Intrafirm Trade,Bargaining Power,and Specific Investments

This paper compares the performance of standard-cost with negotiated transfer pricing under asymmetric information. Negotiated transfer pricing generally achieves higher expected contribution margins, as this method tends to be more efficient in aggregating private information into a single transfer price. Standard-cost transfer pricing confers more bargaining power to the supplier and therefore generates better incentives for this division to undertake specific investments. The opposite holds for buyer investments. If a corporate controller has disaggregated information about divisional costs and revenues, then the firm can improve upon the performance of standard-cost transfer pricing by setting a centralized transfer price equal to expected cost plus a suitably chosen mark-up.     

Pushing the future back: The impact of policy uncertainty on the market pricing of future earnings

We examine whether policy uncertainty triggered by presidential elections pushes the future back by reducing the extent to which current prices reflect information about future earnings. We estimate future earnings response coefficients (FERCs) for the years 1975–2013, a period that covers ten presidential elections. We find that FERCs are significantly lower (by 11.8%) during presidential election years compared to other years. Additional analyses using pseudo election years, ex‐ante polls, contract prices from the Iowa Electronic Political Market, and cross‐sectional firm characteristics provide corroborating evidence that the lower FERCs during election years are related to policy uncertainty. We also investigate potential explanations for the lower FERCs during election years. We find that the lower FERCs relate to forecasting difficulty rather than to changes in the discount rate or in the amount of noise trading. Finally, we find that market prices move toward future earnings to a greater degree during presidential election years compared with other years once the policy uncertainty is resolved. A trading strategy based on this drift yields significant abnormal returns. Overall, we contribute to the literature by providing the first empirical evidence that shocks to policy uncertainty influence the pricing of earnings information.     

Futures trading volume as a determinant of prices in different momentum phases

Recent studies contend that trading volume has predictive power for ex ante stock prices, particularly small stocks that do not react quickly to macroeconomic information. This study postulates that a significant amount of macro-information that flows on to stock markets is derived from derivative markets. We examine the impact of short-term futures trading volume and prices on cash stock prices using a case study of 15-min data from the Australian stock index futures market which reports actual trading volume. After applying vector error correction modelling (VECM), variance decomposition and impulse functions, we conclude that futures prices provide a short-term information lead to stock prices that dominates trading volume effects. We also observe asymmetric changes in the impact of trading volume between bull and bear price momentum phases and after large trading volume shocks. These results suggest that, in future, studies on trading volume should control for the cross-correlation impact from derivative prices and the differential impact of trading phases.     

Information technology,organizational design,and transfer pricing

We show how information technology affects transfer pricing. With coarse information technology, negotiated transfer pricing has an informational advantage: managers agree to prices that approximate the firm's cost of internal trade more precisely than cost-based transfer prices. With sufficiently rapid offers, this advantage outweighs opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining time, and negotiated transfer pricing generates higher profits than the cost-based method. However, as information technology improves, the informational advantage diminishes; the opportunity costs of managers’ bargaining eventually dominate, and cost-based methods generate higher profits. Our results explain why firms generally prefer cost-based methods, and when negotiated methods are preferable.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

Transfer Pricing, Incentive Compensation and Tax Avoidance in a Multi-Division Firm

This article examines the relation between transfer pricing and production incentives using a model of a vertically integrated firm with divisions located in different tax jurisdictions. We show that if divisional profits are taxed at the same marginal rate, the transfer price should be set to minimize the compensation risk faced by the manager of the buying division. For the case where divisional profits are taxed at different marginal rates, we are able to characterize the trade-off between the tax savings from setting transfer prices to reduce profitability in the high tax jurisdication and the loss of effort attributable to the impact of tax avoidance on the incentive compensation system. Further, we show that if it is feasible to compensate the division managers using multiple performance measures, the transfer price should be used to minimize the firm's overall tax liability. Finally, we show that when authority to determine the transfer price must be delegated to one of the division managers, it is optimal to assign responsibility for setting the transfer price to the manager of the division with the most production uncertainty.     

Insider Trading, Investment, and Liquidity: A Welfare Analysis

We compare equilibrium trading outcomes with and without participation by an informed insider, assuming inflexible ex ante aggregate investment choices by agents. Noise trading arises from aggregate uncertainty regarding other agents' intertemporal consumption preferences. The welfare levels of outsiders can thus be ascertained. The allocations without insider trading are not ex ante Pareto efficient, because our model differs from standard ones with negative exponential utility functions and normal returns. We characterize the circumstances under which the revelation of payoff-relevant information via prices—arising from insider trading—benefits outsiders with stochastic liquidity needs, by improving risk-sharing among them.     

Transfer Pricing and the Control of Internal Corporate Transactions

One potential weakness of all divisional profitability schemes is their inability to capture synergies among business units. One way of managing this problem is to design a transfer pricing scheme that attempts to assign common costs and benefits to different business units. What makes transfer pricing both so interesting, and such a challenge, is that the solution involves finding a way to encourage divisional managers whose pay is likely to depend on such transfer prices to reveal their private or unbiased information about the firm's costs in a way that serves the interest of the rest of the firm. With that end in view, the authors provide a general analytical framework for setting transfer prices and go on to discuss the costs and benefits of each of the most common transfer‐pricing methods: (1) market pricing; (2) marginal cost pricing; (3) full‐cost pricing; and (4) negotiated prices.     

Technical trading revisited: False discoveries,persistence tests,and transaction costs

We revisit the apparent historical success of technical trading rules on daily prices of the Dow Jones Industrial Average index from 1897 to 2011, and we use the false discovery rate (FDR) as a new approach to data snooping. The advantage of the FDR over existing methods is that it selects more outperforming rules, which allows diversifying against model uncertainty. Persistence tests show that, even with the more powerful FDR technique, an investor would never have been able to select ex ante the future best-performing rules. Moreover, even in-sample, the performance is completely offset by the introduction of low transaction costs. Overall, our results seriously call into question the economic value of technical trading rules that has been reported for early periods.     

Index arbitrage and the pricing relationship between Australian stock index futures and their underlying shares

This paper examines the mispricing of Australian stock index futures. Exogenous and endogenous price volatility is confirmed to have a positive impact on the mispricing spread, after filtering out predictable time series components. More accurate pricing associated with surprise trading volume in the underlying stocks is consistent with arbitrageurs acting to narrow price disparities relative to the futures market. Ex‐ante interest rate volatility is the primary source of risk faced by arbitrageurs and fluctuations in the transaction cost of opening index arbitrage positions influence the extent to which they drive prices towards theoretical fair values.     

Entry deterrence through credible commitment to transfer pricing at direct cost

This paper examines the choice between direct and absorption costing in a cost-based transfer pricing system for duopolistic firms competing with product market prices. Existing literature has shown that the adoption of an absorption costing system, which drives up the intrafirm transfer price, strategically dominates direct costing for the two firms, regardless of whether the transfer price is publicly observable, thereby constituting a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). However, we demonstrate that direct costing can strategically dominate absorption costing when one of the two firms is an incumbent, whereas the other is a potential entrant. Stated differently, the well-known result in the strategic cost allocation problem reverses if we consider entry threats. More specifically, we show that if the incumbent credibly commits to an observable transfer price, the upfront adoption of a direct costing system enables the incumbent to deter the entry of the potential rival in the SPNE. As a commitment device for the observable price, we consider the regulation of transfer prices that usually exists in oligopolistic network industries. We show that a regulator that pursues social welfare maximization approves direct costing but not absorption costing. Therefore, the firms and the regulator can share a mutual interest in the adoption of a direct costing system, a state thus sustained as the SPNE. This result yields managerial accounting implications for a divisionalized firm facing the threat of potential competitors entering the market in that the firm can use this accounting system to help monopolize the market.     

Competition among hospitals

We examine competition in the hospital industry, in particular the effect of ownership type (for-profit, not-for-profit, government). We estimate a structural model of demand and pricing in the hospital industry in California, then use the estimates to simulate the effect of a merger. California hospitals in 1995 face an average price elasticity of demand of -4.85. Not-for-profit hospitals face less elastic demand and act as if they have lower marginal costs. Their prices are lower than those of for-profits, but markups are higher. We simulate the effects of the 1997 merger of two hospital chains. In San Luis Obispo County, where the merger creates a near monopoly, prices rise by up to 53%, and the predicted price increase would not be substantially smaller were the chains not-for-profit.     

The determinants of a cross market arbitrage opportunity: theory and evidence for the European bond market

This paper examines the determinants of cross-platform arbitrage profits. We develop a structural model that enables us to decompose the likelihood of an arbitrage opportunity into three distinct factors: the fixed cost to trade the opportunity, the level at which one of the platforms delays a price update and the impact of the order flow on the quoted prices (inventory and asymmetric information effects). We then investigate the predictions from the theoretical model for the European Bond market with the estimation of a probit model. Our main finding is that the results found in the empirical part corroborate strongly the predictions from the structural model. The event of a cross market arbitrage opportunity has a certain degree of predictability where an optimal ex ante scenario is represented by a low level of spreads on both platforms, a time of the day close to the end of trading hours and a high volume of trade.     

The Relationship Among Market-Making Revenue, Payment for Order Flow, and Trading Costs for Market Orders

We study the division of market-making revenue among dealer, broker, and trader. When Knight Securities, a major Nasdaq dealer, interacts with market orders in actively traded stocks during the fourth quarter of 1996, we estimate that its revenue is $0.057 per share. Knight pays brokers at least $0.025 per share (44% of revenue) for orders. To examine whether brokers appear to share these payments with traders, we compare net trading costs (trade price net of commissions) for traders using brokers routing Knight orders with estimated net trading costs for traders using the only discount broker we can determine did not directly receive market-making revenue. We find that the net trading cost of the broker refusing order-flow payments does not dominate the net trading cost of all brokers selling order flow to Knight. This finding suggests that order-flow payments do not unambiguously harm traders and challenges the conclusions of extant studies using only trade prices to assess market quality.     

Underpricing and Ex Post Value Uncertainty

As documented by a vast empirical literature, initial public offerings (IPOs) are characterized by underpricing. A number of papers have shown that underpricing is directly related to the amount of ex ante uncertainty concerning the IPOs valuation. Recent theoretical papers propose that not all value uncertainty is resolved prior to the start of trading, but rather continues to be resolved in the beginning of the after market. We term this type of uncertainty as ex post value uncertainty and develop proxies for it. We find strong support for the existence of ex post value uncertainty and find that including a proxy for it more than doubles the explanatory power of previous models.     

COST-VOLUME-PROFIT ANALYSIS UNDER UNCERTAINTY WHEN THE FIRM HAS PRODUCTION FLEXIBILITY

This study examines the behavior of the firm which faces uncertainty in demand but can adjust its output once the uncertainty is resolved, using contingentclaims analysis. The paper finds that (i) the optimal output of the firm with ex post adjustment capability is less than that of the firm without production flexibility; (ii) the optimal ex ante output increases with the higher interest rate; (iii) the greater the marginal cost associated with the expost adjustment and/or salvage value, the greater the optimal ex ante output; and (iv) the effect of demand volatility and production lead time on the optimal ex ante output could be either positive or negative. Based upon the study's findings, some important managerial decision implications are discussed.     

CORPORATE BOARDS AND BANK LOAN CONTRACTING

We investigate the role of corporate boards in bank loan contracting. We find that when corporate boards are more independent, both price and nonprice loan terms (e.g., interest rates, collateral, covenants, and performance‐pricing provisions) are more favorable, and syndicated loans comprise more lenders. In addition, board size, audit committee structure, and other board characteristics influence bank loan prices. However, they do not consistently affect all nonprice loan terms except for audit committee independence. Our study provides strong evidence that banks recognize the benefits of board monitoring in mitigating information risk ex ante and controlling agency risk ex post, and they reward higher quality boards with more favorable loan contract terms.     

Public information arrival: Price discovery and liquidity in electronic limit order markets

How information is translated into market prices is still an open question. This paper studies the impact of newswire messages on intraday price discovery, liquidity, and trading intensity in an electronic limit order market. We take an objective ex ante measure of the tone of a message to study the impacts of positive, negative, and neutral messages on price discovery and trading activity. As expected, we find higher adverse selection costs around the arrival of newswire messages. Negative messages are associated with higher adverse selection costs than positive or neutral messages. Liquidity increases around positive and neutral messages and decreases around negative messages. Available order book depth as well as the trading intensity increases around all news. Our results suggest that market participants possess different information gathering and processing capabilities and that negative news messages are particularly informative and induce stronger market reactions.     

Implied Spot Rates as Predictors of Currency Returns: A Note

Currency call option transactions data and the Black-Scholes option pricing model, as modified by Merton for continuous dividends and as adapted to currency options by Biger and Hull and by Garman and Kohlhagen, are used to imply spot foreign exchange rates. The proportional deviation between implied and simultaneously observed spot rates is found to be a direct and statistically significant determinant of subsequent returns on foreign currency holdings after controlling for interest rate differentials. Further, an ex ante trading rule reveals that the additional information contained in implied rates often is sufficient to generate significant economic profits.     

Goliath Corporation: An instructional case in transfer pricing policy

This case illustrates some of the issues associated with setting firms’ transfer pricing policies. The simulation requires students to assume the roles of top management and divisional management for Goliath Corporation in negotiating transfer prices. The student playing the role of top management first selects a transfer pricing policy from four possible mechanisms: market-based, cost-based, negotiated, and dual-pricing. Given the top manager’s policy choice, divisional managers are then constrained to use that policy as they decide whether to purchase internally or externally based on their respective negotiations. In each negotiation, there is an ex ante best decision for Goliath as a whole. The case is thus useful in demonstrating how managers’ transfer price policy choices can lead to bad sourcing decisions.