Discussion of “How Banks' Value-at-Risk Disclosures Predict their Total and Priced Risk: Effects of Bank Technical Sophistication and Learning over Time”

Liu et al. (2004, this issue) show that technical sophistication and learning over time help improve the ability of bank trading portfolios' value-at-risk (VaR) disclosures to predict future trading income risk, and that trading VaRs predict bank-wide total risk and systematic risk. While the results suggest that VaRs are a reliable measure of risk for the sample firms, the study's incremental contribution is limited because of the nature of the sample firms and problems in variable measurement.     

Measuring bank risk: Forward-looking z-score

While the z-score has been widely used to evaluate bank risk, it is criticized as a backward-looking measure. We propose a forward-looking method to construct the z-score by incorporating analyst forecasts. Empirical results show that the forward-looking z-score can predict the movement of the standard z-score one quarter ahead of time, and its predictive ability on banks' downward risk is better than the standard z-score. Moreover, we find that the predictive ability of the forward-looking z-score improves after the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, especially for large banks, showing the consequences of strengthened regulation and transparency. The forward-looking z-score is also significantly associated with the probability of default and market-based risk measures and can provide predictive signals for banks' future profitability. Overall, our findings suggest that the forward-looking z-score mitigates the shortcomings of the standard z-score and provides a reliable early warning signal for banks' future risk and performance.     

Banks' interest rate risk: the net interest income perspective versus the market value perspective

We use portfolios of passive investment strategies to replicate the interest risk of banks' banking books. The following empirical statements are derived. (i) Changes in banks' market value and in their net interest income are highly correlated, irrespective of the banks' portfolio composition. (ii) However, banks' portfolio composition has a huge impact on the ratio of changes in net interest income relative to changes in market value. These results are important for the design and interpretation of interest rate stress tests for banks.     

The Impact of Supervisory Stress Tests on Bank Ex-Ante Risk-Taking Behaviour: Empirical Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

We use the Federal Reserve's stress-testing regime as a quasi-natural experiment to examine the impact of supervisory stress tests on bank ex-ante risk taking behaviour. Using a sample comprising large U.S. bank holding companies over the period from 2003Q1 to 2016Q4, we find that banks which are subjected to annual supervisory stress tests tend to reduce their overall risk by choosing asset portfolios of lower risk exposures. Nevertheless, this risk reduction happens mainly because stress-tested banks reduce the holding of low-risk assets rather than risky assets. We also find that stress-tested banks tend to reduce their on-balance sheet exposures rather than off-balance sheet exposures. Overall, our finding implies that, while supervisory stress tests can help to reduce the banks' overall risks, policy makers should also have a closer look at the mechanisms in which banks allocate risk to mitigate moral hazard and regulatory arbitrage behaviour.     

Do banks overstate their Value-at-Risk?

This paper is the first empirical study of banks’ risk management systems based on non-anonymous daily Value-at-Risk (VaR) and profit-and-loss data. Using actual data from the six largest Canadian commercial banks, we uncover evidence that banks exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates. The data used in this paper have been extracted from the banks’ annual reports using an innovative Matlab-based data extraction method. Out of the 7354 trading days analyzed in this study, there are only two exceptions, i.e. days when the actual loss exceeds the disclosed VaR, whereas the expected number of exceptions with a 99% VaR is 74. For each sample bank, we extract from historical VaRs a risk-overstatement coefficient, ranging between 19 and 79%. We attribute VaR overstatement to several factors, including extreme cautiousness and underestimation of diversification effects when aggregating VaRs across business lines and/or risk categories. We also discuss the economic and social cost of reporting inflated VaRs.     

Government finances and bank bailouts: Evidence from European stock markets

Using a sample of European banks and a series of events affecting governments' finances, we conduct an event study to examine whether there is a relationship between governments' fiscal difficulties and banks' stock returns. We find a significant reaction of banks' stocks to news concerning governments' finances. Banks' stock returns fall in response to a deterioration of governments' financial situation. We find little difference in the reaction between large and small banks. The evidence points towards all banks being equally likely to be bailed out. Our data are consistent with a policy during the Eurozone sovereign-debt crisis in which “no bank is too small to save”.     

基于非参数检验的商业银行资产价格多变结构点研究

准确判断商业银行资产价格的变化规律是商业银行风险评估和预警的前提。以改进的多变结构点非参数检验方法为基础,实证检验2007~2013年上市商业银行资产价格的变结构点,结果表明:商业银行资产价格在样本期产生了多个均值变结构点和方差变结构点,且系统因素、行业因素和商业银行特质因素均可能会导致商业银行资产价格变结构点的出现。     

The level and quality of Value-at-Risk disclosure by commercial banks

In this paper we study both the level of Value-at-Risk (VaR) disclosure and the accuracy of the disclosed VaR figures for a sample of US and international commercial banks. To measure the level of VaR disclosures, we develop a VaR Disclosure Index that captures many different facets of market risk disclosure. Using panel data over the period 1996–2005, we find an overall upward trend in the quantity of information released to the public. We also find that Historical Simulation is by far the most popular VaR method. We assess the accuracy of VaR figures by studying the number of VaR exceedances and whether actual daily VaRs contain information about the volatility of subsequent trading revenues. Unlike the level of VaR disclosure, the quality of VaR disclosure shows no sign of improvement over time. We find that VaR computed using Historical Simulation contains very little information about future volatility.     

When LIBOR becomes LIEBOR: Reputational penalties and bank contagion

We study whether commonality of incentives and opportunity to commit fraud trigger reputational contagion from culpable firms to nonculpable firms. Relying on a sample of 30 banks involved in fixing the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and a control sample of 30 banks, we find that banks' reputations suffered substantial damage upon the announcement of their involvement in the scandal. We also document reputational contagion spread from banks that manipulated LIBOR to banks that shared the same incentives and opportunity to commit the fraud. The reputational contagion is more pronounced for large derivatives dealers who have had the strongest incentive to commit the fraud.     

The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.     

International Propagation of the Credit Crisis: Lessons for Bank Regulation*

The authors use a large sample of non‐U.S. banks to examine the origins and spread of the 2007–2009 crisis. Using both stock market and structural variables, they test whether the effects of the crisis on individual banks are better explained by crisis models or by the VaR‐type analysis of the Basel system. The latter emphasizes risk weightings for individual assets while ignoring linkages that could leave banks exposed to systemic shocks. Consistent with crisis models, the authors find that a small set of pre‐crisis measures of a bank's international linkages, leverage, and the fragility of its liability structure does a good job of discriminating between banks that suffered a large impact and those that did not. (Indeed, these measures explain almost 50% of the differences among banks' stock returns during the crisis period, and almost 40% of the changes in the variability of those returns.) The authors also provide evidence of both a direct linkage among banks' stock returns and an indirect linkage that could reflect either linkages in the real economy or common demands by investors for liquidity. The authors run a “horse race” that demonstrates that simple measures of book leverage were better predictors of bank performance than the Basel capital ratios. They find that banks with lower Basel risk weightings prior to the crisis proved, on average, to be more exposed to the crisis. The authors' explanation is that banks with lower Basel risk measures tended to operate with higher leverage and more aggressive funding strategies, which in turn exposed them to greater crisis risk (even as they conformed to the letter of the Basel system in terms of asset risk measures). Finally, the authors find no evidence that substandard governance was a separate contributing factor to crisis exposure. Banks with substantial international business that were exposed to systemic shocks had high governance scores.     

Environmental engagement and stock price crash risk: Evidence from the European banking industry

This paper investigates the impact of banks' environmental engagement on their future stock price crash risk. Given the strong commitment of European institutions towards a low carbon economy, we focus on European banks, which are expected to be crucial actors in driving this challenge. Using a sample of 447 bank-year observations across 22 European countries from 2015 to 2021, we find a negative relationship between banks' environmental engagement and future stock price crash risk, in accordance with the signalling theory, suggesting that a high level of environmental engagement corresponds to high ethical standards of bank managers and high levels of financial transparency.     

Risk taking behavior of privatized banks

We examine the risk taking behavior of privatized banks prior to and after privatization and find that privatized banks experience a significant decrease in risk after privatization; however they continue to exhibit higher risk than their rivals. This finding is consistent with the assertion that following privatization and the removal of government guarantees and subsidies, privatized banks become more prudent. Since rival banks do not experience a significant change in risk taking, we attribute the reduction in risk experienced by the privatized banks to changes in the banks' ownership structure rather than to industry factors. Interestingly, we also find that a higher fraction of the privatized banks' shares sold beyond a certain intermediate level induces higher risk taking, as the privatized bank becomes more accountable to shareholders. The finding that the fraction of shares sold is positively related to risk taking, coupled with the result that the privatized banks had higher risk in the pre-privatization period than in the post-privatization period suggests a nonlinear relationship between government/private ownership of banks and risk taking. Results of further analysis are consistent with a somewhat U-shaped relationship between private ownership and risk taking. The risk taking behavior of newly privatized banks is also influenced by the country's level of development and degree of political risk. Our results are robust to different measures of risk.     

Insurance demand and country risks: A nonlinear panel data analysis

This paper investigates the impact of country risks, including political, financial, and economic risks, on the income elasticity of insurance demand. Using the panel smooth transition regression model, we find that there is a significant regime-switching effect concerning the impact of country risks on the income elasticity of insurance demand. A full-sample analysis shows that the income elasticity of insurance demand decreases when country risks diminish. In a subsample analysis based on income level, legal origin, and restriction on banks' participation in insurance activities, we find that the elasticity diminishes in general when economic risk drops. When political risk is lower, the elasticity decreases in countries with high-income, common law origin, and insurance activities permitted by banks, whereas a clear pattern cannot be identified in the case of financial risk.     

Reclassification of Financial Assets under IAS 39: Impact on European Banks' Financial Statements

In response to the financial crisis, the IASB issued on 13 October 2008 an amendment to IAS 39 which enables entities to reclassify non-derivative financial assets held for trading and financial assets available-for-sale. This paper examines the influence of this controversial amendment on the 2008 financial statements of 219 European banks which apply IFRS. I find that approximately one-third of the sample banks have taken extensive advantage of these reclassification opportunities. The mean reclassification amount is 3.9% of total assets and 131% of the book value of equity, respectively. I further document that reclassifying banks avoid substantial fair value losses, and hence, report significantly higher levels of return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), book value of equity and regulatory capital. In particular, the mean ROE switches sign from a negative ROE of ?1.4% to a positive ROE of 1.3% due to gains from reclassifications. Overall, this paper documents a substantial impact of the amendments on banks' financial statements and suggests analysing these reclassifications with particular caution.     

Dividends and financial health: Evidence from U.S. bank holding companies

Using a large sample of U.S. bank holding companies from 1986 to 2020, we show that there is a positive relationship between banks' dividends lagged by one quarter and their financial health in the current quarter. We also find that this positive relationship is more pronounced for banks with lower capital adequacy and during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, indicating that it is more necessary for banks with these characteristics to use dividends to convey information regarding their financial health. Our additional analyses suggest that total payout is also positively associated with bank financial health, and that the positive relationship between dividends and financial health applies to private banks as well, but that the magnitude is weaker for them than for public banks. Our overall findings primarily complement a risk reduction hypothesis in corporate finance and bank payout policies.     

Liquidity creation,regulatory capital,and bank profitability

We examine the interrelationships among liquidity creation, regulatory capital, and bank profitability of US banks. We find that regulatory capital and liquidity creation affect each other positively after controlling for bank profitability. However, this relationship is largely driven by small banks and primarily during non-crisis periods. It is also sensitive to the level of banks' regulatory capital and how it is measured. Furthermore, we find that banks which create more liquidity and exhibit higher illiquidity risk have lower profitability. Finally, the relationship between regulatory capital and bank performance is not linear and depends on the level of capitalization. Regulatory capital is negatively related to bank profitability for higher capitalized banks but positively related to profitability for lower capitalized banks. Therefore, a change in regulatory capital has differential impacts on bank performance. Our findings have various implications for policymakers and bank regulators.     

Ownership structure and risk-taking: Comparative evidence from private and state-controlled banks in China

This study examines the impact of ownership structure on Chinese banks' risk-taking behaviours. We classify the Chinese commercial banks into three categories based on the types of controlling shareholder, and find that banks controlled by the government (GCBs) tend to take more risks than those controlled by state-owned enterprises (SOECBs) or private investors (PCBs). This is attributed to the severe political intervention and weak incentives to follow prudent bank management practices for GCBs. We also find that the results are more pronounced among banks with concentrated ownership presumably because the large controlling power helps to enhance the monitoring of the management and promotes prudent operating procedures. Our findings have important implications for the ongoing reform in the Chinese banking sector.     

Which banks smooth and at what price?

By adjusting lending, banks can smooth the macroeconomic impact of deposit fluctuations. This may, however, lead to extended periods of disproportionately high lending relative to deposit intake and, under certain conditions, to the accumulation of risk in the banking system. Using bank-level data for 8477 banks in 129 countries for the period from 1992 to 2015, we examine how banks' market power and other characteristics may contribute to smoothing or amplification of shocks and the accumulation of risk. We find that the higher their market power the lower is the growth rate of lending relative to deposits. As a result, in periods of falling deposits higher market power for the average bank is associated with a greater fall in lending, consistent with amplification of adverse effects during relatively bad times. Strikingly, at very high levels of market power, there is a threshold past which the effect of market power on the growth rate of lending relative to deposits turns positive so that “superpower” banks may contribute to the smoothing of adverse effects when deposits are falling. In periods of rising deposits, however, such banks are more likely to lead to amplification and accumulation of risk in the economy.     

Does Subordinated Debt Play a Role for Market Discipline?

This paper examines the link between the issuance of subordinated debt by commercial banks and market discipline. Using cross-sectional and time-series data from 2002 to 2007, we empirically examine the relationship between banks' risk level and their decisions to issue subordinated debts in Taiwan. In particular, we test the hypothesis that the commercial banks with low risk levels prefer to issue subordinated debts more than high-risk banks do, and we reject the hypothesis. We conclude that the application of subordinated debt is not a mature channel for providing market discipline for commercial banks in Taiwan. We offer potential reasons for this finding and discuss the policy implications of our findings.