Business credit information sharing and default risk of private firms

We investigate whether and how business credit information sharing helps to better assess the default risk of private firms. Private firms represent an ideal testing ground because they are smaller, more informationally opaque, riskier, and more dependent on trade credit and bank loans than public firms. Based on a representative panel dataset that comprises private firms from all major industries, we find that business credit information sharing substantially improves the quality of default predictions. The improvement is stronger for older firms and those with limited liability, and depends on the sharing of firms’ payment history and the number of firms covered by the local credit bureau office. The value of soft business credit information is higher the smaller the firms and the lower their distance from the local credit bureau office. Furthermore, in spatial and industry analyses we show that the higher the value of business credit information the lower the realized default rates. Our study highlights the channel through which business credit information sharing adds value and the factors that influence its strength.     

Government guarantees of loans to small businesses: Effects on banks’ risk-taking and non-guaranteed lending

We analyzed the loan guarantees that the Japanese government provided for banks’ loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). We modeled and estimated how much and under what conditions loan guarantees affected banks’ risk-taking and banks’ non-guaranteed lending.In the presence of controls for bank capital and other factors that might affect supplies of bank credit, our estimates supported our model's implications that loan guarantees increased banks’ risk-taking.Consistent with our model, our estimates imply that, when banks initially had fewer guaranteed loans and then got more guaranteed loans, guaranteed loans were complements to, rather than substitutes for, non-guaranteed loans. As complements, loan guarantees could be “high-powered” in that they generated increases not only in guaranteed loans, but also increases in non-guaranteed loans that were a multiple of the increases in guaranteed loans. In addition, banks’ having more capital was associated with doing more non-guaranteed lending.     

Are lending relationships beneficial or harmful for public credit guarantees? Evidence from Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee Program

This paper examines the effectiveness of Japan's Emergency Credit Guarantee (ECG) Program set up during the financial turmoil following the failure of Lehman Brothers, in increasing credit availability and improving the ex-post performance of small businesses. In particular, using a unique firm–bank matched dataset, the paper examines whether lending relationships enhanced or dampened the effects of the ECG program. It is found that the ECG program significantly improved credit availability for firms using the program. However, when it was a relationship lender (main bank) that extended an ECG loan, the increased availability was partially, if not completely, offset by a decrease in non-ECG loans by the same bank. Further, propensity score matching estimations show that the ex-post performance of firms that received ECG loans from the main bank deteriorated more than that of firms that received non-ECG loans. We do not find such loan “substitution” or performance “deterioration” effects when a non-main bank extended ECG loans. Our findings suggest that close firm–bank relationships may have perverse effects on the efficacy of public credit guarantees.     

Trade Credit,the Financial Crisis,and SME Access to Finance

Mounting evidence indicates that firms, particularly SMEs, suffered from a significant credit crunch during this crisis. We analyze for the first time whether trade credit provided an alternative source of external finance to SMEs during the crisis. Using firm‐level Spanish data we find that credit constrained SMEs depend on trade credit, but not bank loans, and that the intensity of this dependence increased during the financial crisis. Unconstrained firms, in contrast, are dependent on bank loans but not on trade credit.     

Formal finance and trade credit during China's transition

Using a large panel dataset of Chinese industrial firms, we find that poorly performing SOEs were more likely to redistribute credit to firms with less privileged access to loans via trade credit. While that could be consistent with the efficient redistribution of credit, it is more likely that these SOEs extended trade credit to prop up faltering customers that were in arrears. By contrast, profitable private domestic firms were more likely to extend trade credit than unprofitable ones. Trade credit likely provided a substitute for loans for these firms' customers that were shut out of formal credit markets. As biases in lending become less severe, the allocation of lending became more efficient, and the amount of trade credit extended by private firms declined. Our evidence implies that redistribution of bank loans via trade was not a major contributor to China's explosive growth.     

Impact of proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management

We examine the impact of differential incentives arising from proximity to debt covenant violation on earnings management. We reason that firms with loans close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants have a stronger incentive to engage in earnings management than firms that are far from violating their debt covenants. We find results consistent with this expectation. Firms close to violation or in technical default of their debt covenants engage in higher levels of accounting earnings management, real earnings management, and total earnings management than far-from-violation firms. In additional analysis, we find that firms with a stronger incentive to avoid covenant violation switched from using more accounting earnings management before the Sarbanes–Oxley Act to using more real earnings management and more total earnings management afterwards. We also document that the earnings management implications of debt covenant violation are observed primarily for firms with poor credit ratings and for firms that do not meet analyst forecasts.     

Do banks appraise internal capital markets during credit shocks? Evidence from the Greek crisis

Using data of bank loans to Greek firms during the Greek crisis we provide evidence that affiliated firms, having access to the internal capital markets of their associated group, are less likely to default on their loans. Furthermore, banks require lower loan collateral coverage from affiliated firms and are less likely to downgrade the affiliates’ credit profile. Finally, banks are more likely to show forbearance to affiliated firms with non-performing loans. The results are consistent with the view that banks manage their relationships with firms in a business group jointly, as opposed to viewing each firm as an independent entity. Our findings also suggest that the value of risk sharing through internal capital markets increases when external financing is scarce.     

Tournament incentives and firm credit risk: Evidence from credit default swap referenced firms

In this paper, we evaluate the impact of managerial tournament incentives on firm credit risk in credit default swap (CDS) referenced firms. We find that intra‐firm tournament incentives are negatively related to credit risk. Our results suggest that tournament incentives reduce credit risk by alleviating the potential for underinvestment when managers are concerned about exacting empty creditors. Further, we find that tournament incentives decrease credit risk when internal governance is strong or product market competition is intense. Taken together, our results suggest that creditors perceive senior manager tournament incentives (SMTI) as a critical determinant of a firm's credit risk, particularly in settings where managerial risk aversion is high.     

The changing structure of local credit markets: Are small businesses special?

In many countries consolidation in the banking industry has reduced the number of small banks and led to significant shifts in market shares; deregulation has fostered entry in local credit markets and the expansion of branch networks, increasing competition in local markets. Small businesses are believed to be more vulnerable to these changes, since they are more dependent on credit from local banks. In this paper we investigate the consequences of consolidation and entry for these borrowers compared with those for large firms. We employ a data set for Italy, which provides information on volumes of loans and bad loans by size of borrower with a detailed geographical partition. We find that mergers are followed by a temporary reduction in outstanding credit to all sizes of borrowers and by an increase in bad loans, most likely due to the reassessment of banks portfolios. Entry has a relatively persistent negative impact on credit supply to small and medium-sized firms. Our results also show that concentration, branch density and the share of branches of small banks affect the volumes of credit and bad loans of small borrowers.     

The differential impact of leverage on the default risk of small and large firms

We analyse a sample of 6 million firm-year observations of large corporations and small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) spanning 6 European countries from 2005 to 2015, to determine the impact of leverage and different sources of funding on default risk. We find that financial leverage has a greater impact on the probability of default of SMEs than of large corporations. The difference in default probability between the top and bottom leverage quartiles is 1.24% for large firms and 2.87% for SMEs. This difference may be explained by the greater exposure of SMEs to short-term debt and their consequently higher refinancing risk. Indeed, we find that SMEs that recover from the state of insolvency may have similar leverage to defaulted SMEs; however their liability structure is significantly altered towards long-term debt and away from short-term debt. Our findings have important implications not only for bank regulators and policy-makers but also for credit risk modelling.     

Implicit government guarantees and credit ratings

Exploiting the first default of a state-owned enterprise (SOE) in China, we analyze the role of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings. We consider two causes of implicit government guarantees. First, we suggest a “too big to fail” effect by revealing positive associations between credit ratings and issuer size, number of employees and taxes paid. Second, we propose a “government link” effect by showing positive associations between credit ratings and an issuer's state ownership, indicators for SOEs and central SOEs. Importantly, after the first SOE default, both dimensions of implicit government guarantees are weakened when explaining credit rating variations. Extending to analyses of yield spreads, we find that debt pricing relies more on credit ratings after the default event, consistent with bond investors weighing credit ratings more with weakened beliefs in implicit government guarantees. Collectively, our study proposes two dimensions of implicit government guarantees in credit ratings and shows how the initial SOE default significantly changes the role of such guarantees in credit ratings.     

A portfolio view of consumer credit

To compute risk-adjusted returns and gauge the volatility of their portfolios, lenders need to know the covariances of their loans’ returns with aggregate returns. We use unique credit bureau data to measure individuals’ ‘covariance risk’, i.e., the covariance of their default risk with aggregate consumer default rates, and more generally to analyze the distribution of credit, including the effects of credit scores. We find significant heterogeneity in covariance risk across consumers. Also, the amount of credit they obtain significantly increases with their credit scores, and decreases with their covariance risk (especially revolving credit), though the effect of covariance risk is smaller.     

Credit derivatives and bank credit supply

Credit derivatives are the latest in a series of innovations that have had a significant impact on credit markets. Using a micro data set of individual corporate loans, this paper explores whether use of credit derivatives is associated with an increase in bank credit supply. We find only limited evidence that greater use of credit derivatives is associated with greater supply of bank credit. The strongest effect is for large term loans—newly negotiated loan extensions to large corporate borrowers, with a largely negative impact on (previously negotiated) commitment lending. Even for large term borrowers, increases in the volume of credit are offset by higher spreads. These findings suggest that the benefits of the growth of credit derivatives may be narrow, accruing mainly to large firms that are likely to be “named credits” in these transactions. Finally, use of credit derivatives appears to be complementary to other forms of hedging by banks, though the banks most active in hedging appear to charge more for additional amounts of credit.     

Trade Credit Risk Management: The Role of Executive Risk‐Taking Incentives

In this study we investigate how executive equity incentives affect companies’ risk‐taking behavior in relationships with their customers. We hypothesize and find that executive risk‐taking incentives provided by options are positively related to the degree of trade credit riskiness measured both as the amount of total trade credit a firm extends to all its customers and as the amount of trade credit a firm extends to customers with a high probability of default. We also find that the measures of trade credit riskiness are positively related to the firm's future stock return volatility, suggesting that the customer default risk inherent in customer‐supplier trade credit relationships represents an important economic source of the overall supplier‐firm riskiness. The findings of the study provide insights into why firms facing financial difficulties are not denied trade credit.     

What happens after corporate default? Stylized facts on access to credit

In this paper, we investigate what happens to firms after they default on their bank loans. We approach this question by establishing a set of stylized facts concerning the evolution of corporate default and its resolution, focusing on access to credit after default. Using a unique dataset from Portugal, we observe that half of the corporate default episodes last 5 quarters. Most firms continue to have access to credit immediately after resolving default, though only a minority has access to new loans. Firms have more difficulties in regaining access to credit if they are small, if their default was long and severe, if they borrow from only one bank or if they default with their main lender. Further, half of the defaulting firms record another default in the future. We observe that firms with repeated defaults are, on average, smaller and experience longer and more severe defaults.     

Shadow banking of non-financial firms: Arbitrage between formal and informal credit markets in China

In China's credit markets with financial repression, state-controlled non-financial firms (SOEs) are privileged in gaining access to bank credit, while non-SOEs, especially those small- and medium-sized firms, are disadvantaged. Corporate re-lending emerges as a response wherein the former secure bank loans and then re-lend to the latter. We document the characteristics of inter-corporate loans from a sample of legal cases. We employ four empirical strategies to conduct a forensic study of re-lending by detecting abnormal relations between financial accounts of listed firms. State-controlled companies conduct more re-lending, and firms with better growth opportunities, stronger corporate governance, and more financial constraints engage less. We compare re-lending with entrusted loans and find that firms extending nonaffiliated entrusted loans conduct re-lending actively, while firms offering affiliated entrusted loans do not. We also compare inter-corporate loans with micro-credit company loans in a review of legal cases.     

Bank-firm relationship and credit risk: An analysis on Tunisian firms

This paper analyses the impact of the intensity and length of bank-firm lending relationship on Tunisian banks’ credit risk over the period 2001–2012. The sample includes 494 bank-firm relationships for 383 firms. By applying probit and ordered probit models, our results indicate that firms which engage in intense relationships with banks are less likely to encounter a credit default. In addition, these firms exhibit a higher loan quality. However, no evidence has been found for the impact of the relationship length on credit risk. Further, the findings show that private banks, unlike public financial institutions, take advantage of their close lending relationships with borrowers to mitigate information asymmetry and therefore improve their loans portfolio quality.     

Credit Default Swaps and Managers’ Voluntary Disclosure

We investigate how the availability of traded credit default swaps (CDSs) affects the referenced firms’ voluntary disclosure choices. CDSs enable lenders to hedge their credit risk exposure, weakening their incentives to monitor borrowers. We predict that reduced lender monitoring in turn leads shareholders to intensify their monitoring and demand increased voluntary disclosure from managers. Consistent with this expectation, we find that managers are more likely to issue earnings forecasts and forecast more frequently when traded CDSs reference their firms. We further find a stronger impact of CDS availability on firm disclosure when (1) lenders have higher ability and propensity to hedge credit risk using CDSs, and (2) lender monitoring incentives and monitoring strength are weaker. Consistent with an increase in shareholder demand for public information disclosure induced by a reduction in lender monitoring, we find a stronger effect of CDSs on voluntary disclosure for firms with higher institutional ownership and stronger corporate governance. Overall, our findings suggest that firms with traded CDS contracts enhance their voluntary disclosure to offset the effect of reduced monitoring by CDS‐protected lenders.     

Political similarities in credit ratings

We investigate whether political similarities between credit rating agencies (CRAs) and bond issuers impact credit rating quality. We find that a higher degree of similarity of political affiliation leads to a decrease in timeliness and accuracy of downgrades prior to default events. Our finding supports the notion that CRAs tend to maintain/assign preferential ratings to politically similar firms via delaying negative signals as favourable rating activities. We further show that these politically similar firms tend to increase the proportion of donations to their favoured party following favourable credit ratings. Interestingly, this result is confined to Republican-leaning firms. The results indicate that CRAs successfully use biased credit ratings as an indirect channel of political party support. Our findings support the political similarities in credit ratings hypothesis.     

The effect of firm characteristics in accessing credit for SMEs

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play an important role in socio-economic development. Despite their significance, the failure rate for SMEs is considerably high, especially in developing economies. Among the widely pronounced reasons for the high failure rate is non-availability of external financing. This study examines various firm attributes that affect access to credit using a sample of 970 SMEs that operate across nine provinces of Mediterranean and Southeast Anatolia regions in Turkey. The results suggest that asset size, sales volume and stability, export rate, and legal form are important determinants of satisfaction with bank products and services. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that larger firms with high and stable sales revenues are more likely to have better access to and therefore benefit more from credit services offered by their local banks.