The Coordination Role of Stress Tests in Bank Risk‐Taking

We examine whether stress tests distort banks' risk‐taking decisions. We study a model in which a regulator may choose to rescue banks in the event of concurrent bank failures. Our analysis reveals a novel coordination role of stress tests. Disclosure of stress‐test results informs banks of the failure likelihood of other banks, which can reduce welfare by facilitating banks' coordination in risk‐taking. However, conducting stress tests also enables the regulator to more effectively intervene banks, coordinating them preemptively into taking lower risks. We find that, if the regulator has a strong incentive to bail out, stress tests improve welfare, whereas if the regulator's incentive to bail out is weak, stress tests impair welfare.     

Interest Rates and Credit Risk

This paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default in the context of a dynamic model in which the link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee firm survival. The need to finance new investment pushes firms' leverage ratio above some state‐contingent target toward which firms gradually adjust through earnings retention. The response to interest rate rises and cuts is both asymmetric and heterogeneously distributed across firms. Our results help rationalize some of the evidence regarding the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy.     

The rise and fall of Spain (1270–1850)1

Two distinctive regimes are distinguished in Spain over half a millennium. The first one (1270s–1590s) corresponds to a high land–labour ratio frontier economy, which is pastoral, trade‐oriented, and led by towns. Wages and food consumption were relatively high. Sustained per capita growth occurred from the end of the Reconquest (1264) to the Black Death (1340s) and resumed from the 1390s only broken by late fifteenth‐century turmoil. A second regime (1600s–1810s) corresponds to a more agricultural and densely populated low‐wage economy which, although it grew at a pace similar to that of 1270–1600, remained at a lower level. Contrary to pre‐industrial western Europe, Spain achieved its highest living standards in the 1340s, not by mid‐fifteenth century. Although its death toll was lower, the plague had a more damaging impact on Spain and, far from releasing non‐existent demographic pressure, destroyed the equilibrium between scarce population and abundant resources. Pre‐1350 per capita income was reached by the late sixteenth century but only exceeded after 1820.     

Disagreement and Biases in Inflation Expectations

Disagreement in inflation expectations observed from survey data varies systematically over time in a way that reflects the level and variance of current inflation. This paper offers a simple explanation for these facts based on asymmetries in the forecasters' costs of over- and underpredicting inflation. Our model implies (i) biased forecasts, (ii) positive serial correlation in forecast errors, (iii) a cross-sectional dispersion that rises with the level and the variance of the inflation rate, and (iv) predictability of forecast errors at different horizons by means of the spread between the short- and long-term variance of inflation. We find empirically that these patterns are present in inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters. A constant bias component, not explained by asymmetric loss and rational expectations, is required to explain the shift in the sign of the bias observed for a substantial portion of forecasters around 1982.     

THE PRESENT STATE OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS IN LATIN AMERICA

This document attempts to give an overall review of the present situation of national accounts in Latin America, and deals essentially with the statistical basis and procedures used in their preparation. The purpose of these comments is to place the main problems common to all countries in order of priority and, in view of the need to advance and in the face of the task of establishing the present SNA, to discuss briefly the main lines which future work might follow. The stage of development so far reached by national accounts in Latin America is unsatisfactory if compared with the former system recommended by the United Nations two decades ago, and their recent evolution indicates that the rate of progress has fallen behind the advances made in the theoretical field in this connexion, and in relation to the increasing requirements of macroeconomic information for economic planning and policy. This whole picture becomes more meaningful if the objectives, structure and content of the present SNA, that has already been in force for five years, are compared with the present state of national accounts estimates in the region, which reveals the long road that lies ahead and the magnitude of the effort required if the present situation is to show a change for the better. Clearly, little progress can be made unless the basic statistics are expanded in scope and improved. This is the crux of the problem, towards which the greatest efforts and resources should primarily be channeled. It is necessary to adopt a critical approach and concerted action with respect to four aspects which characterize the national statistical systems in Latin America:

• (a) organizational problems and the shortage of human and financial resources;
• (b) the lack of co-ordinated programmes of basic statistics;
• (c) the limited use of efficient methods of collecting data; and
• (d) the insufficient recourse to administrative records.

     

Are Firms Underleveraged? An Examination of the Effect of Leverage on Default Probabilities

A commonly held view in corporate finance is that firms are less leveraged than they should be, given the potentially large tax benefits of debt. In this paper, I study the effect of firms' leverage on default probabilities as represented by the firms' ratings. Using an instrumental variable approach, I find that the leverage's effect on ratings is three times stronger than it is if the endogeneity of leverage is ignored. This stronger effect results in a higher impact of leverage on the ex ante costs of financial distress, which can offset the current estimates of the tax benefits of debt.     

Response to ‘Duplications’ by Drelichman and Voth

In this response, we demonstrate that Mauricio Drelichman and Hans‐Joachim Voth, in their 2015 Economic History Review note ‘Duplication without constraints: Álvarez‐Nogal and Chamley's analysis of debt policy under Philip II’, provide a misconceived and inaccurate account of our argument about the finances of Philip II in ‘Debt policy under constraints: Philip II, the Cortes, and Genoese bankers’ (Economic History Review, 2014). Here, we summarize our position in the context of the current literature and provide a few comments on data gathering.