Income smoothing and audit fees

In this study, we examine the effect of income smoothing on auditors' pricing decisions. Analyzing a sample of 12,823 firm-year observations from U.S. companies in non-regulated industries for the period 2000–2018, we find that income smoothing is negatively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors favorably view smoothed earnings. This result holds when we control for other variables that have been identified as determinants of audit fees in prior literature, including client-specific (e.g., client size, audit complexity, litigation risk, and corporate governance), auditor-specific (e.g., auditor quality, auditor tenure, and auditor expertise), and engagement-specific (e.g., audit opinion, busy season, reporting lag) factors. Our results also hold across (1) alternative smoothing measures (with and without considering the use of accruals to smooth earnings), (2) different sources of income smoothness (innate vs. discretionary components) and (3) various robustness tests. Overall, our evidence supports the notion that auditors perceive income smoothing as signaling rather than opportunistic behavior, and thus charge lower audit fees. To our knowledge, this is the first study that examines income smoothing directly from the perspective of auditors.     

Sign reversal in the relationship between income smoothing and cost of debt

Despite the fact that income smoothing by managers is a pervasive phenomenon that has been widely researched, extant literature provides incomplete evidence on how smoothing is associated with cost of debt in general, and in the private loan market in particular. The institutional factors associated with private loan contracts, combined with the theoretical motivations for smoothing, make it unclear whether smoothing will be positively, negatively, or not associated with loan spread. Using both cross‐country and within‐country analyses on an international sample of private loans, we predict and provide evidence that income smoothing is associated with lower cost of debt when the threat of private benefits consumption by managers is low, but is associated with higher cost of debt when the threat of private benefits consumption by managers is high. We provide the first evidence in the literature that the garbling effect of smoothing can predictably dominate the signaling view of smoothing in debt contract design, and we identify private benefits consumption threat as the feature of the contracting environment that empirically reveals a sign reversal in the relationship between smoothing and cost of debt.     

Cross-country determinants of bank income smoothing by managing loan-loss provisions

This paper studies the determinants of income smoothing by management of loan-loss provisions in banks around the world. Using a panel database of 3221 bank-year observations from 40 countries and controlling for unobservable bank effects and for the endogeneity of explanatory variables, we find that bank income smoothing depends on investor protection, disclosure, regulation and supervision, financial structure, and financial development. Results suggest there is less bank income smoothing not only with the strength of investor protection, but also with the extent of accounting disclosure, restrictions on bank activities, and official and private supervision, while there is more income smoothing with market orientation and development of a country’s financial system.     

The Effect of Analyst Coverage on the Informativeness of Income Smoothing

This study examines whether analyst coverage affects the informativeness of income smoothing. I find that income smoothing enhances earnings informativeness more greatly for firms with high analyst coverage than for firms with low analyst coverage. The results suggest that income smoothing more efficiently communicates private information to investors when firms are followed by more analysts, consistent with the notion that analysts play an important information intermediary role in enhancing the informativeness of income smoothing.     

THE SMOOTHING OF INCOME NUMBERS: SOME EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SYSTEMATIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CORE AND PERIPHERY INDUSTRIAL SECTORS

This study tests the effects of the dual economy on income smoothing behavior. It is hypothesized that a higher degree of smoothing of income numbers will be exhibited by firms in the periphery sector than by firms in the core sector as a reaction to different opportunity structures and experiences. The results indicate that a majority of firms may be resorting to income smoothing. A higher number is included among firms in the periphery sector.     

收入差距与房地产价格泡沫：基于门槛效应研究

基于不同收入居民对住房消费品和投资品双重属性的偏好差异,结合居民的住房偏好特性,考量收入差距对房价收入比的影响。结果显示：收入差距对房价收入比的影响存在门槛效应：低于门槛值时,影响为抑制作用;高于门槛值时,影响转为促进作用,且随着收入差距进一步的扩大效应更为明显。鉴此,应聚焦缩小收入差距,合理引导居民住房消费与投资,以有效控制我国房地产价格泡沫趋势。     

Market Imperfections as the Cause of Accounting Income Smoothing—The Case of Differential Capital Access

We show income smoothing results as a rational equilibrium behavior in a setting where the manager has superior foresight about the firm's prospects but faces inferior capital access relative to the owner. Under a legal structure that makes forecast-based compensation impractical and an accounting framework that requires reported income to be consistent, unbiased and cash-flow convergent, we show that the manager reports a composite of the underlying income and his foresight information. Moreover, the reported income will exhibit a lower inter-temporal variance than the underlying income. The extent of smoothing is shown to increase with the accuracy of foresight information.We argue that other market imperfections could also cause income smoothing if the manager is privately better informed about future prospects. As such, this paper supports the view that income smoothing is not always opportunistic but can be induced by the owner to satisfy his need to be informed about the future performance of the firm.     

Ownership Differences and Firms' Income Smoothing Behavior

This paper examines the association between differences in ownership structure and income smoothing behavior in firms. The underlying constructs affecting this association include agency relationships, managerial incentives, information asymmetry, and firm profitability. A logistic regression model is used to test the association between income smoothing and variables related to inside ownership, institutional holdings, leverage, managerial compensation, profitability, and firm size. The evidence suggests that ownership differences, managers' incentive structures, and firm profitability are important in explaining income smoothing behavior in firms. By separating inside ownership and levels of debt into different levels, we are able to show the existence of a non-monotonic relationship between ownership differences and firms' income smoothing behavior.     

EXTRAORDINARY ITEMS AND INCOME SMOOTHING: A POSITIVE ACCOUNTING APPROACH

This is an empirical study of single-period income smoothing which uses an incentives-based model to explain classificatory choices. An index is constructed to measure the smoothing effect of these choices. Weighted least squares regression results indicate that classificatory choices consistent with smoothing are more likely to be observed in firms with high earnings variability, high dividend payout, substantial managerial holdings of share options and diffuse share ownership. The existence of material scope for smoothing strengthens these findings. The model as a whole is statistically significant and, although the proportion of variability in smoothing explained is modest, it compares very favourably with other accounting choice studies. The relationship between smoothing and alternative earnings management strategies, including big bath accounting, is explored.     

Firm-Specific Determinants of Income Smoothing in Bangladesh: An Empirical Evaluation

The purpose of this chapter is to empirically examine the existence of income smoothing and determinants of smoothing behavior in Bangladesh. Using Eckel's (1981), Abacus (June), 28–40, “comparison of the variance of sales and profit” method, this study finds that a fair number of Bangladeshi firms engage in income smoothing. Particularly, 46 firms out of a sample of 107 firms with available data, engage in at least one type of income-smoothing behavior. Further, a logistic regression result indicates that firms characterized by sponsors having the largest ownership stake among all the equity holders and smaller firms engage more in income smoothing. Also, firms that have high debt to equity ratio engage more in smoothing behavior.     

Managerial Incentives for Income Smoothing Through Bank Loan Loss Provisions

We examine alternative underlying motives of bank managers in using loan loss provisions (LLP) to smooth reported income. Based on the analytical results of Fudenberg and Tirole (1995), we predict that for banks with good (poor) current performance and expected poor (good) future performance, managers will save income for (borrow income from) the future by reducing (increasing) current income through LLP. We also analyze three additional variables that could explain cross-sectional differences in the level of income smoothing. Our empirical analysis provides support for our predictions. The difference in LLP between the two groups of banks is positive as hypothesized, indicating that bank managers do save earnings through LLP in good times and borrow earnings using LLP in bad times. Similar results are obtained for analysis using discretionary LLP. When bank managers are saving earnings for the future, we provide evidence that the need to obtain external financing is an important additional variable in explaining cross-sectional differences in the extent of income smoothing. Furthermore, whether or not a bank is well capitalized is also weakly significant in explaining cross-sectional differences in income smoothing.     

‘Managerialism’, ‘ownerism’ and risk

This paper proposes that managers, having the value of their human capital dependent on the performance of the firm they manage, and being unable to diversify away this risk, are expected to attempt to reduce their employment risk internally by project selection or by income smoothing, intended to stabilize the firm's income stream. An empirical investigation shows that manager-controlled firms exercise ‘income smoothing’ to a greater extent than owner-controlled firms, have relatively lower unsystematic risk and perhaps lower systematic risk.     

Detecting income-smoothing behaviors of Turkish listed companies through empirical tests using discretionary accounting changes

Flexibility when selecting accounting methods sometimes motivates managers to choose accounting methods or to change employed ones in order to increase, decrease or smooth income figures. In this study, income-smoothing behaviors of Turkish listed companies are detected through empirical tests using discretionary accounting changes (DACs). Parallel to the study conducted by Moses [Moses OD. Income smoothing and incentives: empirical tests using accounting changes. The Accounting Review 1987;11(2):358–77], income smoothing is accepted as one motivation of DACs and the sample firms are classified as smoothers and non-smoothers by using Moses’ smoothing behavior index. Results show that possible motivations of DACs are income smoothing, economical characteristics of the periods in which the DACs are made, and the desire of Turkish firms to have net incomes close to zero.     

Income smoothing among European systemic and non-systemic banks

There is scant research on the financial reporting behaviour of global systemically-important banks (G-SIBs) and non-global systemically-important banks (non-G-SIBs). We examine the link between financial reporting and financial system stability given the understanding that income smoothing is a stability mechanism for banks. We empirically examine whether the way G-SIBs use loan loss provisions (LLPs) to smooth income differ compared to non-G-SIBs and the incentive to do so. We examine 231 European banks and find that income smoothing is pronounced among G-SIBs in the post-crisis period and pronounced among non-G-SIBs in the pre-crisis period. Also, G-SIBs exhibit greater income smoothing when they: (i) have substantial non-performing loans, (ii) are more profitable and meet/exceed minimum regulatory capital ratios (iii) engage in forward-looking loan-loss provisioning and during recessionary periods. The implication of our findings is that capital regulation and abnormal economic fluctuations create incentives for systemic banks to use accounting numbers (loan loss provisions) to smooth income, which also align with the financial system stability objective of bank regulators. Our findings are useful to accounting standard setters in their evaluation of the role of reported accounting numbers for financial system stability, given the current regulatory environment in Europe which focuses on systemic banks.     

Consumption smoothing and portfolio rebalancing: The effects of adjustment costs

A household's response to income and return shocks depends on the costs of portfolio adjustment. In particular, the extent of portfolio rebalancing and consumption smoothing are influenced by the presence of non-convex portfolio adjustment costs. Suppose bonds can be adjusted costlessly while adjustments to stock accounts entail adjustment costs. Due to these portfolio adjustment costs, the household demands both stocks and bonds. A household can buffer some income fluctuations without incurring adjustment costs and engage in costly portfolio rebalancing less frequently. Using the estimated preference parameters and portfolio adjustment costs, the response to income and return shocks is nonlinear and reflects the interaction of portfolio rebalancing and consumption smoothing.     

Loan loss provisions and income smoothing – Do shareholders matter?

In this paper, we aim to analyse the role of shareholders in the creation of discretionary loan loss provisions (LLP) and the use of LLP in income smoothing. Using a sample of over 200 Central European banks, we demonstrate that LLP and income smoothing of foreign-owned banks and state-owned banks differ from those of domestic private banks. Foreign and state banks create higher discretionary LLP than private domestic banks. Foreign banks use these LLP to perform discretionary income smoothing, while state banks, in general, do not smooth income. Higher LLP of foreign banks are observed in banks with low asset quality and high profitability. Foreign banks with low profitability that operate in volatile economic environments do not create higher discretionary LLP than domestic private banks. This implies that their risk is not lower than that of locally owned banks, at least on the credit side. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, both foreign and state banks have become more prudent than domestic private banks, and their discretionary LLP are higher. Overall, we provide evidence that foreign and government ownership affect LLP policy in banks. This complements existing results on the differences in loan cyclicality and default risk between foreign, state and domestic private banks.     

Sources of earnings variability and their effect on earnings forecasts

Previous research shows that analysts’ forecasts of earnings do not fully incorporate information contained in reported earnings variability. This study investigates whether the inefficient forecast is because of a failure to incorporate observable information on two components of earnings variability: variability in operating performance and income smoothing. Our results show that analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate information contained in earnings variability for firms with high income smoothing and for firms with low operating variability. A smaller serial correlation of forecast errors is observed for firms with low operating variability, which suggests that analysts recognize the permanence in earnings for such firms.     

Environmental uncertainty and the market pricing of earnings smoothness

Environmental uncertainty induces variability in an organization's reported earnings, and accentuates the information asymmetry between its managers and outside stakeholders. Managers operating in an environment of high uncertainty, therefore, have an incentive to reduce such variability by smoothing income numbers. We investigate the stock market response to earnings smoothness for firms operating in an environment of high uncertainty. We measure income smoothing by the negative correlation of a firm's change in discretionary accruals with its change in pre-managed earnings as per Tucker and Zarowin (2006). Using future earnings response coefficient (FERC) methodology to measure the informativeness of smoothed earnings, and two measures of environmental uncertainty, this paper documents that current stock price incorporates more information about future earnings for firms operating in high uncertain environments, thus supporting the informational value view of income smoothing.