The Relationship Between Equity-Based Compensation and Managerial Risk Taking: Evidence from China

The authors analyze the impact of equity-based compensation on managerial risk-taking behavior in Chinese listed firms from January 2006 to July 2011. They find that greater risk-taking incentives lead executives to invest more in research and development (R&D) projects and less in capital expenditures. Greater managerial risk-taking incentive increases firm focus. Managerial risk-taking incentives have positive effects on firms' leverage. Overall, increasing the sensitivity of chief executive officers' portfolio value to stock return volatility helps incentivize executives to work harder, as sharing gains and losses with shareholders aligns the interests of executives and shareholders. In addition, the results indicate that state control of firms has a negative effect on R&D investment, and this suggests that state-controlled firms should take more initiative to innovate.     

The Volatility and Price Sensitivities of Managerial Stock Option Portfolios and Corporate Hedging

We use estimates of the Black–Scholes sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility and the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price to test the relationship between managers' risk preferences and hedging activities. We find that as the sensitivity of managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price increases, firms tend to hedge more. However, as the sensitivity of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility increases, firms tend to hedge less.     

CEO risk incentives and firm performance following R&D increases

In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.     

Executive risk incentives,product market competition,and R&D

Prior studies have examined the relation between product market competition (PMC) and research and development (R&D) investments, while the impact of executive risk incentives on this relation remains unexplored. In this study, we find that Vega (the sensitivity of executives’ wealth to stock return volatility) weakens the negative relation between PMC and R&D. We also find that Vega strengthens the negative relation between PMC and firm performance when R&D investments grow higher. In sum, our results suggest that high‐Vega compensation portfolios in competitive environments may induce executives to overinvest in R&D projects, therefore hurting firm performance.     

Why Are U.S. Stocks More Volatile?

U.S. stocks are more volatile than stocks of similar foreign firms. A firm's stock return volatility can be higher for reasons that contribute positively (good volatility) or negatively (bad volatility) to shareholder wealth and economic growth. We find that the volatility of U.S. firms is higher mostly because of good volatility. Specifically, stock volatility is higher in the United States because it increases with investor protection, stock market development, new patents, and firm‐level investment in R&D. Each of these factors is related to better growth opportunities for firms and better ability to take advantage of these opportunities.     

Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness

This study examines equity risk incentives as one determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness. Prior research finds that equity risk incentives motivate managers to make risky investment and financing decisions, since risky activities increase stock return volatility and the value of stock option portfolios. Aggressive tax strategies involve significant uncertainty and can impose costs on both firms and managers. As a result, managers must be incentivized to engage in risky tax avoidance that is expected to generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. We predict that equity risk incentives motivate managers to undertake risky tax strategies. Consistent with this prediction, we find that larger equity risk incentives are associated with greater tax risk and the magnitude of this effect is economically significant. Our results are robust across four measures of tax risk, but do not vary across several proxies for strength of corporate governance. We conclude that equity risk incentives are a significant determinant of corporate tax aggressiveness.     

Managerial incentives and risk-taking

We provide empirical evidence of a strong causal relation between managerial compensation and investment policy, debt policy, and firm risk. Controlling for CEO pay-performance sensitivity (delta) and the feedback effects of firm policy and risk on the managerial compensation scheme, we find that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) implements riskier policy choices, including relatively more investment in R&D, less investment in PPE, more focus, and higher leverage. We also find that riskier policy choices generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta.     

Managerial risk-taking behavior and equity-based compensation

Equity-based compensation affects managers’ risk-taking behavior, which in turn has an impact on shareholder wealth. In response to an exogenous increase in takeover protection in Delaware during the mid-1990s, managers lower firm risk by 6%. This risk reduction is concentrated among firms with low managerial equity-based incentives, in particular firms with low chief executive officer portfolio sensitivity to stock return volatility. Furthermore, the risk reduction is value-destroying. Finally, firms respond to the increased protection accorded by the regime shift by providing managers with greater incentives for risk-taking.     

Diversification benefits of risk portfolio models: a case of Taiwan’s stock market

How to construct effective investment strategies is a core issue for modern finance. In this paper, we investigate the benefits of various models by rebalancing portfolios using the daily stock return data in Taiwan. We further consider investment constraints in portfolios to ensure the feasibility of their applications. Using five performance criteria, we find the risk models, particularly the CVaR, yield higher ex ante and ex post performance than a naïve buy-and-hold portfolio. The two-stage regressions show that high return benefits are associated with a bear market while high reduction in risk is positively related to high volatility. Though VaR is regarded as a standard model applied in the real world, our findings suggest that CVaR can serve as a good alternative.     

CEO incentives and the cost of debt

Motivated by concerns that stock-based compensation might lead to excessive risk-taking, this paper’s main purpose is to examine the relations between CEO incentives and the cost of debt. Unlike prior research, this paper uses the sensitivities of CEO stock and option portfolios to stock price (delta) and stock return volatility (vega) to measure CEO incentives to invest in risky projects. Higher delta (vega) is predicted to be related to lower (higher) cost of debt. The results show that yield spreads on new debt issues are lower for firms with higher CEO delta and are unrelated to CEO vega. The results also show that yield spreads are higher for firms whose CEOs hold more shares and stock options. In sum, the results suggest that both percentage-ownership and option sensitivity variables are important in understanding relations between CEO incentives and the cost of debt.     

Managerial characteristics and stock market investment: evidence from China

We examine the effect of managerial characteristics on investment in the stock market by listed firms in China. Our empirical findings suggest that higher levels of cash‐based compensation may increase both the propensity of investing in the stock market and the total amount of investment. On the other hand, managerial holdings discourage managers from investing in stock markets and also lead to a decrease in the amount of investment. This study sheds light on managerial risk‐taking incentives. Moreover, this study fills the gap in the literature by providing evidence for the determinants of listed firms’ stock market investment.     

Do U.S. Insurance Firms Offer the “Wrong” Incentives to Their Executives?

We examine the relation between executive compensation and market‐implied default risk for listed insurance firms from 1992 to 2007. Shareholders are expected to encourage managerial risk sharing through equity‐based incentive compensation. We find that long‐term incentives and other share‐based plans do not affect the default risk faced by firms. However, the extensive use of stock options leads to higher future default risk for insurance firms. We argue that this is because option‐based incentives induce managerial risk‐taking behavior, which seeks to maximize managerial payoff through equity volatility. This could be detrimental to the interests of shareholders, especially during a financial crisis.     

ON STOCK RETURN SEASONALITY AND CONDITIONAL HETEROSKEDASTICITY

We model the seasonal volatility of stock returns using GARCH specifications and size-sorted portfolios. Estimation results indicate that there are volatility differences between months and that these seasonal volatility patterns are conditional on firm size. Additionally, we find that seasonal volatility does not explain seasonal returns when the reward for risk is held constant over the sample period. Specifically, our results indicate that much of the abnormal return in January for small firms cannot be entirely attributed to either higher systematic risk or a higher risk premium in January.     

Mispricing and risk of R&D investment in European firms

We study whether R&D-intensive firms earn superior stock returns compared to matched size and book-to-market portfolios across several financial markets in Europe. Mispricing can arise if investors are not able to correctly estimate the long-term benefits of R&D investment or whether R&D firms are more risky than others. The results confirm that more innovative firms can earn future excess returns. Stocks listed on continental Europe markets and operating in high-tech sectors are more prone to undervaluation. This can be caused in the first case by information asymmetries that are more severe in bank-based countries. No evidence is found for a different risk pattern of R&D-intensive stocks.     

Stock Markets,Growth, and Tax Policy

An extensive literature documents the role of financial markets in economic development. To help explain this relationship, this paper constructs an endogenous growth model in which a stock market emerges to allocate risk and explores how the stock market alters investment incentives in ways that change steady state growth rates. The paper demonstrates that stock markets accelerate growth by (1) facilitating the ability to trade ownership of firms without disrupting the productive processes occurring within firms and (2) allowing agents to diversify portfolios. Tax policy affects growth directly by altering investment incentives and indirectly by changing the incentives underlying financial contracts.     

How does the executive pay gap influence audit fees? The roles of R&D investment and institutional ownership

Using a sample of US firms from 2003–2014, this study examines how the executive pay gap affects audit fees for firms with different levels of R&D investment and institutional ownership. Consistent with managerial power theory, we find that the executive pay gap is positively associated with audit fees, and that the positive association is attenuated by intense R&D investment and higher institutional ownership. We also find that the executive pay gap more strongly affects audit fees after the passage of the 2010 Dodd–Frank Act and the PCAOB's 2012 call to identify the audit risk related to executive incentive compensation. Additional analyses show that the moderating effects of R&D investment and institutional ownership on the pay gap–audit fees association are not conditional on auditor tenure, but the moderating effect of institutional ownership is stronger for firms hiring specialist auditors. Collectively, our findings suggest that auditors consider the business context, such as innovation initiative and external monitoring, when assessing audit risk related to the executive pay gap.     

管理者能力与资本市场稳定

管理者能力是管理者有效率地利用企业资源创造价值的能力。本文以企业股价大幅下跌风险为切入点系统分析了管理者能力对资本市场稳定的影响。研究发现:管理者能力能够显著抑制企业未来股价大幅下跌的风险,具有市场稳定效应。这种稳定效应主要体现在管理者隐藏坏消息动机较强和隐藏坏消息空间较大(内部缺乏大股东治理和外部制度环境水平较低)的企业。进一步研究发现,管理者能力主要通过降低企业经营风险和提高企业治理水平等路径缓解企业未来股价大幅下跌的风险。本文丰富了管理者能力和股价下跌风险的研究,还对如何合理利用企业家资源维护我国资本市场平稳健康发展提供了重要的现实证据。     

The Stock Market Valuation of Research and Development Expenditures

We examine whether stock prices fully value firms' intangible assets, specifically research and development (R&D). Under current U.S. accounting standards, financial statements do not report intangible assets and R&D spending is expensed. Nonetheless, the average historical stock returns of firms doing R&D matches the returns of firms without R&D. However, the market is apparently too pessimistic about beaten-down R&D-intensive technology stocks' prospects. Companies with high R&D to equity market value (which tend to have poor past returns) earn large excess returns. A similar relation exists between advertising and stock returns. R&D intensity is positively associated with return volatility.     

Good for managers,bad for society? Causal evidence on the association between risk-taking incentives and corporate social responsibility

Using FAS 123R as an exogenous shock to stock options, I provide evidence that equity-based risk-taking incentives discourage corporate social responsibility (CSR). This finding suggests that compensation incentives can motivate managers not to pursue CSR strategies because CSR reduces firms’ risk and provides insurance-like benefits. Firms with a greater demand for CSR's risk reduction are more sensitive to changes in risk-taking incentives. I triangulate my results by confirming that CSR weaknesses are positively related to subsequent stock return volatility. Overall, using a robust empirical design, I find that risk-taking incentives are a determinant of firms’ CSR.     

The Stock Market and Corporate Investment: A Test of Catering Theory

We test a catering theory describing how stock market mispricingmight influence individual firms' investment decisions. We usediscretionary accruals as our proxy for mispricing. We finda positive relation between abnormal investment and discretionaryaccruals; that abnormal investment is more sensitive to discretionaryaccruals for firms with higher R&D intensity (opaque firms)or share turnover (firms with shorter shareholder horizons);that firms with high abnormal investment subsequently have lowstock returns; and that the larger the relative price premium,the stronger the abnormal return predictability. We show thatpatterns in abnormal returns are stronger for firms with higherR&D intensity or share turnover.