The Impact of SFAS No. 14 Segment Information on Price Variability and Earnings Forecast Accuracy

This study provides empirical evidence on the economic effects of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 14 segment disclosures. Required disclosures under this standard subsume those of the Securities and Exchange Commission' (SEC) 1970 line-of-business disclosure rule both in terms of the variables to be disclosed and the degree of decomposition of the consolidated information. Consequently, this study hypothesizes that stock price variability will be greater at the time of, and security analysts' earnings forecasts more accurate following, release of these disclosures. The results of the empirical analysis support these hypotheses. They indicate that SFAS No. 14 segment disclosures convey incremental information over previously reported SEC line-of-business information that is relevant to stockholders and to security analysts.     

Managerial Empire Building and Firm Disclosure

This study tests the agency cost hypothesis in the context of geographic earnings disclosures. The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers, when not monitored by shareholders, make self‐maximizing decisions that may not necessarily be in the best interest of shareholders. These decisions include aggressively growing the firm, which reduces profitability and destroys firm value. Geographic earnings disclosures provide an interesting context to examine this issue. Beginning with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131), most U.S. multinational firms are no longer required to disclose earnings by geographic area (e.g., net income in Mexico or net income in East Asia). Such nondisclosure potentially reduces the ability of shareholders to monitor managers' decisions related to foreign operations. Using a sample of U.S. multinationals with substantial foreign operations, we find that nondisclosing firms, relative to firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings, experience greater expansion of foreign sales, produce lower foreign profit margins, and have lower firm value in the post–SFAS 131 period. Our conclusions are strengthened by the fact that these differences do not exist in the pre–SFAS 131 period and do not relate to domestic operations. We find differences in the predicted direction only for foreign operations and only after adoption of SFAS 131. Our results are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of control variables related to alternative corporate governance mechanisms, operating performance, and the firm's information environment. Overall, the results are consistent with the agency cost hypothesis and the important role of financial disclosures in monitoring managers.     

The Impact of SFAS No. 131 on Information and Monitoring

We investigate the effect of the Financial Accounting Standards Board's (FASB) new segment reporting standard on the information and monitoring environment. We compare hand‐collected, restated SFAS 131 segment data for the final SFAS 14 fiscal year with the historical SFAS 14 data. We find that SFAS 131 increased the number of reported segments and provided more disaggregated information. Analysts and the market had access to a portion of the new segment information before it was made public, but analyst and market expectations were still altered by the mandated release of the new data. By increasing information disaggregation, the new standard induced firms to reveal previously “hidden” information about their diversification strategies. The newly revealed information affected market valuations and lead to changes in firm behavior consistent with improved monitoring following adoption of SFAS 131.     

Security Market Effects Associated with SFAS No. 131: Reported Business Segments

In this study we examine the economic impact of the expected shift from the FASB's segment reporting requirements found in SFAS No. 14 to those found in SFAS No. 131. SFAS No. 131 was the joint effort of the United States' FASB and Canada's Accounting Standards Board (AcSB). It requires firms to report segments based on the firm's internal reporting and management arrangements (the management method) rather than on SFAS No. 14's line-of-business method. One alleged deficiency with the line-of-business method is its flexibility that allowed companies to combine segments. Analysts complained that companies abused this flexibility to conceal information. The management method allegedly is less flexible because companies must report segments externally the same way that they manage them internally. We examine the economic impact of the reporting standard shift by first developing company variables related to the alleged concealment of information under SFAS No. 14. These variables help us to explore why companies combine business segments under the line-of-business method and what costs companies are expected to incur when they are forced to implement the management method. Next we identify a series of dates that chronicle when the market received information about the content of SFAS No. 131. Results of the stock return tests suggest that SFAS No. 131 had a significant impact on firms that previously had the greatest incentives to conceal segment information, consistent with the conjecture that the standard imposed unanticipated costs on affected firms.     

Geographic earnings disclosure and trading volume

Beginning with Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 131 (SFAS 131), Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, most US multinational firms no longer disclose geographic earnings in their annual reports. Given the recent growth in foreign operations of US firms and the varying operating environments around the world, information (or lack thereof) related to geographical performance can affect investors’ information set. Using empirical tests that closely follow the [Kim, O., Verrecchia, R., 1997. Pre-announcement and event-period private information. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24, 395–419] model, we find results consistent with their predictions. Specifically, using a sample of firms with substantial foreign operations, we find evidence of a decrease in event period private information following adoption of SFAS 131 for firms that no longer disclose geographic earnings. These results suggest that decreased public information (i.e., non-disclosure of geographic earnings) reduces the ability of investors to utilize or generate private information in conjunction with the public announcement of quarterly earnings, which dampens trading. We also find evidence of a decrease in pre-announcement private information following adoption of SFAS 131. This is consistent with an overall improvement in public disclosures that has the effect of reducing differences in the precision of private information across investors in the period prior to the earnings announcement. However, such an effect is observed for both firms which no longer disclose geographic earnings and for firms that continue to disclose geographic earnings.     

Geographic segment disclosures in the United States: reporting practices enter a new era

The promulgation by the FASB of SFAS 131, Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, in 1997 (FASB, 1997)(effective 1998) heralded a new era of segment reporting in the United States. The purpose of this paper is to assess the impact and effectiveness of the new standard with reference to geographic segment disclosures. Given the criticisms of its predecessor, SFAS 14, relating to segment identification and the consistency of internal and external reporting, the key issue is the extent to which companies have responded to the changes in geographic information disclosures required by SFAS 131. An empirical study of the 1997 and 1998 annual reports of US Global 1000 companies reveals mixed results. While more country specific data is disclosed and the consistency of disclosures with other parts of the annual report is increased, the problem of reporting highly aggregated geographic areas remains for a significant group of companies.     

Product market pricing power, industry concentration and analysts’ earnings forecasts

This is the first study to establish a link between product market power and analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and bias. Relating two different dimensions of market power to earnings forecastability, we document that (a) a firm’s relative pricing power and (b) its industry concentration are strong positive determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. We find that forecasting earnings of higher market power firms is less complex due to their ability to withstand cost shocks as well as greater informational-efficiency enjoyed by such firms. Further, forecast optimism increases with weakening product market pricing power and with lower industry concentration. The knowledge derived from this study will hopefully improve the accuracy of equity valuation, and thereby engender better buy-side (stock selections) and sell-side recommendations by analysts. Our analysis also suggests that brokerage firms compensating analysts based on forecast accuracy need to adjust for the differential in the information complexity of different industries.     

Segment Disclosure Transparency and Internal Capital Market Efficiency: Evidence from SFAS No. 131

Using the adoption of SFAS 131, I examine the effect of segment disclosure transparency on internal capital market efficiency. SFAS 131 requires firms to define segments as internally viewed by managers, thereby improving the transparency of managerial actions in internal capital allocation. I find that diversified firms that improved segment disclosure transparency by changing segment definitions upon adoption of SFAS 131 experienced an improvement in capital allocation efficiency in internal capital markets after the adoption of SFAS 131. In addition, I find that the improvement in internal capital market efficiency was greater for firms that suffered more severe agency problems before the adoption of SFAS 131 and also for firms whose managers faced stronger incentives to improve efficiency after the adoption of SFAS 131. My results suggest that more transparent segment information can help resolve agency conflicts in the internal capital markets of diversified firms, thus improving investment efficiency.     

The influence of disclosure policy on analyst behavior: The case of segment data

More transparent disclosure reduces the effort required to process reported information. The adoption of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 131, Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information, increased the transparency of segment information reported by diversified firms. Using a long sample window (1988–2007) and a difference-in-difference design, this paper examines the association between corporate diversification and analysts' efforts—as reflected in analysts' idiosyncratic information precision and analyst consensus—across the old SFAS No. 14 and the new SFAS No. 131 segment reporting regime. Results indicate that SFAS No. 131 has improved segment reporting such that analysts need to invest relatively less effort generating idiosyncratic information when issuing forecasts for diversified firms. Given that analysts' information gathering efforts are costly, these findings are of interest to policy makers when assessing whether the intended reporting objectives of SFAS No. 131 are being met in a cost effective manner.     

Risk-based forecasting and planning and management earnings forecasts

This study examines the association between a firm’s internal information environment and the accuracy of its externally disclosed management earnings forecasts. Internally, firms use forecasts to plan for uncertain futures. The risk management literature argues that integrating risk-related information into forecasts and plans can improve a firm’s ability to forecast financial outcomes. We investigate whether this internal information manifests itself in the accuracy of external earnings guidance. Using detailed survey data and publicly disclosed management earnings forecasts from a sample of publicly traded U.S. companies, we find that more sophisticated risk-based forecasting and planning processes are associated with smaller earnings forecast errors and narrower forecast widths. These associations hold across a variety of different planning horizons (ranging from annual budgeting to long-term strategic planning), providing empirical support for the theoretical link between internal information quality and the quality of external disclosures.     

The Value-Relevance of Derivative Disclosures by Commercial Banks: A Comprehensive Study of Information Content Under SFAS Nos. 119 and 133

This study examines the value-relevance of banks' derivative disclosures under Statements of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) Nos. 119 and 133. Using the complete time-series of SFAS No. 119 disaggregated notional value disclosures and the most recently available SFAS No. 133 fair value data, this study investigates whether such expanded disclosures provide incremental information content beyond earnings and book value. Our results indicate that banks' notional principal amount disclosures are value-relevant, and that this evidence of incremental information content is robust to the inclusion of recently available fair value data and alternative model specifications. JEL Classification: M41, G21     

Strategic revelation of differences in segment earnings growth

Prior studies have theoretically and empirically documented that incentives to disclose information involve a trade-off between the benefits to the corporation of reducing information asymmetry and the costs of revealing proprietary information. This study investigates the interplay of managers’ motives to conceal versus reveal cross-segment differences in earnings growth in multi-segment firms. We find that revealed segment earnings growth differences are negatively associated with proxies for proprietary costs and agency costs, and positively associated with firms’ reliance on external financing. We also find that SFAS No. 131 improved the quality of segment information by requiring or allowing revelation of greater cross-segment differences in earnings growth.     

The effect of tax-motivated income shifting on information asymmetry

We examine whether tax-motivated income shifting by U.S. multinational corporations affects information asymmetry. Using a new firm-year measure of income shifting and a two-stage least squares approach, we find income shifting is positively associated with four measures of information asymmetry. Cross-sectional tests reveal that this effect is more pronounced for firms with large differences between foreign and domestic earnings growth. Using SFAS 131 to improve identification and establish evidence consistent with a causal relation between income shifting and information asymmetry, we demonstrate that the adverse impact of income shifting on information asymmetry is concentrated in firms that discontinue geographic earnings disclosures. Overall, our study provides evidence that significant consequences of information asymmetry are associated with tax-motivated income shifting.     

Geographic area disclosures under SFAS 131: materiality and fineness

This paper describes and evaluates certain aspects of the enterprise-wide geographic area disclosures provided by Fortune 500 companies in the implementation of SFAS 131, “Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information.” The first objective of this study is to determine how companies are complying with the materiality criterion of SFAS 131 for determining when an individual country is reportable. The second objective is to evaluate whether foreign operation disclosures provided by companies in accordance with SFAS 131 result in a finer set of information than was provided under SFAS 14. The results suggest that there is considerable diversity among companies in the way that materiality is defined, with a majority of companies that provide country-level disclosures using quantitative thresholds less than 10%. For a large percentage of companies, the information provided under SFAS 131 appears to be finer than the information provided under SFAS 14. However, a significant minority of companies has taken a step backward in this regard.     

Post-Implementation Reviews for IASB and FASB Standards: A Comparison of the Process and Findings for the Operating Segments Standards

Abstract

The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting Foundation (FAF) have recently completed post-implementation reviews (PIRs) for their converged standards on operating segments IFRS 8 and SFAS 131. The two accounting bodies use PIRs as an additional standard assessment mechanism. This paper (1) provides an overview of the main differences and similarities between the two PIR processes and (2) compares the findings of the PIRs on the operating segment standards supplemented with insights from a survey of the segment information notes of a sample of STOXX Europe 600 companies. The IASB and the FAF set the specific PIR objectives and conduct the information gathering phase differently. For the IFRS 8 and SFAS 131 PIRs, these differences meant that the FAF focused more narrowly on how SFAS 131 performs compared to the previous standard, while the IASB is aimed to more broadly assess constituents' views on whether IFRS 8 works well in practice. Comparing the PIR findings for the operating segments standards is warranted given that the standards are converged and that the standard setters re-expressed their commitment to keep them substantially converged. Uniform PIR processes could have eased the cooperation in maintaining convergence. Given the different scope of the reviews, standard setters will need to find a common ground on how to proceed and which issues to address further.     

The effect of SFAS 131 on the stock market’s ability to predict industry‐wide and firm‐specific components of future earnings

This study examines the impact of SFAS 131 on the extent to which stock prices incorporate industry‐wide and firm‐specific components of future earnings. By decomposing earnings into industry‐wide and firm‐specific components, this paper finds that the firms that aggregated segments under the old rule experience significant acceleration in the incorporation of future earnings into current stock prices upon adoption of SFAS 131. However, the acceleration of future earnings is mostly driven by the improved incorporation of industry‐wide components of future earnings, which indicates the market’s ability to predict firm‐specific components is not significantly changed. Supplemental analysis suggests that the reduced geographic earnings information is one possible reason for lack of improvement in incorporating firm‐specific earnings into price.     

Competitive harm and geographic area disclosure under SFAS 131

Prior research documents considerable diversity in the amount of detail provided by companies in complying with the foreign country disclosure requirements of SFAS 131. We posit that the potential competitive harm associated with country specific disclosures provides an incentive for management to avoid making these disclosures. Specifically, we hypothesize that firms with higher potential competitive harm costs will provide less detailed geographic area disclosures. Our results show that, as expected, firms exposed to greater competitive harm costs provide less detailed country specific revenue disclosures. This study helps to explain the diversity in practice with respect to the level of detail provided by companies in their geographic area disclosures under SFAS 131. In addition, it adds to the literature examining the impact of potential competitive harm on disclosures made by U.S. firms, by extending the line of research to geographic area disclosures.     

The Information Content of Segment Disclosures: Australian Evidence

This paper investigates whether the voluntary decomposition of consolidated earnings disclosures into industry segments has information content in the sense that such disclosures better enable investors to predict earnings. The broad rationale underlying the experimental design is that if segment disclosure does enable investors to better predict earnings then residual abnormal returns (after controlling for unexpected earnings) surrounding the earnings announcements of firms providing segment disclosures should on average be significantly lower than a matched' group of firms that do not provide this type of disclosure. Using a short event window design, our results support this view.     

The Impact of AASB 8 Operating Segments on Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts: Australian Evidence

This paper evaluates the impact of firms’ adoption of AASB 8 segment disclosure rules on analysts’ earnings forecasts. It examines whether providing more disaggregated segment information following the adoption of AASB 8 is associated with an increase in analysts’ ability to forecast earnings. We find that analysts’ earnings forecasts have not improved significantly after adopting AASB 8 in Australia, regardless of whether firms disclosed more disaggregated segment information. Our use of control firms provides assurance that the results are due to AASB 8 and not to some other events concurrent with the adoption of AASB 8. Overall, our results imply that the benefits associated with the management approach as experienced by financial analysts in the United States have not been realised by financial analysts in Australia. This suggests that the successful adoption of an accounting standard in one country should not be the justification for recommending adoption in other countries. Further, our results raise questions about whether the enhanced disclosures required in the new standard are more for the other users of financial statements, such as investors, rather than analysts.     

Disclosure Practices, Enforcement of Accounting Standards, and Analysts' Forecast Accuracy: An International Study

Using a sample from 22 countries, I investigate the relations between the accuracy of analysts' earnings forecasts and the level of annual report disclosure, and between forecast accuracy and the degree of enforcement of accounting standards. I document that firm‐level disclosures are positively related to forecast accuracy, suggesting that such disclosures provide useful information to analysts. I construct a comprehensive measure of enforcement and find that strong enforcement is associated with higher forecast accuracy. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that enforcement encourages managers to follow prescribed accounting rules, which, in turn, reduces analysts' uncertainty about future earnings. I also find evidence consistent with disclosures being more important when analyst following is low and with enforcement being more important when more choice among accounting methods is allowed.