Interest rate smoothing and financial stability

Central banks smooth fluctuations in interest rates based on a belief that this policy promotes financial stability. This belief is based on a presumption that the direct effect of less interest rate volatility on a bank's likelihood of insolvency is the predominant effect of this policy. The main point of this paper is that these policies also give rise to indirect effects that lower financial stability. These indirect effects occur because the policy itself alters bank behavior. In effect, if the central bank provides (liquidity) insurance (at zero premia), it may introduce a classic moral hazard problem that encourages risk taking by banks. As a result, to maintain a given degree of financial stability, a bank regulator may, in fact, need to impose a higher prudential capital requirement when an interest rate smoothing policy is in place. The paper concludes that the link between interest rate smoothing policy and financial stability may be more complicated than is generally recognized.     

TARP announcement,bank health,and borrowers’ credit risk

Theory suggests that unhealthy banks exhibit more pronounced flight-to-quality behavior during financial crises and, hence, the infusion of capital through unhealthy banks is less effective in relieving the liquidity shocks of vulnerable borrowers. We test these predictions by investigating how the financial health of leading US banks influenced their borrowers’ credit risk surrounding the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Changes in borrower credit risk, measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads, should reflect the expected relief from liquidity shocks and other benefits of rescuing banks, such as maintaining the existing lending relationships. Consistent with the theory, prior to the TARP capital infusions, unhealthy banks’ borrowers with high leverage experienced a greater increase in their credit risk relative to similar healthy banks’ borrowers. Following the event, the CDS market anticipated less liquidity relief to these vulnerable unhealthy banks’ borrowers, but more liquidity relief to the vulnerable healthy banks’ borrowers.     

Bank credit risk and macro-prudential policies: Role of counter-cyclical capital buffer

This paper investigates the impact of macro-prudential policy (proxied by the counter-cyclical capital buffer (CCyB)) on bank credit risk during uncertain times, as banking sector stability is crucial in promoting financial intermediation. Using a unique daily data set consisting of 4939 credit default swaps (CDS) of 70 banks from 25 countries over the period 2010–2019, we find that CCyB tightening decreases bank-level CDS spreads, while CCyB loosening increases CDS spreads. This heterogeneous effect of CCyB arises due to its asymmetric effect on the capital ratio (i.e., the equity-to-total assets ratio) of banks. Tightening CCyB significantly increases capital, whereas loosening CCyB does not impact capital. Thus, the risks that emanate from the banking sector during periods of heightened uncertainty and financial distress can be significantly dampened when CCyB regulation is enabled. Consequently, macro-prudential policies for banks to hold higher levels of capital during good times are justified to contain financial market risks during downturns.     

Regime dependent determinants of credit default swap spreads

Credit default swap (CDS) spreads display pronounced regime specific behaviour. A Markov switching model of the determinants of changes in the iTraxx Europe indices demonstrates that they are extremely sensitive to stock volatility during periods of CDS market turbulence. But in ordinary market circumstances CDS spreads are more sensitive to stock returns than they are to stock volatility. Equity hedge ratios are three or four times larger during the turbulent period, which explains why previous research on single-regime models finds stock positions to be ineffective hedges for default swaps. Interest rate movements do not affect the financial sector iTraxx indices and they only have a significant effect on the other indices when the spreads are not excessively volatile. Raising interest rates may decrease the probability of credit spreads entering a volatile period.     

Emerging market corporate leverage and global financial conditions

This paper explores how global financial conditions influence corporate leverage growth in emerging markets (EMs). Using a sample of 800,000 listed and non-listed firms across 28 EMs, we find that accommodative global financial conditions—initially proxied with a measure of U.S. monetary policy—are associated with faster leverage growth. The impact is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, such as small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and for EMs whose domestic monetary policy is more aligned with that of the United States. The findings suggest that global financial conditions affect EM firms' leverage growth by influencing domestic interest rates and by relaxing corporate borrowing constraints. Finally, leverage increases disproportionately more for firms that are either relatively less profitable or less solvent when global financial conditions become looser.     

Market discipline and too-big-to-fail in the CDS market: Does banks' size reduce market discipline?

This paper examines market discipline in the credit default swap (CDS) market and the potential distortion of CDS spreads which arises when a bank is thought to be too-big-to-fail. Overall, we find evidence for market discipline in the CDS market. However, CDS prices are distorted by a size effect when a bank is considered to be too-big-to-fail. A 1 percentage point increase in size reduces the CDS spread of a bank by about 2 basis points. We further find that some banks have already reached a size that makes them too-big-to-be-rescued. While the price distortion for these banks decreases, the existence of banks that are considered to be too-big-to-rescue raises important new issues for banking supervisors.     

Monetary Policy,Bank Lending,and the Risk‐Pricing Channel

This paper identifies a monetary policy channel through the risk pricing of bank debt in the market for jumbo certificates of deposit (jumbo CDs). Adverse policy shocks increase debt holder perceptions of bank default, increasing the risk premia for some banks, thereby decreasing their external funding of loans. The results show that contractionary policy increases the sensitivity of jumbo‐CD spreads to leverage and asset risk for small banks, and to leverage for large banks. The results also show a distributional and aggregate effect on banking system jumbo CDs and total loans, producing a risk‐pricing (or market discipline) channel. This channel has implications for monetary and regulatory policies, and financial stability.     

Market discipline during crisis: Evidence from bank depositors in transition countries

The Central European banking industry is dominated by foreign-owned banks. During the recent crisis, for the first time since the transition, foreign parent companies were frequently in a worse financial condition than their subsidiaries. This situation created a unique opportunity to study new aspects of market discipline exercised by non-financial depositors. Using a comprehensive data set, we find that the recent crisis did not change the sensitivity of deposit growth rates to accounting risk measures. We establish that depositors’ actions were more strongly influenced by negative press rumors concerning parent companies than by fundamentals. The impact of rumors was especially perceptible when rumors turned out ex post to be founded. Additionally, we document that public aid announcements were primarily interpreted by depositors as confirmation of a parent company’s financial distress. Our results indicate that depositors react rationally to sources of information other than financial statements; this discovery has policy implications, as depositor discipline is usually the only viable and universal source of market discipline for banks in emerging economies.     

Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks

Following the 1997/1998 financial crisis, Indonesian banks experienced major regulatory changes, including the adoption of the blanket guarantee scheme (BGS) in 1998, a limited guarantee (LG) in 2005, and changes in capital regulation in 1998 and 2001. We examine the impact of these regulatory changes on market discipline during the period 1995-2009. The price of deposits is used to measure market discipline in a dynamic panel data methodology on a sample of 104 commercial banks. We find a weakening of market discipline following the introduction of the BGS. The result is consistent with the deposit insurance scheme being credible in the lower capital requirement environment. The adoption of LG in a recovering economy also mitigates the role of market discipline. However, market discipline is more pronounced in listed banks than unlisted banks and in foreign banks than domestic banks. These results have important implications for banking regulation and supervision, particularly during a crisis period.     

Disclosures of material weaknesses by Japanese firms after the passage of the 2006 Financial Instruments and Exchange Law

We investigate the disclosures of material weaknesses in internal control mandated for Japanese firms under the 2006 Financial Instruments and Exchange Law. We find that the presence of a material weakness is more likely for firms that are younger, have better growth prospects, have a volatile operating environment, are financially constrained, and have weak governance structures. We examine the role of Japan’s main banks in this process and find that the likelihood of a material weakness is higher for firms with stronger links with their main banks. We also show that the financial health of the main banks themselves—proxied for by the banks’ BIS ratios and bad loan ratios—increases the likelihood of a material weakness in affiliated firms. This paper provides novel insights into the determinants of material weaknesses of Japanese firms since the passage of the law. Results from this study contribute to the literature on material weaknesses and relationship banking.     

Bank Leverage and Monetary Policy's Risk‐Taking Channel: Evidence from the United States

We present evidence of a risk‐taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Business Lending. We find that ex ante risk‐taking by banks (measured by the risk rating of new loans) is negatively associated with increases in short‐term interest rates. This relationship is more pronounced in regions that are less in sync with the nationwide business cycle, and less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods of financial distress.     

Are foreign banks more profitable than domestic banks? Home- and host-country effects of banking market structure, governance, and supervision

Using both bank- and country-level data on banking sectors from 70 countries over the period 1992-2006, this paper empirically investigates the joint home- and host-country effects of banking market structure, macroeconomic condition, governance, and changes in bank supervision on foreign bank margins. We find that foreign banks are more profitable than domestic banks when they operate in a host country whose banking sector is less competitive and when the parent bank in the home country is highly profitable. Moreover, when foreign banks operate in a host country with lower growth rates of GDP, higher interest and inflation rates, and more stringent regulatory compliance with Basel risk weights, their margins increase. Specifically, changes in bank supervision of a parent bank’s ownership restrictiveness in the home country significantly increases foreign bank margins, while supervisory changes in regulatory compliance with Basel risk weights in the host country enhances foreign bank margins.     

A Micro Model of the Federal Funds Market

This paper demonstrates that valuable insights into the determination of Federal funds rates can be gained through modeling the micro-decisions of market participants. Fed fund demand functions are derived for different bank valuation functions and several implications are discussed. Specifically, it is: (i) possible to rationalize the observation that large banks are net purchasers and small banks net sellers of Fed funds; (ii) to explain the positive spread of Fed funds rates over other short-term money market rates; and (iii) to link the size of this spread to the Federal Reserve's underlying monetary policy strategy.     

Default Risk Estimation,Bank Credit Risk,and Corporate Governance

This study explores the relationship between credit risks of banks and the corporate governance structures of these banks from the perspective of creditors. The cumulative default probabilities are estimated for a sample of US commercial and savings banks to measure their risk taking behavior. The results show that one year and five year cumulative default probabilities are time‐varying, with a significant jump observed in the year prior to the financial crisis of 2008–09. Generally speaking, corporate governance structures have a greater impact on US commercial banks than on savings institutions. We provide evidence that, after controlling for firm specific characteristics, commercial banks with larger boards and older CFOs are associated with significantly lower credit risk levels. Lower ownership by institutional investors and more independent boards also have lower credit risk levels, although these effects are somewhat less significant. For all the banks in our sample, large board size, older CFO, and less busy directors are associated with lower credit risk levels. When we restrict the sample to consider the joint effects of the governance variables, the results on board size and busy directors are maintained.     

CEO Bonus Compensation and Bank Default Risk: Evidence from the U.S. and Europe

We investigate the link between the incentive mechanisms embedded in CEO cash bonuses and the riskiness of banks. For a sample of U.S. and European banks, we employ the Merton distance to default model to show that increases in CEO cash bonuses lower the default risk of a bank. However, we find no evidence of cash bonuses exerting a risk‐reducing effect when banks are financially distressed or when banks operate under weak bank regulatory regimes. Our results link bonus compensation in banking to financial stability and caution that attempts to regulate bonus pay need to tailor CEO incentives to the riskiness of banks and to regulatory regimes.     

Policy uncertainty and bank’s funding costs: The effects of the financial crisis,Covid-19 pandemic,and market discipline

This paper examines the impacts of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on bank funding costs using the 2001–2021 data of US banks. We document consistent evidence of a negative relationship between EPU and bank funding costs, implying lower bank funding costs during a time of high EPU, consistent with the hypothesis that economic agents tend to reallocate their assets into safer investments, such as bank deposits during high uncertainty. Large banks are likely to benefit most during high EPU when experiencing lower costs of funds compared with other banks, suggesting the “too-big-to-fail” perception of depositors. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that depositors require safer banks to pay lower rates, indicating the existence of market discipline. The cost-decreasing effects of policy uncertainty are less pronounced during the global financial crisis than the Covid-19 crisis.     

Access policy and money market segmentation

Deviations between interest rates paid in the Swiss franc unsecured money market and the respective Libor rate are analysed for a period spanning the financial crisis. First, banks that have access to sources of secured central bank and interbank funding pay less than other banks. Second, foreign banks (not chartered in Switzerland) pay more than domestic banks. Third, both lines of segmentation are economically relevant but limited due to open access to sources of secured funding. Thus, access policy matters for monetary policy implementation and financial stability.     

Does competition influence the bank lending channel in the euro area?

This paper examines how competition influences the bank lending channel in the euro area countries. Using a large panel of banks from 12 euro area countries for the period 2002–2010 we analyze the reaction of loan supply to monetary policy actions depending on the degree of bank competition. We find that the effect of monetary policy on bank lending is dependent on bank competition: the transmission of monetary policy via the bank lending channel is less pronounced for banks with extensive market power. Further investigation shows that banks with less market power were more sensitive to monetary policy only before the financial crisis. These results suggest that bank market power has a significant impact on the effectiveness of monetary policy. Therefore, wide variations in the level of bank market power may lead to asymmetric effects of the single monetary policy.     

Creditor control rights and firm investment policy

We present novel empirical evidence that conflicts of interest between creditors and their borrowers have a significant impact on firm investment policy. We examine a large sample of private credit agreements between banks and public firms and find that 32% of the agreements contain an explicit restriction on the firm's capital expenditures. Creditors are more likely to impose a capital expenditure restriction as a borrower's credit quality deteriorates, and the use of a restriction appears at least as sensitive to borrower credit quality as other contractual terms, such as interest rates, collateral requirements, or the use of financial covenants. We find that capital expenditure restrictions cause a reduction in firm investment and that firms obtaining contracts with a new restriction experience subsequent increases in their market value and operating performance.     

International house price cycles,monetary policy and credit

We evaluate three alternative predictors of house price corrections: anticipated tightenings of monetary policy, deviations of house prices from fundamentals, and rapid credit growth. A new cross-country measure of monetary policy expectations based on an international term structure model with time-varying risk premiums is constructed. House price overvaluation is estimated via an asset pricing model. The variables are incorporated into a panel logit regression model that estimates the likelihood of a large house price correction in 18 OECD countries. The results show that corrections are predicted by increases in the market’s forecast of higher policy rates. The estimated degree of house price overvaluation also contains significant information about subsequent price reversals. In contrast to the financial crisis literature, credit growth is less important. All of these variables help forecast recessions.