A note on discount rate policy and the variability of discount window borrowing

The purpose of this note is to evaluate the appropriate discount rate policy rules consistent with minimization of the variability of borrowing at the Federal Reserve discount window. In the context of Goodfriend's (1983) model of the bank borrowing decision, it is demonstrated that either a penalty rate or a subsidy rate policy will produce minimized variability of borrowing, so long as the subsidy rate adjusts point for point to changes in the value of the Federal funds rate. These policy rules are compatible with a policy procedure designed to target borrowed or non-borrowed reserves. If the Fed does not adhere to one of these specific rules, minimization of borrowing variability requires an open market procedure in which the Fed pegs the Federal funds rate.     

Liquidity Risk,Bank Networks,and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal loan demand was one reason for founding the Federal Reserve System. Nevertheless, less than 8% of state‐chartered banks joined the Fed in its first decade. Banks facing high liquidity risk from seasonal loan demand were more likely to join the Fed in its first decade. We also find evidence consistent with the notion that banks could obtain some indirect access to the discount window through interbank transfers. Some banks apparently joined the Fed to pass through discount window liquidity to other banks via the interbank network.  Joining the Fed increased member banks’ lending.     

Controlling Monetary Aggregates: The Discount Window

This paper argues that current discount window policy, coupled with non-borrowed reserve targeting of the Federal Reserve, makes the quantity of high-powered money endogenous. Examination of the advisability of this procedure in a stochastic environment is conducted using a general equilibrium financial model. It is concluded that the current policy reduces the destabilizing effects of shifts between various depository financial assets, but increases the effect of other asset portfolio shifts and aggregate supply disturbances. These results are consistent with the work of Poole inasmuch as the current debate over discount policy is a repackaging of the debate over interest rate or aggregates control for monetary policy.     

BANK REGULATIONS,CAPITAL STRUCTURE,AND RISK

The joint influence of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) discount window credit and reserve requirements and FDIC's deposit insurance on a bank's optimal capital structure and asset risk choices is analyzed. The specific seniority of such regulatory claims, and potentially strong negative correlation between bank asset classes, significantly alters our traditional view of such regulatory influences on bank behavior. I find that the discount window's presence does not always prompt bank risk taking and leverage, but it does partially offset such incentives under certain conditions. In addition to its cost, a reserve requirement provides the bank with an indirect subsidy that may encourage deposit funding. Thus, regulatory reforms, such as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which curtail banks' access to the discount window, may not always be appropriate to resolve a bank's incentive for moral hazard behavior. The Fed's presence needs to be more comprehensively examined to design effective regulatory policy.     

The effects of shifts in monetary policy and reserve accounting regimes on bank reserve management behavior in the federal funds market

This paper looks at the effects on Fed fund rates and Fed fund purchasing behavior of large banks resulting from (i) the 1982 regime switch from non-borrowed to borrowed reserve targeting by the Fed and (ii) the 1984 switch from lagged to almost contemporaneous reserve accounting (CRA). Whether we analyse changes in the interest-rate or quantity dimensions, the shift in monetary policy targets appeared to have had a more profound effect on the market for bank reserves than the shift in reserve accounting regime. These results, therefore, tend to support the contention that a shift to CRA by itself will have little effect on bank reserve management behavior unless combined with its logical counterpart — a total reserves target.     

Operational outages and aggregate uncertainty in the federal funds market

This paper uses operational problems at depository institutions in sending Fedwire payments as a proxy for aggregate uncertainty in end-of-day Fed account positions and then examines funds market behavior on those days. The results suggest that increased uncertainty is associated with a deviation of the federal funds rate from the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) target rate; the magnitude depends on the severity of the difficulty, the payment volume of the affected participant, and the time of day. The intraday standard deviation of the federal funds rate is also affected by operational outages. Moreover, extensions to Fedwire are more likely on days with possible outages, and discount window borrowing picks up on these days as well.     

The Federal Reserve’s operating procedure,nonborrowed reserves,borrowed reserves and the liquidity effect

Recently, a number of researchers (Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992; Christiano et al., 1996a,b, 1997; Evans and Marshall, 1998; Strongin, 1995; Pagan and Robertson, 1995; Brunner, 1994) claim to have found evidence of a statistically significant liquidity effect in a recursive structural VAR using nonborrowed reserves (NBR). It is claimed that innovations to NBR reflect the exogenous policy actions of the Fed. This paper argues that the opposite is true. Specifically, I show that the Fed has an incentive to offset bank-initiated discount window borrowing when it implements the Federal Open Market Committee’s policy directive, and that it has done so since the late 1950s. This practice has created a negative contemporaneous covariance between NBR and the funds rate that has been incorrectly attributed to the liquidity effect. By showing that these models capture the endogenous response of the Fed to bank borrowing on NBR, rather than the effect of exogenous policy actions on the funds rate, this paper also resolves the puzzle of the vanishing liquidity effect noted by Pagan and Robertson (1995) and Christiano (1995).     

Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.     

Discount window borrowing after 2003: The explicit reduction in implicit costs

In 2003, the Federal Reserve introduced primary credit as its main discount window lending program. This program replaced the adjustment credit program, which, subject to a number of restrictions, had generated a stigma associated with borrowing from the Federal Reserve. Lessening the stigma of borrowing was viewed as essential for reducing the reluctance to borrow from the Federal Reserve. We develop a structural model of daily borrowing. Using this model, we estimate the implicit cost associated with borrowing. Our results suggest that the stigma of borrowing is significantly reduced.     

Reserve regulation and recourse as a source of risk premia in the federal funds market

In this paper we demonstrate that there is a pronounced and persistent daily pattern of returns in the federal funds market, centered on Wednesday. We present evidence that explains this phenomenon as a reflection of the optimal behavior of banks operating in an environment in which there are effective reserve requirements and a penalty cost for recourse to discount borrowing. In particular, we report empirical evidence that shows there was a significant upward shift in the amplitude of this pattern of daily returns that resulted from (1) the increase in uncertainty associated with the change in Federal Reserve operating procedures during the 1979–1982 period, and (2) the imposition of a surcharge on discount borrowing instituted by the Federal Reserve. Our results demonstrate that what otherwise might be regarded as anomalous interest-rate behavior is consistent with the optimal response of banks to the regulatory environment within which they operate.     

Integration of LIBOR and Treasury bill yields over different monetary regimes

In this paper, tests are conducted for cointegration and Granger-causality relationships between monthly yields on 90-day maturities for London Interbank Borrowing Rate (LIBOR) and Treasury bills (T-bills). Unlike prior studies, there is no evidence of increased integration between LIBOR and T-bill yields over time. Findings in this study suggest that tests of integration of global dollar markets are sensitive to sample periods and different monetary regimes. Integration relationships are strongest under interest rate target regimes and weakest under non-borrowed reserve regimes, as predicted. Under the current regime of borrowed reserve targets, a hybrid of money supply and interest rate targeting, LIBOR and T-bill yields are integrated to a lesser extent than under interest rate target regimes prior to 1979.     

Implications of a TAF program stigma for lenders: the case of publicly traded banks versus privately held banks

Term auction facility (TAF) was created during the financial crisis as a substitute for the Federal Reserve’s discount window, the lender of last resort. We hypothesize if TAF borrowing is viewed as a bailout then publicly traded banks would borrow relatively fewer TAF funds to avoid a bailout stigma. We find publicly traded banks did borrow less (as a percent of total assets) in the TAF program than privately held banks. Further, too-big-to-fail banks and investment banks borrowed relatively less than other publicly traded banks indicating greater levels of public scrutiny reduces borrowing under emergency government liquidity programs. We also find that publicly traded banks pledged lower quality and less liquid collateral than private banks when borrowing under the program. Our results suggest TAF provided more benefit to traditional privately held banks with strong balance sheets that were able to borrow relatively greater amounts in anticipation of either future liquidity needs as suggested by Ivashina and Scharfstein (J Financ Econ 97:319–338, 2010) or increased lending as found by Berger et al. (The Federal Reserve’s discount window and TAF programs: “pushing on a string?” Working paper, University of South Carolina, 2014).     

Near integration,bank reluctance,and discount window borrowing

This study puts forth stationarity considerations in explaining the observed breakdown between aggregate Discount Window borrowing and the spread between the Federal Funds rate and the discount rate during the post-1987 period. Tests with biweekly data indicate stationarity for adjustment borrowing, but cannot reject the unit root for the spread. The Goodfriend–Dutkowsky dynamic implicit cost formulation can accommodate the contrasting stationarity properties. Structural restrictions are compatible with stationary borrowing and a stationary or near integrated spread. While empirical findings from the static model indicate greater bank reluctance to borrow over time, the dynamic model gives considerably less support.     

The Over‐the‐Counter Theory of the Fed Funds Market: A Primer

We present a dynamic over‐the‐counter model of the fed funds market and use it to study the determination of the fed funds rate, the volume of loans traded, and the intraday evolution of the distribution of reserve balances across banks. We also investigate the implications of changes in the market structure, as well as the effects of central bank policy instruments such as open market operations, the discount window lending rate, and the interest rate on bank reserves.     

Should the Federal Reserve Pay Competitive Interest on Reserves?

In 2008, the Federal Reserve began paying interest on reserves. How should the Fed use this new policy instrument? As the Fed reduces its balance sheet, should it continue to satiate reserve demand and pay competitive interest on reserves? Here, we argue that this may be an inefficient use of the new policy instrument. Using a standard Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model (DSGE), augmented to include a banking sector and an interbank market, our benchmark calibration implies an optimal tax on reserves of about 20 to 40 basis points in the steady state, and a fluctuating tax rate in response to shocks.     

The Discount Rate of IAS 36 – A Comment

Discussing the guidance in IAS 36 on how to determine the discount rate for present value measurements of impairment reviews, Husmann and Schmidt (Accounting in Europe, 5, pp. 49–62, 2008) conclude that the standard's option to use ‘the entity's incremental borrowing rate’ should be removed. I argue that their conclusion is based on a misconception about what is meant by incremental borrowing, and that the incremental borrowing rate may be a useful approximation to the cost of capital within a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) framework. The reference to it is even more useful if CAPM is deemed not to hold. An important objection to the IAS 36 rules on the discount rate is that they are so different from the US GAAP rules: the former are detailed and adhere closely to the CAPM ideal, whereas the latter are general in nature, superficial and lack theoretical underpinnings. Any modification of the accounting standards' rules on the discount rate should first seek to remove that gap.     

An analysis of real-estate risk using the present value model

The current study uses a present value model that allows for a time-varying expected discount rate in conjunction with a VAR process to decompose real-estate risk. The study finds that the variance ofunexpected returns accounts for most of the total risk with cash-flow risk accounting for twice as much of the unexplained real-estate risk although discount rate risk is also an important factor. This dominance of cash-flow risk is found to result in a weaker mean reversion process for real estate relative to stocks. Another finding is that real estate investors tend to become apprehensive about the future when news on future cash flow is good, and thus they demand higher expected future returns.     

美联储停止缩表的原因、影响及中国对策

近期美联储停止缩表引起广泛关注。美联储停止缩表主要有以下几个原因：一是货币需求大幅上升,二是美联储控制短期利率的能力出现下降,三是美国经济前景存在不确定性。此外,美联储停止缩表还有助于继续发挥财政作用、改善货币政策传导效率、降低污名效应、降低私人部门安全资产的供应以及降低对美联储信用风险和银行清算风险。美联储停止缩表对美国和中国都会产生十分广泛的影响。对美国的影响主要有：资产价格将获得支撑、投资可能出现过热、通胀可能出现阶段性上升、金融风险可能加大、美联储独立性可能受到影响、可能加剧收益率曲线倒挂;对中国的影响主要有：人民币汇率压力有望缓解、资产价格可能上升、短期资本流入可能增多。因此,中国货币政策应保持定力,密切关注国际资本流动趋势的变化,防范资产价格暴涨风险,同时,应加强人民币汇率风险管理。     

EFFECT OF FEDERAL RESERVE POLICIES ON BANK EQUITY RETURNS

We investigate the reaction of bank equity returns to changes in the relevant Federal Reserve (Fed) policy tool, which is the federal funds rate during periods of interest rate targeting and the discount rate during periods of reserves targeting. Three policy periods from 1974 to 1996 are investigated. We find that bank equity returns are inversely related to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool and that the degree of sensitivity of bank equity returns is conditioned on the direction of the change in the Fed policy tool. Also, we find that values of larger commercial banks and low‐capital‐ratio commercial banks are more exposed to changes in the relevant Fed policy tool. JEL classification: G11, G12, G14.     

Predatory trading,Stigma and the Fed׳s Term Auction Facility

Predatory trading may affect the incentives for banks to raise liquidity in times of financial distress. In these periods, borrowing becomes a signal of illiquidity, exposing borrowers to predatory trading and possible insolvency. A stigma of borrowing thus arises, leading distressed banks to take on more illiquid positions than they would otherwise. The Fed׳s Term Auction Facility (TAF) can alleviate this problem. The TAF׳s competitive auction format allows auction winners to signal that they are illiquid but relatively strong. The TAF may therefore be an effective policy tool during financial crises: by altering the signal value of borrowing, this facility supports the injection of liquidity into distressed banks. In normal times, however, this auction facility becomes counterproductive: by cream-skimming the relatively strong banks, the weakest banks are left as potential prey for predators. This suggests that the TAF is a policy best reserved for times of crisis.