IPO Placement Risk and the Number of Co‐Managers

Previous studies show that co‐managers mainly affect initial public offering (IPO) aftermarket activities. We investigate the role of co‐managers in IPO pre‐market activities. We argue that co‐managers help reduce IPO placement risk and hypothesize that IPO issuers hire more co‐managers when placement risk is higher. We find the number of co‐managers is positively associated with three proxies for placement risk. IPOs with more price uncertainty and high‐tech IPOs hire more co‐managers, while IPOs in regulated industries hire fewer co‐managers. We also find larger IPOs, recent IPOs, and IPOs with more reputable lead underwriters hire more co‐managers.     

Long‐term Performance of Greek IPOs

We analyse the long‐run performance of 254 Greek IPOs that were listed during the period 1994–2002, computing buy‐and‐hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over 36 months of secondary market performance. The empirical results differ from international evidence and reveal long‐term overperformance that continues for a substantial interval after listing. Measuring these returns in calendar time, we find statistical significance with several of the benchmarks employed. We also find that long‐term overperformance is a feature of the mass of IPOs conducted during a pronounced IPO wave. Cross‐sectional regressions of long‐run performance disclose several significant factors. The study demonstrates that although Greek IPOs overperform the market for a longer period, underperformance eventually emerges, in line with much international evidence. Our interpretation is that the persistence of overperformance over a significant interval is due to excessive supply of issues during the ‘hot IPO period’. Results associated with pricing during the ‘hot IPO period’ indicate positive short‐ (1‐year), medium‐ (2‐year) and negative long‐term (3‐year) performance.     

VENTURE CAPITAL AND IPO LOCKUP EXPIRATION: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

Most initial public offerings (IPOs) feature “lockup” agreements, which bar insiders from selling the stock for a set period following the IPO, usually 180 days. We examine stock price behavior in the period surrounding lockup expiration for a sample of 2,529 firms from 1988 to 1997. We find that lockup expirations are, on average, associated with significant and negative abnormal returns, but the losses are concentrated in firms with venture capital backing. For the venture‐capital‐backed group, the largest losses occur for high‐tech firms and firms with the greatest post‐IPO stock price increases, the largest relative trading volume in the period surrounding expiration, and the highest quality underwriters. JEL classification: G14, G24     

Do Expert Informational Intermediaries Add Value? Evidence from Auditors in Microcap Initial Public Offerings

Do expert informational intermediaries add value? We address this question by examining the informativeness of the audit report contained in the prospectus associated with a firm's initial public offering (IPO). At the time of the IPO, there is a relative lack of information to facilitate the establishment of equity values, suggesting that the information provided by outside “experts” (e.g., auditors, underwriters) is particularly important. In this article we study small, non‐venture‐backed IPOs, a segment of the market with the poorest long‐run performance and where the prestigious audit firm is often the sole (if any) expert present. We find that the pre‐IPO opinions of larger auditors are more predictive of post‐IPO negative stock delistings. Of particular note, the opinions of the national‐tiered firms are comparably predictive to those of the Big 6, though this finding emerges only after we consider the selectivity‐based differences in the clients that hire these national firms. Our findings also indicate that, for larger auditors the presence of a pre‐IPO going‐concern opinion is more strongly associated with first‐year stock returns and that larger auditors are more likely to give such opinions to their distressed clients. Overall, we address a deficiency in the literature relating to “the paucity of evidence on the value of auditor opinions to investors” (Healy and Palepu [ 2001 p. 415]).     

DIVERGENCE OF OPINION AND LONG‐TERM PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS

Miller's hypothesis posits that divergence of opinion can lead to asset overvaluation and subsequent long‐term underperformance in markets (such as initial public offerings [IPOs]) with restricted short‐selling. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that early‐market return volatility, a proxy for divergence of opinion, is negatively related to subsequent IPO long‐term abnormal returns. This relation holds after accounting for other factors that previous studies suggest affect long‐term abnormal returns for IPOs (including another proxy for divergence of opinion). Moreover, we find that this relation is stronger in IPO markets than in non‐IPO markets (where short‐selling restrictions are less stringent), again consistent with Miller's hypothesis.     

Underwriter Reputation, Initial Returns, and the Long-Run Performance of IPO Stocks

We find that the underperformance of IPO stocks relative to the market over a three-year holding period is less severe for IPOs handled by more prestigious underwriters. Consistent with prior studies, we also find that IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters are associated with less short-run underpricing. Among the various existing proxies for underwriter reputation, the Carter–Manaster measure is the most significant in the context of initial returns and also in the context of the three-year performance of IPOs. The study also provides an updated list of the Carter–Manaster measure for various underwriters.     

Three Decades of IPO Markets in Canada: Evolution,Risk and Return

This article explores the extent that the long‐run returns following initial public offerings (IPOs) can explain the asserted decrease in IPOs in Canada. The causes of such a decrease remain controversial, in part because of our limited knowledge of this market. We first describe in detail the evolution of Canadian IPOs on the senior and the venture stock exchanges over three decades (1986–2016). This evolution differs considerably between natural resource and non‐natural resource firms. Second, using other junior markets as a benchmark, we show that the Canadian IPO market is very particular, mainly because it lists very small firms at an early development stage. Third, using 2,145 Canadian IPOs, we provide evidence that these IPOs generate three‐year negative average abnormal returns, and more than 70 percent report negative abnormal returns. Large issuers reporting profits constitute the only subsample that provides fair returns, but they account for less than 5 percent of IPOs. Such a market probably survived for many decades because of investors' preference for skewness and the characteristics of the returns' distribution. We observe a high level of skewness of abnormal returns, consistent with the behavioral finance proposition that investors are often unduly optimistic when valuing lottery stocks.     

IPO underpricing,signaling, and property returns

This paper investigates whether IPO signals reveal proprietary information about the prospects of an issuing firm’s underlying industry. By analyzing a sample of European property company (EPC) IPOs from 1997 to 2007, we take advantage of a heterogeneous set of industry performance measures, i.e., yields and total returns of direct property investments in various European property markets that can be clearly assigned to each individual IPO. The results reveal that the main signal of interest, underpricing, is in fact positively related to average property yields for a 12-month post-IPO period; a result that supports our assumption. Other signals, as proposed in previous research, do not appear to contain any information about the prospects of the IPO firm’s target property investment market. We also show that total returns seem to be a biased measure for direct property performance. Further tests for the signaling model’s preconditioned presence of information asymmetry among EPCs reveal that underpricing levels are a function of company-specific ex ante uncertainty proxies. In contrast, property-specific ex ante uncertainty proxies do not explain underpricing levels.     

IPO Pricing,Block Sales,and Long‐Term Performance

Block sales following IPOs are related to the IPOs' value relative to an estimate of intrinsic value, opening‐trade return, and IPO size. Overvalued IPOs experience more block sales than undervalued IPOs. IPOs with high block sales outperform IPOs with low block sales from 20 days after IPO through lockup expiration; however, IPOs with high block sales underperform IPOs with low block sales from lockup expiration through the third year after the IPO. The results indicate that block traders are advantaged relative to other traders; whether the advantage is based on superior information or superior valuation capabilities is unknown.     

Does an Industry Effect Exist for Initial Public Offerings?

We examine the impact of initial public offerings (IPOs) on rival firms and find that the valuation effects are insignificant. This insignificant reaction can be explained by offsetting information and competitive effects. Significant positive information effects are associated with IPOs in regulated industries and the first IPO in an industry following a period of dormancy. Significant negative competitive effects are associated with larger IPOs in competitive industries, those in relatively risky industries, those in high‐performing industries, and those in the technology sector. IPO firms that use the proceeds for debt repayment appear to represent a more significant competitive threat to rival firms relative to IPO firms that use their proceeds for other purposes.     

The Wealth Effect of Demutualization: Evidence From the U.S. Property-Liability and Life Insurance Industries

This study examines the wealth effect of demutualization initial public offerings (IPOs) by investigating underpricing and postconversion long‐run stock performance. Our results suggest that there is more “money left on the table” for demutualized insurers than for non‐demutualized insurers. We show that higher underpricing for demutualized firms can be explained by greater market demand, market sentiment, and the size of the offering. Further, contrary to previous research reporting an average underperformance of industrial IPOs, we show that demutualization IPOs outperform non‐IPO firms with comparable size and book‐to‐market ratios and non‐demutualized insurers. We present evidence that the outperformance in stock returns is mainly attributable to improvement in post‐demutualization operating performance and demand at the time of the IPOs. The combined results of underpricing and long‐term performance suggest that the wealth of policyholders who choose stock rather than cash or policy credits is not harmed by demutualization. Stockholders who purchase demutualized company shares either during or after the IPO have earned superior returns. Our findings are consistent with the efficiency improvement hypothesis.     

Venture capital‐backed and commitments test entity initial public offerings on the ASX

This paper examines initial returns to venture capital (VC) backed and non‐VC‐backed IPO companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). We find support for the theoretical predictions of Rossetto (2008), by providing empirical evidence that VC‐backed CTE IPOs exhibit greater wealth losses to pre‐IPO investors compared to non‐VC‐backed CTE IPOs during hot issue markets. We also find that greater retained ownership increases IPO underpricing. In the subsample of IPOs with below the median level of retained ownership IPOs, VC‐backed CTE IPOs and VC‐backed, non‐CTE IPOs have significantly higher levels of underpricing and wealth loss compared to non‐VC‐backed, non‐CTE IPOs.     

UNDERPRICING OF IPOS THAT FOLLOW PRIVATE PLACEMENT

In this study we examine the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) by firms that have private placements of equity before their IPOs (PP IPO firms). We find that PP IPOs are associated with significantly less underpricing than their peers. Furthermore, PP IPOs are associated with lower underwriting spreads, more reputable underwriting syndicates, and greater postissue analyst coverage as compared to IPOs that are issued by their industry peers under similar market conditions. Consistent with the implications of the information asymmetry explanation for IPO underpricing, our findings suggest that companies could benefit by conveying their quality via successful pre‐IPO private placements that help reduce the cost of going public.     

Universal Banking, Asset Management, and Stock Underwriting

This paper examines institutions that underwrite IPOs and have asset management divisions from 1993 through 1998. We provide evidence that these firms use asset management funds as vehicles to help them earn more equity underwriting business. We also show that asset managers affiliated with IPO underwriters use their superior information about their own institution's IPOs to earn annualised market adjusted returns 7.6% above asset managers of firms who did not underwrite the IPO. Superior future returns by asset managers who trade affiliated IPOs are dependent on the information environment for the IPO and the underwriter reputation rank.     

Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputation

This paper examined the returns earned by subscribing to initial public offerings of equity (IPOs). Rock (1986) suggests that IPO returns are required by uninformed investors as compensation for the risk of trading against superior information. We show that IPOs with more informed investor capital require higher returns. The marketing underwriter's reputation reveals the expected level of “informed” activity. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings. With less risk there is less incentive to acquire information and fewer informed investors. Consequently, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs that have lower returns.     

Does the effect of revealed private information on initial public offering (IPO) first trading day return differ by IPO market heat?

By IPO market regime, I decompose the effect of revealed private information on the initial return of IPOs (initial public offerings) into adjusted and unadjusted private information and find (i) investment banks partially adjust the offer price in return for revealed private information in all but the non‐hot IPO market; (ii) the economic importance of private information associated with IPOs (and hence agency costs) is procyclical; and (iii) industry information spillovers between IPOs occur only in the hot and very‐hot IPO markets.     

Accounting conservatism and IPO underpricing: China evidence

This study examines how accounting conservatism impacts underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) in the Chinese stock market. In addition, we investigate how information asymmetry affects the association of accounting conservatism with IPO underpricing. Based on regression analysis of 674 A-shares companies that went public through IPOs at both Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges in China during 2001–2009, we find that (1) accounting conservatism is negatively associated with the magnitude of IPO underpricing; and (2) the relationship between accounting conservatism and IPO underpricing is more pronounced when information asymmetry is high. The findings should shed a light on what drives IPO underpricing and how it could be affected by accounting conservatism in an emerging economy.     

The Pricing of Equity Carve-Outs

This article examines the pricing of stock for 251 equity carve‐outs during the 1986–1995 period. We document a mean initial‐day return of 5.83% and a mean one‐week return of 5.43%. Among carve‐outs, the initial underpricing is lower for issues represented by high prestige investment bankers and those that have a lower offer price. In comparison with 251 initial public offering (IPO) firms matched by size and book‐to‐market ratio of equity, carveouts exhibit significantly lower initial‐day returns, but their buy‐and‐hold returns for sixmonth and one‐year periods are not significantly different from IPOs. The IPO firms have a three‐year return of 28.82% which is significantly higher than the 21.07% return for the carve‐out firms.     

IPO Pricing in “Hot” Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the Table?

This paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on IPO pricing. Using a model in which the aftermarket price of IPO shares depends on the information about the intrinsic value of the company and investor sentiment, I show that IPOs can be overpriced and still exhibit positive initial return. A sample of recent French offerings with a fraction of the shares reserved for individual investors supports the predictions of the model. Individual investors' demand is positively related to market conditions. Moreover, large individual investors' demand leads to high IPO prices, large initial returns, and poor long‐run performance.     

Corporate governance, insider ownership and operating performance of Australian initial public offerings

We examine ownership structures and corporate governance attributes of 313 Australian initial public offerings (IPOs) between 1976 and 1993 and their relation with up to 5 years of post‐listing operating performance, adjusted for similar (non‐IPO) firms. Consistent with prior share price‐based evidence, we find that the operating performance of Australian IPOs typically deteriorates over the first 4 post‐listing years. Any evidence of a positive association between insider ownership and firm performance is confined to the fourth and fifth years after the IPO. Evidence of a positive relation between institutional ownership and performance is restricted to the latter part of our 5‐year post‐listing window. Board composition (i.e. outsider versus insider control) is not associated with operating performance, although there is some evidence that independent board leadership is associated with better operating performance.