完善我国上市公司独立董事制度的思考

独立董事制度作为有效的内部监督机制之一，是改善公司治理机制的一项重要措施。完善我国上市公司独立董事制度，须对独立董事的法律地位有一个清晰的界定，包括制定严格的任职资格标准、明确的选任程序、适当的权利和义务范围以及合理的激励机制。     

国外政府董事制度考察及其启示

政府董事即政府委派或推选至公司董事会中履行公务职责的董事,其功能在于实现政府的政策目标或其他经济目标.国外基于政府董事的公职身份或其承担的公务职责,对其考评、激励、监督及法律责任等均体现了强烈的公法性.我国的国有股权董事类似于国外的政府董事,但现行法律仅承认其董事的私法身份而否认其公法定位.这使得其在公司独立法人地位的保护下,与公司内部人形成了利益同盟,削弱了其作为政府董事的基本功能.我国可借鉴国外有益经验,将国有股权董事定位为承担公务职责的政府董事,以适应我国国企混合所有制改革的需要.     

注册会计师与独立董事协同监督机制研究——基于上市公司财会监督视角

促进财会监督与各类监督的贯通协调，提升注册会计师执业监督与独立董事履职监督的协同监督效能，是我国上市公司内外部监督体系和体制机制建设的重要内容。本文从上市公司财会监督的视角，对注册会计师行业和独立董事职业的发展现状进行了分析，归纳出注册会计师与独立董事协同监督的共性目标和机制缺陷，提出了构建选聘选任机制、动态融入机制、决策咨询机制、信息共享机制、成果共享机制等方面的协同监督机制建议。     

股东知情权之公力救济研究——以检查人选任制度为中心之考察

作为对公司股东知情权在公法层面上的救济手段,"检查人选任制度"存在于各国(地区)立法中.本丈由司法判例切入,对检查人选任制度的实践意义、理论价值进行了探讨,并在启动程序、检查人职权、调查报告的效力等方面提出建议,以供立法参考.     

政府董事概念解析与重构

政府董事是国家基于股权或特别立法,委派到公司制国企或承担了公共任务的私企董事会中履行公务职责的董事,在世界各国普遍存在。近年来,我国学者也相继提出了政府董事的概念,但相关代表性观点仅反映了政府董事某一方面特征,难以揭示其实质内涵及全貌。综观各国政府董事立法与实践,结合我国国情,我国的政府董事当为国家股权董事且为非管理层董事并兼具公私法双重身份,如此才能发挥其作为政府董事的功能,防止企业国有资产流失并保障政府目标的实现,从而为我国国企混合所有制改革提供制度保障。     

对独立董事“独立性”的再思考

2001年中国证监会颁布了《关于在上市公司设立独立董事的指导意见》。该意见指出，所有上市公司必须设立独立董事。其目的是为了防止内部人控制，保护中小股东的权益。但是一些上市公司的实践表明，独立董事并没有起到应有的作用，尤其是近一两年来发生的郑白文事件，猴王事件，以及美国的安然事件，人们对独立董事的公正性和独立性提出了质疑，甚至有人认为独立董事只是公司的一种摆设和花瓶，根本没有必要设立。本文通过对独立董事制度的产生机理，独立董事的选任，激励运行环境等分析，试着解答以上疑问。     

破产法的管理人选任制度比较研究

破产管理人的选任方式主要有由法院选任、债权人会议选任、债权人会议选任和法定权力机关指定相结合、行政机关选任等几种立法模式。每种立法模式各有其特点与优劣。只有加强债权人自治权利和破产管理人的市场培育,才能够更好地完善我国的破产管理人选任制度。     

试析我国董事辞职法律制度

我国《公司法》中仅第46条涉及董事辞职的权利,其他规范性文件中的规定也不尽明确.对于董事与公司关系的研究多侧重于董事的义务而忽视了其权利,其中就包含董事辞职的权利.公司法上对辞职权利规定的空白和对辞职程序规定的欠缺造成了实践中的困难和争议.因此,研究董事辞职的法律问题具有十分重要的理论与实践价值.本文以董事与公司的关系为基点,分析董事辞职的法律性质和辞职制度的现状,进而针对存在的问题提出完善我国董事辞职制度的建议.     

限制董事改选数量：交错董事会的中国模式

一些上市公司在章程中限制股东大会改选董事的数量。很多人认为这种做法属于交错董事会制度，主张应当允许管理层采取这种较为温和的反收购措施。本文认为，交错董事会仅在特定的法律制度下方能成为一种反收购策略。根据我国新《公司法》，交错董事会不具有反收购效应，对其的采用只要符合法定程序就应得到支持。限制董事改选数量的章程条款不属于交错董事会制度，而是对股东享有的董事选任权和罢免权的违法限制.     

关于我国独立董事制度的再思考

建立有效的公司治理机制是我国证券市场目前的一个主要任务。公司治理结构是否健全在很大程度上与董事会是否具有独立地位，是否能真正代表全体股东利益有关，独立董事制度能够较好地达到这一目标。因此建立和完善独立董事制度对完善我国公司的治理结构是非常必要的。要制定独立董事相关法律制度，明确独立董事选聘程序等。     

Monitoring the board: should shareholders have direct proxy access?

Motivated by the current discussion to reform shareholder-nominated director elections, this paper presents a model that shows that, when shareholders have direct access to proxy, the quality of the board of directors improves. This is so because more independent directors—regarded as better monitors of managerial activities—will be elected. In the model, a manager maximizes his expected utility by solving the trade-off between reputation and consumption of private benefits. The board can be of high-type (independent, only cares about reputation) or low-type (non-independent, faces a trade-off similar to the manager's). When the board can signal its type at a relatively small cost, giving shareholders direct access to proxy is better than delegating the nomination of outside directors to managers: in the first alternative, only high-type boards will be kept, whereas in the second, low-type boards will predominate.     

Is Director Industry Experience Valuable?

We investigate whether investor reactions to the announcement of a new outside director appointment significantly depend upon the director's experience in the appointing firm's industry. Our sample includes 688 outside director appointments to boards of S&P 500 companies from 2005 to 2010. We find significantly higher announcement returns upon appointments of experienced versus inexperienced directors. To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we use the deaths of 200 directors holding 280 outside directorships as an identification strategy and find significantly more negative announcement returns associated with the deaths of experienced versus inexperienced directors. However, while our results are robust to accounting for time‐fixed unobservable director and firm characteristics, we still cannot completely rule out endogenous firm‐director matching driving our results.     

Choice of acquisition form in Australia and the post‐takeover employment of target firm directors on the acquiring firm board

In Australia, a corporate acquisition can be structured as either a scheme of arrangement or a takeover. We investigate the association between deal structure and the retention of target directors on the merged entity board. We find that the odds of a target director subsequently sitting on the merged entity's board are significantly higher in schemes. The results also show that premiums are lower in schemes of arrangement when additional target directors are appointed to the board of the acquiring firm. The findings indicate that target director appointment is unrelated to the merged entity's post‐acquisition performance.     

Insolvent trading and voluntary administration in Australia: economic winners and losers?

Australian directors who incur debts while their companies are insolvent can be pursued by the corporate regulator for compensation when their companies fail. Under the Australian insolvent trading laws, directors no longer experience ‘true’ limited liability, and as expected, they adjust their behaviour as a result. Identifying director's rational behaviour in an insolvent trading world is difficult as there are no formal economic models of director decision-making under Australian current corporate law. In this paper, we develop such a model primarily for private companies. We incorporate the threat of insolvent trading as well as director's tactical use of voluntary administration to avoid insolvent trading litigation. We show that neither a combination of insolvent trading or voluntary administration can simultaneously ensure creditors-best outcomes, eliminate insolvent trading and reduce director underinvestment.     

Why do firms appoint CEOs as outside directors?

Companies actively seek to appoint outside CEOs to their boards. Consistent with our matching theory of outside CEO board appointments, we show that such appointments have a certification benefit for the appointing firm. CEOs are more likely to join boards of large established firms that are geographically close, pursue similar financial and investment policies, and have comparable governance to their own firms. The first outside CEO director appointment has a higher stock-price reaction than the appointment of another outside director. Except for a decrease in operating performance following the appointment of an interlocked director, CEO directors do not affect the appointing firm's operating performance, decision-making, and CEO compensation.     

Director Quality and Firm Performance

Many financial economists argue that the board of directors' efficacy in the monitoring of managerial behavior depends upon the quality of the directors. Assuming that there is a link between the stock performance of target firms and the quality of their directors, we empirically categorize directors receiving additional directorships following a takeover as “above average” and “below average.” We then follow the stock performance of firms hiring new directors for three years after their hiring. We match the two categories of directors with the performance of hiring firms after a director's appointment. Accounting for other contemporaneous effects, we regress the hiring firms' post‐performance on director quality and other attributes. The results indicate that directors of “above average” quality are related to hiring firms with “above average” post‐performance.     

中国上市公司独立董事制度研究

独立董事制度在中国上市公司中实施只有四年左右的时间.本文通过独立董事制度实施以来存在问题的研究,从公司治理结构与独立董事制度、独立董事制度产生的基础、股权结构与独立董事制度以及独立董事本身等方面进行了深层次探索,认为完善独立董事制度应从体制和政策调整两方面共同进行.体制方面,完善在国内外公司治理结构模式的比较分析基础上,将独立董事制度与公司治理结构结合起来.从政策调整方面,应从独立董事职责、独立董事产生机制、独立董事监管体系的形成、独立董事工作制度等诸方面加以调整和完善,以使独立董事制度发挥其真正的效用.     

略谈代表(执行)董事及其对第三人的责任

现代公司的权力由股东转移到董事会手中 ,而实际行使权力的主要是代表 (执行 )董事。其对公司有一定的控制力 ,就应当承担相应的义务。在代表 (执行 )董事造成公司损害同时也使第三人遭受损害时 ,要对第三人承担损害赔偿责任。我国公司法应该借鉴英美法系的做法 ,以完善我国的公司制度。     

保护规范理论反思与本土化修正

近年来,我国宏观流动性投放逐步由以前的被动投放（外汇占款）向主动投放转变,银行业资产配置结构更趋多元化,金融创新更加活跃,这些都在一定程度上改变了金融体系流动性传导的渠道和机制,迫使我们重新审视流动性在金融体系中消长、转移的内在逻辑,探讨新形势下流动性管理的合理方式和路径。本文运用动力系统模型来分析和论证银行资产配置结构变化对市场流动性状况的影响机制,以及中央银行流动性管理工具的有效性。研究表明,银行资产配置趋势的同质化容易导致市场流动性状况的恶化;中央银行需要进一步完善利率传导机制,强化货币政策与宏观审慎评估政策的协同配合,以提升流动性管理的有效性。