An essay on conceptualization of issues in empirical accounting research

Empirical research in accounting has lately focused much on sophisticated statistical methodology and econometrics and relatively less on conceptualization of the issues concerned. This essay is written to highlight the conceptualization of the issues as an important ingredient of empirical research in accounting. I present two methods of conceptualization – the single-entity approach and the game theoretic approach. I give several examples in accounting research to explain the conceptualization process. I hope that this essay will fill a much needed void in the research process in accounting and restore the balance between conceptualization and methodology.     

Sharing Demand Information in a Value Chain: Implications for Pricing and Profitability

While it is known that information exchange (IE) in a value chain improves resource coordination, scant attention has been paid to two issues. The first issue is the effect of relative bargaining strengths of the parties on whether and how IE will be implemented. The second issue is whether a resource-based costing system is adequate to motivate the implementation of information exchange. In this paper, we model a value chain consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, where the retailer gets (private) demand information that has the potential of improving the manufacturers resource decisions. In this model, it is always beneficial for the value chain to implement IE. We show that in a monopsony or in a bilateral monopoly when the retailer has sufficient bargaining power, IE can be implemented if and only if the wholesale price compensates him for the loss of the information rent that he would get without IE. Using this model as the benchmark, we also examine other settings where the retailers have less bargaining power due to competition or size. In such settings, even though the retailers are better informed, the manufacturer can implement the IE regime costlessly and appropriate the information rent partially or fully. In effect, the manufacturer benefits both by improved resource coordination and by reduced payment for information rent. In all these settings, we find the retailer will not be motivated to adopt IE solely by a resource-based costing and pricing system.     

Sustainable competitive advantage and stock performance: the case for wide moat stocks

‘In business, I look for economic castles protected by unbreachable “Moats”’. Warren Buffett Companies that have sustainable competitive advantages should be able to create a barrier (Moat) to prevent or lessen competition from other firms. The wider the Moat the greater the barrier and the more secure the company’s profitability. Using the Morningstar classification of ‘Wide Moat’ stocks, we construct annually rebalanced equal- and value-weighted portfolios to analyse their performance in order to determine if they deliver superior performance relative to standard benchmark portfolios. The period for our analysis extends from June 2002 through May 2014. We find that the ‘Wide Moat’ portfolios outperform both the S&P 500 and Russell 3000 indices generating higher average monthly and annualized returns, Sharpe Ratio, Sortino Ratio, Treynor Ratio, Omega Ratio, Upside Potential Ratio, M², M² Alpha, and cumulative returns. When we compute alpha using Carhart four-factor and Fama–French five-factor models, we find that ‘Wide Moat’ portfolios had significantly positive risk-adjusted alphas with both the models. ‘Wide Moat’ portfolios also lost less value during the 2007–2009 financial crisis compared to both S&P 500 and Russell 3000. In conclusion, we find that ‘Wide Moat’ stocks have created significant value for their investors over the course of our study.     

The Effect of Arthur Andersen's Demise on Clients' Audit Fees and Auditor Conservatism: International Evidence

Using samples from 12 non‐U.S.A. countries, we find that following Arthur Andersen's failure in the United States of America, successor Big‐N auditors charged an audit fee premium for ex‐Andersen clients compared to existing clients and non‐Andersen switch‐ins. We show that this audit fee premium is not attributable to the Andersen switch‐ins having lower prior earnings quality or lower bargaining power than non‐Andersen switch‐ins. We also show that ex‐Andersen clients exhibit higher earnings quality after the switch than do ongoing clients and other switch‐ins. These results suggest that the audit fee premium is attributable to auditor conservatism. Furthermore, we find that risk assessments for ex‐Andersen clients are higher in countries with weak legal and extra‐legal institutions. We interpret this result as suggesting that the effect of lost auditor reputation is stronger when objective evidence of earnings quality is uncertain because of weaker supporting institutions. This is the first study to document a direct effect of countrywide institutions on audit risk assessment.     

Leases with Purchase Options and Double Moral Hazard

Abstract:  The purpose of this paper is to explain why leases have a purchase option and how the exercise price of this option is determined. We follow Demski and Sappington's (1991) approach by using a double moral hazard setting. One limitation of their model is that the agent has unlimited liability. The agent has to have enough wealth and the obligation to buy the firm when the principal decides to exercise the put option. In our paper, this problem is resolved by using a call option, which is a feature of many lease contracts. We show that leases with a purchase option can completely resolve the double moral hazard problem even if all the variables in the model are unverifiable. It is the threat of being the residual claimant that induces the lessor to provide an efficient level of effort. On the other hand, it is the opportunity of being the residual claimant that induces the lessee to maintain the asset efficiently. Finally, the model predicts that certain leased assets are not properly accounted for under the current accounting standards for leasing.     

Does High‐Quality Auditing Mitigate or Encourage Private Information Collection?

The finance literature offers two competing possibilities on how investors respond to the quality of public financial statements in their pricing decisions. They could collect either (i) more private information to benefit from lower information collection cost, or (ii) less private information because of lower incremental benefits. In this paper, we use the audit setting to examine which possibility prevails. Using the idiosyncratic return volatility as a proxy for firm‐specific information, we show in a sample of 51,559 firm‐year observations for 8,261 U.S. firms spanning the period of 2000–2010 that firms audited by higher‐quality auditors exhibit lower average idiosyncratic return volatility but a higher concentration of it at the time of earnings announcements. Our findings are consistent with the argument that investors reduce private information collection in response to higher audit quality. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of audit quality and idiosyncratic return volatility.     

Effect of auditing: Evidence from variability of stock returns and trading volume

Although the benefits of auditing are uncontroversial in developed markets,there is scant evidence about its effect in emerging economies.Auditing derives its value by increasing the credibility of financial statements,which in turn increases investors’reliance on them in developed markets.Financial statement information is common to all investors and therefore increased reliance on it should reduce divergence in investors’assessment of firm value.We examine the effect of interim auditing on inter-investor divergence with a large sample of listed Chinese firms and find that it decreases more for firms whose reports are audited compared to non-audited firms.This finding suggests that investors rely more on audited financial information.Results of this study are robust to variations in event window length and specification of empirical measures.     

Family control and idiosyncratic volatility: Evidence from listed firms in Hong Kong

Family control of listed firms in Hong Kong is substantively different and materially higher than in the US which could offer different insights into the effects of family ownership on corporate transparency. Using a sample of listed Hong Kong firms and idiosyncratic volatility as a proxy for firm-specific stock price informativeness, we find that family firms exhibit higher idiosyncratic volatility of stock prices than similar non-family firms. Further, the relation between family ownership and idiosyncratic volatility is weaker for firms with higher leverage but stronger in periods before equity issues. Additionally, we find that family firms disclose more information, particularly related to operations, than nonfamily firms in annual reports. These results are consistent with the argument that family firms disclose more information than their nonfamily peers to reassure skeptical outside investors that they are not expropriating their investment.