Strategic transfer pricing,absorption costing,and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer prices are not observable, strategic transfer pricing is not an equilibrium and the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate product. As a strategic alternative, however, the firms can signal the use of transfer prices above marginal cost to their competitors by a publicly observable commitment to an absorption costing system. The paper identifies conditions under which the choice of absorption costing is a dominant strategy equilibrium.     

Arbitrage-Free Valuation of Exhaustible Resource Firms

We provide an arbitrage-free valuation of exhaustible resource firms through extending the Gibson and Schwartz (1990) model and also the Jamshidian and Fein (1990) solution to valuing an entire petroleum firm based on quoted oil futures. Our solutions are compared to accounting, traditional finance and to stockmarket valuations on a daily basis. An alternative expression of the valuations relative to stockmarket prices is in terms of the time varying implied 'market price' of convenience yield risk. Initial illustrations show that the implied convenience yield risk is not necessarily consistent between stockmarket and derivative market participants. Finally, we calculate the sensitivities of petroleum firm values to changes in oil prices, the convenience yield observable on NYMEX, and oil price volatilities. These partial derivatives show some of the complexities in the dynamic hedging process of using the contingent claims approach to valuing (and hedging) real assets.     

Accounting Standards Harmonization and Financial Statement Comparability: Evidence from Transnational Information Transfer

This paper investigates whether accounting standards harmonization enhances the comparability of financial information across countries. I hypothesize that a firm yet to announce earnings reacts more strongly to the earnings announcement of a foreign firm when both report under the same rather than different accounting standards. My analysis of abnormal price reactions for a global sample of firms supports the prediction. Next, in an attempt to control for the underlying economic comparability and the effects of changes in reporting quality, I use a difference‐in‐differences design around the mandatory introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards. I find that mandatory adopters experience a significant increase in market reactions to the release of earnings by voluntary adopters compared to the period preceding mandatory adoption. This increase is not observed for nonadopters. Taken together, the results show that accounting standards harmonization facilitates transnational information transfer and suggest financial statement comparability as a direct mechanism.     

Absorption versus direct costing: the relevance of opportunity costs in the management of congested stochastic production systems

This paper investigates the relative performance of absorption versus direct costing procedures. Traditionally, absorption costing procedures have been defended on the basis of them acting as a proxy for hard to measure opportunity costs. We question the validity of this traditional defence by explicitly considering the extent to which absorption costing-based accounting calculations actually provide good proxies. Our analysis shows that in some situations absorption costing so over estimates opportunity costs that it would be preferable to use direct costing even though this implicitly assumes opportunity costs are zero. Thus, given that we establish that one can notalwaysuse the existence of opportunity costs as a defence for the adoption of absorption costing procedures we next identifyspecificconditions for which if satisfied, we can unambiguously defend the adoption of absorption costing. We develop an ‘open acceptance condition’ which if satisfied insures that a production system directed by absorption costs out performs a system based upon direct costs.     

Discretionary disclosure in the presence of dual distribution channels

A prevailing view in the disclosure literature is that firms who learn favorable market information are reluctant to disclose it, fearing it will attract new rivals. In this paper, we demonstrate that the presence of dual distribution arrangements, wherein consumers can purchase products either from traditional retail firms or directly from suppliers, can notably alter disclosure incentives. As under prevailing views, a retailer disclosing positive news risks entry by competitors. However, entry shifts the incumbent supplier–retailer relationship: the presence of new competitors leads the supplier to treat its retailer more as a strategic partner, translating into lower wholesale prices. This, in turn, can lead the retailer to willingly share favorable news, since such disclosure invites entry precisely when the retailer stands to benefit most from price concessions. Our results suggest that as dual distribution continues to increase in prominence, firms may be more willing to voluntarily disclose sensitive financial information particularly that which points to high demand for its products.     

Dual transfer pricing with internal and external trade

This paper examines a transfer pricing problem between two divisions of a decentralized firm. The selling division is privately informed about its own costs and produces a good that is sold both externally in an intermediate market and internally within the firm. Unlike most previous work, we focus on dual transfer pricing systems that allow the selling division to be credited for an amount that differs from the amount charged to the buying division. We identify conditions under which efficient decentralized trade and external price setting incentives can be provided with a properly chosen set of dual transfer prices that do not rely on direct communication. Instead, the optimal dual transfer prices will depend only on public information about the market price charged by the upstream division in the external market, which indirectly communicates information about production costs to the downstream division. For a variety of well-known demand functions, the optimal transfer prices will be linear functions of the market price. Our main results hold when the upstream division faces multiple internal buyers or faces a binding capacity constraint.     

The effect of audit firm size on audit prices: A study of the Australian Market

The effect of audit firm size on prizes is a complex function of competition in the market for audit services, product differentiation, and scale economics to large firms. In this study, a competitive market is supported in Australia with product differentiation to Bif Eight accounting firms. Specially, Big Eight accounting firms have significantly higher audit prices than non-Big Eight firms. This results holds for ‘large’ and ‘small’ auditees. A test is also made of price cutting in the Australian market. Price cutting is defined as lower initial audit fees than continuing engagement fees for a comparable audit. Test results do not evidence price-cutting behavior by accounting firms. There is in fact weak evidence that initial audit fees are higher than continuing engagement fee levels. Higher initial fees suggest that accounting firms may recover at least some of the audit start-up costs immediately.     

The effect of entry on R&D networks

We investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of R&D networks considering farsighted firms. The presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbents to collaborate. Incumbent firms may form an otherwise undesirable collaboration to deter entry of a new firm. Moreover, an incumbent may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable collaboration, expecting to form a more profitable link with the entrant. Finally, potential entry may lead an inefficient incumbent to exit the market. Welfare analysis shows market and social incentives to be often misaligned. We propose a subsidy scheme that encourages welfare‐improving entry.     

Timing Equity Issuance in Response to Information Asymmetry Arising from IFRS Adoption in Australia and Europe

This study examines the association between changes in reported financial performance resulting from mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and equity issuance during the transition period leading up to IFRS adoption for listed firms in Australia and Europe. We hypothesize that firms affected by the accounting standards change strategically time equity issuance around the time the firm discloses the effects of IFRS adoption on reported financial performance. We document circumstances where market returns are associated with the reconciliation of net income between local GAAP and IFRS. We find that a firm's likelihood of equity issuance and equity issue size during the three years prior to the IFRS reconciliation disclosure are negatively associated with the unexpected change in net income resulting from the conversion to IFRS.     

Does product market competition affect corporate governance? Evidence from corporate takeovers

We examine the extent to which shareholders strategically allow a weak governance structure in response to increasing competition pressures in the product market. We treat acquisitions by rival firms as shocks that increase threats in a competitive product market. We find that firms adopt greater entrenchment provisions when there are greater competition threats. Moreover, firms with high institutional ownership – especially by dedicated investors – and​ board independence within the compensation committee are particularly aggressive, which is consistent with our theory that aggressive behavior represents a strategic decision by shareholders. Finally, we find positive relationship between the adoption of entrenchment provisions and firm’s future performance, but only for the adoption under relatively severe competitive pressures.     

Entry,exit, and the determinants of market structure

This article estimates a dynamic, structural model of entry and exit for two US service industries: dentists and chiropractors. Entry costs faced by potential entrants, fixed costs faced by incumbent producers, and the toughness of short‐run price competition are important determinants of long‐run firm values, firm turnover, and market structure. In the dentist industry entry costs were subsidized in geographic markets designated as Health Professional Shortage Areas (HPSA) and the estimated mean entry cost is 11 percent lower in these markets. Using simulations, we find that entry cost subsidies are less expensive per additional firm than fixed cost subsidies.     

银行业竞争、创新资源配置和企业创新产出——基于中国工业企业的经验证据

本文利用城市级商业银行分支机构数据,结合中国工业企业数据和企业专利数据,实证分析银行业竞争对中国企业创新产出的影响。研究发现,竞争性的银行业市场结构显著促进了企业创新产出,对非国有企业和中小企业尤为显著。进一步地,本文基于资源配置角度,从新进入企业和在位企业双重视角探讨银行业竞争影响企业创新产出的作用途径。检验发现,银行业竞争提高条件下,更多的高效率企业进入创新部门,更多的高效率在位企业增加创新投入,且上述影响在非国有企业和中小企业中更为明显。本文检验结果显示,银行业竞争能提高银行对高效率企业的信贷支持,优化企业之间创新资源配置,并通过引导高效率非国有企业和中小企业增加创新投入而推动整体层面的创新产出。本文拓展了银行业竞争对企业创新的微观影响研究,为制定基于创新驱动的金融发展政策提供新思路。     

The effect of SFAS 131 on the stock market’s ability to predict industry‐wide and firm‐specific components of future earnings

This study examines the impact of SFAS 131 on the extent to which stock prices incorporate industry‐wide and firm‐specific components of future earnings. By decomposing earnings into industry‐wide and firm‐specific components, this paper finds that the firms that aggregated segments under the old rule experience significant acceleration in the incorporation of future earnings into current stock prices upon adoption of SFAS 131. However, the acceleration of future earnings is mostly driven by the improved incorporation of industry‐wide components of future earnings, which indicates the market’s ability to predict firm‐specific components is not significantly changed. Supplemental analysis suggests that the reduced geographic earnings information is one possible reason for lack of improvement in incorporating firm‐specific earnings into price.     

Networking as a Barrier to Entry and the Competitive Supply of Venture Capital

We examine whether strong networks among incumbent venture capitalists (VCs) in local markets help restrict entry by outside VCs, thus improving incumbents' bargaining power over entrepreneurs. More densely networked markets experience less entry, with a one‐standard deviation increase in network ties among incumbents reducing entry by approximately one‐third. Entrants with established ties to target‐market incumbents appear able to overcome this barrier to entry; in turn, incumbents react strategically to an increased threat of entry by freezing out any incumbents who facilitate entry into their market. Incumbents appear to benefit from reduced entry by paying lower prices for their deals.     

Vertical control of a distribution network—an empirical analysis of magazines

How does an upstream firm determine the size of its distribution network, and what is the role of vertical restraints? To address these questions, we develop two empirical entry models. In the benchmark coordinated entry model, the upstream firm sets market‐specific wholesale prices and implements the first best. In the more realistic restricted/free entry model, the upstream firm only sets a uniform wholesale price. As a second‐best solution, it restricts entry in markets where business stealing (encroachment) is high, and allows free entry elsewhere. We apply the model to magazine distribution, and assess the profitability of alternative vertical restraints. Banning restricted licensing reduces profits only slightly, so the business rationale for restricted licensing should not be sought in the prevention of encroachment. Furthermore, market‐specific wholesale prices implement the first best, but the profit increase would be small, providing a rationale for the commonly observed uniform wholesale prices. Finally, uniform franchise fees are much less effective than a uniform wholesale price to cope with local market differences.     

Unobservable transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the manager is evaluated using a balanced scorecard

This study investigates the optimal level of transfer prices chosen by managers in a divisionalized firm when they are evaluated based on a balanced scorecard. A unique assumption of our model is that transfer prices are unobservable to a competing firm's managers. In contrast to the findings in several studies that examine strategic transfer pricing, this research shows that a manager who is evaluated using a balanced scorecard chooses a transfer price that exceeds marginal cost given a market competitor in a specific economic environment. This result is caused mainly by our model's assumption that a manager considers the competitor's profit in his/her in decision-making when the objective is to maximize long-term profit. This study makes a significant contribution to the strategic transfer pricing literature by showing that even if the transfer price is unobservable to rivals, the optimal transfer price exceeds marginal cost when the final product market is characterized by price competition, something not shown in previous analytical accounting research.     

Industrial Organization of Financial Systems and Strategic Use of Relationship Banking

Using standard Industrial Organization tools, we analyze the relation between competition in arm's length financial markets and the prevalence of close bank-firms ties. We show how the degree of competition between financial intermediaries affects the intensity of relationships between banks and client firms, and explore the idea that investment in bank-firm relationships can be used strategically by incumbent multi-product (universal) banks to limit competition in arm's length markets. The analysis implies that reforms designed to facilitate entry of new intermediaries may actually induce incumbent banks to increase investment in relationship banking, so that regulatory entry barriers are replaced by entry barriers created endogenously, namely, there is ``path dependence' in the market structure of financial systems. This result suggests that increased (potential) competition in the financial services industry will not always destroy bank-firm relationships but, on the contrary, may actually strengthen them.     

投资性房地产公允价值计量的财务影响与决定因素:以北辰实业为例

以北辰实业为例,本文分析了企业在投资性房地产成本模式与公允价值计量模式之间选择的财务影响及其决定因素。与成本模式相比,投资性房地产公允价值计量将大幅提高其账面价值,加剧了企业当期净利润的波动。北辰实业在A股年报中采用成本模式,而在H股年报中采用公允价值计量,这主要源于以下因素:(1)香港会计准则与我国会计准则的差异;(2)两地监管机构对公允价值会计的态度不同;(3)两地投资性房地产信息披露的差异;(4)资本市场成熟度与投资者的理性程度的差异。最后我们总结了本案例对于企业选择公允价值计量模式、监管层推行公允价值会计与应对会计国际趋同三个方面的政策含义。     

Impact of risk aversion and countervailing tax in oligopoly

The literature recognizes the qualitative effects of risk aversion on oligopolistic market performance, but less is known about their magnitudes. We quantitatively evaluate these effects in Cournot and Bertrand oligopolies where firms maximize mean-variance utilities under linear demand and costs. The impacts are very similar for the two types of oligopoly, but have opposite signs. The impacts of a firm’s risk aversion on outputs, prices, consumer surplus and social welfare can be expressed via potentially observable variables. Since these impacts resemble the effects of firms’ cost changes, a regulator can reduce or eliminate undesirable effects of risk aversion by changing firms’ costs with appropriate countervailing taxes.     

Do share prices matter?

This paper examines whether the cross sectional variation in Australian share prices is partially explained by measures of firm size and ownership characteristics in a manner that is consistent with firms behaving in accordance with Merton's (1987) model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Based on a sample of firms whose shares were traded on the ASX during 1995, we show that firms largely owned by less wealthy shareholders tend to have low stock prices, although this relation is not linear. In addition, larger, better–known, firms tend to have higher stock prices. These findings are consistent with prior evidence from US markets, and suggest the existence of a shareholder clientele effect in Australia that is related to the share price of the underlying firm.