Are outside directors with greater board tenure valuable? Evidence from the last credit crisis

Analyses of bank performance around the 2007–2008 financial crisis indicate that outside directors with financial experience acquired through longer board service at their own banks are more effective than those with financial experience acquired elsewhere. Institutions with more long-tenured independent directors (i) earn higher Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) around the collapse of both Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, (ii) limit their risk exposure before the crisis, (iii) exhibit better stock return and accounting performance during the crisis, (iv) are less likely to be bailed out by the U.S. government’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP), and (v) receive proportionally less financial assistance from TARP.     

Central supervision and earnings management: Quasi-experimental evidence from China

Earnings management is costly to society because it decreases the informativeness of earnings and hence distorts capital market efficiency. Drawing upon a natural experiment generated by the staggered random on-site inspection programme initiated by China's central government between 2013 and 2017, this paper finds that highly intensive central supervision significantly decreases local firms' earnings management behaviours. Moreover, the effect of central supervision is found to be more pronounced in provinces with severe GDP exaggeration, provinces with local governors facing impending promotion, and firms controlled by the government. These findings suggest that on-site inspections by the central government may alleviate local officials' political incentives and ability to pressure local firms to engage in earnings management. However, the estimation results of timing tests indicate that this monitoring effect is short-lived, calling for a more comprehensive strategy to enhance the supervision of local officials and consequently improve the reliability of firms' financial reporting quality. These findings highlight the importance of addressing the agency problem between central and local governments in curbing firms' earnings manipulation to improve the capital market efficiency of economies characterized by strong government intervention.     

Politicians and the IPO decision: The impact of impending political promotions on IPO activity in China

This paper shows that incentives created by the impending turnover of local politicians can accelerate the pace of initial public offering (IPO) activity in certain politicized environments. Focusing on China, we exploit a research setting where politicians are rewarded for capital market development, firms rely on political connections for access to capital, rent-seeking behavior is rampant, and the objectives of the state might not be to maximize capital market efficiency. We find that the rate of exchange eligible firms engaging in an IPO temporarily increases in advance of impending political promotion events. This effect holds for both state-owned and non-state-owned entities. For state-owned firms, the effect is strongest in those provinces where the politicians are more likely to be rewarded for market development activity. For non-state-owned firms, the temporary increase in IPO activity appears to be (rationally) opportunistic in nature, with the effect stronger around events more likely to disrupt the firms' political connections. Promotion period IPOs underperform non-promotion period IPOs in terms of both future financial performance and long-run stock returns, have controlling shareholders who retain a larger fraction of the company, and are more likely to divert proceeds away from their intended use after the offering.     

Rent-seeking incentives, corporate political connections, and the control structure of private firms: Chinese evidence

We examine how the rent-seeking incentives of local government motivate private firms¹ listed in China to establish political connections, and whether such connections lead to more concentrated corporate control structures. Our results show that such firms are more likely to establish political connections in regions in which the local economy is less market-oriented or in which the government has more discretion in allocating economic resources. This is consistent with the notion that the presence of incentives for government officials to engage in rent seeking motivates private firms to look for alternative safeguards through political connections. We also find that the controlling owners of politically connected firms tend to concentrate their shareholdings and dominate the board of directors by occupying the position of either chairman or CEO, which supports the conjecture that a concentrated control structure facilitates rent seeking through political connections and allows the controlling owner to retain all of the benefits arising from connections with politicians.     

网络借贷平台风险:宏观驱动因素与监管

本文尝试从网贷平台风险的角度,讨论宏观驱动因素和监管政策对网络借贷市场的影响。首先,利用我国网贷市场有代表性的651家平台近两年的日度交易数据,我们发现网贷平台停业风险与增长速度呈负向关系。进一步分析平台增长背后的宏观驱动因素,我们发现互联网技术供给和普惠金融需求共同影响行业发展,而平台增速低于预期将增大停业风险。其次,我们发现监管政策的出台有效降低了平台停业风险,并且降低了平台正常经营对高增长的依赖。但监管政策对于高风险省份的作用弱于或不显著区别于低风险省份,表明监管效果的针对性需要加强。本文对进一步完善网贷行业监管政策及产业政策有参考意义。     

How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China

This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non‐SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non‐SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non‐SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.     

Sovereign Default,Domestic Banks,and Financial Institutions

We present a model of sovereign debt in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, government defaults are costly because they destroy the balance sheets of domestic banks. In our model, better financial institutions allow banks to be more leveraged, thereby making them more vulnerable to sovereign defaults. Our predictions: government defaults should lead to declines in private credit, and these declines should be larger in countries where financial institutions are more developed and banks hold more government bonds. In these same countries, government defaults should be less likely. Using a large panel of countries, we find evidence consistent with these predictions.     

以地融资、地方债务与杠杆——地方融资平台的土地抵押分析

中国的高经济杠杆率和地方债务风险受到广泛关注,目前较少研究地方债务中的银行贷款,而地方融资平台的土地抵押贷款是其中重要的融资来源。本文首次利用爬虫工具获取了中国土地市场网上的土地抵押数据,并且搜集了地方融资平台名单,通过对比融资平台和非平台公司的土地抵押信息,发现地方融资平台在抵押金额和抵押率上,都显著高于非融资平台的土地抵押。我们进行了各种稳健性检验,通过采用PSM方法,降低样本选择偏误,发现结果是稳健的。此外,本文还探究了背后的政治经济学因素,发现中西部的抵押金额和抵押率显著高于东部;未到期的城投债存量越大,土地抵押越大;地方政府的经济增长压力越大,土地抵押也越大。这一定程度上意味着,融资平台获得的土地抵押较高,是出于地方政府强烈的举债动机和对信贷市场的干预,导致信贷资源的无效率配置。即使是土地抵押这种相对来说风险较小的融资渠道,依然可能蕴含着地方债务风险,这也为地方债务融资的抵押率高提供了证据。     

Contracts,governance, and country risk in project finance: Theory and evidence

Project finance links financial structure to the operational characteristics of the project to optimize the allocations of various project risks. We develop a model in which concession grants and offtake agreements benefit both public and private sponsors in the presence of political risk. The public can use these contracts to incentivize the private sponsor to undertake an otherwise unacceptable project while benefiting from delegating the process of financing, building, and operating the project to the private sponsor. For the private sponsor, the government concession grant, while improving financial returns, entails political influence. We develop hypotheses connecting these contract choices to the public–private partnership governance structure of project finance and provide supporting evidence. Our findings suggest that a country's political and financial risks have significant impacts on the contract choice as well as the public–private governance structure in project finance. Projects in greater political risk countries tend to be structured with less government involvement in order to avoid political influence of the local government. Projects with the private finance initiative end up with more government involvement and control in order to protect the public interest.     

经济增长目标驱动投资吗?——基于2001-2016年地级市样本的理论分析与实证检验

已有文献发现政府制定的经济目标能够产生经济增长绩效,本文考察政府目标实现经济增长绩效的渠道和机制,提出经济增长目标驱动辖区投资增长的理论假说,并采用2001-2016年地级市政府工作报告公布的经济增长目标数据,对理论假说进行了验证。研究发现,经济增长目标每提高1%,地区投资显著上升约0.44%。这一发现在采用不同的核心变量度量指标、回归样本和估计方法后依然稳健。本文还发现,经济发展阶段和地区发展水平差异导致了目标驱动投资效应的异质性。随着经济发展阶段的转变,经济增长目标推动辖区投资增加的边际效应下降;在经济发展水平较高的东部地区,地方政府所制定的增长目标更有效地扩大了辖区投资。本文的研究发现有助于理解中国经济增长的内在动力机制,可为经济高质量发展转型提供政策启示。     

Bank discrimination, holding bank ownership, and economic consequences: Evidence from China

This paper finds that compared with Chinese state-owned firms, non-state-owned firms have a greater propensity to hold significant ownership in commercial banks. These results are consistent with the notion that because non-state-owned firms are more likely to suffer bank discrimination for political reasons, they tend to address their financing disadvantages by building economic bonds with banks. We also find that among non-state-owned firms, those that hold significant bank ownership have lower interest expenses, and are less likely to increase cash holdings but more likely to obtain short-term loans when the government monetary policy is tight. These results suggest that the firms building economic bonds with banks can enjoy benefits such as lower financial expenses and better lending terms during difficult times. Finally, we find that non-state-owned firms with significant bank ownership have better operating performance. Overall, we find that firms can reduce discrimination through holding bank ownership.     

Political embeddedness and firms’ choices of earnings management strategies in China

We examine whether and how political embeddedness influences financial reporting quality in China by investigating how government ownership and political connections affect Chinese listed firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. The results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in particular, central SOEs, are more likely to substitute accrual-based earnings management strategies with costlier but less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-SOEs. The results also indicate that politically connected enterprises (PCEs) are more likely to employ less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-PCEs, so much so that PCEs’ total earnings management level is higher than that of non-PCEs.     

A model of a systemic bank run

This paper provides a model of the view that the 2008 financial crisis is reminiscent of a bank run, focussing on six stylized key features. In particular, core financial institutions have invested their funds in asset-backed securities rather than committed to long-term projects: in distress, these can potentially be sold to a large pool of outside investors at steep discounts. I consider two different motives for outside investors and their interaction with banks trading asset-backed securities: uncertainty aversion versus adverse selection. I shall argue that the version with uncertainty averse investors is more consistent with the stylized facts than the adverse selection perspective: in the former, the crisis deepens, the larger the market share of distressed core banks, while a run becomes less likely instead as a result in the adverse selection version. Therefore, the outright purchase of troubled assets by the government at prices above current market prices may both alleviate the financial crises as well as provide tax payers with returns above those for safe securities.     

Diversification at financial institutions and systemic crises

It is widely believed that diversification at financial institutions benefits the stability of the financial system. This paper shows that it also entails a cost: even though diversification reduces each institution’s individual probability of failure, it makes systemic crises more likely. When systemic crises induce additional costs (over and above individual failures), full diversification is no longer desirable as a result and the optimal degree of diversification may be arbitrarily low. We show that the analysis can be extended beyond diversification, such as to interbank insurance and financial integration.     

改革开放后财政农业投入对农民增收的效应分析

从长期来看,财政农业投入对农民增收具有显著的正面效应,但短期内这一影响并不显著。不过,中央和地方财政农业投入对农民增收的贡献度有所不同,中央财政农业投入效果更佳。为此应继续加大财政对农业的投入力度,优化财政农业投入结构,提高财政资源配置和使用效率;明晰中央和地方财政的投入事权,理顺财政投入资金的管理体制;完善财政投入方式,提高农民直接补贴比重。     

Murphy’s Laws: A Key Explanatory Tool for Public Sector Disputes in the UK

This article reports on the use that the public makes of the budgetary and financial reporting produced by Spanish local authorities. The authors show financial reporting influences voting behaviour. Although citizens cannot decide how much tax they have to pay or the volume or quality of the services, they can control public management when it comes to election time. Accounting information can reflect the results of public policies and consequently serve as a vehicle for communicating the economic effects of political management. The authors make a strong case for more ‘popular’ financial reporting so that government accounts can be understood and properly used by non-specialists.     

疫情背景下的中小微企业金融纾困模式

针对新冠病毒肺炎疫情,本课题组对中小微企业的生存压力进行调研,发现85%中小微企业现金流不足支持3个月;各级政府、金融机构的救助政策反应迅速、积极,但惠及效率有待提高;企业现金流救助需要发挥政府平台和产业链群形成的产业平台的作用,助推金融精准纾困中小微企业。建议政府部门短期积极利用两大平台资源,优化中央、地方政府专项纾困基金和支持性贷款、金融扶持资金和优惠贷款的管理模式;中期建立专项中小微企业发展的扶持基金和就业援助计划,推动中小微企业转型升级。     

Why government banks underperform: A political interference view

This study proposes a political interference hypothesis to explain how political considerations depress the performance of government banks. We define political interference as a situation in which government bank executives are replaced within 12 months after the country’s major elections (presidential or parliamentary elections). We classify political and non-political government banks as those that experience or do not experience political interference, respectively. The hypothesis firstly suggests that once government banks undertake political interference, their financial performance deteriorates. That is, political banks display the worst performance, followed by non-political banks and private banks have the best performance. Next, we posit that the impact of political interference is greater in developing countries than in developed countries. Finally, we hypothesize that the underperformance of government banks will be reduced if we remove political interference. By employing bank data from 65 countries from the period of 2003–2007, our hypothesis effectively explains why government banks in developed countries escape relatively unscathed, while those in developing countries suffer significantly.     

信贷竞争与区域经济增长关系研究

宽松的信贷政策推动了中国经济的快速增长,但也让地方政府背负了沉重的债务负担,严重威胁金融系统的安全。本文采用2003-2012年年度数据,综合分析经济增长的影响因素,检验地方政府信贷竞争的经济增长效果。结论显示地方政府的投资冲动导致大量信贷资金被低效率利用,贷款产出率在下降,贷款产出效率的省际差异显著。财政收支缺口的扩大在一定程度上也刺激了地方政府的银行信贷需求。     

The Existence and Composition of Audit Committees in the New Zealand Public Sector

This study investigates the association between the source of funding of New Zealand public‐sector entities (PSEs) and the existence and composition of their audit committees. We examine 134 PSEs in the health, local government and tertiary sectors. Of these PSEs, 81 (60%) have an audit committee. The size of the audit committees are on average larger than recommended by best practice guidelines. However, most of the PSEs comply with guidelines recommended for audit committee independence but not financial expertise. PSEs with higher levels of government funding are more likely to establish audit committees and PSEs that rely on funding from rate payers and debt providers are more likely to have audit committees with a majority of independent members. There is no support for the association between the source of funding and the level of financial expertise on audit committees.