Less timely earnings announcements and voluntary disclosure

The release of earnings information has become less timely in recent years partly because firms increasingly disclose earnings concurrently with their periodic reports (e.g., 10-Ks, 10-Qs). We examine whether firms use voluntary disclosure to mitigate the negative economic consequences of less timely earnings announcements (EAs). We find that firms with less timely EAs are more likely to provide voluntary 8-K filings over the period leading to the EA. We also find that investors’ demand for timely information, the nature of earnings news and litigation risk affect the extent to which firms provide voluntary disclosure to compensate for less timely EAs. The negative effect of less timely EAs on information asymmetry is attenuated when firms provide voluntary 8-K filings prior to EAs. Overall, our findings suggest that firms voluntarily communicate with investors using voluntary disclosure when their EAs are less timely.     

The usefulness of firm risk disclosures under different firm riskiness,investor-interest,and market conditions: New evidence from Finland

To date, there is only meager research evidence on the usefulness of mandatory annual report risk disclosures to investors. Although it has been argued that corporate disclosure decreases information asymmetry between management and shareholders, we do not know whether investors benefit from high-quality risk reporting in a highly regulated risk disclosure environment. In this paper, we performed association tests to examine whether the quality of firms' mandatory risk disclosures relate to information asymmetry in the Finnish stock markets. In addition, we analyzed whether the usefulness of risk disclosures depends on contingency factors such as firm riskiness, investor interest, and market condition. We demonstrate that the quality of risk disclosure has a direct negative influence on information asymmetry. We also document that risk disclosures are more useful if they are provided by small firms, high tech firms, and firms with low analyst coverage. We also found that momentum in stock markets affects the relevance of firms' risk reports.     

Compliance with pension‐related mandatory disclosures and debt financing

Using hand‐collected data on the level of pension‐related mandatory disclosures required by International Accounting Standard 19 Employee Benefits, we test whether compliance levels with these disclosures convey information that affects firms’ access to the public instead of the private debt market, as well as the cost of their new debt issues. We document a higher tendency to access the public debt market for firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure. Furthermore, we find that firms with higher levels of pension‐related disclosure enjoy a lower cost in terms of issuance of public debt, but not a lower cost for private debt issues. Thus, the benefits of disclosure in reducing information risk are only realisable when creditors rely heavily on financial statements in their decision making, due to the limited access to private information. Additional tests reveal that high compliance levels effectively mitigate the negative effect of pension deficits on the cost of public debt. These findings provide novel evidence in the extant literature on the role of mandatory (and, in particular, pension‐related) disclosures on firms’ debt financing. They also have important policy implications.     

Disclosure Versus Recognition: Inferences from Subsequent Events

Standard setters explicitly state that disclosure should not substitute for recognition in financial reports. Consistent with this directive, prior research shows that investors find recognized values more pertinent than disclosed values. However, it remains unclear whether reporting items are recognized because they are more relevant for investing decisions, or whether requiring recognition itself prompts differing behavior on the part of firms and investors. Using the setting of subsequent events, I identify the differential effect of requiring disclosure versus recognition in a setting where the accounting treatment of an item is exogenously determined. For comparable events, I find a stronger initial market response for firms required to recognize relative to firms that must disclose, although the large magnitude of the identified effect calls into question whether this difference can be attributed to accounting treatments alone. In examining various reasons for the stronger market response to recognized values, I fail to find support for the hypothesis that this difference is due to differential reliability of disclosed and recognized values. I do find some evidence that investors underreact to disclosed events, consistent with investors incurring higher processing costs when using disclosed information.     

Processing Fluency and Investors’ Reactions to Disclosure Readability

The SEC's emphasis on the use of plain English is designed to make disclosures more readable and more informative. Using an experiment, I find that more readable disclosures lead to stronger reactions from small investors, so that changes in valuation judgments are more positive when news is good and more negative when news is bad. Drawing on research in psychology to explain this result, I predict and find that processing fluency from a more readable disclosure acts as a subconscious heuristic cue and increases investors’ beliefs that they can rely on the disclosure. Although I do not find that more readable disclosures directly increase perceptions of management credibility, I do find evidence of an indirect effect operating through feelings of processing fluency. In supplemental analyses, I find that investors who receive more readable disclosures revise their valuation judgments to be less extreme when they are explicitly made aware of the potential for variation in readability. I discuss potential explanations for these revised valuation judgments.     

The Impact of Disclosures of Internal Control Weaknesses and Remediations on Investors' Perceptions of Earnings Quality

We hypothesize and find that firms making SOX‐mandated disclosures of material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting (ICOFR) exhibit lower investor‐perceived earnings quality (IPEQ) than nondisclosers. We measure IPEQ using e‐loading, a market‐returns–based representation of earnings quality developed by Ecker, Francis, Kim, Olsson, and Schipper (2006). Firms do not exhibit decreases in IPEQ after initially disclosing material weaknesses. This is consistent with investors having anticipated ICOFR strength based on observable firm characteristics. However, firms exhibit increases in IPEQ after receiving their first clean audit reports that confirm the remediation of previously disclosed weaknesses. This indicates that, although investors do not find initial weakness disclosures to be incrementally informative, SOX motivates firms to remediate weak controls and provides a venue for credible remediation disclosures, thus enhancing investors' perception of financial reporting reliability. These findings are consistent with the existence of regulatory benefits associated with SOX's internal control disclosure and audit requirements.     

Shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure

We examine the relation between shareholder activism and voluntary disclosure. An important consequence of voluntary disclosure is less adverse selection in the capital markets. One class of traders that finds less adverse selection unprofitable is activist investors who target mispriced firms whose valuations they can improve. Consistent with this idea, we find that managers issue earnings and sales forecasts more frequently when their firm is more at risk of attack by activist investors, and that these additional disclosures reduce the likelihood of becoming an activist’s target. These additional disclosures also prompt a positive price reaction, contain more precise guidance, and exceed prevailing market expectations. These findings imply that managers use voluntary disclosure to preempt activism at their firm, and that activists prefer to target relatively opaque firms.     

The new Form 8-K disclosures

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has mandated new disclosure requirements in Form 8-K, which became effective on August 23, 2004. The SEC expanded the list of items that have to be reported and accelerated the timeliness of these reports. This study examines the market reactions to 8-Ks filed under the new SEC regime and investigates whether periodic reports (10-K/Qs) became less informative under the new 8-K disclosure rules. We observe that the newly required 8-K items constitute over half of all filings and that most firms disclose the required items within the new shortened period (four business days). We find that all disclosed items (old and new) are associated with abnormal volume and return volatility around both the event and the SEC filing dates, and some items have significant return drifts after the SEC filings. Surprisingly, we find that the information content of periodic reports has not diminished by the more expansive and timely 8-K disclosures under the new guidance, possibly indicating that investors may use periodic filings to interpret the effects of material events that had been disclosed earlier.     

Corporate Innovation and Disclosure Strategy

This study investigates the impact of firm innovation on MD&A disclosure. Firms need to reduce information asymmetry to assist investors on the one hand and to prevent rivals from benefitting from disclosures on the other. Innovative firms can use an optimistic tone to convey good news but increase content similarity to reduce proprietary costs. Management chooses a certain content similarity and tone strategy for an innovation and as the number of innovations increases, the ratio of similar innovation disclosure and positive tone increases in the overall MD&A, resulting in greater content similarity and more news conveyed with a positive tone. We find that the firm's level of innovation is positively related to content similarity and tone optimism. We also find that this positive relation is more pronounced when product market competition is stronger and when regional intellectual property rights protection is weaker. Our further analyses on market responses provide evidence suggesting that management's disclosure strategy functions as intended.     

The Impact of SFAS No. 14 Segment Information on Price Variability and Earnings Forecast Accuracy

This study provides empirical evidence on the economic effects of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 14 segment disclosures. Required disclosures under this standard subsume those of the Securities and Exchange Commission' (SEC) 1970 line-of-business disclosure rule both in terms of the variables to be disclosed and the degree of decomposition of the consolidated information. Consequently, this study hypothesizes that stock price variability will be greater at the time of, and security analysts' earnings forecasts more accurate following, release of these disclosures. The results of the empirical analysis support these hypotheses. They indicate that SFAS No. 14 segment disclosures convey incremental information over previously reported SEC line-of-business information that is relevant to stockholders and to security analysts.     

Municipal Disclosure Timeliness and the Cost of Debt

A longstanding concern for municipal bond investors is the lack of timely financial statement disclosures. Municipalities are held to lower disclosure standards than corporations. Using continuing disclosure dates for audited financial statements, we find bond issuers with slower disclosure have higher secondary market yields and spreads, less frequent secondary market trading, and are less likely to issue new bonds. We observe that future disclosure is largely predictable based on past disclosure and that disclosure often improves prior to new bond issuances. When municipalities do not capitalize on the benefits of timely disclosure, economic consequences are imposed on bondholders and taxpayers.     

Conference Presentations and the Disclosure Milieu

Conference presentations differ from other voluntary disclosures in that the audience for the disclosure is co‐located with managers in a well‐defined physical and social setting, or “disclosure milieu.” The milieu affects the degree to which conference participants can update their prior beliefs about the firm with information signals obtained through interactions with management and other informed participants. While the average abnormal stock return and volume reactions to presentations are positive, there is a great deal of cross‐sectional variation as indicated by negative median reactions. We find that conference characteristics that determine the nature of the audience and its interactions, such as sponsor, location, size, and industry‐focus, are significantly associated with the market reaction, consistent with the disclosure milieu explaining the cross‐sectional variation in the information content of the presentation. We also find that conference characteristics explain changes in subsequent analyst and institutional investor following, consistent with the disclosure milieu creating differences in access to management by potential new investors and analysts.     

Do Managers Withhold Bad News?

In this study, we examine whether managers delay disclosure of bad news relative to good news. If managers accumulate and withhold bad news up to a certain threshold, but leak and immediately reveal good news to investors, then we expect the magnitude of the negative stock price reaction to bad news disclosures to be greater than the magnitude of the positive stock price reaction to good news disclosures. We present evidence consistent with this prediction. Our analysis suggests that management, on average , delays the release of bad news to investors.     

The economic benefits of FASB's recommended disclosures: Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry

Prior research has documented an association between disclosure quality and various economic benefits, most notably between the cost of equity capital and market liquidity. We extend this literature by investigating whether pharmaceutical firms that comply with recommended voluntary disclosures of the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) exhibit lower bid-ask spreads, greater market depth, and lower cost of equity capital. Cross-sectional analysis using pharmaceutical firms reveals a negative association between disclosure quality and bid-ask spreads (both the total spread and its adverse-selection component), but no association between disclosure quality and either market depth or the ex ante cost of equity capital. Overall, our findings provide some evidence of benefits accruing to pharmaceutical firms that comply with the FASB's recommended voluntary disclosures under the assumption that lower bid-ask spreads reduce the cost of capital and strong evidence that complying with FASB's recommended disclosures provide a direct benefit to small investors, those who bear the entire weight of bid-ask spreads.     

The value relevance of timely information: The case of comparable store sales growth

Investors and analysts have called for more timely disclosure of corporate information. Responding to these demands, some retail firms issue comparable store sales (CSS) on a monthly or a quarterly basis in addition to an annual basis. This study examines whether a timely disclosure of CSS provides value-relevant information to market participants by examining investors' and financial analysts' responses at the time of CSS disclosures (short-horizon) and over the month or the quarter (long-horizon). We find that both monthly and quarterly CSS are associated with contemporaneous market returns and analyst forecast revisions. More importantly, we find that quarterly CSS news becomes less important to investors when firms provide more timely CSS information, indicating that monthly CSS reports may preempt the information content of quarterly CSS. Additional tests show that investors and analysts rely less on CSS if CSS news and earnings (sales) news are inconsistent.     

Institutional ownership and the informativeness of disclosure tone

Disclosure tone is an important qualitative characteristic of managerial disclosures. There is mixed evidence on the role of tone in disclosure strategy. While some studies highlight the informativeness of disclosure tone, other studies provide evidence consistent with an information obfuscation role. We conjecture that the mixed evidence may be because prior studies have not explicitly modeled the role of oversight over managerial disclosure. Using an exogenous shock to institutional ownership, an important source of managerial oversight, we find that abnormal disclosure tone is informative of a firm's future earnings and cash flows when institutional ownership is high. This positive association between institutional ownership and informativeness of abnormal tone is stronger when there is an increase in quasi-indexer institutional ownership and the contemporaneous performance is negative. Collectively, the results highlight a more complex role for disclosure tone. Abnormal disclosure tone could be reflective of managerial sentiment and convey forward-looking information to investors in the presence of greater oversight over managerial actions.     

When knowledge is power: Evidence from the municipal bond market

I investigate whether access to fundamental information enhances retail investors’ bargaining power, reducing the premium that small municipal bond investors pay over large investors. I find a reduction in this small trade premium after the introduction of an online disclosure repository that lowers retail investors’ information acquisition costs. This finding is limited to issuers whose disclosures are disseminated through the repository. The finding is pronounced for issuers that impose high information acquisition costs on investors ex-ante and those that exhibit high disclosure quality ex-post. These results suggest that as investors’ information sets align, so does their bargaining power with dealers.