Emerging Market Exposures and the Predictability of Hedge Fund Returns

We examine emerging market and global macro hedge funds and find a significant positive relation between hedge funds’ future returns and their exposure to both emerging market equities and emerging market currencies. We present evidence that the strong predictive power of emerging market betas is related to the superior market‐timing ability of these fund managers. Results are robust after controlling for commonly used hedge fund factors, the emerging market equity index, lagged fund returns, liquidity risk, and fund characteristics. Our results suggest that hedge funds can earn positive excess returns by timing their exposure to emerging market securities.     

Hedge funds and optimal asset allocation: Bayesian expectations and spanning tests

This paper analyzes the contribution of hedge funds to optimal asset allocations between 1993 and 2010. The preferences of specific institutional investors are captured by implementing a Bayesian asset allocation framework that incorporates heterogeneous expectations regarding hedge fund alpha. Mean-variance spanning tests are used to infer the ability of hedge funds to significantly enhance the mean-variance efficient frontier. Further, a novel democratic variance decomposition procedure sheds light on the dynamics in the co-movement of hedge fund returns with a set of common benchmark assets. The empirical findings indicate that portfolio benefits of hedge funds are time-varying and strongly depend on investor optimism regarding hedge funds’ ability to generate alpha. In general, allocations to hedge funds improve the global minimum variance portfolio even after controlling for short-selling restrictions and minimum diversification constraints. However, due to dynamics underlying the composition of the aggregate hedge fund universe, the factor structure of hedge fund returns has become more similar to the benchmark assets over time.     

Are hedge funds active market liquidity timers?

This paper investigates liquidity timing behaviour of hedge funds that invest globally in foreign investment assets. We expect these hedge funds to manage currencies exposure differently, depending on the extent they treat them as an asset class. In this paper, we investigate if actively timing foreign exchange (FX) liquidity adds value to hedge funds' investments. Unlike the existing studies where fund managers are assumed to either time or not time the market over the entire study period, we argue that fund managers may strategically choose to be active market liquidity timers based on the market condition at the time. To test this hypothesis, we develop a state-dependent liquidity timing model embedded with a Markov regime switching process and identify changes in the FX liquidity timing behaviour among the Global Derivatives hedge funds over an eighteen-year period. Our findings reveal that such regime changes in timing behaviour are driven by the underlying FX liquidity condition. A further analysis to compare the changes in the timing behaviour over time shows that hedge funds that are active market liquidity timers outperform those that engage in liquidity timing less frequently in all strategies categories.     

A tale of feedback trading by hedge funds

This paper studies the extent of feedback trading at the factor level by hedge fund managers. We show that fund managers continuously adjust their exposure to different risk factors conditional on the recent performance of these factors. The majority of managers apply a positive feedback strategy, whereas the remaining managers use a negative feedback strategy. In addition, we find some evidence for factor timing ability, although managers appear to be more backward looking than forward looking. We show that positive feedback trading can be beneficial to fund performance in our setup. If managers applied the positive feedback strategy more aggressively, however, they could benefit more from it. As such, the “smart switching benchmark” can be used to assess the risk-adjusted performance of hedge funds.     

Higher risk,lower returns: What hedge fund investors really earn

The returns of hedge fund investors depend not only on the returns of the funds they hold but also on the timing and magnitude of their capital flows in and out of these funds. We use dollar-weighted returns (a form of Internal Rate of Return (IRR)) to assess the properties of actual investor returns on hedge funds and compare them to buy-and-hold fund returns. Our main finding is that annualized dollar-weighted returns are on the magnitude of 3% to 7% lower than corresponding buy-and-hold fund returns. Using factor models of risk and the estimated dollar-weighted performance gap, we find that the real alpha of hedge fund investors is close to zero. In absolute terms, dollar-weighted returns are reliably lower than the return on the Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 index, and are only marginally higher than the risk-free rate as of the end of 2008. The combined impression from these results is that the return experience of hedge fund investors is much worse than previously thought.     

The Market Timing Ability of UK Mutual Funds

Abstract:  We apply a recent nonparametric methodology to test the market timing skills of UK equity and balanced mutual funds. The methodology has a number of advantages over the widely used regression based tests of Treynor-Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson-Merton (1981) . We find a relatively small number of funds (around 1%) demonstrate positive market timing ability at a 5% significance level while around 19% of funds exhibit negative timing and on average funds miss-time the market. However, controlling for publicly available information we find very little evidence of market timing ability based on private timing signals. In terms of investment styles, there are a small number of successful positive market timers amongst Equity Income and 'All Company' funds but not among either Small Stock funds or Balanced funds, although a few small stock funds are found to time a small stock index rather than a broad market index.     

Can hedge funds time market liquidity?

We explore a new dimension of fund managers' timing ability by examining whether they can time market liquidity through adjusting their portfolios' market exposure as aggregate liquidity conditions change. Using a large sample of hedge funds, we find strong evidence of liquidity timing. A bootstrap analysis suggests that top-ranked liquidity timers cannot be attributed to pure luck. In out-of-sample tests, top liquidity timers outperform bottom timers by 4.0–5.5% annually on a risk-adjusted basis. We also find that it is important to distinguish liquidity timing from liquidity reaction, which primarily relies on public information. Our results are robust to alternative explanations, hedge fund data biases, and the use of alternative timing models, risk factors, and liquidity measures. The findings highlight the importance of understanding and incorporating market liquidity conditions in investment decision making.     

A global approach to mutual funds market timing ability

In this paper, we globally investigate market timing abilities of mutual fund managers from the three perspectives: market return, market-wide volatility and aggregate liquidity. We propose a new specification to study market timing. Instead of considering an average market exposure for mutual funds, we allow mutual fund market betas to follow a random walk in the absence of market timing ability. As a consequence, we capture market exposure dynamics which is really due to manager market timing skills while allowing dynamics to come from other sources than market timing. We find that on average 6% of mutual funds display return market timing abilities while this percentage amounts to respectively 13% and 14% for volatility and liquidity market timing. We also analyze market timing by investment strategies and for surviving and dead funds. Dead funds exhibit lower volatility and liquidity timing skills than live funds.     

Trapped in diversification – another look at the risk of fund of hedge funds

Recent literature implies that despite being more diversified, fund of hedge funds (FOFs) are exposed to tail risk. We propose an explanation for this phenomenon; tail risk is a systematic risk factor for hedge funds, which by construction, explains the higher portion of the returns in the diversified portfolios. Our study suggests that not only an additional tail risk factor improves the explanatory power of the factor model, the relative importance of tail risk factor increases with the number of underlying hedge funds in an FOF portfolio. Furthermore, we demonstrate that FOFs with a short history, higher management fees, leverage and requiring shorter lockup periods are more sensitive to tail risk.     

The risk in hedge fund strategies: Theory and evidence from long/short equity hedge funds

Theory suggests that long/short equity hedge funds' returns come from directional as well as spread bets on the stock market. Empirical analysis finds persistent net exposures to the spread between small vs large cap stocks in addition to the overall market. Together, these factors account for more than 80% of return variation. Additional factors are price momentum and market activity. Combining two major branches of hedge fund research, our model is the first that explicitly incorporates the effect of funding (stock loan) on alpha. Using a comprehensive dataset compiled from three major database sources, we find that among the three thousand plus hedge funds with similar style classification, less than 20% of long/short equity hedge funds delivered significant, persistent, stable positive non-factor related returns. Consistent with the predictions of the Berk and Green (2004) model we find alpha producing funds decays to “beta-only” over time. However, we do not find evidence of a negative effect of fund size on managers' ability to deliver alpha. Finally, we show that non-factor related returns, or alpha, are positively correlated to market activity and negatively correlated to aggregate short interest. In contrast, equity mutual funds and long-bias equity hedge funds have no significant, persistent, non-factor related return. Expressed differently, L/S equity hedge funds, as the name suggests, do benefit from shorting. Besides differences in risk taking behavior, this is a key feature distinguishing L/S funds from long-bias funds.     

Timing the volatility risk of beta anomaly: Evidence from hedge fund strategies

Hedge funds are known to engage in the betting-against-beta (BAB) strategy arising from beta-anomaly-related market mispricing. This paper examines if equity-oriented hedge funds time the volatility risk when executing the BAB strategy. We apply realised and downside volatility risk measures to assess the BAB strategy. We show that for top volatility risk timers, older funds tend to be better risk timers, while among the bottom volatility risk timers, younger and larger-sized funds stand out as stronger timers of BAB volatility. We observe that the Long/Short Equity funds show evidence as the strongest volatility risk timers of BAB strategy when the market condition turned bad. This is supported by their other effective timing strategies at the same time, including timing the market sentiment. Our findings provide important references for private investors when selecting hedge funds as risk management is crucial to the success/failure of any investments.     

Can hedge funds time global equity markets? Evidence from emerging markets

This paper examines the ability of global hedge funds to time a particularly volatile asset class — emerging market equities. In particular, we study whether or not these funds can either time emerging markets as a whole, or time their exposures to different regions. Using both pooled and calendar-time approaches, we generally find no evidence of overall timing ability. However, we do find some evidence of period-specific timing ability during the financial crisis and subsequent recovery.     

Systematic risk and the cross section of hedge fund returns

This paper investigates the extent to which market risk, residual risk, and tail risk explain the cross-sectional dispersion in hedge fund returns. The paper introduces a comprehensive measure of systematic risk (SR) for individual hedge funds by breaking up total risk into systematic and fund-specific or residual risk components. Contrary to the popular understanding that hedge funds are market neutral, we find that systematic risk is a highly significant factor explaining the dispersion of cross-sectional returns while at the same time measures of residual risk and tail risk seem to have little explanatory power. Funds in the highest SR quintile generate 6% more average annual returns compared with funds in the lowest SR quintile. After controlling for a large set of fund characteristics and risk factors, systematic risk remains positive and highly significant, whereas the relation between residual risk and future fund returns continues to be insignificant. Hence, systematic risk is a powerful determinant of the cross-sectional differences in hedge fund returns.     

The performance of hedge funds and mutual funds in emerging markets

Use of short selling and derivatives is limited in most emerging markets because such instruments are not as readily available as they are in developed capital markets. These limitations raise questions about the value added provided by hedge funds, especially compared to traditional mutual funds active in these markets. We use five existing performance measurement models plus a new asset-style factor model to identify the return sources and the alpha generated by both types of funds. We analyze subperiods, different market environments, and structural breaks. Our results indicate that some hedge funds generate significant positive alpha, whereas most mutual funds do not outperform traditional benchmarks. We find that hedge funds are more active in shifting their asset allocation. The higher degree of freedom that hedge funds enjoy in their investment style might thus be one explanation for the differences in performance.     

Optimal allocation to hedge funds: an empirical analysis

What percentage of their portfolio should investors allocate to hedge funds? The only available answers to the above question are set in a static mean-variance framework, with no explicit accounting for uncertainty on the active manager's ability to generate abnormal return, and usually generate unreasonably high allocations to hedge funds. In this paper, we apply the model introduced in Cvitanic et al (2002b Working Paper USC) for optimal investment strategies in the presence of uncertain abnormal returns to a database of hedge funds. We find that the presence of the model risk significantly decreases an investor's optimal allocation to hedge funds. Another finding of this paper is that low beta hedge funds may serve as natural substitutes for a significant portion of investor risk-free asset holdings.     

A unique view of hedge fund derivatives usage: Safeguard or speculation?

We study the common equity and equity option positions of hedge fund investment advisors over the 1999–2006 period. We find that hedge funds' stock positions predict future returns and that option positions predict both volatility and returns on the underlying stock. A quarterly tracking portfolio of stocks based on publicly observable hedge fund option holdings earns abnormal returns of 1.55% through the end of the quarter. Net of fees, hedge funds using options deliver higher benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns and lower risk than nonusers. The results suggest that hedge fund positions reflect significant timing and selectivity skill.     

HEDGE FUNDS: WHAT DO WE KNOW?

Hedge funds are attracting increased attention because of their reputation for earning superior (risk-adjusted) returns. Hedge Fund Research Inc. estimates that in 2001 there were about 7,000 hedge funds with investor capital of about $600 billion. And yet the diversity of hedge funds, combined with a general lack of transparency, makes the hedge fund industry something of a "black box."
This article provides an overview of the legal structure of hedge funds, the various fund investment strategies, and the existing research on overall hedge fund performance. Without uniform and comprehensive reporting requirements, it is difficult to ascertain the size and scope of hedge fund investments. Nonetheless, current research provides persuasive evidence that hedge funds earn positive risk-adjusted returns, on average, in contrast to their counterparts in the mutual fund industry. In an attempt to explain these higher returns, the authors begin by noting that hedge funds are subject to considerably less regulation than other investment institutions because their client base is limited to wealthy individuals and institutions. Hedge funds can thus employ investment strategies that mutual funds and pension funds are prohibited from pursuing, such as short selling, high leverage, derivatives, concentrated holdings, and limited redemptions. As a result, the funds may be able to earn excess returns by operating in illiquid and specialized markets where there is a shortage of arbitrage capital. At the same time, and perhaps even more important, hedge funds are in a better position than conventional mutual funds to attract skilled managers because of their use of performance-based incentive fee structures.     

Do Hot Hands Exist among Hedge Fund Managers? An Empirical Evaluation

In measuring performance persistence, we use hedge fund style benchmarks. This allows us to identify managers with valuable skills, and also to control for option-like features inherent in returns from hedge fund strategies. We take into account the possibility that reported asset values may be based on stale prices. We develop a statistical model that relates a hedge fund's performance to its decision to liquidate or close in order to infer the performance of a hedge fund that left the database. Although we find significant performance persistence among superior funds, we find little evidence of persistence among inferior funds.     

The second wave of hedge fund activism: The importance of reputation,clout, and expertise

Using a large dataset of hand-collected information on activist interventions from 2008 to 2014, we examine why certain hedge funds succeed in the face of competition. We document that the top hedge funds succeed, not merely because of how they select targets, but because they acquire a reputation for what we label “clout and expertise.” These hedge funds do not intervene more frequently; to the contrary, activists with more interventions are associated with lower returns. Instead, top activists have a demonstrated ability to succeed in difficult interventions by targeting large firms, launching successful proxy fights, filing and winning lawsuits, pressuring target boards through the media, overcoming anti-takeover defenses, and replacing board members. These activists' successes appear to result more from board representation, improved performance, and monitoring management than from capital structure or dividend policy changes.     

Alumni social networks and hedge fund performance: Evidence from China

Based on unique data of Chinese private hedge funds, we first construct the “strong alumni” (alumni of the same school and the same major) social networks of private hedge fund managers, and examine the impact of alumni social networks on the performance of hedge funds in China. We build a series of alumni networks using the educational background information of 4734 private hedge funds, and perform an empirical analysis on a sample of 1115 private hedge funds products from 2010 to 2019. Different from previous findings of mutual funds, we find that more central network positions of hedge fund managers are associated with better risk-adjusted fund performance. Hedge fund managers with more central positions conduct more active investment styles and receive lower fund flows.¹ The results supplement the evidence that information advantages brought by central position in social networks can influence managers' investment styles, thus improve hedge fund performance.