Conditional conservatism and trade credit during the global financial crisis

We investigate conditional conservatism and firms’ access to trade credit during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis. Previous studies argue that suppliers prefer conservative customers because of information asymmetry in production networks; we extend this line of research by focusing on trade credit during the 2007–2008 global financial crisis, a period that was characterized by a credit supply shock. We first document a positive association between conditional conservatism and firms’ access to trade credit both before and after the onset of the crisis, which indicates suppliers’ demand for conditional conservatism. Meanwhile, the association between conditional conservatism and trade credit experienced a significant decline following the onset of the crisis, and this only held when suppliers and customers had frequent transactions or were in close proximity, when transacted goods were standardized rather than differentiated, when customers were financially constrained and had high bargaining power, and when suppliers had sufficient liquidity. It implies that, when information asymmetry along the supply chain was low and customers had strong bargaining power, liquid suppliers increased their tolerance to less conservative customers, and they were even willing to grant trade credit to the less conservative customers that were financially constrained. Overall, this study adds to previous literature by demonstrating suppliers’ multifaceted demand for conditional conservatism.     

Suppliers' listing status and trade credit provision

We show that public suppliers extend more trade credit than their private counterparts. The impact of stock market listing on accounts receivable is more pronounced among firms that are financially more constrained or more reliant on external finance. Moreover, firms significantly increase their trade credit provision following equity issuances in stock exchanges. These results are consistent with the argument that stock market listing status improves firms' access to external sources of financing, especially equity capital, thus enhancing their ability to offer more trade credit to customers.     

Reverse trade credit or default risk? Explaining the use of prepayments by firms

This paper provides a detailed empirical study on the use of advance payments by firms. It establishes that some trade credit theories can also be applied to prepayment. The results, obtained from a large panel dataset, suggest that a series of factors affect prepayments. First, financially stronger customers finance the production of their financially weaker suppliers. Second, advance payments also occur as a response to transaction risk in both domestic and international transactions. Finally, besides financial and warranty reasons, the trading partners' relative bargaining power influences payment terms as well.     

As told by the supplier: Trade credit and the cross section of stock returns

With superior information about their customers’ prospects, suppliers extend trade credit to capture future profitable business. We show that this information advantage generates significant return predictability. After controlling for major firm characteristics, firms that rely more on trade credit relative to debt financing have higher subsequent stock returns. The return predictability by trade credit is stronger among firms with lower borrowing capacity or profitability, and is more significant for firms with a higher degree of information asymmetry. Our findings suggest that trade credit extension reveals suppliers’ information that diffuses gradually across the investing public.     

Trust and the provision of trade credit

State-controlled listed firms in China receive preferential treatment when borrowing from commercial banks; in contrast, private controlled firms rely on informal finance and on trade credit. We argue for and find evidence that private firms located in higher social trust regions use more trade credit from suppliers, extend more trade credit to customers, and collect receivables and pay payables more quickly. These findings are enhanced for firms located in provinces with weak protection of property rights. Our results are robust to different measures of social trust, legal environment, and endogeneity. Overall, our results show that social trust helps private firms overcome institutional difficulties in financing their activities.     

Corporate suppliers and customers and accounting conservatism

We argue that a firm's suppliers and customers prefer it to account more conservatively due to information asymmetry and these stakeholders' asymmetric payoffs with respect to the firm's performance. We predict that a firm meets this demand for accounting conservatism when suppliers or customers have bargaining advantages over it that enable them to dictate terms of trade or whether trade occurs at all. We show that when a firm's suppliers or customers have greater bargaining power, the firm recognizes losses more quickly. Our findings provide insights into how a firm's powerful suppliers and customers are associated with its accounting practices and also support the contracting explanation for accounting conservatism.     

Trade Credit Terms Offered by Small Firms: Survey Evidence and Empirical Analysis

Trade credit has been shown to be an important source of short-term finance for smaller firms but small firms are also suppliers of trade credit. There is little empirical evidence on the credit granting decisions of small firms. Previous empirical work (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; and Ng, Smith and Smith, 1999) has focused on credit granting and investment in accounts receivable in larger firms. In this paper we look at the influences on credit granting for the smallest firms, using a sample of firms with an average of 10 employees. As in previous studies we find that product and demand characteristics influence credit terms. Moreover, we find evidence that firm size affects credit extension choices directly by setting limits on the possibilities for economies of scale, but it also impacts indirectly by affecting the firm's access to finance and its bargaining strength vis-à-vis suppliers. The dominant position of larger customers in bargaining with small suppliers constrains the impact of other factors on the firm's choice of credit terms. Small firms are also under pressure to conform to industry norms, although lack of resources can be a limiting factor. Constrained firms may make use of two-part terms in an attempt to improve their cashflow.     

Trade credit,collateral liquidation,and borrowing constraints

Assuming that firms’ suppliers are better able to extract value from the liquidation of assets in default and have an information advantage over other creditors, the paper derives six predictions on the use of trade credit. (1) Financially unconstrained firms (with unused bank credit lines) take trade credit to exploit the supplier's liquidation advantage. (2) If inputs purchased on account are sufficiently liquid, the reliance on trade credit does not depend on credit rationing. (3) Firms buying goods make more purchases on account than those buying services, while suppliers of services offer more trade credit than those of standardized goods. (4) Suppliers lend inputs to their customers but not cash. (5) Greater reliance on trade credit is associated with more intensive use of tangible inputs. (6) Better creditor protection decreases both the use of trade credit and input tangibility.     

How do suppliers benefit from customers’ voluntary disclosure? the effect of customers’ earnings guidance on upstream firms’ investment efficiency

We explore whether and how the issuance of customers’ financial forward-looking information affects the investment efficiency of their upstream firms. Using earnings guidance as a proxy for forward-looking information, we find that firms wherein customers disclose earnings forecasts invest more efficiently than those where customers withhold forward-looking information. Our findings hold after controlling for a set of firm characteristics, employing alternative model specifications and measurements, and using the 2011 Thailand flood as a quasi-experiment. Further analyses offer support that the positive impact of customers’ earnings guidance on upstream firms’ investment efficiency is stronger for customers issuing more informative, disaggregated, and accurate forecasts and suppliers with weaker bargaining power. We also observe an asymmetric response of suppliers’ investments toward customers’ good-news versus bad-news forecasts. Furthermore, by conducting a textual-based analysis, we find that suppliers’ investment efficiency increases with more embedded supply chain relevant information in customers’ earnings guidance reports. Overall, our findings suggest that suppliers benefit from customers’ earnings guidance to better assess their investment decisions, thereby achieving greater investment efficiency.     

Trade credit in Europe: Financial constraint and substitution effect in crisis times

This paper aims to prove whether financial rationing condition leads European enterprises to increase trade debt during the period 2008–2016 and whether companies offering deferred payments to customers obtain trade debt from suppliers. The work contributes to the existing literature by finding new empirical evidence on the substitution and matching hypotheses in times of crises, measuring the specific rationing conditions for businesses and distinguishing large, medium, small and micro-sized companies. The results revealed that, in times of crisis, medium, small and micro firms, highly likely to be constrained, employ trade credit more extensively, as those granting deferred payment terms.     

Trade Credit Terms: Asymmetric Information and Price Discrimination Evidence From Three Continents

Abstract:   Trade credit terms offer firms contractual solutions to informational asymmetries between buyers and sellers. The credit period permits buyers to reduce uncertainty concerning product quality prior to payment, while the seller can reduce uncertainty concerning buyer payment intentions by prescribing payment before/on delivery or through two‐part payment terms and other mechanisms. Variation in trade credit terms also offers firms price discriminating opportunities. This study, drawing on the responses of 700 large firms in the US, UK and Australia, explores trade credit terms through the twin objectives of reducing information asymmetries and discriminatory pricing. Support is found for both theories.     

Trade credit and supplier competition

This paper examines how competition among suppliers affects their willingness to provide trade credit financing. Trade credit extended by a supplier to a cash constrained retailer allows the latter to increase cash purchases from its other suppliers, leading to a free rider problem. A supplier that represents a smaller share of the retailer’s purchases internalizes a smaller part of the benefit from increased spending by the retailer and, as a result, extends less trade credit relative to its sales. In consequence, retailers with dispersed suppliers obtain less trade credit than those whose suppliers are more concentrated. The free rider problem is especially detrimental to a trade creditor when the free-riding suppliers are its product market competitors, leading to a negative relation between product substitutability among suppliers to a given retailer and trade credit that the former provide to the latter. We test the model using both simulated and real data. The estimated relations are consistent with the model’s predictions and are statistically and economically significant.     

Product differentiation,market dynamics and the value relevance of trade payables: Evidence from UK listed firms

This paper provides a comprehensive evidence on how product and market dynamics affect the value relevance of trade payables. Using a sample of 2559 UK listed firms over the period 2005–2014, we find a positive relationship between trade payables and firm performance. Our evidence suggests that trade payables increase (decrease) performance in firms with differentiated products and demand uncertainty (larger market share). We demonstrate that the relative value relevance of bank credit versus suppliers’ credit is dependent on the nature of the product, the level of sales volatility, and market share. We use an innovative approach to assess the robustness of our results to omitted variable bias.     

Financing firms with restricted access to financial markets: the use of trade credit and factoring in Belgium

Many authors emphasize the implications of restricted access to financial markets for both small and new firms. The paper reports investigations into the use of alternative means of financing. More specifically, the use of trade credit and factoring are examined. Indeed, following the trade credit management literature both institutional and macro economic restrictions on small business finance can be overcome by ‘larger suppliers’ extending trade credit to their smaller customers. However, the DSO-rate cannot be used to measure the supplier's willingness to invest in trade credit as it depends on both suppliers' and customers' characteristics. The decision to extend trade credit is therefore approximated by the will to control its management and operationalized by the decision to factor or not to factor. The results of our study are twofold. First, factoring is mainly used by small and medium-sized companies. Moreover, when looking at the characteristics of the factor's customers, new companies facing huge capital expenditure programmes and seasonal sales decide to factor. The prejudice about factoring being a last resort means of finance is, however, not supported: companies that decide to use factoring are indeed less profitable, but this is simply due to their high growth and/or capital intensive investment programmes.     

Trade credit and the joint effects of supplier and customer financial characteristics

We examine how access to bank credit affects trade credit in the supplier–customer relationships of U.S. public firms. For identification, we use exogenous liquidity shocks to supplier firms in the form of staggered changes to interstate bank branching laws. Using a variety of tests, we show that supplier firms with greater access to banking liquidity offer more trade credit to their customers. We also show that when bank branching restrictions are relaxed in the supplier’s state, the supplier–customer relationship is more likely to survive.     

DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN BUSINESS START‐UPS: THE ROLE OF NONFINANCIAL STAKEHOLDER RELATIONSHIP COSTS

According to the finance literature, nonfinancial stakeholders (NFS), such as customers, suppliers, and employees, take into account their expected liquidation costs when dealing with a firm. In this framework, firms can influence their probability of liquidation by choosing an appropriate capital structure. Also, the literature suggests NFS bargaining power may affect firm financing decisions. In the current article we investigate these ideas for initial financing decisions by business start‐ups, where ex ante failure risk is high and NFS must decide whether to make relationship‐specific investments. We find that start‐ups imposing larger costs on their NFS following liquidation significantly reduce leverage. This effect is strengthened when suppliers have greater bargaining power. We also document a marginally negative effect of NFS liquidation costs on the proportion of bank loans. Finally, business start‐ups rely less on bank loans when customers and suppliers are in a powerful bargaining position.     

Financial Intermediation and the Costs of Trading in an Opaque Market

Municipal bonds trade in opaque, decentralized broker-dealermarkets in which price information is costly to gather. We analyzea database of trades between broker-dealers and customers inmunicipal bonds. These data were only released to the publicwith a lag; the market was opaque. Dealers earn lower averagemarkups on larger trades, even though dealers bear a higherrisk of losses with larger trades. We estimate a bargainingmodel and compute measures of dealer’s bargaining power.Dealers exercise substantial market power. Our measures of marketpower decrease in trade size and increase in the complexityof the trade for the dealer. (JEL G0, G24)     

The influence of economic policy uncertainty on corporate trade credit and firm value

This research investigates the relationship between government economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and trade credit and its value implication for U.S. public firms. We find that firms curtail their receivables periods and face shorter payables periods from suppliers during high EPU. The impact of trade credit policy changes on firm value is nonlinear. Tightening trade credit during periods of high EPU increases shareholder value only to a certain point, beyond which it is value-destroying since overly reducing trade credit can lead to losing customers to competitors.     

Formal finance and trade credit during China's transition

Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, we find that poorly performing SOEs were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged access to loans via trade credit. While that could be consistent with the efficient redistribution of credit, it is more likely that these SOEs extended trade credit to prop up faltering customers that were in arrears. By contrast, profitable private domestic firms were more likely to extend trade credit than unprofitable ones. Trade credit likely provided a substitute for loans for these firms' customers that were shut out of formal credit markets. As biases in lending become less severe, the allocation of lending became more efficient, and the amount of trade credit extended by private firms declined. Our evidence implies that redistribution of bank loans via trade was not a major contributor to China's explosive growth.     

Product Market Competition, Insider Trading, and Stock Market Efficiency

How does competition in firms' product markets influence their behavior in equity markets? Do product market imperfections spread to equity markets? We examine these questions in a noisy rational expectations model in which firms operate under monopolistic competition while their shares trade in perfectly competitive markets. Firms use their monopoly power to pass on shocks to customers, thereby insulating their profits. This encourages stock trading, expedites the capitalization of private information into stock prices and improves the allocation of capital. Several implications are derived and tested.