that the Big 4 firms continue to dominate the market for clients with revenue of more than $500 million while non-Big 4 firms have gained market share among clients with revenue of $500 million or less (GAO, 2008). The US Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession has expressed concern about barriers to entry that might prevent a non-Big 4 firm from increasing its market share among large publicly-traded clients (Advisory Committee, 2008). One of these barriers may be the potential cost to shareholders if the stock market reacts negatively to the appointment of a non-Big 4 auditor (GAO, 2003). We examine whether the stock market reacts negatively when clients switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4, because a negative reaction might make such switching less likely to occur. We find that the market does not react more negatively when clients move from a Big 4 to a Second Tier auditing firm than when clients move from a Big 4 to another Big 4 firm. Our results suggest that a negative market reaction may not represent a significant barrier to entry among Second Tier auditing firms.     

The effects on financial statements of the litigation cost rule in a civil action for negligence against the auditor

The litigation cost rule relates to which of the two parties in a civil lawsuit has to pay the legal costs. In those countries where the American system applies, each has to pay their own legal costs. In most other countries, the British system applies and the loser pays all the legal costs. By means of a single person decision-theoretic model, I examine the effects of this on auditing and financial statements under certainty and uncertainty conditions. Generally, the American system has the effect of restraining shareholders from suing unless they are able to cover their legal costs, thereby providing scope for under- or over-statements, depending on management’s wishes. This scope is denied under the British system and, as a result, audited financial statements will not be similarly biased.     

On Cost Tradeoffs Between Conservative and Market Value Accounting

We identify a cost tradeoff relevant to the comparison of alternative accounting regimes. We compare equilibrium deadweight losses, due to transacting and auditing, across the historical cost, lower-of-cost-or-market, and market value regimes. We provide conditions for each of the regimes to dominate the other two. We show that while market-value accounting is likely to prevail in an inflationary setting, it may also be optimal under deflation. Similarly, lower-of-cost-or-market is likely to prevail in a deflationary setting, though it may also be optimal under inflation. Last, historical cost prevails only if the variation in asset prices is sufficiently high.     

会计稳健性与审计收费:基于审计风险控制策略的分析

随着监管趋于更加严格,会计师事务所承担的法律责任和赔偿也越来越高。如何采取有效措施防范和控制风险,最大可能地降低损失,已经成为会计师事务所的重要议题。本文对2001至2006年我国上市公司展开研究后发现:作为一种风险控制策略,强制审计客户保持一定的会计稳健性能够降低审计风险,从而降低审计收费;但稳健性发挥作用受到法律环境和诉讼风险的影响,仅对同时发行A股和其他类型股票的企业起到了显著作用。较高审计收费的风险控制策略与强制客户保持一定稳健性的风险控制策略之间存在替代关系。