Pillar 2: tax competition in low-income countries and substance-based income exclusion

Pillar 2 of the OECD's global tax reform proposal will have significant direct and indirect impacts for low-income developing countries (LICs). Most interesting and problematic is the question as to how the global anti-base erosion (GloBE) rules for a proposed global minimum effective tax will affect tax competition behaviour in LICs, and how LICs should respond when a critical mass of higher-income economies adopt the new structure. Most LICs are source-only countries, and they are very much in competition to attract foreign direct investment. Do LICs want to continue to compete using the tax system to the extent possible, to step back from that competition, or to take some intermediate course? Pillar 2 does not itself change a country's desired position on the competition spectrum – it merely affects how, and to what extent, that position can still be obtained. This paper posits that LICs should adopt qualified domestic minimum top-up taxes, and that this will not itself have a negative impact on their competitiveness. The primary focus of the paper, however, is on the design of the substance-based income exclusion (carve-out), examining the following three questions. Should the GloBE have been designed without a carve-out? Would there have been a better way of designing it? How will LICs be affected? The paper concludes that, as little real advantage is likely to accrue to LICs from intangible assets, minimising tax competition for those assets will have relatively little impact on them; and that, from an economic efficiency standpoint, shifting the tax burden away from a normal return and toward economic rents – albeit imperfectly – is a reasonable solution.     

Taxpayers' Behavioural Responses and Measures of Tax Compliance ‘Gaps’: A Critique and a New Measure

The work of Feldstein (1995 and 1999) has stimulated substantial conceptual and empirical advances in economists' approaches to analysing taxpayers' behavioural responses to changes in tax rates. Meanwhile, a largely independent literature proposing and applying alternative measures of tax compliance has also developed in recent years, which has sought to provide tax agencies with tools to identify the extent of tax non‐compliance as a first step to designing policies to improve compliance. In this context, measures of ‘tax gaps’ – the difference between actual tax collected and the potential tax collection under full compliance with the tax code – have become the primary measures of tax non‐compliance via (legal) avoidance and/or (illegal) evasion. In this paper, we argue that the tax gap as conventionally defined is conceptually flawed because it fails to incorporate behavioural responses by taxpayers. We show that conventional tax gap measures, which ignore the presence of behavioural responses, exaggerate the degree of non‐compliance. This potentially applies both to indirect taxes (such as the ‘VAT gap’) and direct (income) taxes. Further, where these conventional tax gap measures motivate reforms designed to increase the tax compliance rate, they will likely have a tax‐base‐reducing effect and hence generate a smaller increase in realised tax revenues than would be anticipated from the tax gap estimate.     

Compliance costs for personal income tax in a transition country: the case of Slovenia

The evaluation of taxpayers' compliance costs has grown in significance within tax system research over the last 15 years. In 2001, two surveys of VAT and personal income taxpayers were conducted in Slovenia to evaluate compliance costs for the 2000 fiscal year. This paper presents the results of research into compliance costs for personal income tax in Slovenia. The results show that compliance costs for personal income tax are relatively low, primarily because most taxpayers consider filing their tax declaration to be a simple procedure, which means that consultancy costs are low.     

Tax coordination with different preferences for public goods: Conflict or harmony of interest?

The paper analyzes strategic commodity taxation in a model with trade in a single private good that is simultaneously imported by consumers of a high-tax country and exported by its producers. Conditions for the existence of a Nash equilibrium are given, and an asymmetry is introduced through different preferences for public goods. Two tax coordination measures are discussed—a minimum tax rate and a coordinated increase in the costs of cross-border shopping. It is shown that tax coordination generally benefits the high-tax country while the low-tax country will gain only if the intensity of tax competition is high in the initial equilibrium or if governments are pricesensitive toward the effective marginal costs of public good supply.     

Towards the Development of a Tax System Complexity Index

Reducing tax system complexity is a common goal amongst policymakers; yet there is no commonly agreed definition of complexity. This paper seeks to fill this gap, by proposing the construction of an index of tax system complexity, conceived as a summary indicator of the overall complexity of a tax system at a particular point in time. If adopted, such an index would not only enable assessment of the changing level of a country's tax system complexity over time, but may also facilitate comparisons of the relative complexity of different countries' tax systems in future.     

Thinking and Learning in the Tax Evasion Game

Equilibrium behaviour is one of the fundamental concepts of economics: that each player's strategy is a best response to their beliefs about other players' strategies (and that these beliefs are realised). It is therefore striking that one of the most utilised economic models of tax compliance (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972) lacks this property as random audit selection is not a best response for the tax administration. The game theory literature of tax compliance has solved the equilibrium under assumptions of perfect information, full rationality and representative agents (Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Erard and Feinstein, 1994). The recent application of behavioural economics to tax compliance (Hashimzade et al., 2014) allows richer assumptions such as heterogeneity and asymmetric information to be included in agent‐based models. This paper investigates the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy with heterogeneous taxpayers, imperfect information and evolutionary survival of taxpayers. It finds that, under these conditions, the tax administration's best‐response audit strategy is an adaptive learning approach and not a well‐defined audit function. This fits with actual practice of ‘predictive analytics’ by OECD tax administrations. Behavioural game theory also predicts that when actors are information rich, adaptive learning will dominate abstract thinking.     

论税务稽查期限延长的法律控制——以吉林丰达有限公司案为例

我国现有税收法律规范对税务稽查期限延长次数与长度的规定存有法律漏洞。为避免因税务机关多次延长稽查期限导致纳税义务人承担多缴纳税款滞纳金等不利性后果而由此产生的诸多争议,在立法面上,税务稽查期限延长的次数和长度应予法律保留;在执法面上,税务机关延长稽查期限应接受由程序参与性、程序中立性、程序理性和程序及时性构成的正当行政程序之约束;在救济面上,应建立税务稽查期限不当延长的抵抗权制度、抗告诉讼制度以及税款滞纳金停止计算制度。     

Effectiveness of minimum tax legislation and its effect on corporate financial reporting: A comparative analysis between the United States and India

This paper reports a comparative analysis of the experience of introducing minimum tax legislation in the US and India. Given the differences in the economic and market settings in the two countries, one would expect the impact of the regulation and the corporate response to its introduction to be different. Our empirical analysis, however, indicates that the response to the minimum tax legislation in India is very similar to that in the US. The evidence indicates that the minimum tax legislation is not the best means of achieving horizontal equity among taxpayers, given its significant administrative and compliance costs and the manipulative reporting response it generates from the corporate sector.     

An Alternative View on Determinants of the Effective Tax Rate: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

This article proposes a new model for determining the effective tax rate (ETR), which incorporates the accounting-tax conformity theory and identifies ETR determinant variables to fit the Chinese taxation context. The results show that the ETR is statistically significantly associated with preferential tax rates, investment gains, nonoperating expenses, and provisions for impaired assets. The accounting-tax difference ETR determinant variables provide more consistent results than previous typical ETR determinants, such as size, return on assets, leverage, and capital intensity.     

Response of Tax Credit Claims to Tax Enforcement: Evidence from a Quasi‐Experiment in Chile

Diesel in Chile receives different tax treatments depending on its use. If diesel is used in industrial activities, the diesel taxes paid can be fully used as a credit against VAT, but if it is used in freight or public transportation – basically trucks and buses – only a fraction of diesel taxes paid can be claimed as a tax credit for VAT payments. As a result of this different tax treatment, firms have incentives to use ‘tax‐exempted’ diesel in activities requiring ‘non‐tax‐exempted’ diesel. This tax wedge therefore generates an opportunity for tax evasion, especially for firms with multiple economic activities, one of them being transport. In this paper, we analyse the impact of a tax enforcement programme implemented by the Chilean Internal Revenue Service (IRS), where letters requiring information about diesel purchases and use and vehicle ownership were sent to around 200 firms in 2003. Using different empirical strategies to consider the non‐randomness of the selection of firms, the empirical results show consistently that firms receiving a letter decreased their diesel tax credits by around 10 per cent.     

New development: Time for a consequential impact tax to support the NHS?

The UK's National Health Service (NHS) is facing its most serious financial crisis since its inception and positive, enduring, fundamental changes need to be made if the NHS is to survive as a financially sustainable entity. This article looks at the costs of lifestyle self-abuse behaviour (over 15% of the total NHS spending) and proposes a new tax to offset the costs of treatment and preventative education. The idea is applicable to other countries facing similar problems.     

Corporate profitability and effective tax rate: the enforcement effect of large taxpayer units

This paper examines how Large Taxpayer Units (LTUs), a commonly-used tool for enforcing tax compliance, affect large firms’ reported profitability and effective tax rate. Increased scrutiny may either improve reporting and compliance efforts, or lead to adverse reactions from large taxpayers such as profit shifting to reduce tax liabilities. As a source of exogenous enforcement shock, we exploit the actions of Jamaica's LTU around its large-taxpayer eligibility cutoff using a before-during regression discontinuity approach. We find the LTU increases pre-tax profit margin by 2–3 percentage points. Increased effective tax rates are also evidenced, albeit less robustly.     

Compliance Costs of Corporate Income Taxation in Singapore

This study is the second in a series of studies investigating tax compliance costs incurred by public-listed companies. We found evidence of a size effect which is a predominant finding of similar studies. The size effect was more pronounced when absolute measures of costs were used than when a relative measure, cost/sales turnover, was used. Additional evidence was found of limited success relating to the IRAS's moves to simplify the tax system. Specifically, only large companies with sales turnover exceeding $500m benefited and considerably reduced their overall compliance costs. Most of the decrease was a result of the computational component of compliance costs. This resulted in the gap in absolute costs narrowing between Group 3 and any of the other categories of companies. There was also greater reliance on external professionals, the smaller the company. Views elicited indicate that more could be done to increase accessibility to IRAS publications for Group 1 and Group 2 companies.     

Compliance Costs for Employers: UK PAYE and National Insurance, 1995–96

This paper, based upon research financed by the Inland Revenue and the Contributions Agency of the DSS, presents calculations of the compliance costs for employers of PAYE and National Insurance in 1995–96. Total costs are estimated to have been of the order of £1.3 billion. The costs are very unequally spread across employers, whether measured per employee or per pound of tax raised. They are particularly high for small new employers. For the largest employers, these costs may be offset by the cash-flow benefits of acting as tax collectors. The composition of labour and other costs is calculated and estimates are made of compliance costs under various payroll ‘technologies’. The main determinants of compliance costs, for an employer, are analysed using weighted least-squares regression analysis. Finally, some policy implications are considered.     

An Investigation of Some Factors Affecting Taxpayer Non-compliance

A growing concern in almost every nation today is the amount of ‘tax gap’ (i.e. the difference between the taxes actually paid and what would be paid if all taxpayers filed complete and accurate returns and paid all the taxes they owe). Because the tax gap is often quite substantial, the problem of taxpayer non-compliance is one that requires careful scrutiny. This article addresses the problem of taxpayer non-compliance in an international context. The article briefly presents three of the main factors said to affect taxpayer non-compliance (rate structure, tax complexity, and control system). Next some estimates of the extent of non-compliance in seven countries (Sweden, Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Italy and the United States) are reported and an examination made of the three factors in each country's tax system. It concludes with a discussion of how each factor analysed affects taxpayer compliance.     

Measuring the Cost‐Effectiveness of an R&D Tax Credit for the UK

This paper investigates the economic impact of the government's proposed new UK R&D tax credit. We measure the benefit of the credit by the effect on value added in the short and long runs. This is simulated from existing econometric estimates of the tax‐price elasticity of research and development (R&D) and the effect of R&D on productivity. For the latter, we allow R&D to have an effect on technology transfer (catching up with the technological frontier) as well as innovation (pushing the frontier forward). We then compare the increase in value added to the likely exchequer costs of the programme under a number of scenarios. In the long run, the increase in GDP far outweighs the costs of the tax credit. The short‐run effect is far smaller, with value added only exceeding cost if R&D grows at or below the rate of inflation.     

Decline of Controlled Foreign Company Rules and Rise of Intellectual Property Boxes: How the European Court of Justice Affects Tax Competition and Economic Distortions in Europe

The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become an influential player in the field of direct taxation in the European Union (EU) in the past 20 years. However, it is unclear whether or not the ECJ's decisions and the corresponding reactions by the member states actually contribute to tax neutrality in economic terms and, therefore, to the achievement of the internal market. In 2006, the ECJ limited the applicability of specific tax rules in the EU that are intended to prohibit the excessive use of low‐tax countries by multinationals. Our counterfactual analysis shows that the court's restriction of so‐called controlled foreign company rules and the related second‐round reactions by some member states – i.e. the introduction of low‐tax regimes for income from acquired intellectual properties (IP boxes for acquired IP) – cast doubt on the seemingly positive effects the ECJ has on reducing tax distortions. In addition, we demonstrate that the restricted applicability of IP boxes as endorsed by the OECD and the European Commission would strengthen tax neutrality in Europe.     

中国公共预算约束软化的体制成因：理论分析与实证检验

科学和民主的预算管理制度建立前,税制和分税制对政府预算约束有重要作用。中国税制和分税制缺乏内生约束机制,地方政府有空间和激励突破预算框架参与过度财政竞争,使公共预算约束软化。根据公共预算软约束的估计和面板 probit模型,1994年的税制和分税制改革整体硬化了全国预算收入约束,但导致东部的预算收入约束软化,且未改善预算支出约束。现行税制和分税制下,不规范的税收优惠政策、投资扩张冲动和专项转移支出依赖是导致公共预算约束软化的重要机制。     

Tax Systems in the World: An Empirical Investigation into the Importance of Tax Bases, Administration Costs, Scale and Political Regime

We study the structure of taxation in a sample of 100 democratic and nondemocratic regimes over three time periods. The results provide strong support for several regularities in the world as a whole, specifically (1) scale effect: utilization of each tax source increases as the government expands, (2) base effect: tax systems rely more heavily on relatively larger tax bases, and (3) administrative cost effect: lower costs of administration lead to increased reliance on the corresponding revenue source. We also investigate the role of political regime and find that democracies rely substantially more on other income taxation, possibly because this tax source requires a higher degree of voluntary compliance. JEL Code: H2, D72, D78, E31, E51, F13, P35     

Chief Financial Officers’ Power,Institutional Environment,and Corporate Effective Tax Rate: Evidence from China

Abstract

In this study, we investigate how chief financial officers’ (CFOs’) power and institutional environment influence corporate effective tax rates (ETRs). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2010, we find that firms with expert power or political power CFOs enjoy a low effective tax rate. Furthermore, CFOs’ expert power plays a more important function in reducing ETR in regions with a better institutional environment compared to those with less-developed institutions. CFOs’ political power is the most important factor in reducing ETR in regions with a less developed institutional environment than in those regions with a better institutional environment.