The Delisting Bias in CRSP Data

I document a delisting bias in the stock return data base maintained by the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). I find that delists for bankruptcy and other negative reasons are generally surprises and that correct delisting returns are not available for most of the stocks that have been delisted for negative reasons since 1962. Using over-the-counter price data, I show that the omitted delisting returns are large. Implications of the bias are discussed.     

The survivorship bias, share price effect, and small firm effect in Canadian markets

After controlling for survivorship bias, we examine the relation between average returns, firm size, and price levels for Canadian stocks during the 1975-1994 period. Our findings indicate that there is a significant inverse share price level effect in Canadian markets. When we compare the results of the overall sample with the groups of surviving firms and delisted stocks, the latter group shows strong performance for large-size, high-priced stocks. Evidence that supports an independent size effect is less clear for Canadian stocks. A small size effect exists only among the higher share price denominations, which suggests a confounded size-price effect. Although the delisted group returns are statistically different from those of the survivor and the overall groups, which implies some evidence of survivorship bias, the difference between the survivor group and the overall group is weak at best.     

Option Delisting of Stocks That Continue Trading: An Examination of Welfare Effects

This paper addresses the resulting effects from the delisting of options on underlying stocks that continue to trade. The evidence generally supports the argument that options in this sample are delisted as a result of financial difficulty and/or a lack of interest. An insignificant average abnormal return and a small significantly negative average standardized abnormal return are observed around the delisting date, but the average price effect is determined to be considerably less than the normal discrete trading intervals at which stocks trade on exchanges. There are no effects found on volatility measures directly attributable to option delisting.     

Cross-listing and subsequent delisting in foreign markets

Employing a sample of stocks cross-listed and subsequently delisted from foreign markets, we examine the consequences of delisting to investors in terms of price, risk, and liquidity. We also provide a direct comparison between the firm's performance after a foreign cross-listing and after its subsequent delisting. We find a positive cross-listing and negative delisting effect on stock price, both of which dissipate in the long run. No significant changes in the market risk are found for either event. Foreign cross-listing and delisting are associated with increasing and decreasing long term trading volume respectively. Further analysis reveals that firms delist in response to low host market return and low firm trading volume in the host market. The changes in liquidity and market risk from delisting relate those from cross-listing. Finally, our results show that the bonding hypothesis fails to explain the listing premium and the delisting loss.     

An Investigation of the Informational Role of Short Interest in the Nasdaq Market

This paper examines the relationship between the level of short interest and stock returns in the Nasdaq market from June 1988 through December 1994. We find that heavily shorted firms experience significant negative abnormal returns ranging from −0.76 to −1.13 percent per month after controlling for the market, size, book–to–market, and momentum factors. These negative returns increase with the level of short interest, indicating that a higher level of short interest is a stronger bearish signal. We find that heavily shorted firms are more likely to be delisted compared to their size, book–to–market, and momentum matched control firms.     

Filter Tests In Nasdaq Stocks

This study examines the performance of filter and dual moving-average crossover trading rules applied to Nasdaq stocks. We find that trading rules conditioned on a stock's past price history perform poorly, but those based on past movements in the overall Nasdaq Index tend to earn statistically significant abnormal returns. Since there is a high level of transaction costs in this market, these abnormal returns are generally not economically significant. However, there are indications that pursuing some of these strategies can be worthwhile in carefully selected subsets of stocks.     

How common are common return factors across the NYSE and Nasdaq?

We entertain the possibility of pervasive factors that are not common across two (or more) groups of securities. We propose and implement a general procedure to estimate the space spanned by common and group-specific pervasive factors. In our empirical analysis, we study the factor structure of excess returns on stocks traded on the NYSE and Nasdaq using our methodology. We find that there are only two common pervasive factors that govern the returns for both NYSE and Nasdaq. At the same time, the NYSE and Nasdaq each have one more group-specific factor that is not the same across the two exchanges. Our results point to the absence of complete similarity between the factors driving the returns on these exchanges.     

Trading Costs and Exchange Delisting: The Case of Firms that Voluntarily Move from the American Stock Exchange to the Nasdaq

We examine 47 stocks that voluntarily left the American Stock Exchange from 1992 through 1995 and listed on the Nasdaq. We find that both effective and quoted spreads increase by about 100 percent after listing on the Nasdaq. These spread changes are consistent across stocks. In contrast, excess returns are positive when firms announce a switch from The American Stock Exchange to the Nasdaq. We are unable to explain this apparent contradiction.     

Should earnings thresholds be used as delisting criteria in stock market?

In Chinese stock market, firms reporting two consecutive annual losses are subject to special treatment (ST), with further losses causing the firms’ stocks to be suspended from trading or to be delisted. We argue that these earnings-based delisting requirements are misconstrued. Such policies drive financially healthy firms out of stock market, and induce listed firms to engage in rampant earnings manipulation in order to avoid delisting. The results carry important public policy implications for securities market regulation.     

The information content of stock split announcements: Do options matter?

We provide a new test of the informational efficiency of trading in stock options in the context of stock split announcements. These announcements tend to be associated with positive abnormal returns. Our traditional event study results show abnormal returns that are significantly lower for optioned than non-optioned stocks, whether traded on the NYSE, Amex, or Nasdaq. After controlling for market returns, capitalization, book-to-market ratio, and trading volume, we find that the abnormal returns are significantly lower for NYSE/Amex optioned than non-optioned stocks. Although the results for Nasdaq stocks are not as clear, the overall effects tend to be lower after optioning. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the prices of optioned stocks embody more information, diminishing the impact of the stock split announcement. They provide new evidence of the beneficial effects of options on their underlying stocks.     

Does Idiosyncratic Risk Really Matter?

Goyal and Santa‐Clara (2003) find a significantly positive relation between the equal‐weighted average stock volatility and the value‐weighted portfolio returns on the NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq stocks for the period of 1963:08 to 1999:12. We show that this result is driven by small stocks traded on the Nasdaq, and is in part due to a liquidity premium. In addition, their result does not hold for the extended sample of 1963:08 to 2001:12 and for the NYSE/AMEX and NYSE stocks. More importantly, we find no evidence of a significant link between the value‐weighted portfolio returns and the median and value‐weighted average stock volatility.     

Short Selling and the Weekend Effect in Nasdaq Stock Returns

We examine daily short selling of Nasdaq stocks to explore whether speculative short selling causes a significant portion of the weekend effect in returns. We identify a weekend effect in speculative short selling whereby it constitutes a larger percentage of trading volume on Mondays versus Fridays. We find an opposite effect in dealer short selling, consistent with market makers adding liquidity and stability. Our main finding is that speculative short selling does not explain an economically meaningful portion of the weekend effect in returns, even among the firms most that are most actively shorted. This finding contradicts some prior studies.     

Local sports sentiment and returns of locally headquartered stocks: A firm-level analysis

We undertake a firm-level analysis of the relation between National Football League (NFL) game outcomes and the return patterns of Nasdaq firms headquartered geographically near the NFL teams. We find that a team's loss leads to lower next-day returns for locally headquartered stocks and that this impact increases for a surprising loss or a critical game loss. The negative effects of game losses are stronger for stocks that are more vulnerable to shifts in sports sentiment. Our results suggest that the game outcomes of local sports teams influence investor sentiment, which significantly affects the returns of localized trading stocks.     

What if Trading Location Is Different from Business Location? Evidence from the Jardine Group

We examine the price behavior and market activity of the Jardine Group companies after they were delisted from Hong Kong in 1994. Although the trading activity of the Jardine Group moved to Singapore, the core businesses remained in Hong Kong and Mainland China. Evidence indicates the Jardine stocks are correlated less (more) with the Hong Kong (Singapore) market after the delisting. This result cannot be explained by various hypotheses, such as relocation of core business, time‐varying betas, migration of trading activity, and currency and tax distortions. We conclude that price fluctuations are affected by country‐specific investor sentiment.     

Liquidity risk,leverage and long-run IPO returns

We examine the risk-return characteristics of a rolling portfolio investment strategy where more than 6000 Nasdaq initial public offering (IPO) stocks are bought and held for up to 5 years. The average long-run portfolio return is low, but IPO stocks appear as “longshots”, as 5-year buy-and-hold returns of 1000% or more are somewhat more frequent than for non-issuing Nasdaq firms matched on size and book-to-market ratio. The typical IPO firm is of average Nasdaq market capitalization but has relatively low book-to-market ratio. We also show that IPO firms exhibit relatively high stock turnover and low leverage, which may lower systematic risk exposures. To examine this possibility, we launch an easily constructed “low-minus-high” (LMH) stock turnover portfolio as a liquidity risk factor. The LMH factor produces significant betas for broad-based stock portfolios, as well as for our IPO portfolio and a comparison portfolio of seasoned equity offerings. The factor-model estimation also includes standard characteristic-based risk factors, and we explore mimicking portfolios for leverage-related macroeconomic risks. Because they track macroeconomic aggregates, these mimicking portfolios are relatively immune to market sentiment effects. Overall, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the realized return on the IPO portfolio is commensurable with the portfolio's risk exposures, as defined here.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

Biases in computed returns: An application to the size effect

Previous estimates of a ‘size effect’ based on daily returns data are biased. The use of quoted closing prices in computing returns on individual stocks imparts an upward bias. Returns computed for buy-and-hold portfolios largely avoid the bias induced by closing prices. Based on such buy-and-hold returns, the full-year size effect is half as large as previously reported, and all of the full-year effect is, on average, due to the month of January.     

Nasdaq Trading and Trading Costs: 1993–2002

Nasdaq spreads decline from 1993 to 2002, largely independently of tick‐size reductions. Trade size declines, consistent with greater retail investor activity. Using the method of Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2001), we find that concurrent market returns strongly affect liquidity and trading activity. Liquidity exhibits distinct day‐of‐the‐week patterns. There is little evidence that macroeconomic announcements or changes in key interest rates affect Nasdaq stocks overall; but in the bear market, we find a relation between some of these variables and effective spreads, which we interpret as consistent with Nasdaq participants' paying greater attention to fundamentals after the market crash.     

On the Stability of the Cross‐Section of Expected Stock Returns in the Cross‐Section: Understanding the Curious Role of Share Turnover

In this paper, we shed further light on cross‐sectional predictors of stock return performance. Specifically, we explore whether the cross‐section of expected stock returns is robust within stock groups sorted by past monthly return. We find that the book/market and momentum effects are remarkably robust to sorting on past returns. However, share turnover is negatively related to future returns for stocks with abnormally low stock price performance in the recent past, but postively related to returns for well‐performing stocks. This casts doubt on the use of turnover as a liquidity proxy, but is consistent with turnover being a proxy for momentum trading which pushes prices in the direction of past price movements. Our results are robust to both NYSE/AMEX and Nasdaq stocks, and also robust to stratifying the sample by time period.     

Factors Associated with Differences in the Magnitude of Abnormal Returns Around NYSE Versus Nasdaq Firms' Earnings Announcements

This study provides an explanation for the 'exchange effect' puzzle documented in prior accounting research. Grant (1980) finds that the magnitude of earnings announcement week abnormal returns is higher, on average, for firms traded over-the-counter than for NYSE firms. Atiase (1987) shows that this incremental 'exchange effect' persists even after controlling for firm size. We investigate potential explanations for this incremental exchange effect. We first show that even after controlling for differences in firm size, Nasdaq firms have less rich information environments and enjoy greater growth opportunities than NYSE firms. We then investigate whether differential predisclosure information environments and/or growth opportunities can explain the incremental exchange effect. The results indicate that although the absolute magnitude of the earnings announcement-related abnormal returns is inversely related to proxies for the amount of predisclosure information, the incremental exchange effect cannot be explained by differences in the predisclosure information environment. In contrast, after controlling for differences in growth opportunities across NYSE versus Nasdaq firms, and investors' heightened sensitivity to Nasdaq firms' growth opportunities in particular, there is no significant incremental exchange effect (whether or not we control for predisclosure information). These results suggest that the incremental exchange effect puzzle documented in prior research is more likely to reflect growth-related phenomena than differences in the predisclosure information environment.