The international zero-leverage phenomenon

We analyze the zero-leverage phenomenon around the world. Countries with a common law system, high creditor protection, and a dividend imputation or dividend relief tax system exhibit the highest percentage of zero-leverage firms. The increasing prevalence of zero-leverage firms in all sample countries is related to market-wide forces during our sample period, such as IPO waves, shifts in industry composition, increasing asset volatility, and decreasing corporate tax rates. Firm-level comparisons reveal that only a small number of firms deliberately maintain zero-leverage. Most zero-leverage firms are constrained by their debt capacity. Analyzing the time-series dynamics of leverage and investment behavior, we further show that firms which pursue a zero-leverage policy only for a short period of time seek financial flexibility.     

Taxes and dividend policy under alternative tax regimes

This paper examines changes in corporate dividend policy around the introduction of a dividend imputation tax system. This represented a significant change to the Australian tax framework and allows us to test the effect of differential taxation on corporate dividend policy. Consistent with the tax preference for the distribution of dividends, we find dividend initiations, all dividend payout measures and dividend reinvestment plans increased with the introduction of dividend imputation. Similarly we find that gross dividend payouts are more volatile under dividend imputation. Finally, we find that the increase in dividend payout and initiations differs across firms. In particular, we find that the higher the level of available franking tax credits the higher the firm's gross dividend payout and the more likely the firm is to initiate a dividend.     

The Role of Dividends, Debt and Board Structure in the Governance of Family Controlled Firms

Abstract:  We investigate whether family controlled firms use dividends, debt and board structure to exacerbate or mitigate agency problems between controlling and minority shareholders in a capital market environment with high investor protection and private benefits of control. Results indicate family controlled firms employ higher dividend payout ratios, higher debt levels and lower levels of board independence compared to non-family firms. This suggests family controlled firms use either dividends or debt as a substitute for independent directors. We also find that dividends and debt are more effective governance mechanisms in mitigating the families' expropriation of minority shareholders' wealth. Independent directors are, in contrast, more effective in controlling owner-manager conflict in non-family firms.     

The effect of taxes on multinational debt location

We provide new evidence that differences in international tax rates and tax regimes affect multinational firms' debt location decisions. Our sample contains 8287 debt issues from 2437 firms headquartered in 23 different countries with debt-issuing subsidiaries in 59 countries. We analyze firms' marginal decisions of where to issue debt to investigate the influence of a comprehensive set of tax-related effects, including differences in personal and corporate tax rates, tax credit and exemption systems, and bi-lateral cross-country withholding taxes on interest and dividend payments. Our results show that differences in personal and corporate tax rates, the presence of dividend imputation or relief tax systems, the tax treatment of repatriated profits, and inter-country withholding taxes on dividends and interest significantly influence the decision of where to locate debt and the proportion of debt located abroad. Our results are robust to firm and issue specific factors and to the effect of legal regimes, debt market development, and exchange rate risk.     

Dividend Policy and Financial Distress: An Empirical Investigation of Troubled NYSE Firms

This paper studies the dividend policy adjustments of 80 NYSE firms to protracted financial distress as evidenced by multiple losses during 1980–1985. Almost all sample firms reduced dividends, and more than half apparently faced binding debt covenants in years they did so. Absent binding debt covenants, dividends are cut more often than omitted, suggesting that managerial reluctance is to the omission and not simply the reduction of dividends. Moreover, managers of firms with long dividend histories appear particularly reluctant to omit dividends. Finally, some dividend reductions seem strategically motivated, e.g., designed to enhance the firm's bargaining position with organized labor.     

Strategies and dividend imputation: the effect of foreign and domestic ownership on average effective tax rates

This study examines how dividend imputation affects the incentive of New Zealand firms to minimize tax. By effectively eliminating double taxation on company income, imputation reduces firms’ incentives to engage in costly tax minimization strategies. Before September 1993, resident and nonresident shareholders were treated differently under New Zealand’s imputation system. Because imputation credits cannot be passed to shareholders unless dividends are paid, we expect firms to pursue different tax paying strategies depending on their level of foreign ownership and their dividend payout ratios. After September 1993 when imputation credits were extended to nonresident portfolio shareholders, we expect that firms with high foreign ownership and high dividend payouts would have less incentive to minimize tax. Our results provide some support for these expectations.     

Dividend payouts and catering to demands: Evidence from a dividend tax reform

Utilizing the 2012 dividend tax reform in China, this paper examines how firms make dividend payout decisions that cater to the controlling shareholders' demand, especially when controlling shareholders and outside minority shareholders have different dividend preferences. We find that firms increase dividend payouts when controlling shareholders demand higher dividends after the dividend tax reform. In particular, firms pay higher dividends when facing increased demand from controlling shareholders than when the demand is from minority investors. In addition, we find that firms that increase dividend payments due to the controlling shareholders' demand subsequently have more debt financing and poorer firm performance, suggesting that catering to the demands from controlling shareholders is subject to the Type II agency problem.     

Do Emerging Market Firms Follow Different Dividend Policies From U.S. Firms?

We find that emerging market firms exhibit dividend behavior similar to U.S. firms, in the sense that dividends are explained by profitability, debt, and the market‐to‐book ratio. However, empirical dividend policy equations are structurally different, indicating different sensitivities to these variables. Additionally, emerging market firms seem to be more affected by asset mix, which seems to be due to their greater reliance on bank debt. Overall, country factors are as important in dividend policies as previous studies find them to be in capital structure decisions.     

R&D Intensity and Corporate Financial Policy: Some International Evidence

This paper presents evidence on the financial policies of firms strongly engaged in research and development activities. By referring to the under-investment paradox, the asset substitution problem, the asset specificity proposition and the information asymmetry literature, we postulate that R&D-intensive firms should adopt specific financial policies. In conformity with our hypotheses, empirical results based on a sample of R&D-intensive and non-R&D firms in four major industrialized countries (Europe, the UK, Japan and the US) show that R&D-intensive firms exhibit significant lower debt and dividend payment levels, but shorter debt maturities and higher cash levels than non-R&D ones.     

Forced Versus Voluntary Dividend Reduction: An Agency Cost Explanation

We examine whether the agency cost arising from shareholder‐bondholder conflict is an important determinant of the timing of dividend reduction decisions. Firms forced to reduce dividends owing to bond covenant violations experience lower earnings, more frequent losses, and greater earnings declines around the dividend reduction year than do firms that voluntarily reduce dividends. Relative to voluntary‐reduction firms, forced‐reduction firms have higher debt‐to‐equity ratios and managerial holdings. These findings coupled with the increased dividend payout ratios and lower announcement period returns suggest that financially distressed firms that anticipate poor performance have greater incentives to delay reducing dividends to avoid a wealth transfer to bondholders.     

Adapting the APV valuation methodology and the beta gearing formula to the dividend imputation tax system

This paper adapts the APV valuation methodology and the formula for gearing beta to the Australian dividend imputation tax system. The APV formulation is shown to be able to be applied in the dividend imputation tax system by simply replacing the statutory tax rate with an effective tax rate in the calculation of the “cash flows”. The effect of the dividend imputation tax system on a company's value is shown to be easily bounded using the APV formulation by making the extreme assumption that imputation credits are either: fully distributed and fully valued by the market; or that they are worthless. This paper also quantifies the effect of changing the assumed value of imputation credits on: (i) the value of the interest tax shield of debt; and (ii) the levered, or equity, beta.     

Do UK firms manage earnings to meet dividend thresholds?

This paper examines earnings management by dividend-paying firms in cases where pre-managed earnings would fall below the expected dividend, and by non-dividend paying firms aiming to avoid reporting losses. We find that within the UK market the likelihood of upward earnings management is significantly greater in the former case than the latter, though both are drivers for earnings management. Large firms are less likely to upwardly manage earnings to reach dividend thresholds, consistent with prior UK evidence on the ability of the largest firms to avoid restrictive debt covenants. We also find that earnings management is more clearly observable through examining working capital discretionary accruals than through examining total discretionary accruals.     

Financially Constrained Stock Returns

We study the effect of financial constraints on risk and expected returns by extending the investment-based asset pricing framework to incorporate retained earnings, debt, costly equity, and collateral constraints on debt capacity. Quantitative results show that more financially constrained firms are riskier and earn higher expected stock returns than less financially constrained firms. Intuitively, by preventing firms from financing all desired investments, collateral constraints restrict the flexibility of firms in smoothing dividend streams in the face of aggregate shocks. The inflexibility mechanism also gives rise to a convex relation between market leverage and expected stock returns.     

Chaebol,Investment Opportunity Set and Corporate Debt and Dividend Policies of Korean Companies

This paper examines explanations for the association between Korean Chaebol, which are giant conglomerates supported by various government initiatives, and corporate debt and dividend policies. Unlike in the US, the Korean corporate sector is dominated by the Chaebol which are characterized by concentrated family ownership, political affiliation and bank ownership. These institutional arrangements are likely to encourage more debt financing. In addition, the study also investigates whether firms with more growth options measured in terms of the investment opportunity set (IOS) have lower leverage and dividends. Results using observations from 411 Korean firms showed that for a fixed level of growth opportunities, Chaebol carry higher levels of debt. Results also show that growth options were negatively associated with leverage and dividends. No association, however, was found between Chaebol and dividends.     

Debt Financing under Asymmetric Information

We analyze the optimal design of debt maturity, coupon payments, and dividend payout restrictions under asymmetric information. We show that, if the asymmetry of information is concentrated around long-term cash flows, firms finance with coupon-bearing long-term debt that partially restricts dividend payments. If the asymmetry of information is concentrated around near-term cash flows and there exists considerable refinancing risk, firms finance with coupon-bearing long-term debt that does not restrict dividend payments. Finally, if the asymmetry of information is uniformly distributed across dates, firms finance with short-term debt.     

Bank dividends,agency costs and shareholder and creditor rights

Using data on listed banks in 51 countries, we analyze whether banks' dividend payouts are influenced by the relative strengths of the agency conflicts faced by their shareholders and creditors. We show that dividend policy depends on the relative strengths of these agency conflicts, but with a more decisive role played by the agency cost of equity than the one of debt, in contrast to results found in the literature on non-financial firms. We then further investigate whether those relationships are shaped by differences in funding structure, levels of capitalization and capital stringency, and potential differences in external corporate governance mechanisms.     

Optimal dividend policy,debt policy and the level of investment within a multi-period DCF framework

This paper simultaneously analyses optimal dividend, debt and investment policy within a conventional multi-period DCF framework, and takes account of differential personal taxation over both investors and types of income, the effect of dividends and interest on the level of share issues and hence share issue costs, and the effect of dividends and interest on the level of internally-financed investment. Application of the model to three distinct tax regimes reveals that the value benefit from debt is small at best whilst the value benefit from dividends is substantial even in a regime without dividend imputation.     

The Informativeness of Dividends and Associated Tax Credits

This paper investigates the informativeness of dividends and the associated tax credits with respect to earnings persistence. After confirming that dividend‐paying firms have more persistent earnings than non‐dividend‐paying firms, we show that the taxation status of the dividend is also important. Firms that pay dividends with a full tax credit attached have significantly more persistent earnings than firms that pay dividends which carry no associated tax credit. Consistent with higher levels of tax credits identifying more mature firms, those paying dividends with full tax credits have significantly less persistent losses than firms that pay dividends with only partial tax credits. Further, market pricing tests confirm that the incremental information in dividends and tax credits contributes to reductions in market mispricing of the persistence of earnings and earnings components. Our results are robust to alternative model specifications and controlling for dividend size and firm age.     

DIVIDEND POLICY AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO INVESTMENT AND FINANCING POLICIES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

In this paper it is argued that dividend policy is not determined as a residual, but rather that firms adopt independent dividend and investment policies. Empirical evidence, based on a questionnaire survey, supports this view. Independent dividend and investment policies are possible because debt finance is usually raised in sufficient quantities to accommodate the financial demands created by dividend and investment decisions.     

Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Predictions About Dividends and Debt

Confirming predictions shared by the trade-off and pecking ordermodels, more profitable firms and firms with fewer investmentshave higher dividend payouts. Confirming the pecking order modelbut contradicting the trade-off model, more profitable firmsare less levered. Firms with more investments have less marketleverage, which is consistent with the trade-off model and acomplex pecking order model. Firms with more investments havelower long-term dividend payouts, but dividends do not varyto accommodate short-term variation in investment. As the peckingorder model predicts, short-term variation in investment andearnings is mostly absorbed by debt.