财政分权对农村居民消费影响的实证研究——基于地方政府竞争视角

近年来,财政分权与经济增长关系成为经济学界研究的热点问题之一,而研究财政分权对居民消费影响的文章并不多见.基于1995～2008年中国省级面板数据,采用GMM分析方法,对财政分权对中国农村居民消费影响进行检验,结果表明:从直接影响来看,财政分权促进了我国农村居民消费水平的提高;而间接影响方面,财政分权通过拉大居民收入差距使农村居民消费下降;通过提高通货膨胀预期间接地降低了农村居民消费;通过扭曲财政支出结构使农村居民消费下降.     

财政分权、空间效应与产业结构升级——基于SDM模型的经验研究

基于2000-2014年中国31个省级面板数据,运用空间杜宾模型分别考察财政收入分权和支出分权对产业结构升级的空间效应以及由此引致的策略性竞争效应,研究表明：财政分权等经济社会因素存在区域差异,这种差异导致产业结构升级在空间分布上具有显著的异质性特征。财政收入分权和支出分权对产业结构升级的影响呈现出非对称的空间溢出效应。一方面,财政收入分权对本地区产业结构升级的影响并不显著,而支出分权对本地区产业结构升级具有积极影响;另一方面,财政收入分权和支出分权对相邻地区产业结构升级均产生抑制效应,但较之于收入分权,支出分权的抑制效应更为明显。     

财政分权、政府干预行为与地区不良贷款——基于省级面板数据实证分析

基于我国2006-2015年31个省(市、自治区)的面板数据,使用动态面板模型的GMM估计,检验财政分权、政府干预行为对地区不良贷款的影响.结果发现:财政分权与地区不良贷款规模呈正相关,即财政分权水平较高的地区会导致不良贷款的增加;分权下政府干预行为对地区不良贷款的作用也存在显著差异,中部地区的政府干预行为会抑制不良贷款的增加,而东、西部地区的政府干预行为则相反.     

财政分权、地方政府行为与经济绿色转型

依据2009—2019年省级面板数据,运用空间计量模型和中介效应模型,考量财政分权对经济绿色转型的影响。结果显示：财政分权促进本地经济绿色转型作用显著,但会阻碍相邻地区经济绿色转型进程。地方政府行为在二者之间发挥着中介作用,财政分权主要通过促进地方政府合理竞争、提高地方政府财政科技投入强度促进经济绿色转型,提高财政分权程度会强化地方保护主义行为,但地方保护主义行为对经济绿色转型的影响不显著。     

财政分权与经济增长可持续性——基于情势转换与聚类视角的分析

经济增长可持续性不仅取决于增长速度还取决于增长稳定性。本文利用我国245个地级市1978—2014年间面板数据和马尔科夫情势转换聚类面板模型,从情势转换与聚类视角考察了地级市经济增长动态特征,识别出不同的动态增长模式及其可持续性,进而剖析了财政分权的影响。研究表明,地级市经济增长呈现出三种动态增长模式,这三种模式在平均增速、增长状态及其持续期、增长波动性进而在增长可持续性方面存在明显差异。支出分权显著增加了地级市归属为低增长、高波动模式的概率,不利于经济可持续增长,而在1994年分税制改革后则产生了较积极的作用。收入分权总体有利于增强经济增长可持续性,1994年分税制改革后,受地方纵向财政失衡加剧的不利影响,这一积极作用有所减弱。增加地方财政自给度(即增加地方收支分权匹配度、减小地方纵向财政失衡)有利于增强经济增长可持续性,这一作用在1994年分税制改革后表现得更为突出。本文研究结论对优化完善财税体制以有效促进经济可持续增长具有良好启示。     

Fiscal decentralization,equalization, and intra-provincial inequality in China

Using a nationwide county-level panel dataset for the years 1995–2009, this paper conducts the first analysis in the literature to examine the impacts of fiscal decentralization and fiscal equalization, both measured at the sub-provincial level, on intra-provincial inequality in China. While fiscal decentralization offers significant advantages regarding public expenditure efficiency, a potentially large disadvantage is that it may lead to increased regional inequality. In this paper, in line with our theoretical hypotheses, we find that while fiscal decentralization at the sub-provincial level in China leads to larger intra-provincial inequality, fiscal equalization efforts performed by provincial governments tend to mitigate the detrimental effect of fiscal decentralization on intra-provincial inequality. Our results also indicate that the quantitative effects of fiscal decentralization on regional inequality tend to be larger when they are measured from the expenditure side, which is consistent with the fact that expenditure decentralization is a much more meaningful measure of decentralization in China. Overall, we provide evidence on the potential inequality costs of using fiscal decentralization as a development strategy. At the same time, we emphasize the importance of implementing a fiscal equalization program to ensure the overall success of decentralization policy.     

财政分权与经济增长可持续性——基于情势转换与聚类视角的分析

经济增长可持续性不仅取决于增长速度还取决于增长稳定性。本文利用我国245个地级市1978—2014年间面板数据和马尔科夫情势转换聚类面板模型,从情势转换与聚类视角考察了地级市经济增长动态特征,识别出不同的动态增长模式及其可持续性,进而剖析了财政分权的影响。研究表明,地级市经济增长呈现出三种动态增长模式,这三种模式在平均增速、增长状态及其持续期、增长波动性进而在增长可持续性方面存在明显差异。支出分权显著增加了地级市归属为低增长、高波动模式的概率,不利于经济可持续增长,而在1994年分税制改革后则产生了较积极的作用。收入分权总体有利于增强经济增长可持续性,1994年分税制改革后,受地方纵向财政失衡加剧的不利影响,这一积极作用有所减弱。增加地方财政自给度(即增加地方收支分权匹配度、减小地方纵向财政失衡)有利于增强经济增长可持续性,这一作用在1994年分税制改革后表现得更为突出。本文研究结论对优化完善财税体制以有效促进经济可持续增长具有良好启示。     

地方政府周期性财政收支、融资依赖与地区出口结构

在财政分权与政治垂直管理的激励体制下,地方政府财政支出的逆周期性弱化。同时,地区间初始禀赋差异和风险异质性则使得地方政府财政政策的周期性特征存在明显的地区差异。本文借鉴Rajan与Zingales(1998)发展的固定效应估计模型,采用2004年我国29个省份29个行业的相关数据,考察了周期性财政政策对地区出口结构的影响。本文研究显示,财政政策逆周期性较强的地区,在外部融资依赖性高的行业出口相对更多,具有比较优势。同时,在控制了人力资本、物质资本和自然资源禀赋等传统比较优势影响因素,以及外部市场接近度、国内市场容量和基础设施等新经济地理的因素之后,本文的结论依然成立。     

Decentralization,Economic Development,and Growth in Turkish Provinces

There have been important developments in the decentralization of the government structure in Turkey since the early 1980s. This paper examines economic development and growth in Turkish provinces. It first discusses local government reforms throughout the history of Turkey with the focus on recent reform efforts. It then empirically analyzes the effects of recent decentralization reforms in Turkish provinces using cross-sectional and panel data approaches as well as spatial econometrics. The panel data set consists of sixty-seven provinces from 1976 to 2001. Using the number of local governments per capita and number of local governments per square kilometer of land to indicate decentralization, the analysis examines whether variations in local decentralization across these provinces and across time have significantly affected economic development and growth in those provinces. The findings suggest a weak negative economic effect of decentralization through a number of municipalities per capita. However, the findings do not show any significant effect from the creation of new provinces by separation from the existing ones.     

Fiscal Decentralization,Budgetary Transparency,and Local Government Size in China

This article makes use of panel data for 31 provinces between 1985 and 2010 and specifies a dynamic panel model to investigate the determinants of local government size in China and achieved several conclusions: (1) the fiscal decentralization since TSS reform in 1994 has increased the local government size; (2) budgetary transparency has a U-shape nonlinear effect on local government size; (3) fiscal revenue is the important factor to drive the overexpansion of local government size in China; and (4) local government size has a strong dependence of past path.     

对中国财政分权度的研究

以财政分权理论述评为基础,文章构建了支出法财政分权度衡量指标,计算并分析了中国总体和分省财政分权度.研究发现:中国总体财政分权度已接近或达到最优水平;东、西、中部财政分权度依次递减;财政分权地区差异较大,西部地区财政分权不均衡现象尤为严重;各地区财政分权度缓慢收敛.文章较客观完整地反映了我国财政分权状况,指明了我国未来财政分权化改革的方向在于局部分权程度的调整而非整体分权程度的扩大.     

Central-local government fiscal relations and cyclicality of public spending: evidence from China

In this study, we analyze how fiscal decentralization affects the cyclicality of government spending. We focus on China, which experienced fiscal decentralization during 1979–1993 and then partly centralized its revenue with the 1994 fiscal reform. By employing both time series and province-level panel data, we show that Chinese provincial and total government spending was strongly procyclical during the decentralization period before the reform, but both became significantly less procyclical with respect to nationwide output fluctuations after the reform. We suggest several channels through which the procyclicality of subnational government spending in decentralized fiscal federations could be restrained. We further find that less procyclical provincial government spending is associated with smaller output volatility.     

浅谈分权与市场经济条件下的财政体制

本先就市场经济条件下进行适当的财政分权的理论依据进行了论述，随后对集权的理论依据也进行了论述。本指出，当前，对于我国财政体制的完善来说，并不是简单的分权问题，而应在规范政府收支的同时，根据政府职能的实现来理顺集权与分权的关系。     

Fiscal Consolidations and Economic Growth

The aim of this paper is to deepen the understanding of the macroeconomic consequences of fiscal consolidations. In particular, there is evidence in the literature of fiscal consolidation episodes producing (non‐Keynesian) expansionary effects in the short run. We replicate this result for a panel of OECD countries under exogeneity of the fiscal consolidation. However, we provide some evidence that output growth might affect the fiscal tightening process so that fiscal consolidations are not exogenous to economic growth. Once we allow for feedback effects from economic growth to fiscal adjustments, we find that expansionary effects disappear and recover the typical Keynesian effect of fiscal adjustments. This finding points to the need to take these short‐term negative implications into account in the design of fiscal consolidations.     

财政分权、社会保障支出与城乡居民收入差距的实证分析

基于1998～2012年各省的面板数据,利用动态广义矩(GMM)和面板门槛模型实证分析财政分权、社会保障支出对城乡收入差距的影响,结果显示:由于中国城乡二元经济的特殊性,财政分权、人均社会保障支出与城乡居民收入差距均成正相关性.但社会保障支出对城乡收入差距的影响存在基于财政分权的双门槛效应,当财政分权水平较低时,社会保障支出的增加加剧了城乡收入差距;当财政分权高于一定水平时,社会保障支出有助于缩小城乡收入差距.     

财政合理分权与县乡财政解困

本文从财政分权的理论视角探讨当前的县乡财政困难问题,在阐明财政合理分权的若干基本原则的基础上指出,当前我国县乡财政困难的根源在于财政分权不合理的制度安排,而县乡财政解困的根本途径也必然是寻求各级政府间的财政合理分权.     

中国式财政分权影响资本配置效率研究

高度集中的政治管理体制下的财政分权使得中国财政分权对地方政府行为所产生的激励与西方国家不同。使用2002～2009年数据,对中国财政分权与资本配置效率进行理论研究与实证分析,结果表明:财政分权程度的提高对资本配置效率产生了阻碍作用,中国式分权所引致的地方政府规模扩张等行为扭曲是导致财政分权与资本配置效率负相关的主要原因。为此,应改革政绩考核指标、完善税收体系、调整财权分配制度。     

正确把握大思路配套推进分税制--兼与"纵向分两段,横向分两块"的主张商榷

本文在总结并充分肯定了1994年分税制改革的大方向和基本制度成果的基础上,提出了省以下财政体制并没有真正进入分税制轨道的基本判断,进而提出了"跳出财政看财政"的全局性思维观念,对症下药,结合国情寻求在渐进改革中以"扁平化"为导向,逐步落实省以下的分税制.     

Vertical effects of fiscal rules: the Swiss experience

Formal fiscal rules have been introduced in many countries throughout the world. While most studies focus on the intra-jurisdictional effects of fiscal rules, vertical effects on the finances of other levels of government have yet to be explored thoroughly. From a theoretical point of view, vertical effects could work in opposite directions, i.e., improve and burden other levels’ finances. This paper is the first formally investigating the influence of Swiss debt brakes, which primarily target the cantonal level, on municipal finances. A difference-in-differences estimation (two-way fixed effects) of aggregated and disaggregated local panel data provides unique evidence that suggests little effect of budget constraints at the cantonal level on average municipal finances and fiscal decentralization. The results are confirmed by a wide range of robustness tests. If anything, cantonal debt brakes are associated with improved local finances and fiscal centralization. These findings run counter to popular fears and emphasize the possibility of positive spillover effects of fiscal rules.     

Borrowing to Finance Public Investment? The ‘Golden Rule of Public Finance’ Reconsidered in an Endogenous Growth Setting*

In this paper, we look for long‐run and short‐run effects of fiscal deficits on economic growth and welfare in a standard endogenous growth model. We show that, under very general hypotheses, the ‘golden rule of public finance’, which allows a government to run public‐investment‐oriented fiscal deficits, leads to a lower balanced‐growth path in the long run, and eventually in the short run, compared with balanced‐budget rules. Welfare effects are more difficult to assess, and depend on the form of the utility function. Our model shows that debt rules such as the golden rule may improve (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘low’) or weaken (if the consumption elasticity of substitution is ‘high’) intertemporal welfare. Consequently, a balanced‐budget rule does not necessarily dominate debt rules from the point of view of welfare, while it does from the point of view of long‐run economic growth.