Accounting Rate of Return vs. Economic Rate of Return

The accounting rate of return (ARR) has traditionally been used as a surrogate for the economic rate of return (IRR) in evaluating the effectiveness of managements' capital investment decisions. Over the years, some question has been raised as to the validity of using the ARR as an approximation of the IRR. Several papers have recently come to grips with this question with varying degrees of success. This paper is intended to expose the conceptual differences between these rates of return, with the goal of clearly pointing out just how useful the ARR can be to management.     

Accounting Returns Revisited: Evidence of their Usefulness in Estimating Economic Returns

Accounting information is used for measuring firm performance in various financial applications—a practice supported by empirical studies demonstrating the value relevance of accounting numbers, but disputed by theoretical papers arguing that a firm's accounting rate of return (ARR) serves poorly as a proxy for its internal rate of return (IRR). We derive a new model of the ARR–IRR relation, and describe how the conservatism of GAAP constrains a firm's IRR to fall in a range bounded by its historical growth rate and ARR. Using cross-sectional data, we demonstrate that economic returns can be estimated from accounting numbers for many firms. We link empirical results to underlying economic theory, and thus contribute to understanding why accounting information is value relevant.     

What Determines TSR

Researchers have long wrestled with the question of what determines a company's total shareholder return, or TSR, and their results have been decidedly mixed. Some empirical studies come down in favor of dividends or earnings per share, while others favor return on capital or other profitability measures. In this article, the author takes a “first principles” approach that begins by demonstrating that TSR should be a function of a company's economic profit, or its Economic Value Added (or EVA). He shows that, from a theoretical standpoint, the sum of dividends and share price appreciation—which is the definition of TSR—is ultimately a function of increasing EVA and, along with it, a company's “aggregate NPV.” He further shows that if stock prices are determined by discounting expected cash flows, corporate NPV will equal the discounted value of EVA, and increasing NPV will come down to increasing EVA. In developing his argument, the author demonstrates that TSR is actually a leveraged version of a measure he calls “TIR,” or total investor return, which is the blended return that an investor would earn from owning the entire capital structure of a company, bonds as well as stock. He then presents the findings of regression analysis showing that a company's TIR and TSR are both strongly positively correlated with its EVA performance plus the change in its aggregate NPV (with R²s equal to 1.0 and 0.94, respectively). In a final step, the author shows that the change in EVA provides a better statistical explanation than other financial measures for changes in aggregate NPV and, hence, actual TSR     

The Economic Cost of Growing Up Poor: Estimating the GDP Loss Associated with Child Poverty*

One of the motivations for the UK government's target to reduce (and eventually eliminate) child poverty is the perception of a significant long‐term economic cost of growing up in poverty. This perception arises from the observation that individuals who experience poverty in their childhood earn less as adults, are less likely to be in employment, are more likely to engage in criminal or anti‐social activities and are more likely to experience poor health and lower life satisfaction. This paper quantifies these effects, and expresses them in terms of GDP losses to the nation. We begin by focusing on lost earnings that arise from poorer skills and reduced employment opportunities, and then move on to the wider costs associated with the higher crime rates, poorer health and reduced well‐being that are linked with growing up poor. We find a sizeable economic cost, with the cost of growing up in poverty amounting to at least 1 per cent of GDP.     

Economic and Accounting (Book) Rates of Return: Application of a Statistical Model

Harcourt's (1965) classic paper has spawned a considerable literature dealing with the relationship between economic and accounting rates of return. Kay (1976), Ijiri (1979), Salamon (1982) and Kelly and Tippett (1991), for example, can be interpreted as extensions of Harcourt's seminal analysis, while Kay (1976), Salamon (1982, 1985) and Gordon and Hamer (1988) provide empirical evidence on the sustainability of basic propositions. The present paper's focus is on the latter area; we apply the statistical procedures laid down in Kelly and Tippett (1991) to about 200 British companies to assess the correspondence between the ex post accounting rate of return and the prospective economic return. The economic return is estimated using three cash flow definitions. For all three, the accounting rate of return is significantly lower than the economic return. Further tests show the economic return to be inversely related to the accounting rate of return, although the relationship is weak. In addition, ‘large’ firms tend to report lower accounting rates of return than ‘small’ firms, but again the relationship is weak.     

What is an Investment Project's Implied Rate of Return?

How to measure a project's implied rate of return has long been an unresolved problem, except for some special cases. This paper derives return on present cost (ROPC) as the correct measure of an investment project's implied rate of return. The IRR is a biased measure except for projects classified as simple projects, and this bias is likely to be substantial in many real‐world applications. Thus while net present values should be used to determine whether to accept/reject projects, I recommend that analysts use ROPC in place of the IRR as a measure of a project's true rate of return.     

Can salience theory explain investor behaviour? Real-world evidence from the cryptocurrency market

Research on human attention indicates that objects that stand out from their surroundings, i.e., salient objects, attract the attention of our sensory channels and receive undue weighting in the decision-making process. In the financial realm, salience theory predicts that individuals will find assets with salient upsides (downsides) appealing (unappealing). We investigate whether this theory can explain investor behaviour in the cryptocurrency market. Consistent with the theory's predictions, using a sample of 1738 cryptocurrencies, we find that cryptocurrencies that are more (less) attractive to “salient thinkers” earn lower (higher) future returns, which indicates that they tend to be overpriced (underpriced). On average, a one cross-sectional standard-deviation increase in the salience theory value of a cryptocurrency reduces its next-week return by 0.41%. However, the salience effect is confined to the micro-cap segment of the market, and its size is moderated by limits to arbitrage.     

Determinants of nonprofits’ taxable activities

Although nonprofit is often considered to be synonymous with tax-exempt, many nonprofit organizations earn revenues from unrelated taxable activities, and on average these taxable activities generate $1.5 million in revenues. Policymakers have expressed concern that the pursuit of unrelated taxable revenues can distract a nonprofit from its primary charitable mission. Our results show that nonprofits earn taxable revenues when the taxable activities produce a relatively higher return, the nonprofit itself is experiencing lower profitability, and donor aversion is lower. These results suggest that nonprofits will pursue specific types of unrelated taxable activities, and then only under certain circumstances, reducing concerns over mission drift caused by widespread nonprofit expansion into taxable markets.     

On Testing the Assumptions of the Cash Recovery Rate Approach to the Estimation of Economic Performance

The first purpose of this paper is to investigate the necessary (as opposed to sufficient) assumptions underlying the CRR approach to the estimation of corporate economic performance. By so doing, the general circumstances in which an estimate of corporate economic performance based on CRRs will exactly equal a firm's IRR are identified. It is pointed out that these necessary assumptions are related to the concept of corporate economic performance being invoked (within the general idea that we are trying to estimate a firm's internal rate of return). Second, there is a drawing out of the empirical implications, as to the behaviour of corporate cash flows and CRRs, of the necessary assumptions for the CRR approach to produce an estimate of economic performance equal to a firm's IRR for each of these definitions of corporate economic performance. In particular, it is argued that these empirical implications depend upon the specific manner in which the CRR approach is applied in practice. A third purpose of the paper is to provide some empirical evidence as to whether an example of the practice of using the CRR approach employs data consistent with the necessary assumptions for this particular approach to be valid outlined in the paper. In fact, it turns out that this might not be the case. The evidence casts light on the extent to which CRR-based estimates of corporate economic performance are likely to be reasonable proxies of firms' IRRs.     

Accounting and economic rates of return: Additional Australian evidence

The key issue addressed in my paper is whether accounting rate of return (ARR) performs as an effective monitoring surrogate for internal rate of return (IRR). Financial information derived from a sample of 44 Australian corporations between 1968 and 1990 was utilized to accomplish this objective. The Kelly-Tippett (1991) technique was employed to analyze the data set. Results confirm earlier work in the area in that the ARR was found to be an unreliable substitute for the IRR.     

Unfunded pension liabilities and stock returns

This paper investigates whether the market rationally anticipates the value implications of unrecognized pension obligations, using a large sample of Japanese firms where pension obligations are substantially underfunded. If a firm's unrecognized pension obligation is not incorporated into its share price, its stock returns will be lower than those of other firms, because its deficit will affect the firm's income statement in the coming years. We find that firms with large unrecognized obligations earn lower risk-adjusted returns. This evidence suggests that the market does not efficiently incorporate information in the pension items.     

Productivity and payout policy

I investigate how a firm's total factor productivity (TFP) is related to its payout policy. I find that firms with higher TFP are more likely to pay dividends and repurchase shares. Such firms also pay higher dividends and repurchase more shares, even after controlling for income and other factors known to affect payout policy. Results are robust to propensity score matching and other analyses, including adoption of productivity-enhancing technology. I find that firms with higher TFP earn higher future operating income; productive firms with higher agency concerns pay back more, thus draining resources that could potentially be misused.     

Is Economic Growth Good for Investors?1

When measured over long periods of time, the correlation of countries' inflation‐adjusted per capita GDP growth and stock returns is negative. This result holds for both developed countries (for which the correlation coefficient is –0.39 using data from 1900–2011) and emerging markets (the correlation is –0.41 over the period 1988–2011). And this means that investors would have been better off investing in countries with lower per capita GDP growth than in countries experiencing the highest growth rates. This seems surprising since economic growth is generally assumed to be good for corporate profits. In attempting to explain this finding, the author begins by noting that economic growth can be achieved through increased inputs of capital and labor, which don't necessarily benefit the stockholders of existing companies. Growth also comes from technological advances, which do not necessarily lead to higher profits since competition among firms often results in the benefits accruing to consumers and workers. What's more, it's important to recognize that growth has both an expected and an unexpected component. And one explanation for the negative correlation between growth and stock returns is the tendency for investors to overpay for expected growth. But there is another—and in the author's view, a more important—part of the explanation. Along with the negative correlation between long‐run average stock returns and per capita growth rates, the author also reports a strong positive association between (per share) dividend growth rates and overall stock returns. Such an association is not surprising since unusual growth in dividends is a fairly reliable predictor of increases in future earnings. But another effect at work here is the role of dividends—and, in the U.S., stock repurchases too—in limiting what might be called the corporate “overinvestment problem,” the natural tendency of corporate managers to pursue growth, if necessary at the expense of profitability. One of the main messages of this article is that corporate growth adds value only when companies reinvest their earnings in projects that are expected to earn at least their cost of capital—while at the same time committing to return excess cash and capital to their shareholders through dividends and stock buybacks.     

Momentum in Residential Real Estate

This paper examines whether there is return momentum in residential real estate in the U.S. Case and Shiller (American economic review 79(1):128–137, 1989) document evidence of positive return correlation in four U.S. cities. Similar to Jegadeesh and Titman’s (Journal of finance 56:699–720, 1993) stock market momentum paper, we construct long-short zero cost investment portfolios from more than 380 metropolitan areas based on their lagged returns. Our results show that momentum of returns in the U.S. residential housing is statistically significant and economically meaningful during our 1983 to 2008 sample period. On average, zero cost investment portfolios that buy past winning housing markets and short sell past losing markets earn up to 8.92% annually. Our results are robust to different sub-periods and more pronounced in the Northeast and West regions. While zero cost portfolios of residential real estate indices is not a tradable strategy, the implications of our results can be useful for builders, potential home owners, mortgage originators and traders of real estate options.     

Economic significance of predictability in Australian equities

This paper examines evidence of predictability in Australian equities using both statistical and economic metrics of significance. A probit‐based predictive model is used to forecast the probability that the 1 month ahead excess market return will be positive. Funds under management are then switched between equities and fixed income on the basis of this forecast. Although the statistical evidence of the model's predictive ability is mixed, the results suggest convincing evidence of an economically significant degree of return predictability. A $A1 investment in the switching strategy (market) in January 1980 grows to over $A55 ($A39) by June 2007. Although the economic significance of the switching strategy remains even in the presence of high transaction costs, robustness checks suggest that the seemingly impressive full‐sample results might be sample specific. The apparent superiority of the portfolio‐switching strategy can be traced to a handful of observations early in the study during which the predictive model provides a timely signal to exit equities. There is little evidence that the predictive model has forecasting ability across the entire sample. As such, this paper serves both to illustrate how alternate metrics of return predictability can lead to divergent conclusions, and to emphasize the importance of subjecting apparent findings of predictability to robustness checks.     

The Effect of Client Industry Agglomerations on Auditor Industry Specialization

Prior research on auditor industry specialization documents fee premiums for local audit offices that are industry specialists. This research assumes that the effects of specialization are uniform across markets. We examine industry specialization based on the economic theory of industry agglomeration (geographic areas with high industry concentration). Agglomeration economies can facilitate access to knowledge for auditors serving a specific industry in those locations. We find that industry specialists in agglomerations earn a fee premium in excess of specialists in other markets. We find that nonspecialist offices in agglomerations also earn fee premiums in that industry when compared to nonspecialists in other markets even when controlling for these groups’ absolute share of the national market. We also address whether or not this expertise can be shared among offices in an agglomeration specialist's firm. We find that audit offices that have easy connections to a within-firm office in an agglomerated market can earn a fee premium relative to more distant offices, suggesting a benefit from knowledge transfer. This fee premium accrues to offices that would not be considered a specialist using traditional market share measures in a given industry. These findings indicate that the benefit of industry specialization depends on more than local market share.     

Expectations‐Based Management

The authors begin by summarizing the results of their recently published study of the relation between stock returns and changes in several annual performance measures, including not only growth in earnings and EVA, but changes during the year in analysts' expectations about future earnings over three different periods: (1) the current year; (2) the following year; and (3) the three‐year period thereafter. The last of these measures—changes in analysts' expectations about three‐ to five‐year earnings—had by far the greatest explanatory “power” of any of the measures tested. Besides being consistent with the stock market's taking a long‐term, DCF approach to the valuation of companies, the authors' finding that investors seem to care most about earnings three to five years down the road has a number of important implications for financial management: First, a business unit doesn't necessarily create shareholder value if its return on capital exceeds the weighted average cost of capital—nor does an operation that fails to earn its WACC necessarily reduce value. To create value, the business's return must exceed what investors are expecting. Second, without forecasting returns on capital, management should attempt to give investors a clear sense of the firm's internal benchmarks, both for existing businesses and new investment. Third, management incentive plans should be based on stock ownership rather than stock options. Precisely because stock prices reflect expectations, the potential for prices to get ahead of realities gives options‐laden managers a strong temptation to manipulate earnings and manage for the short term.     

Information trading by corporate insiders based on accounting accruals: forecasting economic performance

In this paper, we test whether directors’ (corporate insiders) trading in Australia, based on accounting accruals, provides incremental information in forecasting a firm's economic performance. We determine that directors’ trading on negative accruals in larger firms has greater forecasting content and is associated with 1‐year‐ahead bull market phases. Moreover, arbitrage portfolios set up to mimic insider trading can earn 1‐year‐ahead excess size‐adjusted arbitrage returns of up to 12.2 per cent. Results are consistent with directors hiding their trades in liquid well‐traded firms and in providing incremental information above that supplied by a continuous information regime.     

This Time Is the Same: Using Bank Performance in 1998 to Explain Bank Performance during the Recent Financial Crisis

Are some banks prone to perform poorly during crises? If yes, why? In this paper, we show that a bank's stock return performance during the 1998 crisis predicts its stock return performance and probability of failure during the recent financial crisis. This effect is economically large. Our findings are consistent with persistence in a bank's risk culture and/or aspects of its business model that make its performance sensitive to crises. Banks that relied more on short‐term funding, had more leverage, and grew more are more likely to be banks that performed poorly in both crises.     

The Impact of the Source and Sequence of Information in Primary Equity Offerings

Empirical studies of the announcement effects of equity offerings have generally defined the event date as the earlier of the SEC registration date or the first mention in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), the implicit assumption being that the two types of announcements are equally informative. This study examines whether the source of the event announcement might influence a study's results and whether subsequent announcements from other sources elicit a market reaction. Specifically, this paper investigates whether Dow Jones News Wire (DJNW) announcements that differ in timing from either of these information events elicit a market response and, more important, whether impacts from the DJNW announcements alter the validity of the widely used methodology. The results of the paper indicate that, for issues that are not mentioned in the WSJ Index, there is a negative and significant return on the registration date. However, no matter whether the registration occurs before or after its mention on the DJNW, the share price reaction is greater from mention on the DJNW than at registration. This finding leads to the conclusion that the DJNW should be used as the event date and that press coverage