高管团队内部网络与并购绩效

近年来,高管外部社会网络特征对企业决策的影响受到学术界的广泛关注。与以往研究侧重点不同,本文探究高管团队内部网络结构对企业决策是否产生重大影响,并构建了上市公司高管团队内部网络结构指标。基于社会网络和信息不对称等相关理论,本文实证检验了高管团队内部网络对企业并购决策绩效的影响。结果显示,高管团队内部网络结构密度越高,高管成员之间的沟通越有效,公司并购绩效越好。进一步地分析发现,当并购的复杂度和风险较高、企业所在地区制度环境较差以及高管任职时间较短时,高管团队网络密度对于并购绩效的影响更为明显。最后,本文还发现高管团队内部网络密度高的企业并购后,公司的会计业绩和市场业绩也优于其他公司。     

企业并购影响高管薪酬业绩敏感性吗?——基于中国国有上市公司的实证分析

本文以中国沪深股市2006-2010年间作为买方发生并购行为的362个国有上市公司为研究对象,分析了公司并购行为对高管薪酬与公司业绩的敏感度的影响。研究发现,公司资产回报率、市场回报率与公司高管薪酬显著正相关。说明并购前,高管薪酬与资产回报率以及市场回报率显著正相关,即高管薪酬与公司业绩敏感度较高。并购所增加的会计业绩和市场业绩与高管薪酬在10%的水平下显著负相关。可见,企业并购显著降低了高管薪酬与公司资产回报率以及市场回报率的业绩敏感度。并购规模无论是通过会计绩效还是市场绩效检验分析,都显著与高管薪酬正相关,说明高管薪酬与并购规模的扩大显著正相关。为进一步分析并购绩效是否会影响高管薪酬变动,本文采用差分模型分析了高管薪酬变化值与并购业绩变化值和并购规模变化的关系,研究发现,高管薪酬的变化与并购绩效无显著的相关关系,而与并购增加的公司规模显著正相关。     

高管薪酬差距对企业业绩影响分析

本文主要研究了高管薪酬、企业业绩和合作需求见的关系,发现合作需求通过影响高管团队内部薪酬差距来直接或间接影响企业业绩.     

并购相关性与企业绩效的关系研究

自六七十年代海外并购浪潮的兴起,国内外企业纷纷效仿以此来提高在企业自身实力、扩大规模。而公司高管的并购决策决定着企业的并购类型,即相关并购和不相关并购,不同的并购类型对企业并购后的总体绩效也产生着不同的影响,而不同的并购类型对企业短期及长期绩效的影响也会有所不同。本文主要的研究内容对当前已有文献中针对并购相关性与企业绩效的关系研究进行综述,证明相关并购优于非相关并购,为国内企业高管做出有利于企业绩效的并购决策提供一些具有指导性的参考。     

并购行为提升高管薪酬效应的内在机理——基于管理层权力理论视角的分析

并购作为一项最为重要的资源整合战略,是高管实现企业价值提升的首选手段。但是现实情况中,随着企业并购活动的发生,无论并购绩效如何,高管的薪酬都在不断增加,并购可能成为高管利用权力追求个人利益最大化的机会主义行为,这现象似乎违背了最优契约理论。本文结合我国的现实背景,选取2009—2011年深沪两市的A股国有控股上市公司1674个样本数据作为研究对象,对管理层权力、并购行为和高管薪酬之间的关系进行实证研究,探究管理层权力对高管基于薪酬动机诱发并购行为的影响。研究发现,管理层权力与高管薪酬呈现显著正相关关系;并购行为具有提升高管薪酬的效应;在管理层权力控制下,并购行为与高管薪酬显著正相关;并购公司管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响比非并购公司更大。实证表明,存在高管利用权力通过并购的途径提高自身薪酬的行为。在管理层权力理论的逻辑体系下,高管薪酬是目的,并购行为是手段;并购行为影响高管薪酬是现象与途径,而管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响才是本质与内在机理。     

并购行为提升高管薪酬效应的内在机理——基于管理层权力理论视角的分析

并购作为一项最为重要的资源整合战略．是高管实现企业价值提升的首选手段。但是现实情况中,随着企业并购活动的发生,无论并购绩效如何,高管的薪酬都在不断增加,并购可能成为高管利用权力追求个人利益最大化的机会主义行为,这现象似乎违背了最优契约理论。本文结合我国的现实背景,选取2009--2011年深沪两市的A股国有控股上市公司1674个样本数据作为研究对象,对管理层权力、并购行为和高管薪酬之间的关系进行实证研究．探究管理层权力对高管基于薪酬动机诱发并购行为的影响。研究发现,管理层权力与高管薪酬呈现显著正相关关系：并购行为具有提升高管薪酬的效应;在管理层权力控制下,并购行为与高管薪酬显著正相关;并购公司管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响比非并购公司更大。实证表明．存在高管利用权力通过并购的途径提高自身薪酬的行为。在管理层权力理论的逻辑体系下,高管薪酬是目的,并购行为是手段;并购行为影响高管薪酬是现象与途径,而管理层权力对高管薪酬的影响才是本质与内在机理。     

管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效

合理的高管人力资本激励机制是发挥高管人力资本效用进而提高企业绩效的有效途径。本文通过实证检验管理层权力、高管人力资本激励与企业绩效的关系,结果表明:高管货币薪酬与企业绩效显著正相关,与国有企业相比,非国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管货币薪酬对企业绩效的激励作用。国有企业的在职消费与企业绩效显著负相关,但非国有企业其二者之间的相关性并不显著;管理层权力加大了在职消费对企业绩效的负向影响。高管团队内部薪酬差距与企业绩效显著正相关,且非国有企业比国有企业的相关性更明显;管理层权力削弱了高管团队内部薪酬差距对企业绩效的激励作用。     

企业内部薪酬差距对组织未来绩效影响的实证研究

薪酬差距和组织绩效关系的研究大多采取同期的截面数据。本文认为薪酬差距的激励效果具有滞后性,进而提出了高层管理团队内部薪酬差距、高管团队/员工的薪酬差距对组织未来绩效影响的理论假说,并以我国上市公司为样本进行实证研究。实证分析的结果发现:高管团队薪酬差距对组织未来绩效ROA有负向的影响,但是技术复杂性、企业人数和高管团队薪酬差距的交互作用对未来绩效ROA有正向的影响;高管/员工薪酬差距对组织未来绩效ROA没有显著的影响,但是,技术复杂性、企业人数和高管/员工薪酬差距的交互作用对未来绩效ROA有正向的影响,而当企业最终控制人类型为国有股份时,高管/员工薪酬差距和组织未来绩效之间表现出负向的关系。论文最后对研究结论和局限性进行了讨论,并提出了未来研究建议。     

论高管团队社会资本与企业绩效的关系

该文在现有研究的基础上,采用来自中国化工企业的样本数据实证检验了高管团队社会资本对企业绩效的功效结构。结果显示,不论是高官团队外部社会资本还是内部社会资本对企业财务绩效都没有显著直接作用,但有明显的间接作用。高管团队外部社会资本主要通过提升企业市场绩效而间接改善财务绩效,同时也部分通过提高企业创新绩效进而促进市场绩效最终改善企业财务绩效。而高管团队内部社会资本则主要是影响企业创新绩效,并最终通过企业市场绩效来间接促进财务绩效的提高,对市场绩效和财务绩效的直接作用均不显著。以上结论既证实了企业社会资本总体上对企业财务绩效确实有显著提升作用,同时也阐明这一显著影响来自于其对企业创新绩效和市场绩效的显著作用,明确了企业社会资本对企业财务绩效的作用路径,是对已有研究结论有效的融合与扩展。     

论高管团队社会资本与企业绩效的关系

该文在现有研究的基础上,采用来自中国化工企业的样本数据实证检验了高管团队社会资本对企业绩效的功效结构。结果显示,不论是高官团队外部社会资本还是内部社会资本对企业财务绩效都没有显著直接作用,但有明显的间接作用。高管团队外部社会资本主要通过提升企业市场绩效而间接改善财务绩效,同时也部分通过提高企业创新绩效进而促进市场绩效最终改善企业财务绩效。而高管团队内部社会资本则主要是影响企业创新绩效,并最终通过企业市场绩效来间接促进财务绩效的提高,对市场绩效和财务绩效的直接作用均不显著。以上结论既证实了企业社会资本总体上对企业财务绩效确实有显著提升作用,同时也阐明这一显著影响来自于其对企业创新绩效和市场绩效的显著作用,明确了企业社会资本对企业财务绩效的作用路径,是对已有研究结论有效的融合与扩展。     

期权激励与企业并购行为

本文以2006年至2015年我国上市公司为研究对象,考察了期权激励对企业并购行为的影响。研究发现:授予高管的期权激励显著提升了企业发起并购的可能性和并购规模。缓解代理问题和提升风险承担是潜在的作用渠道。进一步研究表明,激励对象异质性会影响期权激励的效果,期权激励对企业并购倾向和并购规模的提升作用在管理者年龄较高、管理者任期较长以及管理者相对薪酬水平较低的企业中更加明显。此外,期权激励对企业并购行为的影响在非国有企业中更加突出。最后,本文还发现期权激励提升了企业并购的财务业绩。本文的研究不仅丰富了有关期权激励效果方面的文献,而且对于理解企业并购行为具有一定的参考意义。     

Executive team heterogeneity,equity pledges,and stock Price crash risk: Evidence from China

Heterogeneous characteristics of executive teams have drawn wide concern as a factor highly related to economic decisions. Using data from 2015 to 2020 among Chinese A-share listed companies, we examine the moderating role played by executive team heterogeneity in the positive impact of controlling shareholder equity pledges on stock crash risk. We find that executive team heterogeneity of overseas background and age reduce the positive impact, while tenure heterogeneity increases the positive impact. Further evidence shows that political connections, ownership property and D&O liability insurance can induce different moderating effects of executive team heterogeneity in the relationship between equity pledges and stock price crash risk. Our study also contributes to helping listed companies effectively manage stock crash risk connected with equity pledges.     

Social Networks and Corporate Governance

We analyse frameworks that link corporate governance and firm values to governing boards' social networks and innovations in technology. Because agents create social networks with individuals with whom they share commonalities along the dimensions of social status and income, among other attributes, CEOs may participate in board members' social networks, which interferes with the quality of governance. At the same time, social connections with members of a board can allow for better evaluation of the members' abilities. Thus, in choosing whether to have board members with social ties to management, one must trade off the benefit of members successfully identifying high ability CEOs against the cost of inadequate monitoring due to social connections. Further, technologies like the Internet and electronic mail that reduce the extent of face‐to‐face networking cause agents to seek satisfaction of their social needs at the workplace, which exacerbates the impact of social networks on governance. The predictions of our model are consistent with recent episodes that appear to signify inadequate monitoring of corporate disclosures as well as with high levels of executive compensation. Additionally, empirical tests support the model's key implication that there is better governance and lower executive compensation in firms where networks are less likely to form.     

External social networks and earnings management

Using a sample of U.S. listed firms for the 2000–2017 period, we examine how external social networks of top executives and directors affect earnings management in their firms. We find that well-connected firms are more aggressive in managing earnings through both accruals and real activities and that the results are robust after controlling for internal executive social ties. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that earnings management decreases after a socially connected executive or director dies. Additional analysis shows that connections forged by past professional working experiences have a greater impact on earnings management than connections forged by education and other social activities. Moreover, CFO social networks have a greater influence on earnings management than CEO social networks. Finally, we explore the underlying mechanisms, finding that 1) firms that are socially connected to each other show more similarities in their earnings management than firms that do not share a connection, and 2) more connected firms are less likely to incur accounting restatements. Collectively, our findings indicate that the external social networks of top executives and directors are important determinants of both their accrual- and real activity-based earnings management.     

TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM CHARACTERISTICS AND LIFE INSURER PERFORMANCE: DO TOP MANAGERS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

Abstract: This study examines the impact of top management team characteristics on life insurer performance. The authors argue that greater social cohesion among team members makes it less likely that the insurer will be able to adapt to the changes that have characterized the U.S. life insurance industry over the past decade and will, therefore, be detrimental to performance. Our findings support this assertion and suggest that life insurers driven by more diversified top management teams outperform life insurers with more homogenous top management teams.     

兼并收购可以促进劳动力结构优化升级吗？

本文使用2000-2016年我国沪深A股上市公司数据,实证研究了公司被并购对其劳动力结构的影响。研究发现,公司被并购带来公司的劳动力结构优化升级,即公司会增加非常规高技能劳动力占比和高学历劳动力占比,降低常规低技能劳动力占比。渠道检验发现,并购会通过降低企业融资约束,促进企业生产技术升级来促进企业的劳动力结构优化升级。异质性分析发现并购对劳动力结构优化升级的影响在非完全换股并购和低绩效企业中更为显著。     

How do political connections cause SOEs and non‐SOEs to make different M&A decisions/performance? Evidence from China

This study examines the impact that political connections have on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) performance and the decisions of Chinese listed firms. We find that political connections destroy (create) value in SOEs (non‐SOEs). Our findings show that connected SOEs are more likely to acquire local targets, especially when the local unemployment rate is high and when the firms are controlled by the local government, and they are less likely to conduct vertical mergers. M&A decisions of connected non‐SOEs are less influenced by the government; instead, political connections in non‐SOEs help bidders to integrate vertically and obtain external financing support.     

Factors that influence the perceived use of the internal audit function's work by executive management and audit committee

The internal audit function (IAF) is an important component of high-quality corporate governance. We study how the head of internal audit perceives the executive management team and the audit committee to rely on the IAF's work. It is not obvious from prior work or professional anecdotes whether the IAF satisfies the needs of both groups. If multiple factors influence the IAF's work, chief audit executives (CAEs) may find themselves in a situation with competing demands, which could then compromise quality for all stakeholders. Based on a unique dataset from CAEs, two logistic regression models identify factors that influence the degree to which IAF's results are perceived as being used by both executive management and the audit committee. The results show the existence of various factors that are relevant either to both groups (e.g., strategic project reports and IAF quality) or to only one (e.g., only audit committees are interested in risk management reports while only executive management teams are interested in internal control reports), depending on whether the IAF focuses on assurance or consulting work.     

The effect of management team characteristics on risk-taking and style extremity of mutual fund portfolios

This paper investigates the effect of management team-level characteristics on portfolio risk and style extremity using a unique dataset of 1678 mutual fund managers. Results show that teams with more members, longer tenure, and more members with graduate business training hold less risky portfolios. The opposite is true for teams whose members engage in side-by-side management; that is, they manage multiple funds simultaneously. Member diversity is related to less extreme style decisions. These findings have important implications for fund management companies as they make decisions about the composition of management teams as well as for individual investors’ investment allocation decisions.