新证券法背景下审计师选择性披露行为研究

新证券法的颁布和实施进一步夯实了审计师的法律责任，新审计准则要求审计师在审计报告中披露关键审计事项信息。在新的法律背景下，注册会计师是否会采取选择性披露以规避法律风险，从而抵消新准则实施效果，受到社会关注。本文通过实验研究方法，从审计师视角对不同关键审计事项披露情形下审计师法律责任判定进行了检测。研究表明：披露相关关键审计事项下审计师法律责任最小，因而披露相关关键审计事项可以起到诉讼保护的作用，新报告准则能够敦促审计师为减轻法律责任而勤勉尽责；针对不同报表项目的会计准则弹性差异，审计师感知的法律责任与会计准则弹性的关系并不显著，因而不支持外界对审计师为规避法律责任进行选择性信息披露的猜疑。     

职业晋升与审计质量能够“职质同趋”吗——来自审计师晋升合伙人的经验证据北大核心

审计师晋升合伙人是个人职业角色的重大转变,会影响个人执业行为与合伙人“更新换代”效率。采用我国证券资格会计师事务所的审计师晋升合伙人前后审计的客户公司为样本,研究发现:相比晋升之前,审计师在晋升合伙人之后提供了更高质量审计服务,整体实现了“职质同趋”;然后从三个维度刻画晋升机制,新晋合伙人属于本所培养、晋升时点早、晋升难度大时,职业晋升效应更加明显;考虑作用机制,法律责任与声誉效应敦促新晋合伙人通过增加审计投入并降低审计风险,提高审计质量;此外,会计师事务所主体的人力资本结构及质控机制异质性对审计师职业晋升效应产生调节作用。研究可为审计行业监管部门及会计师事务所合伙人治理机制建设提供科学依据。     

真实盈余管理与审计师认知

本文以2008-2013年A股上市公司为对象,考察审计师对真实盈余管理的认知。具体探讨:审计师能否识别真实盈余管理;审计师对真实盈余管理客户的辞聘或保留决策选择;以及审计师应对真实盈余管理带来风险的策略等三个问题。研究表明,审计师能够识别真实盈余管理,并将真实盈余管理作为风险因素在审计定价决策中加以考虑;会计师事务所对真实盈余管理带来的风险现阶段整体可控,事务所倾向于采取客户保留决策;事务所主要通过审计师付出额外的努力和更换审计团队两种策略来降低审计风险。本文的研究结果为理解审计师对真实盈余管理的认知提供了直接的经验证据,对于从审计角度强化真实盈余管理的监管提供了政策参考依据。     

会计事务所组织形式、法律责任与审计质量——基于签字审计师个体层面的研究

本文从签字审计师个体层面研究了会计事务所组织形式对审计质量的影响。与有限责任制相比,特殊普通合伙制将审计法律责任与风险落实到了签字审计师个人,增加了审计师的违规成本,因此审计师可能会变得更加独立和谨慎。研究表明,同一签字审计师同年在特殊普通合伙制身份下比在有限责任制身份下更容易出具非标审计意见,其审计公司的盈余管理水平更低,审计质量更高。同时,我们还发现,事务所从有限责任制转变为特殊普通合伙制以后,相同签字审计师转制后出具非标审计意见的可能性更高,而且被审计公司的盈余管理水平更低,审计质量也明显提高。这些结果为我们判断2010年以来我国推动事务所转制为特殊普通合伙制的政策提供了直接的经验证据,表明特殊普通合伙制对审计师的审计行为产生了预期的政策治理效果,有助于事务所做强。     

审计师关心年报前瞻性文本信息吗？

此前研究主要关注历史信息与审计师决策,本文考察年报前瞻性文本信息对审计定价的影响。研究发现,年报前瞻性文本信息与审计定价显著负相关。机制检验发现,年报前瞻性文本信息能传递企业未来持续经营信号,降低审计师所感知的持续经营风险,进而降低审计定价。异质性检验发现,当年报披露语调更积极、披露未来经营计划内容更丰富时,二者负向关系更显著;且这种负向关系仅在企业未来盈余反应系数更高和分析师关注更多以及审计师行业专长较低和忙碌程度更高的样本中才显著。进一步研究发现,年报前瞻性文本信息披露能够显著降低企业被出具持续经营不确定性审计意见的概率。本文为理解审计师决策依据提供了新的理论参考,并为现有审计定价影响因素的研究作出增量贡献。     

内部控制重大缺陷与审计定价的关系分析——基于产权性质视角

论文基于内部控制与外部审计间具有的相互替代作用和互补作用,研究内部控制重大缺陷与审计定价的关系,结果表明内部控制与外部审计间具有相互替代作用,即审计费用与内部控制重大缺陷间存在显著正向关系.进一步基于产权性质的视角,研究表明审计师对内部控制存在重大缺陷的企业设置更高的审计定价,而且与非国有企业相比,该现象在国有企业更加显著.企业的内部控制有效性直接决定了注册会计师的审计工作投入程度和可接受的审计风险,进而影响到外部独立审计师的审计定价.论文的研究结论表明有效的内部控制制度有助于审计师基于风险导向原则评估重大错报风险,从而降低所面临的风险和审计投入,提高审计工作效率和工作质量.     

事务所“改制”、保险价值与投资者保护

组织形式是事务所内部治理的前提和基础。不同组织形式下,审计师需承担的法律责任存在明显不同。事务所从有限责任制转为特殊普通合伙制,其法律责任从以出资额为限承担有限责任,转变为承担无限责任。由于审计师可能会因审计失败而承担法律责任,审计师"变相"提供了公司失败的部分补偿,从而使审计具有了保险价值,有利于投资者保护。本文利用事务所转制提供的良好自然实验机会来检验审计保险价值。研究发现,事务所改制提高了审计师的法律责任,为公司股票注入了保险价值,从而有利于投资者保护。进一步分析发现,审计师经济实力不同对投资者保护的影响也存在差异,事务所转制所产生的保险价值仅在四大所审计的公司成立,而非四大所未发现有明显结论。本文不仅提供了验证审计保险假说的新视角,也为事务所转制监管政策的制定提供了参考。     

会计事务所组织形式、法律责任与审计质量——基于签字审计师个体层面的研究

本文首先指出签字审计师在审计签字之后的法律责任,然后就会计事务所的组织形式、法律责任和审计质量之间的关系做出分析,组织形式的变化、法律责任的压力会给审计质量的提升带来相应的积极影响,也会给审计质量的提升带来负面影响,必须加以克服。     

欧盟各国降低法定审计师法律责任风险的措施及其启示

世界系列会计丑闻之后,法定审计师面临更多的法律责任诉讼赔偿要求,执业风险更是无限扩大,各国都在研究各种可能降低法定审计师法律责任风险的有效措施。这方面,欧盟各成员国的法律规定一直比较完整。欧盟各国立法明确规定了有关法定审计师的诉讼时效期间、法定最高赔偿额及审计师公司组织结构等可以降低法定审计师承担法律责任风险的系列法律条款,同时欧盟各国法律也允许法定审计师与审计客户通过合同约定降低自己的审计风险,从不同角度来缓解因系列会计丑闻而给法定审计师带来的巨大诉讼赔偿压力。下面简要介绍一下欧盟国家的具体做法,或…     

会计师事务所组织形式、盈余管理与IPO折价

会计师事务所组织形式由有限责任制变为特殊普通合伙制,增加了审计师的法律责任,提高了审计的鉴证价值和保险价值,有利于审计师在 IPO 审计过程中更好地发挥信息中介作用。以保荐制下 IPO公司为样本,实证考察事务所组织形式对 IPO 盈余管理和 IPO 折价的影响。研究发现,相比有限责任制事务所,特殊普通合伙制事务所审计的发行公司的正向盈余管理水平更低,IPO 折价率也更低。研究结论表明事务所转制后,审计师加强了对发行公司盈余管理行为的约束,提高了 IPO 定价效率,监管部门推动的事务所转制对 IPO 市场具有积极治理效果。     

Group audits: Are audit quality and price associated with the Lead auditor’s decision to accept responsibility?

Lead auditors frequently rely on work performed by Other auditors, especially when auditing clients with operations in multiple countries. The PCAOB has expressed concern that the quality of such group audits may differ depending on whether the Lead auditor accepts or declines responsibility for work done by Other auditors. The PCAOB also has been concerned with the venue through which Lead auditors and Other auditors disclose their participation in group audits, including disclosure of whether Lead auditors accept or decline responsibility. To investigate these issues, we employ a sample consisting entirely of group audit engagements. We identify Lead auditors taking responsibility from PCAOB Form 2, filed by Other auditors of U.S. registrants for fiscal years 2009 to 2017. We identify Lead auditors not accepting responsibility from audit report disclosures during the same period. The results suggest that Lead auditors accepting responsibility charge higher audit fees but provide audits of no higher quality, and possibly of even lower quality. These results are robust to various additional analyses. Our research contributes to the ongoing debate over how the participation of Other auditors affects audit quality.     

Auditor Size,Market Segmentation and Litigation Patterns: A Theoretical Analysis

We provide a theoretical rationale for the observed audit industry structure where well-capitalized auditors hold an extremely large market share. Our analysis focuses on the economics of trading in an adverse selection market where audit quality is unobservable. We show that concentration of market share can arise even if well-capitalized auditors have no relative advantage with regard to supplying high-quality audits, and that the strategy of attracting a narrow base of high-margin clients is typically unsustainable in rational expectations equilibrium. Other results derived from our analysis of strategic competition for clients also conform (qualitatively) with empirical findings regarding audit fee structures and litigation rates. In particular, we show that better-capitalized auditors get a dominant market share, produce more accurate reports and are more profitable. In addition, we show that the imposition of high minimum standards increases the market power of wealthy auditors, even though smaller auditors can potentially provide the same level of audit quality at lower fees. All these results are demonstrated within a framework that endogenizes both a securities trading market and profit-maximizing auditors who strategically compete for clients.JEL Classification: C72, D43, D82, K23, K41, L15     

Non-audit services and financial reporting quality: evidence from 1978 to 1980

We provide evidence on the long-standing concern about the potential conflicts of interest of auditors that provide clients with non-audit services using rarely explored non-audit services fee data from 1978 to 1980. In this setting, we find evidence of improved earnings quality when auditors provide non-audit services, especially those related to information services. This is consistent with better audit quality resulting from knowledge spillovers in the joint offering of audit and consulting services. Events related to the 1982 repeal of mandatory non-audit services disclosures are associated with a small positive stock price reaction, suggesting that the disclosure repeal has no adverse economic consequences. Furthermore, following the repeal we find no change in the earnings quality of client firms. In sum, our data suggest that non-audit services offered by audit firms can be associated with improved audit and reporting quality in client firms via auditors’ reputational incentives, synergies, and knowledge transfers.     

The effect of audit market structure on audit quality and audit pricing in the private-client market

This study examines whether audit market structure affects audit quality and audit pricing. We analyze two conceptually distinct dimensions of market structure: audit market concentration and client mobility. Focusing on the private-client segment of the Belgian audit market, we compare the pricing and quality effects of market structure between the segment of small and medium-sized (SME) clients and the segment of large clients to test how audit complexity moderates such effects. We find that market concentration impairs price and quality competition in the SME-client segment. Market concentration is unrelated to audit quality in the large-client segment, where we argue that concentration is endogenous to audit complexity. Furthermore, we find that client mobility stimulates price competition in both segments but improves audit quality only in the large-client segment. We interpret our findings as evidence that (a) audit market concentration impairs competition especially when audits have low complexity and that (b) the large-client market segment, characterized by higher audit complexity and higher market concentration, can also be price and quality competitive if clients are sufficiently mobile, and change auditors relatively frequently.     

Audit firm's Confucianism and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study examines the association between audit firm's Confucianism and stock price crash risk. We postulate that Confucian moral standards predict a mixed relationship between audit firm's Confucianism and stock price crash risk. Using a large sample of listed firms in China during 2006–2018, we find that audit firm's Confucianism is positively related with client's future stock price crash risk, implying that Confucianism of audit firm aggravates client's bad news hoarding behavior. The effect is more pronounced for client without female auditors and/or with closer personal relationship with auditors. Mechanism analysis shows that audit firm's Confucianism exacerbates crash risk by worsening audit quality and information transparency. Political discipline and external monitoring help to alleviate the negative influence of audit firm's Confucianism on stock price crash risk.     

Japanese stock market reaction to announcements of news affecting auditors’ reputation: The case of the Olympus fraud

The revelation of accounting fraud by the Olympus Corporation gave rise to shareholder allegations of audit failure against Olympus’ auditors—Ernst & Young ShinNihon LLC and KPMG AZSA LLC—in 2011. In this study, we investigate whether the auditors’ affiliation with Olympus contributes to divergent perceptions of audit quality in the event of news announcements affecting the reputation of Olympus’ auditors. First, we use a nonparametric generalized rank event study methodology on 918 sample firms from the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) to observe Japanese investors’ perceptions of auditor reputation as proxied by abnormal returns. Second, we perform a multivariate linear regression on firms’ abnormal returns after controlling for firm-specific variables. We find that Japanese investors do not respond to negative or neutral reputational information arising from news announcements concerning Olympus’ auditors for firms affiliated and not affiliated with those auditors. In the absence of legal penalties imposed on Olympus’ auditors, we argue that Japanese investors consider the Olympus fraud case as an expected occurrence of audit failure due to a lack of evidence suggesting systematic audit failure on the part of Olympus’ auditors and an expectation of lower audit quality in the Japanese capital market. As a result, Japanese investors do not consider news announcements affecting the Olympus auditors’ reputation as sufficient evidence to change their prior expectation regarding the reputations of the audit firms affiliated with the Olympus fraud case.     

Using machine learning to predict auditor switches: How the likelihood of switching affects audit quality among non-switching clients

In this paper, we utilize machine learning techniques to identify the likelihood that a company switches auditors and examine whether increased likelihood of switching is associated with audit quality. Building on research that finds a deterioration in audit quality associated with clients that engage in audit opinion shopping, we predict and find lower audit quality among companies that are more likely to switch auditors but remain with their incumbent auditor. Specifically, we find that companies more likely to switch auditors have a higher likelihood of misstatement and larger abnormal accruals. These results are consistent with auditors sacrificing audit quality to retain clients that might otherwise switch. Our findings are especially concerning because there is no public signal of this behavior, such as an auditor switch. Our methodology is designed such that it could be implemented by investors, audit firms and regulators to identify companies with a higher probability of switching auditors and preemptively address the deterioration in audit quality.     

AUDIT PRICING, AUDITOR CHANGES, AND THE WINNER'S CURSE

This paper presents a two-period model of the audit market. In the first period, all auditors have symmetric information and adopt identical bidding strategies. In the process of performing the audit, the incumbent auditor learns the actual costs, thereby becoming informationally advantaged in the second period. In the model presented, unlike earlier ones found in the literature, audit costs include both a component common to all potential auditors and a private component that varies across auditors. The common component of auditor costs gives rise to a ‘winner's curse’ scenario. A winner's curse is said to exist because a non-incumbent bidder who does not take into account the superior information of the incumbent would be expected to generate a loss from winning the audit engagement. The adjustment of bids by sophisticated auditors to compensate for the winner's curse is shown to play a significant role in determining the degree of low-balling (first-period price cuts) and auditor turnover. In the model, low-balling is not associated with loss of audit quality. Additionally, it is shown that it is in the interest of the client to structure audit selection in a manner that gives rise to low-balling.     

Auditors' Liability, Vague Due Care, and Auditing Standards

This paper expands the set of previously considered liability rules to include a negligence liability rule with a vague specification of due care. Auditors who are negligent in conducting their audit are liable for losses that result from reliance on misstated financial statements. However, what constitutes negligence for auditors is not clearly specified in the law. Consequently, courts often resort to Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (GAAS) and Statements on Auditing Standards (SAS) as benchmarks for determining due care. A liability regime that consists of a vague negligence rule supports and amplifies the credibility of auditing standards. While auditing standards alleviate some of the vagueness that is inherent in the legal standard, they also form a lower bound on due care, since an audit of a quality that is lower than the quality that auditing standards require would be considered negligent. Thus, the vague specification of due care enables auditors to commit to audit quality as pronounced in auditing standards. This paper explores this link between professional standards and auditors' legal liability. It establishes that the commitment to auditing standards could not have been as credible as it is, if auditors' liability was determined based on the strict liability rule, or based on a negligence rule with a clearly specified due care, since under these two liability rules courts would not need to refer to auditing standards to establish fault. The paper also demonstrates that a legal regime where audit standards are used as a benchmark to evaluate negligence is not the same as a legal regime where due care is defined clearly. Therefore, previous studies that assumed a negligence regime with clear due care may have overstated the effort level that is induced by legal liability.