员工持股计划的公司治理效应研究--基于股价大幅下跌风险的视角北大核心CSSCI

本文采用PSM-DID方法检验员工持股计划对股价大幅下跌风险的影响。研究发现:实施员工持股计划能显著降低企业股价大幅下跌风险。其作用机理为:员工持股计划通过提升企业信息透明度、缓解企业双重委托代理成本,减少坏消息的产生和隐藏,进而降低股价大幅下跌风险。当员工认购股票的资金来源于自有资金,认购的股票为非公开发行,以及在劳动密集度更高的企业,实施员工持股计划对股价大幅下跌风险的抑制作用更强。     

多个大股东与股价崩盘风险

控股股东之外的其他大股东可以抑制控股股东隐藏坏消息的行为,从而降低未来股价崩盘风险。本文以2000-2015年的中国A股上市公司为样本,检验了多个大股东对股价崩盘风险的影响。本文的实证结果表明,当公司存在多个大股东时,其股价的崩盘风险更低。进一步的研究发现,其他大股东对控股股东的监督作用主要体现在其他大股东相对于控股股东的力量较大、控股股东隐藏坏消息的动机较强、以及公司治理机制较弱的公司中。本研究在丰富股权结构以及股价崩盘风险相关领域文献的同时,对上市公司、投资者和政府监管部门也具有重要的启示意义。     

党组织参与治理对企业股价崩盘风险的影响研究

以沪深两市2014—2019年的上市公司为样本,研究发现党组织参与董事会治理可有效降低股价崩盘风险水平,而且这种关系在非国有企业样本中更加显著.此外,研究发现这一关系通过"党组织参与董事会治理—降低总代理成本和第一类代理成本—股价崩盘风险水平降低"的路径来实现.最后,研究发现当企业风险承担能力更强和融资约束较高时,党组织参与董事会治理与股价崩盘风险的负向关系更加显著.此外,党组织参与治理与公司内部治理水平具有替代效应,而与分析师关注度和企业所在地市场化水平等治理因素具有互补效应.研究为党组织参与治理的有效性提供经验证据,说明了我国资本市场这一特色体制的有效性.     

儒家文化与股价崩盘风险

本文从非正式制度视角考察了儒家文化对公司股价崩盘风险的影响效应及作用机理。研究发现,公司受到儒家文化的影响程度越强,其股价崩盘风险越低。渠道分析表明,儒家文化主要通过抑制管理者自利动机、改善公司信息质量及降低管理者过度自信三条路径影响股价崩盘风险。进一步研究发现,儒家文化对股价崩盘风险的抑制作用在公司治理较弱和外部信息环境较差的情况下更加明显。这表明,儒家文化作为正式制度的一种隐性替代治理机制,对于防范股价崩盘风险、促进资本市场健康发展具有重要积极作用。本文不仅丰富了股价崩盘风险影响因素的研究,也深化了对儒家文化现代商业价值的理论认知。     

ESG表现与股价崩盘风险

本文选取2013-2020年沪深A股上市公司数据为样本，研究了环境、社会责任及公司治理（ESG）表现对企业股价崩盘风险的影响。研究表明：良好的ESG表现能够发挥监督效应和声誉效应，即通过提高企业的外部监督和声誉水平，进而抑制其股价崩盘风险。进一步研究发现，企业信息环境越差，ESG表现对企业股价崩盘风险的抑制作用越强；经济政策不确定性越高时，ESG表现对企业股价崩盘风险抑制作用越为明显。研究基于企业ESG表现这一非财务指标，扩展了企业股价崩盘风险的影响因素研究，肯定了良好的ESG表现在微观的企业层面所发挥的积极作用，也对维护资本市场稳定、促进我国经济高质量发展具有一定的现实意义。     

内部人抛售、信息环境与股价崩盘

我国自2006年起允许内部人在公开市场交易公司股票,本文分析了其后内部人的抛售行为对股价崩盘风险的作用机理。本文的研究结果表明,内部人中的大股东抛售行为确实引发了股价崩盘,但是股价崩盘并非由于内部人隐藏了坏消息,而是由于大股东的抛售行为加大了与外部投资者之间的利益分离,大幅增加了不确定性,导致外部投资者压低股价寻求风险补偿所致。由内部人抛售引发的不确定性上升,并不能被机构投资者和分析师在基本面信息的搜集过程中预知,相反,一致预期的打破和机构投资者应对不确定性上升的持股调整行为反而加大了股价的崩盘风险。本文的研究对加强内部人交易行为监管,促进资本市场稳定发展具有一定的意义。     

金融同业活动与实体企业经营风险——来自地区层面同业存单业务的证据

本文研究了地区层面金融同业活动对实体企业经营风险的影响。基于各省份金融机构开启同业存单业务的研究表明,地区层面金融同业活动显著提升了当地上市企业股价大幅下跌的风险。进一步研究表明,随着同业存单业务的发展,当地上市企业债务融资成本和风险水平有所上升,而业绩表现和市场价值有所下降。上述发现表明,企业融资链条变长后,信贷市场道德风险上升,部分企业因风险偏好增强导致经营风险上升,更容易突然出现负面事件而导致股价大幅下跌。本文的发现揭示了金融同业活动存在监管规避的可能性及其影响实体企业的潜在路径,凸显了完善金融监管以更好服务实体经济发展的重要现实意义。     

金融同业活动与实体企业经营风险——来自地区层面同业存单业务的证据

本文研究了地区层面金融同业活动对实体企业经营风险的影响。基于各省份金融机构开启同业存单业务的研究表明,地区层面金融同业活动显著提升了当地上市企业股价大幅下跌的风险。进一步研究表明,随着同业存单业务的发展,当地上市企业债务融资成本和风险水平有所上升,而业绩表现和市场价值有所下降。上述发现表明,企业融资链条变长后,信贷市场道德风险上升,部分企业因风险偏好增强导致经营风险上升,更容易突然出现负面事件而导致股价大幅下跌。本文的发现揭示了金融同业活动存在监管规避的可能性及其影响实体企业的潜在路径,凸显了完善金融监管以更好服务实体经济发展的重要现实意义。     

国有资本参股能提高民营企业股价信息含量吗北大核心

深化资本市场改革要求完善要素资源市场化配置体制机制,助力实体经济高水平循环,而民营企业作为资本市场的重要组成部分,其股价信息含量的高低对市场的健康发展具有重要意义。本文以2008—2020年我国A股上市民营企业为样本,实证检验国有资本参股对民营企业股价信息含量的影响及作用机制。研究发现,国有资本参股促进了民营企业股价信息含量的提升,机制检验结果表明,国有资本参股具有治理效应和资源效应,能显著缓解民营企业第一类代理问题,并通过派遣董事、监事、高级管理人员和吸引更多分析师跟踪分析民营企业增强其监督作用,并能在一定程度上缓解民营企业融资约束,增加民营企业短期借款,提高民营企业信息披露质量,从而促进股价信息含量的提升。进一步研究发现,国有资本参股对民营企业股价信息含量的促进作用主要存在于内部控制质量更低、管理者权力更大、资本密集度更高和政府补贴更少的企业中。本文不仅丰富了股价信息含量影响因素和国有资本参股经济后果的研究文献,而且对现实中通过优化股权结构来提高企业股价信息含量的做法具有重要的实践指导意义。     

企业过度投资与股价崩盘风险

实体经济的过热投资是否会导致股市出现“泡沫”进而引发股市的暴跌风险是当前学术界和实务界关注的一个焦点问题。本文以2004-2013年A股上市公司为样本,从微观层面考察企业过度投资对股价崩盘风险的影响,并从“代理理论”和“管理者过度自信”两种视角分析其背后的作用机理。研究结果表明:(1)企业过度投资显著加剧了股价未来的崩盘风险;(2)股东与经理人之间的代理冲突而非管理者过度自信是导致二者正相关的主要原因;(3)进一步的研究发现,企业过度投资对未来股价崩盘风险的影响具有长期性,且其对股价未来的暴涨不具有预测能力。本文的研究结论不仅丰富了股价崩盘风险、过度投资等相关领域的文献,对于如何抑制实体经济投资过热以降低股价崩盘风险、维护金融市场稳定也具有重要的参考价值。     

The Effect of Managerial Incentives to Bear Risk on Corporate Capital Structure and R&D Investment

In this study we use estimates of the sensitivities of managers' portfolios to stock return volatility and stock price to directly test the relationship between managerial incentives to bear risk and two important corporate decisions. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases firms tend to choose higher debt ratios and make higher levels of R&D investment. These results are even stronger in a subsample of firms with relatively low outside monitoring. For these firms, managerial incentives to bear risk play a particularly pivotal role in determining leverage and R&D investment.     

中国式卖空机制与高管减持——基于融资融券分步扩容的准自然实验

本文以我国的融资融券制度为背景,结合双重差分模型,研究卖空机制对上市公司高管减持行为的影响。研究发现,相对于非融券标的,可融券标的公司高管的月减持比例在允许卖空后下降22%,这种抑制作用在小规模、高盈余平滑度以及非国有公司中体现得更为明显。其次,成为可融券标的后,股价定价效率提高,高管减持收益显著下降。进一步地,本文将高管的减持行为分为定期性与投机性两类,发现卖空机制显著抑制了高管基于信息优势和股价偏差的投机性减持行为。     

Managerial ability,investment efficiency and stock price crash risk

We examine empirically the effect of managerial ability on firm-level investment efficiency and how this affects future stock price crash risk. Using a managerial ability measure developed by Demerjian et al. (2012), the paper documents consistent evidence that the more able managers over-invest compared to their not-so-able counterparts, even after controlling for the effects of financial reporting quality and other firm specific determinants of investment efficiency. This evidence is robust to alternative proxies for investment efficiency. The empirical evidence also suggests that crash risk increases for firms with more able managers, primarily through the investment inefficiency channel. Overall, the study contributes to a better understanding of the influence of managerial ability on investment decisions in the context of diverging opinions regarding manager-specific effects on organizational outcomes.     

Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold Mining Industry

This article examines a new database that details corporate risk management activity in the North American gold mining industry. I find little empirical support for the predictive power of theories that view risk management as a means to maximize shareholder value. However, firms whose managers hold more options manage less gold price risk, and firms whose managers hold more stock manage more gold price risk, suggesting that managerial risk aversion may affect corporate risk management policy. Further, risk management is negatively associated with the tenure of firms' CFOs, perhaps reflecting managerial interests, skills, or preferences.     

高管宏观认知具有管理者“烙印”吗？——基于管理者风格效应的实证检验

本文利用“管理层讨论与分析”(MD&A)中的文本信息构造高管宏观认知指标(MMC),研究高管宏观认知是否具有管理者风格效应及其作用机理。研究发现,高管宏观认知具有明显的管理者个体“烙印”,会受到管理者个人风格的显著影响,表现为管理者风格效应。进一步研究发现,管理者个人背景特征对高管宏观认知的管理者风格效应具有显著影响,管理者风格效应主要受管理者后天因素的影响。管理者能力与高管宏观认知的管理者风格效应显著正相关。     

An information-based model of target stock price runup in the market for corporate control

The stock price runup of target firms in the market for corporate control has been anecdotally attributed to inside trading. Moreover, the empirical merger and acquisitions literature documents a time-varying level and duration of the stock price runup of target firms. Using a market microstructure approach, we model stock price runup as a stochastic process that shifts between a random walk without drift and a predictable process dependent on a parsimonious set of state variables. Consistent with the market microstructure literature, predictability in prices can be exploited only by the informed trader. The model is capable of explaining the complex stylized facts observed in stock price runup. It is also consistent with the merger wave literature, as we find that capital liquidity, economic growth, and market valuations drive the complex dynamics of stock price runup.     

Adoption and content of key audit matters and stock price crash risk

We examine whether the mandate for auditors to report key audit matters (KAMs) affects firm-specific stock price crash risk in China. Auditors in China are required to issue an expanded audit report that contains KAMs for AH-share firms, effective on January 1, 2017 (applicable to the financial year 2016), and for A-share firms, effective on January 1, 2018 (applicable to the financial year 2017). Applying a staggered difference-in-differences (D-i-D) design on a sample of 18,751 observations for financial years 2012–2019, we find that auditor reporting of KAMs is not significantly associated with stock price crash risk. The mechanism tests show that the disclosure of KAMs does not reduce information opaqueness and managerial opportunistic behaviors. Furthermore, our findings are not sensitive, but are robust to firms' corporate governance, product market competition, ownership structure, and auditor size. Overall, our study informs regulators, investors, auditors, and other stakeholders interested in the economic consequences of mandating KAM disclosures.     

Does preventive regulation reduce stock price synchronicity? Evidence from Chinese annual report comment letters

Based on a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2015 to 2018, this paper studies the impact of annual report comment letters (ARCLs) on firm stock price synchronicity. We find that after firms receive ARCLs, their stock price synchronicity decreases. Moreover, the longer the ARCLs and the more negative the ARCLs’ tone, the lower the resulting stock price synchronicity. The mechanism test shows that after firms receive ARCLs, the firms’ information disclosure increases in quantity and quality, external media attention increases, and the firms’ governance improves, reducing their stock price synchronicity. Further research shows that this negative association is more significant in firms with higher information asymmetry. This paper shows that the ARCL, an innovative application of the capital market supervision philosophy, is conducive to improving the quality of listed firms and to the healthy development of the capital market.     

管理者短视偏差对企业投资行为影响研究——一个基于股东短期利益压力视角的实证

基于股东短期利益压力的视角,以沪深两市2003～2009年间的A股上市公司为对象,采用多元回归分析就管理者短视偏差与企业短期投资间的关系及其对企业未来盈利能力、业绩水平和财务困境的影响进行研究。实证结果表明,管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资水平越高;管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资对企业未来盈利能力和业绩水平的削弱作用越强,意味着管理者短视偏差企业进行的短期投资降低了企业未来盈利能力和业绩水平;管理者短视偏差越大,企业短期投资对企业当期陷入财务困境可能性的削弱作用越弱,说明管理者短视偏差企业进行的短期投资虽然增大了企业风险,但是并不会加大企业当期陷入财务困境的可能性。     

Managerial Ownership, the Method of Payment for Acquisitions, and Executive Job Retention

This study investigates how acquiring and target firm managers' preferences for control rights motivate the payment for corporate acquisitions. We expect that managers of target firms who value influence in combined firms will prefer to receive stock. One reason top managers desire influence is to enhance their chances of retaining jobs in the combined firm. Our analysis shows a strong, positive association between managerial ownership of target firms and the likelihood of acquisitions for stock. We also find that managers of target firms are more likely to retain jobs in combined firms when they receive stock rather than cash.