Fund Manager Succession in Closed-End Mutual Funds

Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed‐end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed‐end mutual funds makes them a unique laboratory for such a study. Our results suggest that while the overall abnormal returns of these manager changes are statistically insignificant, that the returns are more positive for funds with large expense ratios and for funds trading at a discount. We also find the abnormal returns are negatively related to the percentage of inside director stock ownership. Corporate bond funds and international equity funds react more negatively to these announcements than other types of funds. The abnormal returns do not appear to be related to board composition, but board composition does vary across fund type, and may therefore indirectly influence the results.     

Effectiveness of independent boards of UCITS funds

In order to protect fund investors against conflicts of interest with fund management companies, US funds have mandatory independent directors, but this obligation is not required under the European Union Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities (UCITS) Directive. Nevertheless, a considerable number of UCITS funds do have independent directors. Whether independent directors should also be mandatory in Europe has been a topic of ongoing debate. Using a sample of Luxembourg UCITS, we test the hypothesis that more independent boards add value for investors through lower costs and/or better investment performance, but we fail to find supporting evidence, even for funds with a higher risk of conflicts of interest. Oversight by independent depositaries and institutional shareholders does not seem to be effective either. It appears that board attitude and the sponsor distribution model are more important since we find evidence that boards that prioritise cost monitoring have lower costs and that independent sponsor funds have better performance. These results question the effectiveness of self-regulation or formal regulation requiring independent board members.     

When boards use related parties: outsourcing and superannuation fund performance

Superannuation funds heavily outsource key fund functions to service providers who play a crucial role in superannuation fund operations and affecting Australians’ retirement savings. We examine the impact of related party service provider usage and trustee‐director affiliation on investment performance. We find that for‐profit funds significantly underperform when using related party service providers. The underperformance is more severe when the board is controlled by more affiliated trustee‐directors and belongs to a vertically integrated conglomerate group. Our results raise concerns about whether recent regulatory reforms increasing trustee‐directors’ duties effectively address the conflicts of interest inherent in related party service provider arrangements.     

Appointments of academic directors

We examine the outside director selection process using unique data on appointments of academic directors. Overall, we find that academic directors tend to be appointed by small- and mid-cap firms expanding their boards. However, we find important differences in both the factors influencing academic appointments and the market's reaction when allowing for firm, board, and director heterogeneities. Academics in science, medicine and engineering appear to be appointed for their expertise, and the market reacts favorably. Academic administrators appear to be appointed for their networks, and the market reacts favorably when the administrator is affiliated with a business school but negatively when the administrator is not within close geographic proximity. Business professors appear to be appointed for general expertise and reputation, but we find little evidence of any significant market reaction. The results in this paper highlight the importance of recognizing heterogeneity in understanding the director selection process and the role of outside directors.     

从2000年基金年报信息追溯基金研究中心的三个问题

本文从三个方面对2000年基金年报信息进行了剖析。第一，从多角度对33只证券投资基金进行分类的结果表明，最能体现基金业绩与投资风格差异度的分类方法不是基金的投资目标而是基金管理公司。基金管理公司内部的资源共享是造成这一现象的原因。第二，指数型基金在2000年的表现尚不尽人意，投资理念亦不清晰。第三，保险公司选择基金的标准相当理性，注重基金的分红市价比、夏普指数、资产净值收益率几项指标，其选择的正确性亦得到2000年基金业绩的证实。     

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Closed‐end Funds

This study uses a large sample of UK‐listed closed‐end funds to examine whether governance has an impact on two indicators of fund performance: the level of fund‐management fees and the discount at which a fund trades. Fees are under the control of the directors, and we find that they are inversely related to fund returns, even after allowing for differences across investment sectors. Fees are, on average, higher if a fund has a large board, few directors from outside the fund‐family, many directors from within the fund‐family, and low ownership by the management company. Discounts for funds are wider if the management company or any blockholder has a significant long‐term stake, suggesting that investors are wary of entrenched management. The results suggest that boards are frequently compromised in their duty to shareholders by their dependence on fund‐management companies.     

Independent directors’ board networks and controlling shareholders’ tunneling behavior

As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships, board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market. Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.     

基金网络能够提高投资绩效吗？

基金网络在金融市场的信息流动中发挥着重要作用。本文利用基金共同持股关系构建了一个有效的基金网络数据集,以中国资本市场股票型基金2005-2018年季度数据为研究样本,考察基金网络是否以及如何影响投资绩效。结果表明,基金在基金网络中越处于网络中心地位,基金的投资绩效越高。使用基金家族网络作为工具变量缓解内生性偏误后,基金网络仍然对投资绩效具有显著的正向影响。进一步地,本文考察了基金网络影响投资绩效的渠道,结果表明,基金网络主要通过提高基金的选股技能、资产配置技能和管理技能影响投资绩效。最后,本文考察了基金网络对基金市场份额的影响,研究发现基金网络会显著提高基金的市场份额,对基金在市场上的占有率有积极的正向影响。     

Seasonality, Market Timing and Performance Amongst Benchmarks and Mutual Fund Evaluation

Abstract:  Mutual fund performance is normally measured by comparing results of active management with those obtained by one or several benchmarks that should represent the fund's investment. In this context, this paper examines the effect on mutual fund assessment if a relevant benchmark is omitted. This effect is analysed in three elements of active management: stock selection, market timing, and seasonality. The latter is defined as fund management at specific moments of time with the objective of achieving positive abnormal returns to improve performance. For a sample of Spanish mutual funds, we find that the omission of style benchmarks, particularly that corresponding to small-cap stocks, leads to greater evidence of negative market timing and positive seasonality at year beginning. However, the positive abnormal returns of the seasonality at year end, month end and especially at the beginning of July hold regardless of benchmark omission. The paper therefore also analyses the relation between performance and seasonality, finding that positive seasonality at year beginning and at July beginning improves performance; however, at other moments it implies a possible window dressing strategy in mutual fund management.     

Evaluating Mutual Fund Performance

We study standard mutual fund performance measures, using simulated funds whose characteristics mimic actual funds. We find that performance measures used in previous mutual fund research have little ability to detect economically large magnitudes (e.g., three percent per year) of abnormal fund performance, particularly if a fund's style characteristics differ from those of the value-weighted market portfolio. Power can be substantially improved, however, using event-study procedures that analyze a fund's stock trades. These procedures are feasible using time-series data sets on mutual fund portfolio holdings.     

Do independent directors and chairmen matter? The role of boards of directors in mutual fund governance

Recent scandals involving late trading, market timing, and other trading abuses have prompted the SEC to propose changes in the governance of mutual funds. Among these changes are the requirements for an independent chairman and a board consisting of at least 75% independent directors. Using a large sample of mutual fund families for 2002, we find that neither the probability of a fund scandal nor overall fund performance is related to either chair or board independence. Overall, our results question the usefulness of these recently proposed SEC changes in mutual fund governance.     

Information Transfers across Same–Sector Funds When Closed–End Funds Issue Equity

This study examines the reaction of non–issuing, same–sector funds when a closed–end fund announces a seasoned equity offering. The non–issuing, same–sector funds have a significant, negative announcement–day abnormal return. The abnormal returns for U.S. debt funds are less negative than U.S. equity and international debt funds. The abnormal returns for international debt funds are more negative than international equity funds. Announcement–day abnormal returns are directly related to the announcement–day abnormal return of the issuing fund and the premium/discount of the issuing fund. Announcement–day abnormal returns are inversely related to the premium/discount of the non–issuing, same–sector funds.     

The retention of directors on the audit committee following an accounting restatement

Prior research suggests that corporate directors suffer the loss of outside board positions following a financial reporting failure. This loss of board positions, however, does not occur at the same rate for all outside directors. To examine this apparent discrepancy between director actions and consequences, I examine whether the retention of individual directors on the audit committee is related to director characteristics and/or CEO influence over the board of directors. Results indicate that the retention of directors on the audit committee is positively related to the influence of the CEO and weakly related to the qualitative characteristics of the audit committee member. I then classify my sample of restatements based on their underlying cause and re-examine the retention of audit committee members at restating firms. Results suggest that the involvement of the CEO in the nominating process can affect the composition of the audit committee at firms where restatements are the result of intentional misapplications of GAAP.     

Fund governance contagion: New evidence on the mutual fund governance paradox

Why is poor governance pervasive in the mutual fund industry? Researchers, practitioners and regulators have attributed this failing to a lack of director independence from fund management. This paper proposes an alternate explanation: fund governance is contagious. Fund directors act as vectors, transmitting governance attributes from their primary place of employment to the fund. Using hand-collected director employment data, the paper finds that boards dominated by directors tied to the finance industry, to shareholder unfriendly firms, and to shareholder unfriendly funds, have worse governance. Examining employment shocks, litigations and firm bankruptcies, within a quasi-experimental framework, provides causal evidence that these connections cause fund governance spillover. Overall, the results suggest that contagious governance plays a role in propagating business malpractice in the mutual fund industry.     

Director expertise and co-option in industry superannuation funds?

This study examines whether independent directors who possess financial expertise and are independent from the CEO (i.e., non-co-opted) are associated with improved outcomes for industry superannuation funds. Our results highlight that independence alone is insufficient to improve fund outcomes. Instead, we find that only non-co-opted independent directors benefit fund members in terms of higher performance and lower fees. Moreover, we find that independent directors' financial expertise is not associated with fund performance and fees. Our study has implications for regulators and superannuation funds who are currently debating the need for one-third independent directors on the board of Australian superannuation funds.     

Independent Directors and Favoritism: When Multiple Board Affiliations Prevail in Mutual Fund Families

I examine whether independent directors with multiple board affiliations (IDMAs) trade off the interests of one fund relative to another (fund favoritism) or whether they benefit fund shareholders by increasing the level of the board's expertise. Using a sample of mutual funds affiliated with the top 55 fund sponsors from 2002 to 2008, I find that the presence of IDMAs is negatively related to performance/resource shifting across funds within fund families. IDMAs appear to decrease fund fees, increase the return gap associated with the unobserved actions of fund managers, and facilitate the transfer of information across funds in a fund family.     

全球私募基金的发展趋势及在中国的前景

私募基金发展已经对全球经济运行和金融市场发展产生了重要影响.本文通过对全球私募基金发展历程、发展特点以及发展趋势的分析,以及对中国私募基金市场发展历史与现状的评价,提出以下观点:在私募基金的演化与国际化扩张进程中,私募基金经营范围的综合化趋势愈加明显;中国私募基金市场仍是一个不对称的畸形市场,市场上尚缺乏真正意义的本土私募股权投资基金.本文同时得出以下结论:由于社会信用环境、法律环境已经趋好,证券市场日趋理性规范发展,中国私募基金市场的"不对称"和"不规范"的色彩将逐步减轻;私募股权投资基金将逐渐成为中国私募基金存在的重要方式.     

Independent director incentives: Where do talented directors spend their limited time and energy?

We study reputation incentives in the director labor market and find that directors with multiple directorships distribute their effort unequally based on the directorship's relative prestige. When directors experience an exogenous increase in a directorship's relative ranking, their board attendance rate increases and subsequent firm performance improves. Also, directors are less willing to relinquish their relatively more prestigious directorships, even when firm performance declines. Finally, forced Chief Executive Officer departure sensitivity to poor performance rises when a larger fraction of independent directors view the board as relatively more prestigious. We conclude that director reputation is a powerful incentive for independent directors.     

Does independent directors’’ monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets

Using novel data on independent directors’ opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying “no” to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said “no.” We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.     

Governance and Funds Allocation in United States Medical Research Charities

We examine boards of directors of medical research charities and find that medical charities spend less on program activities and more on fund-raising when the executive director of the charity serves on the board of directors, especially when the board is small. Executive salaries are also higher at charities where management is represented on the board. Management and general expenses and fund balances are, however, unrelated either to the presence of an insider on the board or to the size of the board.