The impact of junior debt issuance on senior unsecured debt’s risk premiums

Numerous studies have examined the impact of security issuance upon the value of pre-existing debt and equity but the focus has largely been on changes in equity value. We examine changes in senior unsecured debt risk premiums that accompany new junior debt issues. Additionally, we test several hypotheses regarding the potential impacts of junior debt issues. Extant theory suggests senior debt value may be threatened under certain conditions by the issuance of junior debt. Our results indicate that when junior debt replaces bank debt, senior default risk premiums experience abnormal declines. The result is broadly consistent with the elevation of the senior unsecured debt by way of the elimination of a separate and more senior class of debt claimants. In contrast, we also find that larger junior bond issues are associated with abnormal increases in senior risk premiums, broadly consistent with issue size being correlated with negative information about firm cash flows. We find strong evidence of interaction effects. For example, replacement of bank debt results in greater changes in default risk premiums the larger the issue size. We also find lower credit ratings magnify other effects. For example, if the junior debt issued matures before the outstanding senior unsecured bond, senior risk premiums experience abnormal increases for lower rated debt.     

The Effects of Relative Changes in CEO Equity Incentives on the Cost of Corporate Debt

We examine how effort and risk incentives embedded in CEO equity incentives are related to the cost of debt and the role credit worthiness plays in this relationship. Our empirical approach addresses a number of unanswered questions in the literature by examining the sources and effects of co‐movements in CEO incentives, whether the proportionality of these movements is rationally priced, and whether the effects are concentrated among bonds with greater likelihood of default. Our findings confirm that effort and risk incentives are rationally priced by bond market participants. We also show that significant cross‐sectional effects are more pronounced for speculative bonds, implying that previously documented links between equity incentives and the cost of debt may not be generalizable to all debt issues.     

Distance to default,subordinated debt,and distress indicators in the banking industry*

The recent financial crisis has highlighted the inadequacy of present supervisory arrangements to identify reliable ex‐ante indicators of banking distress. For a sample of US bank holding companies, we analyse the extent to which distance to default based on market data can be explained using accounting‐based indicators of risk. We show that a larger number of bank fundamentals help predict default for institutions that issue subordinated debt. For banks that issue sub‐debt, we find that higher charter values and low bank capitalizations further increase the power of bank fundamentals to predict default risk.     

Longitudinal accounting comparability and bond credit spreads: Evidence from China

This paper proposes a procedure to measure firms’ longitudinal accounting comparability and investigates whether it affects bond risk premiums. The results provide robust evidence that bonds of firms with more longitudinally comparable accounting information have lower credit spreads. This effect is stronger when the firms’ financial performance is poor and for bonds with speculative credit ratings. Results also reveal that firms with less longitudinally comparable accounting information are more informationally asymmetric and do have a higher expected default probability. Finally, the effects of the longitudinal and the cross-sectional comparability in reducing bond credit spreads are incremental to each other.     

Liquidity and CDS premiums on European companies around the Subprime crisis

This paper sheds new light on the liquidity dynamics of the credit default swaps (CDS) market in Europe around the Subprime crisis. Based on an original dataset of 94 European companies from 2005 to 2009, we use a panel regression analysis to study the relationship between CDS premiums and liquidity. We measure the level of liquidity, look at liquidity risk, and study the liquidity spillovers from the bond and equity markets to the CDS market. We show that the effect of liquidity on CDS premiums is dominated by the influence of worsening credit conditions and deteriorating investors?? expectations about default risk. Controlling for credit risk, we also find that liquidity risk is priced in the European CDS market and that liquidity spillovers from the bond market matter in determining CDS premiums.     

From T-Bills to Stocks: Seasonal Anomalies Revisited

This paper employed eleven data series which consist of stocks, bonds, bills, equity premiums, term premiums, and various default premiums to investigate whether January seasonality reported in existing literature is robust across different states of the economy as this has important trading implications. For the periods 1926–1990, small stocks, small stock premiums, low grade bonds, and default premiums (spread between high grade, low grade and government bonds) reveal January seasonality and that the seasonality is robust across different states of the economy except for low grade bond returns and default premiums. January seasonality for low grade bond returns and low grade bond default premiums are primarily driven by results found during periods of economic expansion. Overall, January seasonality is more evident during the economic expansion periods although the magnitude of default premiums is larger during periods of economic contraction. Furthermore, prior findings of strong summer equity returns are primarily driven by the results found during the periods of economic contraction. It is also found that equity returns are generally higher during periods of economic expansion.     

Corporate Yield Spreads and Bond Liquidity

We find that liquidity is priced in corporate yield spreads. Using a battery of liquidity measures covering over 4,000 corporate bonds and spanning both investment grade and speculative categories, we find that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads, and an improvement in liquidity causes a significant reduction in yield spreads. These results hold after controlling for common bond‐specific, firm‐specific, and macroeconomic variables, and are robust to issuers' fixed effect and potential endogeneity bias. Our findings justify the concern in the default risk literature that neither the level nor the dynamic of yield spreads can be fully explained by default risk determinants.     

Valuing Debt in a Complex Capital Structure

This article extends previous bond valuation models to account for more realistic assumptions regarding financial distress. Realized value of an individual bond under severe financial distress will reflect the expected outcome of credit-event negotiations and the relative priority listing of the security. We explicitly represent the probability rate of credit-event occurrence as a function of firm value relative to the fixed overall debt obligations of the firm. Risk premiums generated under reasonable parameter value choices fall within the range of observed bond risk premiums. Our model also provides an explanation as to why observed bond risk premia are positive after adjustment for default.     

Optimal Portfolios with Credit Default Swaps

Using a continuous-time, stochastic, and dynamic framework, this study derives a closed-form solution for the optimal investment problem for an agent with hyperbolic absolute risk aversion preferences for maximising the expected utility of his or her final wealth. The agent invests in a frictionless, complete market in which a riskless asset, a (defaultable) bond, and a credit default swap written on the bond are listed. The model is calibrated to market data of six European countries and assesses the behaviour of an investor exposed to different levels of sovereign risk. A numerical analysis shows that it is optimal to issue credit default swaps in a larger quantity than that of bonds, which are optimally purchased. This speculative strategy is more aggressive in countries characterised by higher sovereign risk. This result is confirmed when the investor is endowed with a different level of risk aversion. Finally, we solve a static version of the optimisation problem and show that the speculative/hedging strategy is definitely different with respect to the dynamic one.     

Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure

I build a dynamic capital structure model that demonstrates how business cycle variation in expected growth rates, economic uncertainty, and risk premia influences firms' financing policies. Countercyclical fluctuations in risk prices, default probabilities, and default losses arise endogenously through firms' responses to macroeconomic conditions. These comovements generate large credit risk premia for investment grade firms, which helps address the credit spread puzzle and the under‐leverage puzzle in a unified framework. The model generates interesting dynamics for financing and defaults, including market timing in debt issuance and credit contagion. It also provides a novel procedure to estimate state‐dependent default losses.     

The Pricing of Initial Public Offers of Corporate Straight Debt

This study examines the initial-day and aftermarket price performance of corporate straight debt IPOs. We find that IPOs of speculative grade debt are underpriced like equity IPOs, while those rated investment grade are overpriced. IPOs of investment grade debt are typically issued by firms listed on the major exchanges and underwritten by prestigious underwriters. In contrast, junk bond IPOs are more likely to be handled by less prestigious underwriters and are typically issued by OTC firms. Our analysis also reveals that bond rating, market listing of the firm, and investment banker quality are significant determinants of bond IPO returns.     

Sovereign risk premiums in the European government bond market

This paper provides a study of bond yield differentials among EU government bonds on the basis of a unique data set of issue spreads in the US and DM (Euro) bond market between 1993 and 2009. Interest differentials between bonds issued by EU countries and Germany or the USA contain risk premiums which increase with fiscal imbalances and depend negatively on the issuer’s relative bond market size. The start of the European Monetary Union has shifted market attention to deficit and debt service payments as key measures of fiscal soundness and eliminated liquidity premiums in the euro area. With the financial crisis, the cost of loose fiscal policy has increased considerably.     

Liquidity and Credit Risk

We develop a structural bond valuation model to simultaneously capture liquidity and credit risk. Our model implies that renegotiation in financial distress is influenced by the illiquidity of the market for distressed debt. As default becomes more likely, the components of bond yield spreads attributable to illiquidity increase. When we consider finite maturity debt, we find decreasing and convex term structures of liquidity spreads. Using bond price data spanning 15 years, we find evidence of a positive correlation between the illiquidity and default components of yield spreads as well as support for downward‐sloping term structures of liquidity spreads.     

融资流动性与债券资产流动性的互动特征——基于MS-VAR模型的时变分析

依据2015-2021年货币市场和债券市场的时间序列数据,运用MS-VAR探究了不同违约风险环境下融资流动性与债券资产流动性间的互动关系。研究发现：无论是利率债还是信用债,其资产流动性与货币市场的融资流动性存在互为正反馈的流动性螺旋。此外,两类流动性间的互动特征存在非对称性和异质性,在风险时期,融资流动性与利率债资产流动性互动特征比较明显,而在平稳时期,融资流动性与信用债资产流动性互动特征比较明显。     

Taxpayer resistance,guarantee uncertainty,and housing finance subsidies

In the absence of external guarantees, a private firm's debt trades in the market at rates reflective of its private default risk. Not all firms go it alone, however. There are entities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), whose debt obligations enjoy federal guarantees. Federal guarantees affect housing finance indirectly in that they tend to enhance the creditworthiness of the debt obligations of the housing intermediary which lessens the debtholder's exposure to default. The market investor then becomes a willing buyer of GSE debt at a lower (subsidized) rate as a result of the government guarantee.Due to the fact that the subsidy rests on the presumption that the GSE debt will be bailed out by the government it can be seen that the subsidy in turn rests upon the presumption by the GSE debtholder that the taxpayers will honor the guarantee in the event of a GSE default. Hence, government subsidies to the housing intermediaries rest not on ongoing government outlays but rather on the confidence that the taxpayers will be willing, if called upon, to cover GSE losses, i.e., the confidence of a bailout.This article analyzes the effects on the GSE subsidy and on the taxpayer, if the debt markets charge for bailout risk. Bailout risk pricing is an economic event. When debtholders seek to protect themselves by pricing for bailout risk, this increases GSE borrowing costs and cuts into both GSE borrowers' subsidies and stockholder earnings. Higher borrowing costs leave the GSE in a weakened condition and increase the ex ante bailout cost to the taxpayer. When bailout risk premiums become priced by the market, it substantially lessens the government's ability to subsidize housing finance or other GSE activities.     

A Macrofinance View of U.S. Sovereign CDS Premiums

Premiums on U.S. sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) have risen to persistently elevated levels since the financial crisis. We examine whether these premiums reflect the probability of a fiscal default—a state in which a balanced budget can no longer be restored by raising taxes or eroding the real value of debt by increasing inflation. We develop an equilibrium macrofinance model in which the fiscal and monetary policy stances jointly endogenously determine nominal debt, taxes, inflation, and growth. We show that the CDS premiums reflect the endogenous risk-adjusted probabilities of fiscal default. The calibrated model is consistent with elevated levels of CDS premiums but leaves dynamic implications quantitatively unresolved.     

Inflation Risk in Corporate Bonds

We argue that corporate bond yields reflect fears of debt deflation. When debt is nominal, unexpectedly low inflation increases real liabilities and default risk. In a real business cycle model with optimal but infrequent capital structure choice, more uncertain or procyclical inflation leads to quantitatively important increases in corporate log yields in excess of default‐free log yields. A panel of credit spread indexes from six developed countries shows that credit spreads rise by 14 basis points if inflation volatility or the inflation‐stock correlation increases by one standard deviation.     

Monitoring and Controlling Bank Risk: Does Risky Debt Help?

We examine whether mandating banks to issue subordinated debt would enhance market monitoring and control risk taking. To evaluate whether subordinated debt enhances risk monitoring, we extract the credit‐spread curve for each banking firm in our sample and examine whether changes in credit spreads reflect changes in bank risk variables, after controlling for changes in market and liquidity variables. We do not find strong and consistent evidence that they do. To evaluate whether subordinated debt controls risk taking, we examine whether the first issue of subordinated debt changes the risk‐taking behavior of a bank. We find that it does not.     

Empirical Evidence on Corporate Risk‐Shifting

We study empirically whether nonfinancial firms’ behavior is consistent with systematic risk‐shifting. We compare firms’ operating risk before and after a debt issue, under the assumption that if there is any risk‐shifting it is most likely to occur right after a debt issue. We document a significant increase in firms’ operating risk, even after adjusting for industry influences. The risk‐shifting is higher for firms with no subsequent debt issues, and for firms with lower credit ratings. Other determinants are earnings volatility, size of debt issue, and whether the bond is callable.     

Resolving the Presidential Puzzle

Many financial economists are puzzled by the fact that stock returns are higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies. In this paper, we test whether this return differential is explained by risk using a conditional version of the Fama and French (1993) model that allows risk to vary across political cycles. We find that the presidential puzzle can be explained when risk is properly taken into account. Much of the return differential can be attributed to the fact that Democratic presidencies are associated with higher market and default risk premiums than their Republican counterparts.