Do Short Sellers Target Firms with Poor Earnings Quality? Evidence from Earnings Restatements

We study the behavior of short sellers around earnings restatements. We find that short sellers accumulate positions in restating firms several months in advance of the restatement and subsequently unwind these positions after the drop in share price induced by the restatement. The increase in short interest is larger for firms with high levels of accruals prior to restatement. We document that heavily shorted firms experience poor subsequent performance and a higher rate of delisting. Overall, these results suggest that the motive for short selling is, at least in part, related to suspect financial reporting and that short sellers pay attention to information being conveyed by accruals.

What Do Management Earnings Forecasts Convey About the Macroeconomy?

We decompose quantitative management earnings forecasts into macroeconomic and firm‐specific components to determine the extent to which voluntary disclosure provided by management has macroeconomic information content. We provide evidence that the forecasts of bellwether firms, which are defined as firms in which macroeconomic news explains the greatest amount of variation in the forecasts, provide timely information to the market about the macroeconomy when bundled with earnings announcements. Further, we show that bellwether firms provide timely information about both industry‐specific events and broader economic events. Finally, we document that the macroeconomic news in individual forecasts is more pronounced for bad news and point forecasts.     

Do Earnings Targets and Managerial Incentives Affect Sticky Costs?

This study explores motivations underlying managers’ resource adjustments. We focus on the impact of incentives to meet earnings targets on resource adjustments and the ensuing cost structures. We find that, when managers face incentives to avoid losses or earnings decreases, or to meet financial analysts’ earnings forecasts, they expedite downward adjustment of slack resources for sales decreases. These deliberate decisions lessen the degree of cost stickiness rather than induce cost stickiness. The results suggest that efforts to understand determinants of firms’ cost structures should be made in light of the managers’ motivations, particularly agency‐driven incentives underlying resource adjustment decisions.     

Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period.     

Earnings Management in Business Groups: Tax Incentives or Expropriation Concealment?

This study provides evidence that Belgian firms affiliated to a business group (holding) manage their earnings more than stand-alone firms. Earnings management is especially more prevalent in fully owned group firms compared to group firms with minority shareholders. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that controlling shareholders face fewer constraints to manage earnings if opportunistic earnings management cannot adversely affect the value of minority shareholders and is inconsistent with the claim that group firms would engage in earnings management to hide controlling shareholders' self-serving transactions. On the incentive part, we find that group firms strategically manage earnings in response to tax incentives. More specifically, we show that signed discretionary accruals of group firms depend significantly more on the marginal tax rate status of the firm as compared to independent firms. Finally, we document that earnings management is particularly facilitated through intra-group transactions.     

Does Earnings Management Relieve the Negative Effects of Mandatory Pension Contributions?

Mandatory pension contributions (MCs) are negative shocks to a firm's liquidity that can unfavorably impact its cost of capital, financing, and investment plans. We examine whether firms faced with MCs use both noncash (NEM) and cash‐generating earnings management (CEM) to partially offset their negative effects. Firms increase CEM, but not NEM, when they experience MCs. We also find that earnings management associated with MCs does not substantially lower the weighted cost of capital or boost external funding and investment. Our findings suggest that MC firms use CEM as it directly generates cash to fund MCs, while NEM does not.     

Do Restatements Improve the Persistence of Earnings and Its Components?

We examine the persistence of earnings in the pre‐ and postrestatements periods and find that restatements generally improve the persistence of earnings. We also examine how the persistence of earnings is influenced by restatements that are voluntarily initiated by managers (voluntary restatements) and those forced onto firms by outsiders (mandated restatements). Our analysis shows that voluntary restatements are followed by improvement in the persistence of earnings and that mandated restatements are not followed by improvement in earnings persistence. We find results that are consistent with the main finding when we decompose earnings into accruals and free cash flows. We use a difference‐in‐difference research design and confirm that the improvement in the postrestatement persistence of earnings components exceeds that of control firms only for voluntary restatements. Further, we show that our results are robust after controlling for endogeneity of voluntary restatements by including a two‐stage model using the Heckman ( 1979 ) method where we first estimate the likelihood of manipulation detection and analyze change in persistence conditional on the first stage analysis. The improvement in earnings persistence around voluntary restatements is not driven by the level of earnings decomposition or a subgroup of voluntary restatements. The results support our hypothesis that voluntary restatements have distinctly different economic consequences from mandated restatements.     

What is the Relationship Between REIT Governance and Earnings Management?

The empirical corporate finance literature claims that better corporate governance constrains earnings management, while others argue that the unique legal and reporting structure of REITs may reduce the need for such internal corporate governance. Using a sample of publicly traded REITs for the 2004–2008 time period, we examine the relationships amongst corporate governance, accruals earnings management, manipulation of Funds from Operations (FFO), and real earnings management. We find that corporate governance quality is unrelated to accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO. At first glance, the findings suggest that managers need less internal oversight because of the more transparent reporting structure of REITs. However, we document that REITs engage in significant real activities manipulation for earnings management purposes. Our empirical findings further show that corporate governance characteristics, in particular board size, independence, number of board meetings and audit committee financial expertise, are essential for constraining such activities. Finally, by focusing on a subset of REITs that act in ways which previous research has identified as more susceptible to earnings management activities, we demonstrate that good corporate governance effectively reduces accruals earnings management and manipulation of FFO for these REITs. Overall, our findings indicate that, despite the unique legal and reporting structure, REITs engage in certain forms of earnings management, and that the ability for REITs to manipulate earnings is reduced when corporate governance is more effective.     

Would Switching to Timely Reviews Delay Quarterly and Annual Earnings Releases?

The SEC recently issued a proposal to modernize and clarify the regulatory structure of securities offerings. The proposal would allow companies to access capital markets on an almost continuous basis but would require strengthening of the role of independent accountants and other gatekeepers in the registration process. The Commission is seeking comment on whether it should add to the proposed practices the fact than an independent accountant performed a timely review under SAS 71 of an issuer's quarterly financial information (SEC, 1998, p. 231). This is the most recent of several proposals, made by the SEC and others, that provides incentives for companies to purchase quarter-end (timely) reviews of their quarterly data. Some managers who currently have their quarterly earnings reviewed only at year-end (retrospective reviews) argue that having a timely review would delay interim earnings releases. Proponents of timely reviews deny that this would occur, and assert that shifting certain review procedures into interim periods would decrease the time needed to release annual earnings.We estimate the quarterly and annual reporting lags that would occur if companies currently selecting retrospective reviews switched to timely reviews. Our results indicate that quarterly earnings release lags would increase, as opponents of mandatory timely review have argued. Switching to timely review would reduce annual earnings release lags only when interim earnings contain unusual components.     

Inefficiency in Analysts' Earnings Forecasts: Systematic Misreaction or Systematic Optimism?

A rational analysis of analyst behavior predicts that analysts immediately and without bias incorporate information into their forecasts. Several studies document analysts' tendency to systematically underreact to information. Underreaction is inconsistent with rationality. Other studies indicate that analysts systematically overreact to new information or that they are systematically optimistic. This study discriminates between these three hypotheses by examining the interaction between the nature of information and the type of reaction by analysts. The evidence indicates that analysts underreact to negative information, but overreact to positive information. These results are consistent with systematic optimism in response to information.     

Do Weather‐Induced Moods Affect the Processing of Earnings News?

We investigate whether unpleasant environmental conditions affect stock market participants’ responses to information events. We draw from psychology research to develop a new prediction that weather‐induced negative moods reduce market participants’ activity levels. Exploiting geographic variation in equity analysts’ locations, we find compelling evidence that analysts experiencing unpleasant weather are slower or less likely to respond to an earnings announcement relative to analysts responding to the same announcement but experiencing pleasant weather. Price association tests find evidence consistent with reduced activity due to weather‐induced moods delaying equilibrium price adjustments following earnings announcements. We also use our analyst‐based research design to re‐examine an existing prediction that unpleasant weather induces investor pessimism, and find evidence of both analyst pessimism and reduced activity in the presence of unpleasant weather. Together, our study provides new evidence that both extends and reaffirms findings of a relation between unpleasant weather and market activities, and contributes to the broader psychology and economics literature on the impact of weather‐induced mood on labor productivity.     

Does the Presence of Female Executives Curb Earnings Management? Evidence from Korea

We investigate the role of female executives in curbing earnings management behaviour in Korea, a country known for its strong male‐dominant culture. In a sample of Korean firms from 2002 to 2010, we find that female presence in top management is negatively associated with discretionary accruals, suggesting that gender diversity in senior management deters opportunistic financial reporting even in a highly male‐dominant corporate environment. Further, this association is primarily observed in firms with stronger (weaker) female (male) dominance. This finding is consistent with the idea that female executives can exert more influence on corporate decisions in a more female‐friendly environment. These findings have implications for academics and practitioners seeking to understand the impact of the role of top executive gender diversity in corporate accounting practices.     

Discussion of “The Predictive Value of Expenses Excluded from Pro Forma Earnings”

Doyle et al. (2003, this issue) provide evidence that IBES exclusions have incremental explanatory power (over GAAP earnings) for future cash flows, for market-adjusted returns at the earnings announcement date, and for future market-adjusted returns. They argue that this evidence supports the viewpoint that the current regulatory concern about the use of pro forma earnings may be warranted. My contention in this discussion is that one can readily posit alternative explanations for each of the empirical results, in turn suggesting that the results do not provide a basis for regulatory concern. Further, since there is considerable evidence that IBES earnings differ from pro forma earnings, it is not clear that the empirical analyzes in this paper may be used to draw any conclusions about pro forma earnings.     

Earnings Reported under IFRS Improve the Prediction of Future Cash Flows? Evidence from European Banks

This paper examines the relative costs and benefits of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption in the European Union by testing the ability of earnings computed under IFRS to predict future cash flows. The study considers the contribution of net income, comprehensive income and other comprehensive income to the usefulness of earnings to predict cash flows, and it compares IFRS with domestic Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). Evidence from a sample of Continental European banks shows that IFRS improve the ability of net income to predict future cash flows. Comprehensive income, too, provides relevant information to predict future cash flows, although with a measurement error which is higher than that in net income for greater lags of time. In our interpretation, these findings are consistent with unrealised gains and losses recognised in other comprehensive income being more transitory and volatile in nature. Overall, our results are relevant to academics and standard setters debating the merits of IFRS adoption and to those who use financial statements and adopt reported earnings to form expectations about future cash flows.     

Spring-loading future performance when no one is looking? Earnings and cash flow management around acquisitions

We find evidence that performance—reflected in earnings and cash flows—is transferred from targets to acquirers around acquisitions. Using a sample of 2128 completed deals from 1985 to 2010, our results suggest that targets depress performance when investor attention declines once the deal parameters are set, and much of that performance understatement is transferred to boost post-acquisition acquirer performance. Evidence of variation across subsamples provides additional confirmation: transfers are more visible for large deals (with transfers large enough to be detected) and muted for pooling transactions (with lower incentives to transfer). We contribute to the earnings management literature by showing that earnings and cash flows are transferred not just within firms but also across firms, and to the mergers and acquisitions literature by documenting that performance is managed not only before but also after deals are announced.     

Early Movers Advantage? Evidence from Short Selling during After‐Hours on Earnings Announcement Days

We examine short sellers’ after‐hours trading (AHT) following quarterly earnings announcements released outside of the normal trading hours. Our innovation is to use the actual short trades immediately after the announcements. We find that on these earnings announcement days, there is significant shorting activity in AHT relative to shorting activity both during AHT on nonannouncements days and during regular trading sessions around announcements. Short sellers who trade after‐hours on announcement days earn an excess return of 0.82% and 1.40% during before‐market‐open (BMO) and after‐market‐close (AMC)sessions, respectively. The magnitude of these returns increases to 1.48 (3.92%) for BMO (AMC) earnings announcements with negative surprise. We find that the reactive short selling during AHT has information in predicting future returns. Short sellers’ trades have no predictive power if they wait for the market to open to trade during regular hours. In addition, we find that the weighted price contribution during AHT increases with an increase in after‐hours short selling. Overall, our results suggest that short sellers in AHT are informed. Our findings remain robust using alternative holding periods and after controlling for macroeconomic news announcements during BMO sessions.     

Do Accruals Earnings Management Constraints and Intellectual Capital Efficiency Trigger Asymmetric Cost Behaviour? Evidence from Australia

This study examines whether accruals earnings management constraints and intellectual capital (IC) efficiency affect asymmetric cost behaviour by analysing data for the 1990 to 2016 period on firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange. The analysis reveals that, on average, anti‐sticky cost behaviour occurs when firms have limited ability to engage in accrual earnings management to manipulate earnings in the current year. Further, IC efficiency – particularly human capital efficiency – increases the degree of cost stickiness. This study also finds that the degree of asymmetric cost behaviour is more pronounced in the post‐International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) period than in the pre‐IFRS period. The results suggest that the increased asymmetric cost behaviour in the post‐IFRS period derives from higher IC efficiency relative to the pre‐IFRS period. This study presents important implications for external stakeholders because they can consider the extent of earnings management constraints and the extent of firms’ IC efficiency as the determinants of asymmetric cost behaviour when assessing firms’ cost behaviour.     

Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts for DAX100 Firms During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s

This paper examines the reliability of financial analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts in the 1990s. Analysts are often accused of having fuelled the stock market boom with exaggerated evaluations of firms’ prospects. However, this criticism primarily refers to the analysts’ buy recommendations rather than earnings forecasts. Although biases in earnings forecasts have been reported since the 1980s, a systematic study capturing the period of ‘irrational exuberance’ until 2000 on the German stock market has not yet been published. Our data set consists of DAX100 firms, leaving out the peculiarities of forecasting earnings (or rather losses) of young technology firms. To evaluate the information content of analysts’ forecasts, we confront them with five alternative forecasting models. The empirical results reveal that analysts’ forecasts were too optimistic throughout the entire sample period. However, contrary to the increase in stock prices, the optimistic bias has declined over time. If the bias is removed, the analysts’ consensus forecasts significantly outperform all other models considered. Thus, the forecasts seem to be informative with respect to earnings differences, even if the market level of earnings is optimistically overstated.     

Does pedigree matter? Earnings quality of U.S. listed domestic firms via reverse mergers

This paper examines earnings quality of U.S. domestic firms that access capital markets via a reverse merger transaction (RM firms) compared to those via the more traditional initial public offering (IPO firms) during the period from 1997 to 2011. In order to mitigate confounding effects of legal regime, law enforcement, and culture, we require both the acquiring and target firms to be incorporated and headquartered in the U.S. to be included in our sample. We also use the Heckman (1976) procedure to control for self-selection bias. To capture earnings quality, we use a battery of measures established in prior literature, including discretionary accruals, discretionary revenues, real activities earnings management, and accrual estimation errors. Our measures have both convergent and discriminant validity and therefore appear to capture earnings quality fairly well. We find consistent evidence that U.S. domestic RM firms have lower earnings quality compared with U.S. IPO firms. Our evidence suggests that investors and other stakeholders should take into account the fact and consequences of the method that firms use to access capital markets in their investment decision making process.