The effect of financial reporting quality on CEO compensation structure: Evidence from accounting comparability

This study examines the effect of accounting comparability on the design of CEO compensation structure. After controlling for firm-specific attributes, we find that accounting comparability is positively associated with CEO equity-based compensation intensity and pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that the improved comparability increases the usefulness of equity-based compensation and a firm is willing to offer more equity-based compensation contracts to CEOs and increase their pay-performance sensitivity. Further, we find that the impact of comparability on the CEO’s compensation contract increases with information asymmetry, which is consistent with the notion that accounting comparability is a quality of financial reporting that facilitates the use of equity-based compensation in a poor information environment. Our analysis also reveals that the effect of accounting comparability on CEO compensation structure is greater when a firm’s corporate governance is strong, consistent with the complementary relation between comparability and the exiting corporate governance in determining CEO compensation schemes. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms utilize more equity-based compensation as a proportion of total compensation under greater accounting comparability and enhance the alignment between equity-based compensation and firm performance.     

CEO risk-taking incentives and relative performance evaluation

This paper examines how changes in CEO risk-taking incentives are associated with changes in the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) in CEO contracts. Using a shock to the accounting for executive stock options (FAS 123R), I confirm that risk-taking incentives and option grants declined following FAS 123R using a within-firm design, but not a within-CEO-firm design. Decreased risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest in projects with lower systematic risk and can result in reduced incentives to hedge exposure to systematic risk in CEO compensation contracts via RPE. However, CEO relative risk aversion increases with decreases in risk-taking incentives, potentially increasing incentives to protect CEO wealth from systematic performance via RPE. Testing these competing predictions, I find modest evidence consistent with reduced RPE surrounding FAS 123R, suggesting that when CEO risk-taking incentives are reduced, so are incentives to shield CEO pay from systematic performance.     

Accounting quality,bank monitoring,and performance pricing loans

We provide new evidence on the determinants of performance pricing provisions in bank loan contracts. We find that firms that are easier to monitor, such as those with better accounting quality, lower information opacity, or a stronger relationship with the lender are more likely to have performance pricing loans. The use of performance pricing is less likely after financial restatement events. Furthermore, we find that the likelihood of using accounting-based (as opposed to credit-rating-based) pricing provisions increases as the firm’s accounting quality increases, and as the strength of the prior lending relation increases. Our results are robust to alternative measures of accounting quality, information opacity, and bank monitoring, and suggest that monitoring costs have a significant impact on the design of debt contracts.     

Governance structure and the weighting of performance measures in CEO compensation

We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.

Performance peer groups in CEO compensation contracts

How do firms choose performance peer groups used in chief executive officer (CEO) relative performance evaluation contracts? We find that while firms, for the most part, choose performance peers to better identify their CEOs’ impact on firm performance, they also tend to select underperforming peers. Dynamically, we find that peers that are added and retained every year are weaker than ones that were not chosen. These findings suggest managers may have some influence on the choice of performance peers. Finally, using a quasi-natural experiment, we find that enhanced disclosure did not affect the tendency of firms to select underperforming peers.     

Mandatory IFRS Adoption and the Contractual Usefulness of Accounting Information in Executive Compensation

We examine how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in continental Europe affects the contractual usefulness of accounting information in executive compensation, as reflected in pay‐performance sensitivity (PPS) and relative performance evaluation (RPE). The empirical evidence indicates a weak increase in accounting‐based PPS in the post‐adoption period, primarily driven by countries with large differences between IFRS and their previously adopted local accounting standards. We also document a significant increase in accounting‐based RPE using foreign peers after the adoption. Additional analysis shows that the increase in RPE is greater for firms with more foreign sales, and for those with lower availability of domestic peers of comparable size. The overall results are consistent with the compensation committees in those countries perceiving earnings after IFRS adoption to be of higher quality and comparability. Our paper highlights an important benefit of IFRS largely ignored by the literature, that is, the higher earnings quality and comparability brought by the adoption of IFRS facilitate executive compensation contracting.     

Peer choice in CEO compensation

Current research shows that firms are more likely to benchmark against peers that pay their Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) higher compensation, reflecting self serving behavior. We propose an alternative explanation: the choice of highly paid peers represents a reward for unobserved CEO talent. We test this hypothesis by decomposing the effect of peer selection into talent and self serving components. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the association between a firm's selection of highly paid peers and CEO pay mostly represents compensation for CEO talent.     

Relative performance evaluation in board cash compensation: UK empirical evidence

This paper presents an empirical examination of whether evidence of the implicit use of relative performance evaluation (RPE) can be found in the cash compensation of boards of directors for 169 UK non-financial listed companies that existed for all of the period from 1971 to 1998. We perform two types of analyses. Initially, we estimate individual firm time series regressions of the change in board cash compensation against measures of firm and peer group performance. The measures of firm performance we use are annual cash stock market returns and pre-tax accounting earnings. Peer group measures of performance are industry value-weighted average cash stock market returns and industry value-weighted average pre-tax accounting earnings. Subsequently, we analyse the data as a balanced panel.We provide evidence that board cash compensation is positively related to accounting earnings and negatively associated with peer group pre-tax accounting earnings. Some evidence suggests that board cash compensation is related to firm stock market returns but none suggests it is related to peer group market returns. This result implies the presence of RPE based on accounting earnings in the design of UK board compensation, with the cash compensation of boards of directors implicitly (partially) protected from industry uncertainties.     

Peer firms in relative performance evaluation

Relative performance evaluation (RPE) in chief executive officer (CEO) compensation provides insurance against external shocks and yields a more informative measure of CEO actions. I argue that empirical evidence on the use of RPE is mixed because previous studies rely on a misspecified peer group. External shocks and flexibility in responding to the shocks are functions of, for example, the firm's technology, the complexity of the organization, and the ability to access external credit, which depend on firm size. When peers are composed of similar industry-size firms, evidence is consistent with the use of RPE in CEO compensation.     

Accounting fundamentals and CEO bonus compensation

Research indicates that there is a positive association between accounting earnings and chief executive officer (CEO) cash compensation; however, evidence also suggests that this positive association ceases to exist when earnings performance is poor or declining. This latter result has led some critics of corporate compensation policies to conclude that CEOs are not penalized for poor or declining firm performance. The purpose of this study is to further illuminate the pay-performance debate by expanding the traditional executive bonus compensation model to include a set of accounting fundamentals that prior research indicates are related to both current and future firm performance. Our results indicate that there is a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and the level of and change in CEO bonus compensation. Moreover, we find a highly significant relationship between accounting fundamentals and both bonus omissions and bonus reductions. When earnings are negative or declining, we find that the above relationships remain intact. In contrast, when earnings are negative or declining, we find that the relationship between aggregate earnings and bonus compensation is weak or insignificant in most of our analyses. Taken together, our results suggest that the apparently weak relationship between accounting earnings and CEO bonus compensation (particularly when earnings are negative or declining) is partly due to the fact that the bonus compensation model excludes accounting fundamentals which are strongly associated with bonus compensation. Thus, we conclude that (i) bonus compensation is more closely tied to firm performance than critics sometimes claim and (ii) bonus compensation awarded to CEOs when earnings performance is poor is at least partially explained by the presence of favorable accounting fundamentals.     

CEO gender and managerial entrenchment

This paper investigates the effect of gender on managerial authority and control over firms. The study examines S&P 1500 firms for the period of 1999–2014. Our findings suggest that accounting performance, firm value, CEO age, firm age, and board size reduce the likelihood of appointing female managers. On the other hand, the appointment of female CEOs is directly associated with the percentage of female directors, board independence, and beta. The study confirms the notion that female CEO appointments are generally associated with firms facing adverse conditions, and shows that female CEOs are more entrenched as compared to male CEOs. We find that the presence of female CEO decreases the turnover-performance sensitivity, increases the E-index, and inflates CEO compensation. Our research suggests that the level of female CEOs’ entrenchment provides them with greater job security, higher level of control, and inflated pay that compensate the risk of accepting the appointment in a high risk and poor performing firm.     

The CEO pay slice

We investigate the relation between the CEO Pay Slice (CPS)—the fraction of the aggregate compensation of the top-five executive team captured by the Chief Executive Officer—and the value, performance, and behavior of public firms. The CPS could reflect the relative importance of the CEO as well as the extent to which the CEO is able to extracts rents. We find that, controlling for all standard controls, CPS is negatively associated with firm value as measured by industry-adjusted Tobin's q. CPS also has a rich set of relations with firms' behavior and performance. In particular, CPS is correlated with lower (industry-adjusted) accounting profitability, lower stock returns accompanying acquisitions announced by the firm and higher likelihood of a negative stock return accompanying such announcements, higher odds of the CEO receiving a lucky option grant at the lowest price of the month, lower performance sensitivity of CEO turnover, and lower stock market returns accompanying the filing of proxy statements for periods when CPS increases. Taken together, our results are consistent with the hypothesis that higher CPS is associated with agency problems and indicate that CPS can provide a useful tool for studying the performance and behavior of firms.     

A path analysis investigation of the relationships between CEO pay ratios and firm performance mediated by employee satisfaction

We posit that information about CEO pay ratios is important to investors because employees' perceived fairness of their firm’s CEO pay ratio has consequences for firm performance. We use path analysis to examine the association between firm performance and (1) the predicted CEO pay ratio as determined by economic factors (the fair component of CEO pay ratio) and (2) the predicted CEO pay ratio as determined by non-economic factors (the unfair component of CEO pay ratio). We test for the existence and relative importance of direct and indirect paths using two measures of employee satisfaction and two measures of firm performance. We find that pay equity, a larger CEO pay ratio driven by economic factors, is associated with employee contributions to better firm performance. Conversely, we show that pay inequity, a larger CEO pay ratio driven by non-economic factors, is associated with employees' contributions to poorer firm performance. Consistent with the view that managerial entrenchment may amplify the negative effects of the CEO pay ratio, we find that the negative indirect path between pay inequity and firm performance, mediated by employee satisfaction, is more pronounced in firms with entrenched CEOs. Our findings contribute to the accounting compensation literature because they are consistent with CEO pay ratio information having economic consequences.     

Tests for relative performance evaluation based on assumptions derived from proxy statement disclosures

The main purpose of this paper is to test for relative performance evaluation (RPE) using assumptions derived from an examination of firms’ disclosures about their RPE use. Prior empirical evidence supporting the use of RPE in executive compensation is mixed. This is puzzling since studies of firm disclosures indicate that firms claim to use RPE based on both accounting measures and stock returns. Those few studies that do find empirical support observe it with either an accounting performance measure or stock returns, but not both. The lack of strong consistent empirical support for RPE is due, in part, to the fact that the preponderance of tests for RPE incorporate unsubstantiated assumptions about the way firms apply RPE. This includes the compensation measure to which RPE is applied and the way in which firms use firm-own and peer group performance when determining compensation. Our test results provide support for the use of RPE among 1998 S&P 500 firms with both stock returns and return on equity. To our knowledge, this is the first study to find support for RPE with both stock returns and an accounting performance measure. Through a series of sensitivity analyses, we also provide insight into the amount of detail researchers need to build into their empirical tests in order to find support for RPE.     

Excessive managerial entrenchment,corporate governance,and firm performance

This paper investigates the differential impact of positive and negative excessive managerial entrenchment on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, CEO compensation, and firm performance. We measure the degree of managerial entrenchment using the E-index introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009). Our findings suggest that an increase in excess CEO entrenchment reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor performance. We also show a positive association between excessive entrenchment and CEO compensation as managers gain more power and authority when they are entrenched. On the other hand, excess CEO entrenchment has an inverse correlation with firm performance and firm value. Overall, we propose that excessive managerial entrenchment has a converse impact on board monitoring and shareholders’ welfare.     

Mandatory IFRS adoption and executive compensation:Evidence from China

This study investigates how the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards(IFRS) affects the contractual benefits of using accounting information to determine executive compensation in China. After controlling for firm and corporate governance characteristics, we find strong evidence supporting the positive role of mandatory IFRS adoption on the accounting-based performance sensitivity of executive compensation. Subsample analysis suggests that improvements in accounting-based performance sensitivity after IFRS adoption differ across regions with various levels of institutional quality and across firms that are affected to a different extent by the adoption. Additional analysis supports the argument that the positive effects of IFRS adoption on the use of accounting performance in executive compensation are driven by the reduction in accounting conservatism associated with IFRS adoption.     

Underperformance of founder-led firms: An examination of compensation contracting theories during the executive stock options backdating scandal

Using the executive stock option (ESO) backdating scandal as a backdrop, this paper examines whether compensation committees can effectively set executive compensation contracts in the presence of a founding CEO. Analyzing a sample of firms accused of backdating ESO grant dates and a control sample of non-backdating firms, we find evidence suggesting that managerial power influences the decision to backdate. Specifically, our analysis indicates the presence of a founder CEO increases the likelihood that ESOs are backdated by 22%. We further find that founder-led firms strongly underperform a matched sample of non-backdating firms. This finding contrasts a number of studies that document superior operating and stock return performance for founder-led firms.     

Does accounting conservatism pay?

We investigate whether or not there is a link between conservative accounting practices and the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance. Using several accrual‐based measures of accounting conservatism as well as alternative measures of accounting performance, we estimate an econometric model of CEO compensation that incorporates the interaction of accounting conservatism and accounting performance. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance is higher for firms that report conservative accounting earnings. These results support the hypothesis that accounting conservatism, by limiting earnings management opportunities and improving the reliability of accounting performance measures, allows firms to formulate contracts that tie executive compensation more closely to accounting performance.     

Auditor monitoring and verification in financial contracts: evidence from earnouts and SFAS 141(R)

We study how monitoring and verification of accounting-based performance benchmarks influences the design and efficiency of earnout contracts. Earnouts are commonly used to resolve agency conflicts arising in mergers and acquisitions, but these contracts create measurement and other agency problems when contingent payments are tied to future accounting-based performance. Exploiting changes in auditor monitoring of earnouts that arose as\ a consequence of SFAS 141(R), we find that acquisition contracts are more likely to incorporate accounting-based earnouts and that contingent payments tied to accounting-based performance benchmarks make up a larger portion of the consideration when acquiring firms have high-quality auditors. We also find that market reactions to announcements of earnout deals are more positive after SFAS 141(R) for acquisitions most susceptible to disputes over accounting-based performance metrics and these results are more pronounced for acquiring firms with high-quality auditors. By exploiting the features of this unique setting, we illuminate the role of monitoring and verification of accounting information in financial contracts.     

Why do managers avoid EPS dilution? Evidence from debt–equity choice

Survey evidence reveals that managers prefer to avoid dilution of earnings per share (EPS), though financial theory suggests it is irrelevant in firm valuation. We explore contracting and behavioral explanations for this apparent paradox using a large sample of debt–equity issuers. We first provide evidence that firms with greater agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are more likely to use EPS as a performance measure in bonus contracts. After controlling for possible endogeneity related to compensation contract design, we find that managers are more likely to avoid earnings dilution when their bonus compensation explicitly depends upon EPS performance. This effect is increasing in the magnitude of bonus compensation for this subset of firms; we document no such associations for the firms that do not use EPS in setting bonus pay. Additional tests of firms’ speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios and firms’ debt conservatism levels indicate that explicitly rewarding executives on EPS performance helps to resolve underleveraging problems. We also find that clientele effects are associated with managers’ aversion to earnings dilution. Our findings provide a deeper understanding of the factors that underlie the use of accounting performance in compensation contracts and new evidence on the implications of the contracting role of accounting in firm decision-making.