盈余管理与短期资产减值准备关系的实证研究

本文选取2009年—2012年我国A股的工业上市公司的数据,对上市公司盈余管理的动机与短期资产减值准备的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现:微利公司、配股达线公司倾向于少计提短期资产减值准备以避免亏损,亏损公司倾向于多计提减值准备进行盈余大冲洗,高盈利公司则利用资产减值准备进行利润平滑,而对于当年扭亏的上市公司则不存在利用短期资产减值准备进行扭亏的动机。     

盈余管理与短期资产减值准备关系的实证研究

本文选取2009年—2012年我国A股的工业上市公司的数据,对上市公司盈余管理的动机与短期资产减值准备的关系进行了实证研究。研究发现:微利公司、配股达线公司倾向于少计提短期资产减值准备以避免亏损,亏损公司倾向于多计提减值准备进行盈余大冲洗,高盈利公司则利用资产减值准备进行利润平滑,而对于当年扭亏的上市公司则不存在利用短期资产减值准备进行扭亏的动机。     

阈值处的盈余分布断层:盈余管理解释的实证检验

本文利用中国沪深两市2008-2010年A股上市公司财务数据,检验了阈值处的盈余分布断层是否由盈余管理引起。检验结果表明,避免报告亏损和避免盈余下降动机诱发了阈值两侧样本公司盈余的异常变动,这些异常变动包括:第四季度初的微损公司和微利公司中有异常高比例的公司报告年度微利;第四季度初的盈余微增长公司和盈余微下降公司中有异常高比例的公司报告年度微增长。正是这些公司的盈余的异常变动导致了阈值处的盈余分布断层。本文的研究不仅为盈余分布断层的盈余管理解释提供了充分证据支持,也为投资者和监管机构及时发现公司的盈余管理行为提供了参考依据。     

公开增发公司分类转移与核心盈余异象研究

本文研究中国上市公司增发前分类转移与由此产生的核心盈余异象。研究发现,针对增发公司业绩门槛法规变化,公司公开增发前分类转移增强,可操控应计盈余管理减弱,核心盈余持续性下降,核心盈余异象增强。研究表明,公开增发业绩门槛变化使公司偏好以分类转移方式虚增核心盈余,从而改变核心盈余结构,引起核心盈余持续性下降,进一步造成投资者高估公司未来价值,导致核心盈余异象。本文不仅发展了盈余管理与盈余异象研究,还充实了不同盈余管理方式成本收益权衡的研究。同时,本文丰富了分类转移动机研究,且本文结论有助于投资者对增发公司正确估值。     

关联交易、线下项目与盈余管理——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

近年来,关联交易盈余管理愈演愈烈,极大地损害了投资者的利益。以往大量研究提供了上市公司操纵应计项目及线下项目进行盈余管理的证据,本文则以中国上市公司2002--2004年的面板数据为研究样本,首次大样本检验关联交易、线下项目与盈余管理的关系。本文的主要结论包括：（1）有配股盈余管理动机的公司的第一类关联交易（通常计入线上项目的关联交易）比例显著高于控制样本,第三类关联交易（担保抵押类关联交易）比例显著低于控制样本。（2）有避亏盈余管理动机的公司的第二类关联交易（通常计入线下项目的关联交易）比例显著高于控制样本。（3）有盈余管理动机的公司,当其附属企业集团时,或者其控股股东处于绝对控股地位时,其关联交易比例更高。（4）第一类关联交易与线下项目显著负相关,有盈余管理动机的公司,线下项目较低时第一类关联交易比例较高。（5）配股公司配股后的关联销售和关联采购比例显著低于配股前。扭亏为盈的公司扭亏当年的第二类关联交易比例显著高于扭亏前一年。综上所述,计入线上项目的关联交易是上市公司为获取配股资格而进盈余管理的重要手段,计入线下项目的关联交易是上市公司为避免亏损而进行盈余管理的重要手段;上市公司控股股东处于绝对控股地位时,或控股股东隶属某一企业集团时,关联交易盈余管理行为更严重;进行盈余管理时,线下项目与计入线上项目的关联交易具有替代性。     

避免亏损的盈余管理程度:上市公司与非上市公司的比较

本文以非上市公司盈余管理程度作为基准,运用参数估计的方法,对股票市场是否提高了公司盈余管理程度的问题进行研究。研究结论显示,1998年至2004年我国上市公司与非上市公司每年都存在避免亏损的盈余管理;在上市公司中,盈余管理公司比例为15.87%,它们提高ROA数据0.0122;在非上市公司中,盈余管理公司比例则只有5.49%,它们提高ROA数据0.0009。上市公司盈余管理频率大约为非上市公司的3倍,平均盈余管理幅度大约为非上市公司的13倍;两类公司盈余管理程度差异随着时间的推移而不断增大,因为非上市公司盈余管理程度在年度上的分布比较稳定,而上市公司盈余管理程度则随着时间的推移而不断增大。研究结论表明,股票市场提高了公司的盈余管理程度。     

中国上市公司会计差错的动因分析

本文以 1999- 2 0 0 1年的年度财务报表中出现“会计差错更正”的A股上市公司为样本 ,研究了高报盈余的会计差错的动因。研究表明 ,高报盈余的会计差错有着明显的盈余管理的动机 ,当期利润低于上期 ,有较高的资产负债率 ,线下项目产生的收益高以及规模小和亏损的公司更容易产生高报盈余的错误。本文的研究发展了盈余管理研究的内容 ,为监管部门加强监管、防范上市公司操纵盈余、提高会计信息质量提供了经验证据     

影响上市公司业绩的内部因素分析

本文以1998-2000年264家亏损公司及配比公司为样本,研究了影响上市公司业绩的内部因素。单变量和多变量检验的结果都支持我们提出的公司品质假说、盈余管理假说、大股东侵害假说和过度投资假说。研究表明,亏损公司IPO前的质量就劣于配比样本,它们在IPO过程中的盈余管理幅度更大;IPO之后,大股东通过占用上市公司资金和要求上市公司担保来直接或间接地损害上市公司利益;此外,亏损公司还投资于更多行业,也对其业绩产生负面影响。     

盈余管理与所得税支付：基于会计利润与应税所得之间差异的研究

公司在进行盈余管理时,往往面临着财务报告成本与税务成本的权衡。为了摆脱该困境,公司有动机通过操纵非应税项目损益,以规避盈余管理的所得税成本。本文通过考察会计利润与应税所得差异(Book-Tax Differences)和盈余管理之间的关系,证实了该假设。我们的研究表明,上市公司盈余管理幅度越大,则会计利润与应税所得差异(本文定义为非应税项目损益)也越高,即上市公司通过操纵非应税项目损益,以规避盈余管理的税负成本。我们的研究进一步发现,上市公司通过非应税项目损益规避盈余管理税负成本的行为主要发生在高税率组别,而享受所得税优惠的公司则没有呈现出该特征。另外,我们的研究还发现,上市公司主要通过操纵长期应计项目规避所得税负。但我们的研究也表明,上市公司通过非应税项目损益规避的盈余管理税负成本较为有限,平均每1元操纵利润中,只有1．8分的操纵利润可以规避所得税成本,这或许表明进行盈余管理的公司为了避免引起资本市场或税务当局的怀疑,而为其大部分利润操纵支付了所得税成本。此外,本文研究还发现,高税率公司存在强烈的通过非应税掼益项目规避所得税的动机。我们的样本公司中,平均而言,所得税税率每增加1个百分点,操纵非应税项目损益占资产的比例将增加0．029％;适用33％税率的公司与适用15％优惠税率的公司相比,为此所规避的所得税成本平均高达330万元。     

定向增发与股利分配动机异化:基于“高送转”现象的证据

现金分红是上市公司回报股东的根本途径,然而基于数字游戏的"高送转"乱象却长期充斥我国资本市场。本文以定向增发作为研究A股"高送转"现象的切入点,结果发现:上市公司在定向增发的新股解禁期附近推出"高送转"的频率显著提高,这一举动主要是为了迎合参与定向增发的外部投资者,帮助外部投资者进行股票减持,是一种动机异化的机会主义股利分配行为;通过定向增发融资的上市公司如果在定向增发后进行了"高送转",这些公司相比于未进行"高送转"的上市公司业绩更差、关联交易更频繁、大股东占款更高、盈余管理更激进、投资效率更低,这些发现意味着"高送转"现象的存在削弱了外部投资者发挥积极参与、积极治理功能的良性机制。本文为监管机构近期加强对"高送转"乱象的监管力度提供了经验证据,也支持了新修订的《证券法》中拟明确现金分红的决定。     

Consequences of earnings management triggered by delisting regulation: Evidence in China

This paper investigates the consequences of earnings management triggered by earnings-based delisting regulations in China. Our main finding is that there is a positive relationship between earnings management to avoid delisting by firms subject to delisting regulations and the subsequent performance, measured by operating performance and recurrence of losses. The results are robust to the various performance measures, including gross margin, assets turnover, and probability of bankruptcy, indicating that performance improvement is supported by fundamentals. Although previous literature documents that firms subject to delisting opportunistically manage their earnings to circumvent regulations, the implementation of earnings management in the context of delisting regulations is in the best interest of shareholders. We confirm this argument by showing positive market consequences of earnings management induced by delisting regulations.     

Government assisted earnings management in China

As the socialist system in China embraces the market economy, it has created many conflicts of interests and collusion between firms and different layers of governments. The central government in China sets regulations to ensure the quality of firms listed in the capital market, while local governments engage in inter-jurisdictional competition for more capital, and their interests are aligned with listed firms through the stringent IPO quota system. This paper examines how local governments in China help listed firms in earnings management to circumvent the central government’s regulation. We find that local governments provide subsidies to help firms boost their earnings above the regulatory threshold of rights offering and delisting. Moreover, this collusion between government and listed firms in earnings management exists mainly in firms controlled by local governments.     

Should earnings thresholds be used as delisting criteria in stock market?

In Chinese stock market, firms reporting two consecutive annual losses are subject to special treatment (ST), with further losses causing the firms’ stocks to be suspended from trading or to be delisted. We argue that these earnings-based delisting requirements are misconstrued. Such policies drive financially healthy firms out of stock market, and induce listed firms to engage in rampant earnings manipulation in order to avoid delisting. The results carry important public policy implications for securities market regulation.     

中国亏损上市公司第四季度盈余管理的实证研究

本文对中国A股上市公司是否在第四季度进行盈余管理以避免当年亏损或下一年亏损进行了实证研究,发现上市公司的确会在第四季度进行盈余管理来实现当年扭亏为盈或者调低利润,为下一年扭亏做好准备。因此审计师与投资者对上市公司第四季度的财务数据应该高度关注,并提高对会计信息质量的鉴别能力。     

Quality of reported earnings by Chinese firms: The influence of ownership structure

This paper examines the influence of ownership structure on earnings quality of firms listed on the Chinese Stock Exchanges. We empirically test four contemporary earnings quality measures, including volatility of earnings, variability of earnings over cash flows, correlations between accruals and cash flows, and level of discretionary accruals, for 1438 firms listed on Shenzhen Stock Exchange and Shanghai Stock Exchange. We find that although state-owned firms are bigger in size and appear more profitable based on reported earnings; privately-owned firms, foreign-owned firms and society-owned firms outperform the state-controlled firms in earnings quality; and foreign-owned firms have the highest earnings quality among all types of ownership groups. We find that there is not much difference in earnings quality between collectively-owned firms and state-owned firms and employee-owned firms exercise least discretion in earnings management. The findings in particular will have direct policy implications for the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC).     

审计师变更与盈余管理关系的实证研究--来自中国A股市场的经验证据

通过对2001～2003年A股上市公司的实证研究发现:审计师变更与公司可操纵应计利润的增长具有显著正相关关系,且两者关系在不同年度、不同前期审计意见的情况下有所不同.这表明,一方面审计师变更影响到后任审计师的独立性,即公司能够通过更换审计师实现盈余管理的目标;另一方面,对前期非标审计意见的公司,审计师采取了较为谨慎的做法,且伴随着监管政策的逐渐强化,后任审计师的独立性逐年提高.     

Earnings management at rights issues thresholds—Evidence from China

Burgstahler and Dichev (BD) (Burgstahler, David, Ilia, Dichev, 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics 23(1), 99–126.) and Degorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (DPZ) (Degeorge, Franscois, Patel, Jayendu, Zeckhauser, Richard, 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of Business 72(1), 1–33.) examine earnings management among American firms by looking at actual distributions around critical thresholds. Chinese firms must meet minimal ROE requirements if they are to have rights issues. Using a distribution approach, we examine whether Chinese firms manipulate their earnings to meet the regulatory requirements. Our empirical findings indicate that Chinese firms indeed heavily engaged in earnings management to meet the rights issue thresholds during the period 1994–2002. In addition, we show that these firms changed their behavior in response to changes in regulatory requirements. Furthermore, we analyse the pervasiveness of this practice and the means used in earnings management at the relevant ROE thresholds. Our findings have direct policy implications for the China Securities Regulatory Committee (CSRC).     

Corporate governance and earnings management in the Chinese listed companies: A tunneling perspective

This paper examines the relation between earnings management and corporate governance in China by introducing a tunneling perspective. We document systematic differences in earnings management across the universe of China's listed companies during 1999–2005, and empirically demonstrate that firms with higher corporate governance levels have lower levels of earnings management. We study two China-specific situations, in which the listed firms have strong incentives to manage earnings in order to meet certain return on equity (ROE) thresholds, and earnings management has been shown to be the most conspicuous. We identify tunneling evidence for each. Our empirical findings, although not being able to completely exclude other explanations, strongly suggest that agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and minority investors account for a significant portion of earnings management in China's listed firms.