Reducing complexity and compliance costs: a simplification safe harbour for the global minimum tax

I present a simplification safe harbour based on tax administrative guidance for Pillar Two, the global minimum tax, developed together with Cedric Döllefeld, Joachim Englisch, Simon Harst and Felix Siegel. It aims at reducing unnecessary compliance costs by avoiding effective tax rate (ETR) calculations if a minimum tax of 15 per cent has already been paid. The simplification safe harbour consists of a two-level test to determine if a full GloBE ETR calculation is required from a multinational enterprise (MNE) or if a simplified ETR calculation or no calculation at all is sufficient. The test consists of a country-level test and – only if necessary – an MNE-level test. The country-level test assesses a country's tax system. It seeks to determine whether the national tax system's nominal tax rates are (too) low and whether significant deviations between a country's tax base and the GloBE income exist. The second level, the MNE-level test, is only carried out if the country-level test has identified potential ‘red flags’. Even if this second test is required, the simplification safe harbour offers a significant reduction in compliance costs. This reduction is achieved by relying on national tax data, which are readily available in firms, instead of highly adjusted accounting data.     

Empirical evidence on the global minimum tax: what is a critical mass and how large is the substance-based income exclusion?

This paper presents empirical evidence on the proposed global minimum tax (GMT) of the OECD's Pillar 2. First, it addresses how many, and which, countries or country groups can be seen as constituting a ‘critical mass’ for its successful implementation; given such a critical mass, remaining jurisdictions worldwide will have an incentive to implement the GMT as well. Second, it assesses the generosity of the substance-based income exclusion (SBIE), which is informative for the revenue collected under the GMT.     

The use of accounting information in the tax base in the Pillar 2 global minimum tax: a discussion of the rules,potential problems,and possible alternatives

In this paper, I provide a high-level, non-technical review of how accounting information is used in Pillar 2 and what this means for the tax base. In addition, I discuss potential problems of using accounting data explicitly in a minimum tax and then, specifically, as the starting point for the computation of the income measures in Pillar 2. I then discuss several alternative solutions that may be simpler – or at least no more complex – and, importantly, pose fewer problems in terms of the quality of financial accounting information and the information available to capital markets.     

Tax and the Crisis*

Did taxation play any role in precipitating the financial crisis? Are there lessons to be drawn for future tax reform priorities? This paper reviews the main channels by which tax effects might have been felt and which may require forceful attention. These include in particular the large tax biases favouring debt finance and, in some countries, investment in housing. The complexities of national tax codes, and the international interaction between them, have, moreover, encouraged the use of complicated financial instruments and international tax planning, reducing transparency. Tax distortions did not cause the crisis – in the sense that there are no obvious tax changes likely to have triggered it – but they may well have contributed by leading to higher leverage and more complexity than would otherwise have been the case. Most of these distortions have long been a source of concern, but dealing with them may be more important than previously supposed.     

The Financial Crisis and the Value‐relevance of Recognised Deferred Tax Assets

The objective of this study is to consider if the value‐relevance of recognised deferred tax assets, which often represent unused tax losses, was affected by the financial crisis. A regression analysis of a sample of Australian and United Kingdom firms reveals that the value‐relevance of recognised deferred tax assets was affected by the financial crisis. However, the impact of the financial crisis differed between the sample countries. The study shows that a plausible explanation for this difference might be found in the tax law of the two countries. Findings of this paper will be of interest to regulators and standard setters, as they highlight how interaction between accounting requirements and tax law affects the relevance of accounting and tax information.     

"特朗普税改政策"的溢出效应及中国的应对策略

特朗普税改使美国成为税收洼地,各国为争夺国际资本竞相效仿降税,加剧了全球税收竞争,为世界经济复苏增加了更多的不确定性.因此,有必要通过构建利润转移视角的税收竞争模型,揭示特朗普税改对全球经济产生溢出效应的作用机制及赤字约束问题,并运用一般均衡模型(CGE)模拟特朗普税改对世界经济溢出效应的长短期影响.特朗普税改是以邻为壑的经济政策,但长期内对中国等世界主要经济体的负面影响不断减弱,并会对出口产生一定的正面影响.因此,我国应构建国际税务交互管理体制,强化企业税收激励的法制保障,完善税改冲击的应急运行机制.     

Mobile tax base as a global common

If countries anticipate international Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their taxpayers less mobile or increases the mobility of taxpayers elsewhere. Piecemeal evidence on what activities countries use is provided. Such activities are analyzed that interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the groups of loyal and nonloyal citizens or investors is endogenous. Further, the implications of tax harmonization and minimum taxes for these types of nonprice competition are considered. Home attachment reduces the intensity of tax competition, but generates a strategic disadvantage for the country that invests much in such home attachment. Harmonization of taxes and high minimum taxes can intensify countries’ investment in home attachment.      

Minimum taxes and repeated tax competition

An agreement about a lower bound for admissible tax rates can reduce the equilibrium tax rate (and thus welfare) in tax competition among fully symmetric countries. This is shown in an infinitely repeated game where the stage game describes the standard tax competition model with source-based taxes and symmetric countries. Repeated interaction may allow countries to sustain cooperation through implicit contracts. Lower bounds on tax rates (‘minimum taxes’) restrict the ability of countries to punish deviators. This makes cooperation harder to sustain. The introduction of a lower bound on feasible tax rates may thus harm all countries.     

跨国公司在华投资战略的变化及我国相应的对策

对国际跨国公司来说,21世纪和中国入世是两个重要的环境变化.前者是国际市场大环境的变化,这主要表现为全球经济一体化和知识经济的迅猛发展;后者是一个重要的目标市场小环境变化,这主要是说中国将更加开放同时竟争也将进一步加剧.面对这两个环境变化,国际跨国公司将采取哪些战略措施,我国应当如何应对是本文要探讨的问题.     

International capital market equilibrium with investment barriers

This paper outlines models of capital market equilibrium when there are explicit barriers to international investment in the form of a tax on holdings of assets in one country by residents of another country. There is a corresponding subsidy on short positions in foreign assets. Asset prices deviate from the predictions of the world capital asset pricing model. Investors do not hold a mixture of national market portfolios, but the mix of risky assets is the same for every investor in a country. Optimal portfolios tend to be heavy in domestic assets, and light in foreign assets. Tax free investors, however, tend to hold assets anywhere in the world that are taxed heavily. Estimates of the magnitude of the average tax (or the magnitude of effective barriers to international investment) can be made by comparing the average return on the minimum variance zero β portfolio, z, with the average across countries and time of the short-term interest rate. When barriers are ineffective, the expected return on portfolio z will be the average short-term interest rate, and the world capital asset pricing model will hold.     

Life Insurance Liabilities at Market Value: An Analysis of Insolvency Risk, Bonus Policy, and Regulatory Intervention Rules in a Barrier Option Framework

This article takes a contingent claim approach to the market valuation of equity and liabilities in life insurance companies. A model is presented that explicitly takes into account the following: (i) the holders of life insurance contracts (LICs) have the first claim on the company's assets, whereas equity holders have limited liability; (ii) interest rate guarantees are common elements of LICs; and (iii) LICs according to the so‐called contribution principle are entitled to receive a fair share of any investment surplus. Furthermore, a regulatory mechanism in the form of an intervention rule is built into the model. This mechanism is shown to significantly reduce the insolvency risk of the issued contracts, and it implies that the various claims on the company's assets become more exotic and obtain barrier option properties. Closed valuation formulas are nevertheless derived. Finally, some representative numerical examples illustrate how the model can be used to establish the set of initially fair contracts and to determine the market values of contracts after their inception.     

Does recent empirical evidence support the existence of international corporate tax competition?

Recent reductions in institutional barriers to international investment have meant that the existence of international corporate tax differentials is now one of the most significant remaining causes of distortion to the optimum global allocation of resources, and hence to international trade. In the debate as to how to reduce such distortion, two main schools of thought have emerged. The first believes that this result can be achieved primarily through the international co-ordination of corporate taxes. To date, efforts in this direction have not made significant progress. The second contends that market forces, through tax competition, will spontaneously reduce international corporate tax differentials. In this article, an analysis of recent trends in corporate tax rates supports this second contention: statutory and effective corporate tax rates are continuing to decline and converge. However, recent tax revenue data give little support for the existence of tax competition; the expected shift in the tax burden from corporate profits onto less mobile factors such as labor has largely failed to materialize. Several explanations for these contrasting findings are outlined and analyzed.     

Do government preferences matter for tax competition?

This paper explores how government preferences affect capital tax decisions of a country. We develop a model in which governments, differentiating in their preferences for economic development and income equality, compete for mobile capital over corporation taxes. The key prediction of the model, borne out in data from OECD countries over the years 1990–2012, is that an increase in government preferences for pursuing economic development relative to income equality makes countries’ horizontal tax reactions stronger. Unlike the existing studies, our result contributes to the tax competition literature by highlighting the importance of government preferences in determining the extent of tax competition among countries and so offering a novel explanation for the widely observed heterogeneous tax policies across countries.     

Empirical evidence on the effects of tax incentives

This paper considers two empirical questions about tax incentives: (i)?are incentives used as tools of tax competition and (ii)?how effective are incentives in attracting investment? To answer these, we prepared a new dataset of tax incentives in over 40 Latin American, Caribbean and African countries for the period 1985–2004. Using spatial econometrics techniques for panel data to answer the first question, we find evidence for strategic interaction in tax holidays, in addition to the well-known competition over the corporate income tax (CIT) rate. We find no robust evidence, however, for competition over investment allowances and tax credits. Using dynamic panel data econometrics to answer the second question, we find evidence that lower CIT rates and longer tax holidays are effective in attracting FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean but not in Africa. None of the tax incentives is effective in boosting gross private fixed capital formation.     

Tax competition and the international distribution of firm ownership: an invariance result

How does the international distribution of firm ownership affect the outcomes of tax/subsidy competition for mobile plants? As corporate ownership becomes increasingly globalised, this question becomes increasingly important for policy. We prove a strong invariance result in the context of the tax/subsidy competition between two host countries for a monopoly firm’s plant. Both the equilibrium plant location and the equilibrium tax/subsidy offers are independent of the international distribution of the firm’s ownership. The reason is that the tax/subsidy competition equalises the firm’s post-tax profits across countries, making owners of capital indifferent towards the location of production.     

Taxation,imperfect competition,and discontinuities

Most work on taxation assumes that market adjustments to taxation will be small and continuous and so analyzes the effects of taxation using standard marginal methods. However, the world often changes in large and discontinuous ways. This paper looks at the effects of taxation when discontinuities in market adjustments are allowed because market structure is determined endogenously by the discrete entry and exit decisions of firms. The results indicate that the potential for discontinuities generates tax effects that are considerably different from those that emerge when adjustments are small and continuous. With discontinuities, taxes can have large and discrete effects, for example, by increasing prices far in excess of the tax itself or by changing utility in a highly nonmarginal way. Of more significance, with discontinuities taxes can actually increase welfare even when they lessen competition and raise prices. Taxes can also have markedly different effects on the income and welfare of different groups. Consumers are always made worse off by a tax, but a tax may be supported by the firms in an industry if the tax limits entry and thereby increases firm profits.     

The end of corporate imperialism

As they search for growth, multinational corporations will have no choice but to compete in the big emerging markets of China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil. But while it is still common to question how such corporations will change life in those markets, Western executives would be smart to turn the question around and ask how multinationals themselves will be transformed by these markets. To be successful, MNCs will have to rethink every element of their business models, the authors assert in this seminal HBR article from 1998. During the first wave of market entry in the 1980s, multinationals operated with what might be termed an imperialist mind-set, assuming that the emerging markets would merely be new markets for their old products. But this mind-set limited their success: What is truly big and emerging in countries like China and India is a new consumer base comprising hundreds of millions of people. To tap into this huge opportunity, MNCs need to ask themselves five basic questions: Who is in the emerging middle class in these countries? How do the distribution networks operate? What mix of local and global leadership do you need to foster business opportunities? Should you adopt a consistent strategy for all of your business units within one country? Should you take on local partners? The transformation that multinational corporations must undergo is not cosmetic--simply developing greater sensitivity to local cultures will not do the trick, the authors say. To compete in the big emerging markets, multinationals must reconfigure their resources, rethink their cost structures, redesign their product development processes, and challenge their assumptions about who their top-level managers should be.     

税费替代:增值税减税、非税收入征管与企业投资

通过减税促进企业投资和提振宏观经济是近年来中国税收制度改革的重要目标,但减税政策的实际效果却存在争议。本文利用2009年增值税转型改革,研究了减税对地方政府税费收入和企业非税负担的影响,从税费替代的角度揭示非税负担变动如何影响企业固定资产投资。研究发现:(1)增值税转型在减税的同时提高了地方政府非税收入并加重了企业非税负担,地方财政收入受增值税转型冲击越大,企业非税负担上升越明显。(2)上述应主要体现在小型、微型和民营企业上,大中型、非民营企业的非税负担未发生明显变化。(3)非税负担上升会显著抑制小型、微型和民营企业的固定资产投资,促使小型微型和民营企业通过持有更多现金和减少流动性负债来应对税费负担不确定性。本文有助于理解减税政策对小型微型和民营企业非税负担的溢出效应及其影响,为通过减税降费促进投资和提振经济提供经验支撑。     

Corporate Restructurings: A Comparison of Equity Carve-outs and Spin-offs

In this paper we examine divisive corporate restructurings in which a firm takes a subsidiary public. Using a sample of 64 spin-off and 76 carve-out firms during 1991–1997, we find firms carve-out subsidiaries with higher market demand. These subsidiaries are more frequently in related industries than spin-offs. The carve-out firms are also more likely to be cash constrained and have lower marginal tax rates, but are not likely to be considering financial reporting synergies when structuring the divestiture. These results provide evidence that factors impacting the divestiture choice related to Master Limited partnerships, as studied previously, differ when divesting a corporate subsidiary.     

优化营商环境视域下网络虚构交易的税法因应

我国正积极优化营商环境以推动公平竞争.网络虚构交易作为新兴商业策略,目前正被网络经营者滥用.已有研究多侧重关注如何维护竞争秩序,而较少关注税制因素对竞争秩序的影响.理论上,网络虚构交易所涉增值税、企业所得税等税款均可申请退税.这在一定程度上间接鼓励网络虚构交易的发生,事实上构成了对守法经营者的税制歧视,最终会扭曲电子商务的竞争秩序.为配合营商环境的优化,税法有必要按形式外观限制相关税款的退税,限制相关成本费用在计算企业所得税时进行扣除,税务机关在税收征管活动中应对网络虚构交易保持警惕.从呼应优化营商环境的改革来看,税法的竞争中立这一议题不应被回避.