Protection or expropriation: Politically connected independent directors in China

This paper empirically investigates politically connected independent directors among Chinese listed firms using 7487 firm-year observations from the Shanghai stock exchange during the period of 2003–2012. We distinguish between privately controlled firms and state-controlled firms. We find that the value effect and incentives of appointing independent directors with political ties are shaped by a firm’s ownership structure. More exactly, Chinese listed privately controlled firms with a large fraction of politically connected independent directors tend to outperform their non-connected counterparts, due to the ease of access to external debt financing and more subsidies from the government. However, the appointment of politically connected independent directors also enlarges the magnitude of related-party transactions with the controlling party in listed privately controlled firms. In contrast, having politicians as independent directors does not help to add value to listed state-controlled firms, especially firms controlled by the local government, due to the expropriation of minority investors via more related-party transactions and more severe over-investment problems.     

Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China

This study investigates the effect of politically connected independent directors on a firm's likelihood of committing fraud in China. We classify the political backgrounds of independent directors into three categories based on their employment histories: local background, central background, and local and central background. Using corporate fraud data from 2000 to 2014, we find that independent directors with local political backgrounds significantly reduce the likelihood of a firm committing fraud. Further analysis shows that locally connected independent directors are more likely to have both employment experience in regulatory agencies and financial/accounting/law expertise.     

Do political connections affect stock price crash risk? Firm-level evidence from China

Using a sample of Chinese listed firms in the period from 2003 to 2012, this paper empirically investigates how the presence of politically connected directors affects stock price crash risk. We thereby make a distinction between listed state-controlled firms and privately controlled firms due to their different incentives to appoint politicians as directors on the board. Our empirical results show that politically connected directors exacerbate stock price crash risk in listed state-controlled firms, an effect driven by the appointment of local government officials as directors. In contrast, hiring politicians as directors, particularly central-government-affiliated directors, helps listed privately controlled firms to reduce stock price crash risk. Finally, good quality of institutions does not help to alleviate the positive relationship between political connections and stock price crash risk in listed state-controlled firms. However, it does weaken the role of political connections in reducing crash risk in listed privately controlled firms.     

What’s the value of politically connected directors?

This study examines the stock price response to Document 18, a regulation released in China in 2013 requiring independent directors with political connections to resign from the boards of directors for publicly listed firms. We document a significant positive price response in the window surrounding the directive’s promulgation date. This response is also of important economic magnitude. Our findings suggest that on average, the market views the costs of hiring politically connected directors as outweighing the associated benefits. Consistent with this view, we document that politically connected directors often shirk their board duties, as evidenced by their poor rates of attendance at board meetings. Further investigations show that the value decreasing effect of politically connected directors is apparent mainly for firms in regulated industries and varies with earnings management practices. However, the market views politically connected directors favorably if firms have significant business transactions with the government.     

The politics of government investment

This paper investigates the relation between corporate political connections and government investment. We study various forms of political influence, ranging from passive connections between firms and politicians, such as those based on politicians’ voting districts, to active forms, such as lobbying, campaign contributions, and employment of connected directors. Using hand-collected data on firm applications for capital under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), we find that politically connected firms are more likely to be funded, controlling for other characteristics. Yet investments in politically connected firms underperform those in unconnected firms. Overall, we show that connections between firms and regulators are associated with distortions in investment efficiency.     

Politically connected boards,family and business group affiliations,and cost of capital: Evidence from Indonesia

We investigate the effect of politically connected boards (both supervisory boards [SBs] and boards of directors [BODs]) on cost of debt and equity capital of listed companies in Indonesia which has established a two-tier corporate governance system. The results, based on 250 firms, suggest that companies with politically connected SBs experience lower cost of debt and equity capital, whereas politically connected BODs have no association with cost of either debt or equity. Furthermore, we find that family firms and firms belonging to business groups with politically connected SBs enjoy lower cost of debt and equity capital. Our main results are robust to alternative measures and to tests for endogeneity.     

Politically connected CEOs,corporate governance,and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms

Almost 27% of the CEOs in a sample of 790 newly partially privatized firms in China are former or current government bureaucrats. Firms with politically connected CEOs underperform those without politically connected CEOs by almost 18% based on three-year post-IPO stock returns and have poorer three-year post-IPO earnings growth, sales growth, and change in returns on sales. The negative effect of the CEO's political ties also show up in the first-day stock return. Finally, firms led by politically connected CEOs are more likely to appoint other bureaucrats to the board of directors rather than directors with relevant professional backgrounds.     

Do Political Connections Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from a Developing Country

We investigate how politicians serving on the boards of directors influence firm performance. The results show a negative relationship between political connections and firm performance. Specifically, politically connected firms underperform nonconnected firms directors by almost 17 percent and 15 percent based on return on assets and return on equity, respectively. By stratifying the sample duration into two periods based on the political environment, we find that this effect is more pronounced in autocratic as opposed to democratic regimes. Finally, our results also suggest that the performance of connected firms with more growth opportunities is not affected by political connections.     

Political connections and the cost of equity capital

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected peers. We find further that political connections are more valuable for firms with stronger ties to political power. In additional analyses, we find that the effect of political connection on firms' equity financing costs is influenced by the prevailing country-level institutional and political environment, and by firm characteristics. Taken together, our findings provide strong evidence that investors require a lower cost of capital for politically connected firms, which suggests that politically connected firms are generally considered less risky than non-connected firms.     

Political connections,environmental violations and punishment: Evidence from heavily polluting firms

Using hand-collected data on violations of environmental regulations by heavily polluting firms in China, we examine the relationship between political connections and the probability of punishment for breach of such regulations. To this end, we exploit a regulatory reform, the enactment of Rule 18, a key component of China's anti-corruption campaign, which required politically connected independent directors to resign from their positions. Using difference-in-differences specifications, we find that firms from which politically connected directors resigned due to Rule 18 experience a significant increase in both the likelihood of ever being punished for environment-related violations and the frequency of punishment. The effect of Rule 18 is more pronounced among firms located in regions with less efficient judicial systems and higher levels of corruption, as well as firms that are not state-owned. Our evidence indicates that in the absence of effective regulation, political connections can be costly to the environment as they strongly affect the enforcement of environmental regulations.     

Earnings credibility in politically connected family firms

We investigate whether politically connected family firms provide the market with more or less credible earnings compared with unconnected family firms. Our results evidence that politically connected family firms show higher earnings informativeness than unconnected family firms. Our findings are consistent with the market perceiving that, in the presence of political ties, family firms are more likely to reduce information asymmetries by signalling their superior earnings quality.     

Politically connected boards,value or cost: evidence from a natural experiment in China

This study investigates the net effect of a politically connected board for a firm. Using a natural experiment in China – a regulatory change to forbid bureaucrats from sitting on the board of public firms – we address the causality of the net effect of a politically connected board by testing the market reaction of the shares of firm targeted by the regulatory change to the policy announcement. The stocks of firms with politically connected directors who are targeted by the regulatory change show on average a significantly positive abnormal return, which suggests that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect. The result is robust to various model settings and to a matched sample using the propensity score methodology. Additionally, the announcement effect of the resignation of a politically connected director is significantly positive, and significantly higher than that of a non‐connected director. Overall, our results suggest that the agency cost effect of a politically connected director dominates the value effect.     

Does economic policy uncertainty drive the initiation of corporate lobbying?

Economic policy uncertainty (EPU) raises firms' incentives to lobby policymakers to access policy information and influence policy outcomes. Surprisingly, we find that non-lobbying firms are less likely to initiate lobbying during periods of heightened EPU. The evidence is consistent with our time-varying barriers hypothesis that entry barriers to lobbying increase with EPU. We verify that the negative effect of EPU on lobbying initiation arises through the channels of lobbying entry expenses and returns to experience. Furthermore, lobbying entry expenses are not large, implying that the returns to experience channel is likely a more serious barrier preventing non-lobbying firms from initiating lobbying. We also find that facing high lobbying entry barriers, non-lobbying firms go for alternative political activities, such as hiring politically connected directors.     

Learning from failures: Director interlocks and corporate misconduct

Motivated by social learning and social network theories, we argue that firms learn from failures in their director interlocked firms. Empirical results show that enforcement for violations in errant firms inhibit misconduct commitments in focal firms (i.e., firms interlocked with errant firms). We investigate the role of interlocking directors in facilitating the inhibition of misconduct. Empirical results evidence that information transmission by interlocking directors plays a crucial role in the process of inhibitive learning. Besides information transmission, we also find that interlocking directors react with higher diligence in focal firms. Further, overall diligence of independent directors in focal firms is heightened. Additionally, we test several factors that influence the significance of this inhibition, including characteristics of interlocking directors, firm features, and industry characters. Finally, the enforcement can deter more than one form of misconduct in focal firms. Overall, we thoroughly investigate the reactions of focal firms and their directors. Our study focuses on inhibitive learning, which has received limited attention in corporate finance literature.     

Auditors' Response to Political Connections and Cronyism in Malaysia

This paper extends the literature on the role of political economy in financial reporting and auditing by testing two hypotheses. The first hypothesis predicts that there will be a greater increase in audit effort and audit fees for Malaysian firms with political connections, as a result of the Asian financial crisis, than for non‐politically connected firms because these firms have a higher risk of financial misstatements. The second hypothesis predicts that the audit fees of politically connected firms will decline when capital controls are introduced by the government as a ploy to financially assist politically connected firms to rebound from the crisis, and thus reduces the risk of financial misstatements. The results show that there is a greater increase in audit fees for firms with political connections than for non‐politically connected firms as a result of the Asian financial crisis. However, there is a decline in audit fees for politically connected firms after the capital controls are implemented.     

Bank Loan Supply in the Financial Crisis: Evidence from the Role of Political Connection

We investigate the changes in bank loan supply during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, with particular focus on the influence of political connections. We demonstrate that although political connections can help firms obtain lower loan rates during the precrisis period, such benefits disappear in the postcrisis period. Moreover, the loan acceptance ratio for politically connected firms is enhanced in the postcrisis period, especially for the politically connected firms with high risks. Evidence reveals that the focus of the benefits for politically connected firms is more likely to shift from the loan rate to the loan acceptance ratio during the postcrisis period.     

Relationship-based debt financing of Chinese private sector firms: The role of social connections to banks versus political connections

We study whether a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it obtain loans. In China, Regulation No. 18 (announced in 2013) prohibits all high-level government officials from being independent directors of firms. As a result, many firms lost their political connections. We find that after firms lose their politically connected independent directors, firms having no social connections to banks experience, on average, a 12% decrease in the bank loan ratio relative to the median ratio; but those whose board chairs or CEOs are socially connected to local bank branch heads experience a 22% increase in the loan ratio relative to the median. However, this positive effect is short lived and thus not a new equilibrium. Overall, our findings support the hypothesis that a firm's social connections to banks can augment its political connections to help it get bank financing.     

Cash holdings of politically connected firms

Politically connected firms benefit from soft-budget constraints and are unlikely to suffer from liquidity constraints. This argument suggests that politically connected firms should hold less cash than non-connected peers. Another view posits that these firms exhibit acute corporate governance problems. In this setting, politically connected firms are more likely to hold more cash than non-connected firms. Using a sample of 50,119 firm-year observations from 31 countries, we find that politically connected firms hold more cash than their non-connected peers. We put forth two explanations for this result. Firstly, politicians use politically connected firms as “cash cows” to advance their political agendas. Secondly, political connections are conducive to agency problems. In additional analyses, we find that the positive relationship between political connections and cash holdings is stronger when corporate governance is weak.     

Political Connections and the Efficiency of Capital Allocation Through Bond Financing in Chinese Listed Companies

Using a database of firms issuing short-term financing bonds and mid-term notes in China from 2007 to 2011, we uncover whether and how political connections influence the companies' capital allocation efficiency. The authors show that politically connected firms have significantly lower capital allocation efficiency, especially in the case of overinvestment subsamples. In addition, different types of political connections have different effects on firms' inefficient investments. Compared with firms connected to members of the people's congresses and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (MPCP firms), firms connected to government officials (GOF) overinvest more and underinvest less. One year after bond financing, GOF politically connected firms decreased overinvestment, while underinvestment undergoes an upward trend in the MPCP firms.     

Political connections and privatization: Evidence from China

We examine how the political connections of acquirers influence the process and outcomes of privatization in China. We find that politically connected acquirers receive preferential treatment and acquire higher quality firms during full privatization, and document evidence of post-privatization tunneling from target firms to acquirers. We show that the excessive tunneling by politically connected acquirers is associated with lower performance after privatization. Overall, our results suggest that individuals are likely to abuse their political connections to exploit the opportunities arising from privatization. We recommend that policymakers constrain the influence of political connections in the privatization process.