An exploratory study of the effects of the European Union 8th Directive on Company Law on audit committees: Evidence from EU companies listed on the US stock exchanges

Member States in the European Union will be required to establish audit committees for all public-interest entities, according to the EU 8th Directive on Company Law. This EU 8th Directive creates a convergence of corporate oversight for both audit processes and financial reporting process and thus provides an opportunity to examine and contrast associations that exist among audit committee, board of directors characteristics with audit committee alignment, and the impact of such alignment on earnings management. Results of a logistic regression analysis suggest that firms with audit committees possessing greater financial expertise, with larger boards and more independent boards are less likely to engage in audit committee alignment while firms with audit committees possessing greater governance expertise are more likely to engage in alignment. In addition, we find that firms associated with audit committee alignment engage in less earnings management.     

Local creative culture and audit fees

This paper examines the association between local creative culture and audit fees. Using a large, unbalanced panel data of listed US firms between 2004 and 2018, we find evidence that firms headquartered in US counties with high creative culture tend to pay higher audit fees than firms headquartered in counties with low creative culture. We also find that such firms tend to have longer audit report lag and are subject to more shareholder litigation. Cross-sectional tests show that real earnings management, managerial risk-taking propensity, and external corporate governance environment moderate the positive association between creative culture and audit fees. The positive association between local creative culture and audit fees remains robust to controlling for endogeneity concerns. Our study contributes to the emerging literature on local creative culture by providing evidence that local creative culture encourages managers and employees to undertake risky initiatives, thereby increasing audit risks.     

Beyond gender diversity: How specific attributes of female directors affect earnings management

We apply the system GMM regression estimation approach to a matched sample of French firms listed on Euronext Paris during the period 2001–2010 in order to investigate the relationship between female directors and earnings management by considering their specific (statutory and demographic) attributes. We first find that the presence of female directors deters managers from managing earnings. However, this finding does not hold when the statutory and demographic attributes of female directors are taken into account, thus showing that the detection and the correction of earnings management require particular competencies and skills. Interestingly, we find that business expertise and audit committee membership are key attributes of female directors that promote the effective monitoring of earnings management. An important implication of our findings is that the decision to appoint women on corporate boards should be based more on their statutory and demographic attributes than on blind implementation of gender quotas. Finally, our supplementary analysis reveals that female CEOs and CFOs are strongly inclined to reduce earnings management.     

Making honest men of them: Institutional investors,financial reporting,and the appointment of female directors to all-male boards

In this paper, we theorize that dedicated institutional investors are more likely than transient institutional investors to appoint female directors to investee firms with all-male boards, particularly those with high opacity. We conjecture that dedicated investors appoint female directors as a governance mechanism to improve the financial reporting quality of these investee firms. Specifically, we find that through the appointment of female directors, dedicated institutional investors trigger the release of stockpiled negative accounting information, thereby increasing the likelihood of a stock price crash risk. We also show that dedicated investors, through the appointment of female directors, improve investee firms' corporate disclosure environment by decreasing earnings management. Finally, we find that through continued service on investee firms' boards, female directors reduce the future likelihood of a stock price crash.     

The Impact of Corporate Governance Quality on Earnings Management: Evidence from European Companies Cross‐listed in the US

The study reported herein examines the impact of two central corporate governance mechanisms (internal audit function quality and board of directors’ quality) on the incidence of earnings management. Unlike most prior studies in the area, focused mainly on US firms, this study looks at European firms that are cross‐listed in the US and covers a long time span – before and after major changes were implemented in corporate governance policies (Sarbanes‐Oxley Act in the US and the 8th Company Law Directive in the European Union). Using novel and comprehensive measurement approaches for internal audit function quality and board of directors’ quality, we find that both mechanisms have a negative direct effect on the incidence of earnings management, while their interactive effect is positive. A longitudinal analysis of both mechanisms also reveals that internal audit function quality and the quality of boards of directors have increased significantly since the policy changes.     

Corporate lobbying: Resource-seeking or rent-seeking? Evidence from audit fees

Theory and prior research suggest that corporate lobbying is a primary means that corporations use to influence government policies either for improving firm performance (i.e., strategic decisions) or for rent-seeking activities (i.e., agency costs) but the evidence between lobbying activities and auditor assessments of audit risk remains unclear. Our results show that lobbying firms are associated with higher audit risks and fees, consistent with the idea that lobbying is related to rent-seeking and higher agency costs. In cross-sectional analyses, we find that the positive association between lobbying and audit fees is weaker for firms with strong corporate governance. Further analysis shows that firm financial returns or low earnings quality mediate the relationship between lobbying and audit fees. The results suggest that practitioners, users of financial statements and regulators could benefit by recognizing that lobbying activities could signal managerial opportunistic behavior.     

Problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality

The objective of this paper is to examine empirically the consequences for financial reporting quality of having audit committees that include problem directors, that is, directors with prior involvement in corporate bankruptcies, major accounting restatements, or other accounting scandals. An ordinary least squares regression model is used to examine the association between problem directors on the audit committee and financial reporting quality as proxied by accruals and real earnings management. Results reveal that there is a positive association between the presence of problem directors on the audit committee and real earnings management, and this association is more pronounced in cases where those problem directors have been involved in prior instances of accounting restatements and fraudulent reporting practices.     

Internal governance structures and earnings management

This paper investigates the role of a firm's internal governance structure in constraining earnings management. It is hypothesized that the practice of earnings management is systematically related to the strength of internal corporate governance mechanisms, including the board of directors, the audit committee, the internal audit function and the choice of external auditor. Based on a broad cross‐sectional sample of 434 listed Australian firms, for the financial year ending in 2000, a majority of non‐executive directors on the board and on the audit committee are found to be significantly associated with a lower likelihood of earnings management, as measured by the absolute level of discretionary accruals. The voluntary establishment of an internal audit function and the choice of auditor are not significantly related to a reduction in the level of discretionary accruals. Our additional analysis, using small increases in earnings as a measure of earnings management, also found a negative association between this measure and the existence of an audit committee.     

Management earnings forecasts and the quality of analysts’ forecasts: The moderating effect of audit committees

This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts’ forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.     

The Association between Corporate Boards, Audit Committees, and Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis

We study how corporate boards and audit committees are associated with voluntary financial disclosure practices, proxied here by management earnings forecasts. We find that in firms with more effective board and audit committee structures, managers are more likely to make or update an earnings forecast, and their forecast is less likely to be precise, it is more accurate, and it elicits a more favorable market response. Together, our empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the notion that effective corporate governance is associated with higher financial disclosure quality.     

The effects of corporate governance and audit and non-audit fees on IPO Value

This paper examines the effects of non-executive board members, audit committee composition and financial expertise, and fees paid to audit firms on the value of 375 UK initial public offerings (IPOs). Empirical findings show that underpricing decreases in audit fees whereas it increases in non-audit fees. A higher proportion of non-executive directors on the firm’s board and audit committees with a higher proportion of non-executive directors and financial accounting expertise of their members positively moderate the inter-relationships between underpricing and both audit and non-audit fees paid by companies going through an IPO. Further investigations using the adjusted price-to-book value as a proxy for firm value at IPO confirm our main findings that internal governance mechanisms may complement services provided by the auditors in terms of generating higher valuations. Controlling for the simultaneous determination of audit and non-audit fees, our results remain consistent.     

R&D capitalization and audit fees: Evidence from China

Our study investigates the association between capitalized R&D costs and audit fees and whether this association reflects the effect of earnings management. By exploring Chinese listed firms, we find that capitalized R&D costs are positively associated with audit fees, where such positive association holds for both the discretionary and nondiscretionary portions of capitalized R&D costs. Moreover, the positive association between the discretionary portion of capitalized R&D costs and audit fees is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives to manipulate earnings. Overall, our findings imply that firms' reporting incentives affect how auditors react to clients' accounting choices. This in turn suggests that auditors believe some firms capitalize R&D to manipulate earnings, and the resulting earnings-management concerns lead them to charge higher fees.     

Does CEO duality constrain board independence? Some evidence from audit pricing

This study examines whether CEO duality affects the association between board independence and demand for higher quality audits, proxied by audit fee. The findings show that there is a positive association between board independence and audit fees. This result is consistent with findings of Carcello et al. (2002) that more independent boards demand higher audit quality and effort. However, this positive association is only present in firms without CEO duality, thus suggesting that CEO duality constrains board independence. The results support recommendations against CEO duality by showing that dominant CEOs may compromise the independence of their board of directors. Additionally, evidence is provided that board size (the number of directors on the board) is positively associated with audit fee pricing. This is consistent with prior studies that indicate that larger board sizes are associated with inefficiency and negative firm performance.     

Consequences of Financial Reporting Failure for Outside Directors: Evidence from Accounting Restatements and Audit Committee Members

I use a sample of 409 companies that restated their earnings from 1997 to 2001 to examine penalties for outside directors, particularly audit committee members, when their companies experience accounting restatements. Penalties from lawsuits and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) actions are limited. However, directors experience significant labor market penalties. In the three years after the restatement, director turnover is 48% for firms that restate earnings downward, 33% for a performance‐matched sample, 28% for firms that restate upward, and only 18% for technical restatement firms. For firms that overstate earnings, the likelihood of director departure increases in restatement severity, particularly for audit committee directors. In addition, directors of these firms are no longer present in 25% of their positions on other boards. This loss is greater for audit committee members and for more severe restatements. A matched‐sample analysis confirms this result. Overall, the evidence is consistent with outside directors, especially audit committee members, bearing reputational costs for financial reporting failure.     

The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms

We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.     

Gender-diverse boards and audit fees: What difference does gender quota legislation make?

We investigate the effect of board (audit committee) gender diversity on audit fees in the French context. We also examine whether the relationship between the proportion of female directors and audit fees is moderated by the enactment of the gender quota law in 2011. We use the system GMM estimation approach on a matched sample of French firms listed in the SBF 120 index between 2002 and 2017. Consistent with the supply-side perspective, we contend that female independent directors and female audit committee members, by improving board monitoring effectiveness, affect the auditor's assessment of audit risk, resulting in lower audit fees. Our findings also document that, by breaking the glass ceiling, the effectiveness of the gender quota law lies not in increasing the proportion of female insider directors, but in boosting the appointment of female independent directors and female audit committee members. Using the difference-in-difference approach, our results reveal that female independent directors and female audit committee members are more willing to assert their monitoring skills after the quota law, leading to lower audit fees. Moving beyond tokenism, we show that, after the quota law, the negative impact on non-audit fees is strengthened only for female independent directors.     

Board Characteristics,Firm Profitability and Earnings Management: Evidence from India

The present paper explores the association between earnings management and specific board characteristics and the firm's profitability in the Indian context. In India, the corporate ownership model is the promoter dominated shareholders model. This is the first study based on a panel data framework that employs a fixed effect model to control for time‐invariant endogeneity. It also contributes to the literature by exploring the role of the firm's profitability in transmitting the impact of audit committee independence on earnings management. The study finds that profitability is an important variable, as it moderates the association between audit committee independence and earnings management. Managers of a profit‐making company would have little need to modify their earnings. This signifies that independent audit committees are more effective monitors of earnings management in profitable firms than in non‐profitable firms. Independent directors with multiple directorships are also found to be ineffective monitors. The findings are of material significance to policymakers in analysing board effectiveness and earnings management and improving policymaking for corporate governance by using profitability and related variables.     

Complementary relationship between female directors and financial literacy in deterring earnings management: The case of high-technology firms

We explore whether the presence of female directors on the boards of high-technology firms has an impact on the boards' monitoring and oversight of earnings management. Using difference-in-difference analyses, we utilize an exogenous change in Israel to examine the changes in, and the effects of, female director representation in constraining earnings management in a changing accounting environment that increased managers' ability to report earnings opportunistically. We find that a high representation of women on the board does not make an incremental contribution to the explanation of earnings management over and above the presence of a female director with financial literacy. However, the presence of one financially literate female director on the board does have a significant effect on restraining earnings management. Moreover, financially literate female directors are more effective than their financially literate male counterparts in deterring earnings management. Our results are robust to controlling for firm characteristics related to the selection of a woman to participate on the BOD as well as to the selection of a financially literate woman in particular. We conclude that financial literacy is complementary to female representation on the board in constraining earnings management. An important economic implication of our findings is that a regulatory move to increase the representation of women on corporate BODs should refer specifically to the inclusion of at least one woman with financial literacy on the board.     

Audit committee financial expertise,corporate governance,and the voluntary switch from auditor-provided to non-auditor-provided tax services

A prime objective of the SOX is to safeguard auditor independence. We investigate the relation between audit committee quality, corporate governance, and audit committees' decision to switch from permissible auditor-provided tax services. We find that firms with more independent boards, audit committees with greater accounting financial expertise, higher stock ownership by directors and institutions, that separate the CEO and Chairman of the board positions, and with higher tax to audit fee ratios are more likely to switch to a non-auditor provider. Further, we document that firms are more likely to switch prior to issuing equity. We find no evidence that broad financial expertise on audit committees is related to the switch decision, suggesting that the SEC's initial narrow definition of expertise is more consistent with the objective of the SOX. Overall, our results suggest that accounting financial expertise and strong corporate governance contribute to enhanced audit committee monitoring of auditor independence.     

Audit committee composition and the use of an industry specialist audit firm

Independent, competent boards of directors and audit committees are said to be important mechanisms of corporate governance. The purpose of the present study is to empirically examine the association between audit committee composition and audit quality. Specifically, the link between the proportion of non‐executive directors on an audit committee, financial qualifications of directors and the number of audit committee meetings held in a year are investigated and expected to have a positive association with the quality of the audit firm used. Audit quality is proxied by industry specialization. The results support the link between a higher proportion of non‐executive directors on an audit committee and use of an industry specialist audit firm. Other measures of audit committee quality (those with a higher proportion of directors with financial qualifications and those that meet more frequently) are not significantly associated with the use of an industry specialist audit firm. Sensitivity analysis shows that the presence of an audit committee is linked to use of an industry specialist audit firm.