A note on the Wang and Wang measure of the quality of the compass rose

H. Wang and C. Wang [Visibility of the compass rose in financial asset returns: A quantitative study, J. Bank. Financ. 26 (2002), 1099–1111] derive a measure of the visibility of the radial patterns that appear in a plot of current and past returns, which are more commonly known as the compass rose. In theory, this measure should be positively related to the tick/volatility ratio. In practice however, we find that this relationship does not hold for higher tick/volatility ratios that are common to stock market data. Thus, the use of this measure is limited in real world applications. We propose a correction factor that improves the behaviour of the quality measure over higher tick/volatility ratios, however, further research is required to fully identify and correct the problem.     

The tick/volatility ratio as a determinant of the compass rose: empirical evidence from decimalisation on the NYSE

Recent research suggests that volatility has an important role to play in the appearance of the compass rose pattern. The introduction of decimal prices on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) provides an ideal opportunity to test this hypothesis using actual market data. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that the 85 per cent reduction in the tick/volatility ratio resulting from the decimalisation of prices was not sufficient to eliminate the compass rose pattern.     

Inside the “Black Box” of Sell‐Side Financial Analysts

Our objective is to penetrate the “black box” of sell‐side financial analysts by providing new insights into the inputs analysts use and the incentives they face. We survey 365 analysts and conduct 18 follow‐up interviews covering a wide range of topics, including the inputs to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations, the value of their industry knowledge, the determinants of their compensation, the career benefits of Institutional Investor All‐Star status, and the factors they consider indicative of high‐quality earnings. One important finding is that private communication with management is a more useful input to analysts’ earnings forecasts and stock recommendations than their own primary research, recent earnings performance, and recent 10‐K and 10‐Q reports. Another notable finding is that issuing earnings forecasts and stock recommendations that are well below the consensus often leads to an increase in analysts’ credibility with their investing clients. We conduct cross‐sectional analyses that highlight the impact of analyst and brokerage characteristics on analysts’ inputs and incentives. Our findings are relevant to investors, managers, analysts, and academic researchers.     

The R&D-abnormal return anomaly: a transaction cost explanation

Previous research finds a positive and significant relation between current increases in R&D expenditures and future abnormal stock returns. While the existence of this anomalous pattern is well-established, its underlying causes are the subject of much debate. Recent research also shows that transaction costs can lead to apparent market anomalies such as the post-earnings-announcement drift. We combine these two lines of research and posit that the positive relation between R&D increases and future abnormal stock returns is due to transaction costs. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that abnormal returns on R&D-based, zero-net-investment portfolios disappear after incorporating standard measures of transaction costs. Overall, our results show that the R&D-abnormal return anomaly is more likely due to transaction costs than to the alternative hypotheses of market inefficiency or omitted risk factors.     

An Anatomy of the “S&P Game”: The Effects of Changing the Rules

This study analyzes the effects of changes in S&P 500 index composition from January 1986 through June 1994, a period during which Standard and Poor's began its practice of preannouncing changes five days beforehand. The new announcement practice has given rise to the “S&P game” and has altered the way stock prices react. We find that prices increase abnormally from the close on the announcement day to the close on the effective day. The overall increase is greater than under the old announcement policy although part of the increase reverses after the stock is included in the index.     

“De‐risking” Corporate Pension Plans: Options for CFOs

Until the stock market bubble burst in 2000–2002, most CFOs viewed their defined benefit pension plans as profit centers and relatively risk‐free sources of income. Since neither pension assets nor liabilities were reported on corporate balance sheets, and expected returns on pension stocks could be substituted for actual returns when reporting net income, the risks associated with DB plans were masked by GAAP accounting and thus assumed to have no bearing on corporate capital structure. But when stock prices and corporate profits fell together, the risks associated with conventional stock‐heavy pension plans showed up first in reduced pension surpluses (or, in many cases, deficits) and then later in higher required cash contributions and lower reported earnings. As a consequence, today's investors (and rating agencies) are viewing pension and other legacy liabilities as corporate debt, and demands for transparency and increased funding have triggered accounting changes and proposed legislative reforms that will further unmask the economics. This article aims to provide both private‐sector and public‐sector CFOs with suggestions for reducing and controlling the cost of providing for the retirement of their employees. Profitable, tax‐paying companies with DB plans should consider (1) funding any unfunded liabilities (if necessary, by issuing debt) and (2) reducing pension equity and interest rate exposures by shifting some (if not all) pension assets into bonds and defeasing the pension liability (achieving a tax arbitrage in the process). And in cases where the expected costs of maintaining DB plans outweigh the benefits, companies should consider freezing or terminating their plans and switching to a defined contribution (DC) or some form of hybrid plan. The authors also propose similar changes for public pension plans, where underfunding and mismatch problems are greater, less transparent, and in some ways less tractable than those of corporate DB plans.     

THE IMPACT OF THE INSIDER TRADING SCANDAL ON THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF THE WALL STREET JOURNAL'S “HEARD ON THE STREET” COLUMN

We examine the impact of a scandal on the information content in the “Heard on the Street” column of the Wall Street Journal. Following the scandal in 1984, the column is found to have a reduced impact on stock prices for both buy and sell recommendations. However, the stock price response to information later published in the column before the publication day is smaller for the post-scandal period. This result suggests that after the scandal, editors and authors may have become more cautious in guarding against information leaks in the column. The scandal does not appear to have changed the impact of the column on trading volume.     

Does Stock Return Momentum Explain the “Smart Money” Effect?

Does the “smart money” effect documented by Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) reflect fund selection ability of mutual fund investors? We examine the finding that investors are able to predict mutual fund performance and invest accordingly. We show that the smart money effect is explained by the stock return momentum phenomenon documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) . Further evidence suggests investors do not select funds based on a momentum investing style, but rather simply chase funds that were recent winners. Our finding that a common factor in stock returns explains the smart money effect offers no affirmation of investor fund selection ability.     

ABNORMAL RETURNS AND ANALYSTS' EARNINGS FORECAST REVISIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE PUBLICATION OF “STOCK HIGHLIGHTS” BY VALUE LINE INVESTMENT SURVEY

We examine the reaction of stocks and the response of financial analysts' earnings forecasts to securities recommended as “Stock Highlights” by Value Line Investment Survey. Significant abnormal returns appear around the publication of stock highlights. Stock price responses are relatively efficient and permanent. Using earnings expectation data provided by the Institutional Brokers Estimate System, we find analysts raise their forecasts significantly following Value Line recommendations. Near-term forecast revisions are significantly related to stock returns at the time of the recommendations. Thus, an explanation for Value Line's security recommendation success is its ability to generate firm-specific earnings information.     

Avoiding the “Synergy Trap”: Practical Guidance on M&A Decisions for CEOs and Boards

When a major acquisition is announced, investors try to understand where the value is going to come from and whether the acquirer has a plan to achieve that value. Deals are often brought to market with one big synergy number and a statement that the deal will be “accretive” to earnings. The problem, however, is that investors can't understand or track one number. Going to market with just one number also suggests that the acquirer has no credible plan, which in turn gives investors more reason to sell shares than to buy, particularly when a significant premium is being offered. According to academic studies, the acquiring company's stock price has fallen upon the announcement of more than half of the large corporate M&A deals that have been transacted since the early 1980s. And as the authors find in their recent study of the merger boom of 1995–2001, such negative stock price reactions are a fairly reliable predictor of future disappointing operating performance and, in many cases, further stock‐market underperformance. But as the authors also point out, such studies focus mainly on average results. And whether or not mergers pay on average doesn't really matter‐at least not to well‐informed executives and boards. What matters is that the executives who make these major capital investment decisions, and the boards that monitor them, have the tools that can help them distinguish the good deals from the bad before committing shareholder capital. For any proposed transaction requiring a significant premium over market, the authors present a simple, earnings‐based model for the target that yields combinations of cost reductions and revenue enhancements that would j ustify that premium. The authors go on to present a capabilities/market access matrix that can be used to assess the potential sources of synergies in any deal. Their methodology can be used to inform and guide detailed discussions about the combination of revenue and cost synergies that management believes it can achieve in a potential deal, and that should become the main focus of management's communication to investors. While no substitute for a carefully considered DCF valuation, the authors' method is a complement to DCF and effectively translates DCF merger criteria into the operational language that is familiar to most corporate managers and investors. In so doing, it can help boards avoid obvious mistakes of overpayment, particularly when “accretive” deals clearly fall short on economic grounds.     

Over-the-Counter Option Market Dividend Protection and “Biases” in the Black-Scholes Model: A Note

Most options are traded over-the-counter (OTC) and are dividend “protected;” the exercise price decreases on the ex date by an amount equal to the dividend. This protection completely inhibits the early exercise of American call options. Nevertheless, OTC-protected options have market values which differ systematically from Black-Scholes values for European options on non-dividend paying stocks. The pricing difference is related to both the variance of the underlying stock return and to time until expiration of the option, but it is quite small in dollar amount.     

The Dynamic and Dependence of Takaful and Conventional Stock Return Behaviours: Evidence from the Insurance Industry in Saudi Arabia

This paper investigates the dynamics of volatility in the stock market using competing univariate GARCH specifications. Moreover, it provides a study of the pairwise correlation pattern of stock returns for a wide range of Saudi Arabian insurance business lines by using a dynamic DCC-GARCH model. Our results show that volatility responds asymmetrically to shocks with a persistence of variance in the stock return data, supporting the presence of irrational behaviour as well as the effectiveness of a cross-market diversification strategy. Finally, we reach a point at which, between every two-business line stock returns, there is a dynamic conditional correlation.     

An Analysis of the Recommendations of the “Superstar” Money Managers at Barron's Annual Roundtable

We examine the performance of common stock recommendations made by prominent money managers at Barron's Annual Roundtable from 1968 to 1991. To avoid survivorship bias, we examine the performance of recommendations by all the participants. The buy recommendations earn significant abnormal returns of 1.91 percent from the recommendation day to the publication day, a period of about 14 days. However, the abnormal returns are essentially zero for one to three year postpublication day holding periods. Thus, an individual investing according to the Roundtable recommendations published in Barron's would not benefit from the advice.     

Fundamental Investors Reduce the Distraction on Management from Random Market “Noise”: Evidence from France

The authors find that financial markets have real effects on corporate decisions but that, unfortunately, some temporary market enthusiasm, unrelated to firm intrinsic value, may cause management to make value‐destroying decisions as the result of random and uninformed stock market volatility. In particular, they are prone to making bad decisions after stock market overreactions to “surprise” earnings announcements. This study shows a positive effect of greater long‐term ownership on French listed firms. Fundamental investor ownership reduces the degree of market mispricing which serves long‐run shareholder value maximization. A fundamental investor is one that, on average, hold his shares for at least two years, is in the top quartile of a firm ownership, and has an active allocation strategy. They are about 8% of all investors. Compared to non‐fundamental investors, fundamental investors hold their positions on average three times longer and have positions 1.5 times larger. Fundamental investors are more present in firms which have more liquid stocks, which pay dividends, and which are relatively poorer performers and have relatively lower market‐to‐book than their industry peers.     

Revisiting the Illiquidity Discount for Private Companies: A New (and “Skeptical”) Restricted‐Stock Study

Data from restricted‐stock studies are routinely used by business‐valuation analysts and small‐business appraisers to estimate discounts for lack of marketability, or DLOMs, which are then applied in the valuation of private companies. The rationale for the use of such DLOMs is that, even after an investor is compensated for the risk associated with holding an asset, an asset held unwillingly (due to illiquidity) must be worth less than if the asset were held by choice. But the same rationale can also be applied to the DLOM on riskless assets (such as Treasuries), and the evidence is consistent with a DLOM on such assets of only about 2.5%. This in turn suggests that any DLOM larger than 2.5% amounts to a second round of discounting for risk (where the first round occurs in a DCF or similar core valuation). Discounting with conventionally measured DLOMs is likely to be redundant because liquidity or marketability is highly correlated with company size, and size is already an important determinant of discount rates. Existing evidence suggests that, before DLOMs are applied, real‐world valuations of small businesses typically include discounts of as much as 50% for lack of size. And given that restricted‐stock studies are routinely used to support DLOMs of 20% to 40%, the valuation discounts resulting from this procedure are likely to be much too large. In contrast to industry practice, the author's study of a large sample of private placements of equity produces evidence consistent with use of a DLOM no greater than 5% or 6%.     

Internal Governance Does Matter to Equity Returns but Much More So During “Flights to Quality”

Although few doubt that good internal governance helps firms perform better, the statistical evidence is actually mixed because the positive effects of good corporate governance matters much more so at some times than others. The statistical link is strongest during “flights to quality,” when market sentiment turns bearish and pessimistic but weakens for long periods of time during bull markets and low market volatility. Using more than ten years' evidence from Australian firms, the authors show that internal governance is related to both firm value and performance and that firms with stronger governance are less risky, generate higher equity returns and perform significantly better during market downturns. When risk aversion is high, demand for well‐governed firms increases and investors discount the value of firms with potential agency conflicts. This time‐varying relationship between internal governance and returns may explain both the limited explanatory power of governance on firm value and the mixed empirical evidence reported in previous studies. Firms with strong internal governance do earn significantly higher stock returns compared with firms with weak governance; but that also means that the value of governance is not fully incorporated into prices, thereby explaining the limited explanatory power of governance on firm value.     

Macroeconomic Implications of “Deep Habits” in Banking

Recent empirical evidence shows that price‐cost margins in the market for bank credit are countercyclical in the U.S. economy and that this cyclical behavior can be explained in part from the fact that switching banks is costly for customers (i.e., from a borrower hold‐up effect). Our goal, in this paper, is to study the “financial accelerator” role of these countercyclical margins as a propagation mechanism of macroeconomic shocks. To do so, we apply the “deep habits” framework in Ravn, Schmitt‐Grohé, and Uribe (2006) to financial markets to model this hold‐up effect within a monopolistically competitive banking industry. We are able to reproduce the pattern of price‐cost margins observed in the data, and to show that the real effects of aggregate total factor productivity shocks are larger the stronger the friction implied by borrower hold‐up. Also, output, investment, and employment all become more volatile than in a standard model with constant margins in credit markets. An empirical contribution of our work is to provide structural estimates of the deep habits parameters for financial markets.     

人民币汇率政策推出时机抉择: 汇率与股指相关性视角

通过构建T-Copula-GARCH模型从人民币汇率与股市指数相关性视角,分析我国深化金融市场改革开放背景下汇率政策推出时机抉择。结果表明：人民币兑美元、日元汇率贬值时,上证指数下降;而人民币兑美元、日元汇率升值时,上证指数上涨。人民币兑欧元汇率、人民币指数升值时,上证指数下降;而人民币兑欧元汇率、人民币指数贬值时,上证指数上涨。人民币兑美元汇率与上证指数相关性波动趋势跟人民币指数与上证指数相关性波动趋势基本相反,人民币兑日元、欧元汇率与上证指数相关性波动趋势跟人民币指数与上证指数相关性波动趋势基本相同。股票市场趋势性上涨后,我国外汇市场和股票市场关联性进一步降低。因此,为弱化外汇市场和股票市场联动风险,人民币兑美元、日元汇率的改革措施应选择在股票市场趋势性上涨阶段推出,尤其是人民币兑美元汇率改革措施的推出;人民币兑欧元汇率的市场化改革对时机窗口要求不高,故在人民币汇率市场化改革中可优先推行人民币兑欧元汇率市场化改革;人民币汇率综合改革措施则可选择在股票市场趋势性上涨阶段推出。     

Corporate Governance and Value: Evidence from “Close Calls” On Shareholder Governance Proposals

The authors summarize the findings of their recent study of the effects of specific corporate governance provisions on firm value. Using a sample of governance provisions that were subjected to shareholder votes during the period 1997–2011, this study analyzes cases in which shareholder‐sponsored corporate governance proposals were either rejected or passed by a small margin (no more than 5% of the vote). By so doing, this study helps correct two limitations of the existing governance literature: (1) that the effects of expected governance changes are already incorporated in share prices (the “expectations” problem); and (2) that governance policies are often a consequence rather than a cause of other variables such as corporate performance and are thus correlated with many other firm characteristics (the “endogeneity” problem). The authors' findings show that expected improvements in corporate governance through the adoption of particular corporate governance provisions—particularly the removal of anti‐takeover provisions—is associated with both positive abnormal stock returns and improvements in long‐term firm operating performance. The authors estimate that the adoption of such governance proposals increases shareholder value by 2.6%, on average. Moreover, these returns are consistent with, and thus accurate predictors of, future changes in corporate investment (reductions of capital spending, in most cases) and improvements in operating performance.