Public Goods,Social Norms,and Naïve Beliefs

An individual's contribution to a public good may be seen by others as a signal of attributes such as generosity or wealth. An individual may, therefore, choose their contribution so as to send an appropriate signal to others. In this paper, we question how the inferences made by others will influence the amount contributed to the public good. Evidence suggests that individuals are naïve and biased toward taking things at “face value.” We contrast, therefore, contributions made to a public good if others are expected to make rational inferences versus contributions if others are expected to make naïve inferences.     

Unobservable outcomes and multiattribute preferences in the evaluation of managerial performance*

Abstract. This paper employs a generalized principal-agent model to analyze accounting situations in which the outcome is not jointly observable and the principal's and agent's preferences are multiattribute in nature. This requires the consideration of accounting signals for risk-sharing (or insurance) information in addition to performance evaluation (or incentive) information. It is shown that precisely two factors determine whether a signal will be valuable in the agency relationship: Observability of the agent's effort and the principal's multivariate risk neutrality. Sufficient conditions for various accounting signals to have value are also developed. Furthermore, when multiple accounting signals are available, it is shown that under certain conditions, the insurance components of the multiple signals can be aggregated into a single aggregate insurance measure and the incentive components of the signals can be aggregated (via a different aggregation procedure) into another aggregate incentive measure. Résumé. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle généralisé mandant-mandataire pour analyser les situations comptables dans lesquelles le résultat n'est pas observable conjointement et les préférences du mandant et du mandataire comportent, par nature, de multiples attributs. Cela exige la prise en considération d'indicateurs comptables relatifs à l'information sur le partage des risques (ou de l'assurance) en plus de l'information relative à l'évaluation du rendement (ou aux stimulants). Les auteurs démontrent que deux facteurs permettent de déterminer avec précision si un indicateur sera valable dans la relation de mandataire: le caractère observable de l'effort du mandataire et la neutralité multivariée du mandant à l'égard du risque. Des conditions suffisantes pour que les divers indicateurs comptables soient valables sont également établies. En outre, lorsque des indicateurs comptables multiples sont disponibles, les auteurs démontrent que dans certaines conditions, les éléments des indicateurs multiples liés à l'assurance peuvent faire l'objet d'une regroupement en une seule mesure globale d'assurance, et que les éléments des indicateurs liés aux stimulants peuvent faire l'objet d'une regroupement (au moyen d'une méthode différente) en une autre mesure globale des stimulants.     

Global Value Chains and Effective Exchange Rates at the Country‐Sector Level

The real effective exchange rate (REER) is one of the most cited statistics in open‐economy macroeconomics. We show that the models used to compute these numbers are not rich enough to allow for the rising importance of global value chains. Moreover, because different sectors within a country participate in international production sharing at different stages, sector‐level variations are also important for determining competitiveness. Incorporating these features, we develop a framework to compute REER at both the sector and country level and apply it on intercountry input‐output tables to study the properties of the new measures.     

Hot Hands in Mutual Funds: Short-Run Persistence of Relative Performance, 1974–1988

The relative performance of no-load, growth-oriented mutual funds persists in the near term, with the strongest evidence for a one-year evaluation horizon. Portfolios of recent poor performers do significantly worse than standard benchmarks; those of recent top performers do better, though not significantly so. The difference in risk-adjusted performance between the top and bottom octile portfolios is six to eight percent per year. These results are not attributable to known anomalies or survivorship bias. Investigations with a different (previously used) data set and with some post-1988 data confirm the finding of persistence.     

Measuring the Degree of International Harmony in Selected Accounting Measurement Practices

This research assesses empirically the extent to which selected accounting measurement practices of companies from France, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US are harmonised in the context of major international efforts to enhance the comparability of company financial statements. The findings suggest that significant differences continue in accounting measurement practices between companies originating in each of these countries. The results of the study have important implications for international standard-setters, investors, creditors and those interested in international accounting.     

Returns and Volatility of Low-Grade Bonds 1977–1989

This paper examines the risks and returns of long-term low-grade bonds for the period 1977–1989. We find: (1) low-grade bonds realized higher returns than higher-grade bonds and lower returns than common stocks, and low-grade bonds exhibited less volatility than higher-grade bonds due to their call features and high coupons; (2) there is no relation between the age of low-grade bonds and their realized returns; cyclical factors explain much of the observed relation between default rates and bond age; and (3) low-grade bonds behave like both bonds and stocks. Despite this complexity there is no evidence that low-grade bonds are systematically over- or under-priced.     

Stock Dividends,Stock Splits,and Signaling

This paper provides evidence that firms signal their private information about future earnings by their choice of split factor. Split factors are increasing in earnings forecast errors, after controlling for differences in pre-split price and firm size. Furthermore, price changes at stock dividend and split announcements are significantly correlated with split factors, holding other factors constant, and with earnings forecast errors. These correlations suggest that management's choice of split factor signals private information about future earnings and that investors revise their beliefs about firm value accordingly. The analysis also suggests, however, that announcement returns are significantly correlated with split factors after controlling for earnings forecast errors. This suggests that earnings forecast errors measure management's private information about future earnings with error, that split factors signal other valuation-relevant attributes, or that a signaling explanation is incomplete.     

The Pricing of Initial Public Offers of Corporate Straight Debt

This study examines the initial-day and aftermarket price performance of corporate straight debt IPOs. We find that IPOs of speculative grade debt are underpriced like equity IPOs, while those rated investment grade are overpriced. IPOs of investment grade debt are typically issued by firms listed on the major exchanges and underwritten by prestigious underwriters. In contrast, junk bond IPOs are more likely to be handled by less prestigious underwriters and are typically issued by OTC firms. Our analysis also reveals that bond rating, market listing of the firm, and investment banker quality are significant determinants of bond IPO returns.     

Imitation and the Incentive to Contribute Early in a Sequential Public Good Game

Whether motivated by reciprocity or conformity, imitation is common in public good contexts. We consider the incentive for an agent to contribute to a public good if he expects imitation from others. Using a sequential public good game with exogenous ordering, we show that agents early enough in the sequence who believe imitation to be sufficiently likely would want to contribute. By contributing, they expect total contributions to increase significantly. We also show that preferences determine how early an agent need be, that the observed share of imitators in experiments is sufficiently high to warrant contribution and that an increase in group size reduces the incentive to contribute.