Strategic revelation of differences in segment earnings growth

Prior studies have theoretically and empirically documented that incentives to disclose information involve a trade-off between the benefits to the corporation of reducing information asymmetry and the costs of revealing proprietary information. This study investigates the interplay of managers’ motives to conceal versus reveal cross-segment differences in earnings growth in multi-segment firms. We find that revealed segment earnings growth differences are negatively associated with proxies for proprietary costs and agency costs, and positively associated with firms’ reliance on external financing. We also find that SFAS No. 131 improved the quality of segment information by requiring or allowing revelation of greater cross-segment differences in earnings growth.     

The Effect of SFAS No. 131 on the Cross-segment Variability of Profits Reported by Multiple Segment Firms

Our study assesses whether SFAS No. 131 improved disclosure about the diversity of multiple segment firms’ operations. We find a post-SFAS No. 131 increase in cross-segment variability of segment profits, an increase in the association between reported and inherent cross-segment variability, and an increase in association between reported variability and capital market incentives to disclose. We interpret the results as evidence that SFAS No. 131 increased the transparency of segment profitability disclosures, and as indicating SFAS No. 131 allowed firms depending more on external financing to disclose more about differences in segment profitability.

LIFO adoption and dividend payout

Adoption of the LIFO inventory costing method tends to decrease reported earnings but increases cash flows to adopting firms. This study examines the change in dividend payout ratios (cash dividends divided by earnings) accompanying LIFO adoption. The question addressed is whether adopting firms likely paid out incremental cash flows or retained them to the benefit of management. The evidence suggests that managers and directors adjusted payout ratios to partially offset the negative earnings effect of LIFO. The adjustments made were not sufficient in magnitude to achieve a neutral LIFO effect on dividend payout, and the net result was the retention of incremental cash flows generated by LIFO adoption.     

Fee pressure and the longitudinal dynamics of audit engagement budgeting and reporting

Using longitudinal data from an international accounting firm, this paper investigates how budgeted and reported audit hours change in response to prior budget variances, fee pressure, and budget pressure imposed by audit firm management. This investigation is motivated by concern regarding the association between these factors and quality-reducing audit behaviors. The results for audit firm management budgeting show that budgets increase following unfavorable variances, and that fee pressure does not affect the budgeting process. Regarding engagement team reporting behavior, we find that both prior unfavorable variances and fee pressure are associated with subsequent reduction in reported audit hours. Further, when audit firm management imposes budget pressure on engagement teams, they respond by reducing reported hours. Overall, the results provide evidence on the interplay between audit firm management and engagement teams in responding to prior variances, fee pressure, and budget pressure during the period 2001-2003.     

Effects of SOX 404(b) implementation on audit fees by SEC filer size category

This study provides novel information about the consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) by documenting differential audit fee shocks accompanying implementation of SOX 404(b) internal control tests and reports for clients in three size categories: large accelerated filers (LAFs), small accelerated filers (SAFs), and non-accelerated filers (NAFs). First, we find that although both LAFs and SAFs experience audit fee shocks attributable to 404(b), SAFs on average experience relatively greater fee shocks than LAFs (107.8% versus 84.6%; Table 6). Second, even though NAFs are not subject to 404(b) procedures, we document a 42.7% fee shock for NAFs. Our interpretation is that 404(b) generated an immediate increase in demand for audit services with no corresponding sudden increase in supply of experienced audit personnel, enabling audit firms to charge higher prices for all filers including NAFs. We find that audit fee shocks attributable to 404(b) are positively associated with audit offices’ bargaining power relative to clients, and that the effect of offices’ bargaining power is strongest for SAFs and weakest for NAFs. Although higher audit fees (with client characteristics held constant) are often considered an indicator of better audit quality, we find virtually no evidence that the massive fee increases in 2004 are accompanied by improvements in same-year or next-year audit quality, measured as decreases in discretionary accruals and a lower likelihood of subsequent restatements of audited financial reports.     

Dissemination of information for investors at corporate Web sites

We extend the limited prior research on Internet financial reporting by providing insights into dissemination of two types of financial information at corporate Web sites. One type consists of reports that already have been filed with the SEC (i.e. required filings). The second type is all other (voluntary) information for investors. In doing so we investigate whether Web-based dissemination of both types of data can be explained by theories of incentives to voluntarily disclose information via more traditional means such as meetings or conference calls with analysts. We use regression analysis to test hypotheses that link the variation in the information disseminated through corporate Web sites to factors thought to influence voluntary disclosure of financial information. Presence of required items is significantly associated only with size and a proxy for information asymmetry, while voluntary information item disclosure is associated with variables proxying for size, information asymmetry, demand for external capital, and companies’ traditional disclosure reputations. Our results confirm that incentives motivating initial voluntary disclosure also explain the subsequent dissemination of voluntary material.     

Fee pressure and audit quality

This study investigates the association of audit fee pressure with an inverse measure of audit quality, misstatements in audited data, during the recent recession. Fee pressure in a year is measured as the difference between benchmark “normal” audit fees and actual audit fees. We find fee pressure is positively and significantly associated with accounting misstatements in 2008, the center of the recession. Our results suggest that auditors made fee concessions to some clients in 2008, and that fee pressure was associated with reduced audit quality in that year.     

Security Market Effects Associated with SFAS No. 131: Reported Business Segments

In this study we examine the economic impact of the expected shift from the FASB's segment reporting requirements found in SFAS No. 14 to those found in SFAS No. 131. SFAS No. 131 was the joint effort of the United States' FASB and Canada's Accounting Standards Board (AcSB). It requires firms to report segments based on the firm's internal reporting and management arrangements (the management method) rather than on SFAS No. 14's line-of-business method. One alleged deficiency with the line-of-business method is its flexibility that allowed companies to combine segments. Analysts complained that companies abused this flexibility to conceal information. The management method allegedly is less flexible because companies must report segments externally the same way that they manage them internally. We examine the economic impact of the reporting standard shift by first developing company variables related to the alleged concealment of information under SFAS No. 14. These variables help us to explore why companies combine business segments under the line-of-business method and what costs companies are expected to incur when they are forced to implement the management method. Next we identify a series of dates that chronicle when the market received information about the content of SFAS No. 131. Results of the stock return tests suggest that SFAS No. 131 had a significant impact on firms that previously had the greatest incentives to conceal segment information, consistent with the conjecture that the standard imposed unanticipated costs on affected firms.