Monitoring and limit order submission risks

This paper presents a formal analysis of the relation between monitoring and limit order submission risk. With heterogeneous information, limit order traders face two types of risk. First, they may be “picked off” when prices change unexpectedly after the limit order is entered (known as free trading option risk). Second, they face the possibility that their limit order will not result in a trade. To mitigate these risks, traders can monitor information and prices and cancel or revise their orders as needed. But such monitoring is costly, resulting in a trade-off between the cost of monitoring and the risks of limit order submission. The model predicts that if the stock is actively traded, limit order submission risks and order cancellations/revisions are positively related. Further, shares with a wide bid-ask spread will tend to have a lower rate of order cancellations and revisions than shares with small bid-ask spreads. Finally, the model suggests that if larger capitalization stocks have lower costs of gathering information (and hence more intense monitoring of limit orders), there will be more cancellations and revisions in limit orders. A sample of 23 liquid stocks provides evidence that is consistent with these three main hypotheses.     

Cost of Transacting and Expected Returns in the Nasdaq Market

This article empirically examines the liquidity premium predicted by the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model using Nasdaq data over the 1973–1990 period. The results support the model and are much stronger than for the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as reported by Chen and Kan (1989) and Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993) . I conjecture that the stronger evidence on the Nasdaq is due to the dealers' inside spreads on the Nasdaq being a better proxy for the actual cost of transacting than the quoted spreads on the NYSE, since the Nasdaq dealers do not face competition from limit orders or floor traders.     

Government intervention and adverse selection costs in foreign exchange markets

An important group of traders in the foreign exchange marketis governments who often adhere to a foreign exchange rate policyof occasional interventions with otherwise floating rates. Inthis article we provide a theoretical model and empirical evidencethat government foreign exchange interventions create significantadverse selection problems for dealers. In particular, our modelshows that the adverse selection component of the foreign exchangespread is positively related to the variance of unexpected interventionand that expected intervention has no impact on the spread.After controlling for inventory and order processing costs,we find that bid-ask spreads increase with U.S. dollar and Germandeutsche mark foreign exchange rate intervention during theperiod 1976-1994. Furthermore, when the intervention is decomposedinto expected and unexpected components, we find a statisticallyand economically significant increase in spreads with the varianceof unexpected intervention, while expected intervention hasno significant impact on spreads.     

Portfolio risk,adjustment costs,and security dealers' bid/ask spreads

This article notes that dealers' bid/ask spreads should vary directly with their costs of adjusting to inventory imbalances. Thus, well-diversified dealers are expected to quote lower bid/ask spreads on stocks with substantial total risk caused by undiversifiable risk. Furthermore, the effect of systematic risk on bid/ask spreads should be negligible if dealers are compensated for systematic risk by market returns. This article shows that, empirically, bid/ask spreads of OTC stocks are insensitive to the systematic risk of individual stocks—even when only stocks with stable betas are considered. Furthermore, bid/ask spreads are not sensitive to changes in market variance, as would be expected if systematic risk affected spreads. While unsystematic risk affects bid/ask spreads, its effect is pronounced for stocks traded by small, undiversified dealers. If stocks are only traded by large dealers with low diversification costs, unsystematic risk does not affect bid/ask spreads.     

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OTC BID-ASK SPREADS AND DEALER SIZE: THE IMPACT OF ORDER-PROCESSING AND DIVERSIFICATION COSTS

The effects of large transactions on OTC security dealers' bid-ask spreads are analyzed for stocks with different price levels. Because overhead expenses vary little with the value of transactions, economies of scale exist for dealers in higher-priced stocks. Thus, percentage bid-ask spreads decline with the price level of the stock. However, larger transactions entail larger order-clearing and inventory-adjustment costs. These costs may be particularly burdensome for smaller dealers with limited purchasing powers and abilities to diversify inexpensively. Consequently, smaller dealers charge higher spreads for trading high-priced stocks.     

Trade Disclosure,Information Learning and Securities Market Performance

In this paper we examine the effect of information disclosure on securities market performance when liquidity traders are able to acquire information about inside trading. We show that the bid-ask spread increases with the liquidity trader's learning efficiency, which is greater when trade information is disclosed. The bid-ask spread is always higher when trade information is not disclosed. However, the discrepancy between the bid-ask spreads with and without information disclosure narrows when the learning efficiency increases. We also show that the gains of the informed traders in a market without trade information disclosure are reduced in the presence of the liquidity trader's learning. Nevertheless, liquidity traders do not necessarily benefit from increased transparency. In particular, liquidity traders may face higher trading costs.     

Intraday patterns in London listed Exchange Traded Funds

In this paper we examine the intraday trading patterns of Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) listed on the London Stock Exchange. ETFs have been shown to be characterised by much lower bid–ask spread costs and by lower levels of information asymmetry than individual securities. One possible explanation for intraday trading patterns is that concentration of trading arises at the start of the trading day because informed traders have private information that quickly diminishes in value as trading progresses. Since ETFs have lower trading costs and lower levels of information asymmetry we would expect these securities to display less pronounced intraday patterns than individual securities. We fail to find that ETFs are characterised by concentrated trading bouts during the day and therefore find support for the argument that information asymmetry is the cause of intraday volume patterns in stock markets. We find that ETF bid–ask spreads and volatility are elevated at the open but not at the close. This lends support to the “accumulation of information” explanation that sees high spreads and volatility at the open as a consequence of information accumulating during a market closure and impacting on the market when it next opens.     

External Monitoring of Property Appraisal Estimates and Information Asymmetry

Finance theory proposes that firms' cost of capital increases when market makers set wider spreads due to perceived higher information asymmetry across traders. Using a sample of UK investment property firms and controlling for firms' non-random selection of external monitors, we find evidence that market makers perceive information asymmetry across traders to be lower for firms employing external appraisers versus those employing internal appraisers. This evidence is consistent with liquidity-motivated traders being unable to overcome such reliability differences using asset value information from sources other than accounting. We fail to find a similar difference for firms employing Big 6 versus non-Big 6 auditors. Our findings contribute to the debate over the recognition of fair value estimates for long-lived tangible assets by documenting that reliability differences attributable to differential monitoring by appraisers can affect information asymmetry, and therefore firms' cost of capital.     

Adverse Information and Dealer Spreads: Evidence from Dutch Auction Repurchases

The Dutch auction repurchase has become an increasingly popular alternative to open market repurchases and self-tender offers for the distribution of earnings to shareholders. In a Dutch auction, the repurchase price is not determined by a managerial decision, but by shareholders. The extent to which a Dutch auction signals private information is tested by examining stock returns and bid-ask spreads. Stock prices increase and bid-ask spreads widen during the announcement of a Dutch auction; prices decrease and spreads narrow at expiration. Because of the uncertainty surrounding the final repurchase price, Dutch auctions initially increase the risk to which security dealers are exposed. As information asymmetry among managers, investors, and dealers is reduced at expiration, security dealers no longer need to protect themselves from information trades.     

Reputation and interdealer trading: a microstructure analysis of the Treasury Bond market

Trading generates not only information about the payoff of the assets traded, but also information about the traders themselves. Over time this information creates reputation. By using a unique dataset on the Treasury bond market, we derive a measure of reputation. This is then used to group dealers on the basis of their reputation and to analyze how they react to the reputation of other dealers. We show that the same type of trade, on the same asset, in the same market can generate different volume and volatility patterns depending on the type of dealers originating it. We also identify the “salient traders”. These traders, even if they do not originate the biggest volume of trade, have the highest impact on the market. These results have strong implications in terms of forecastability of future returns, volatility and overall trading volume because they show that most of the explanatory power of trades is due to salient traders.     

Dealer attention,the speed of quote adjustment to information,and net dealer revenue

Using trade and quote data from the NYSE, we examine the relation between dealer attention, dealer revenue, and the probability of informed trade. We find that dealer revenue net of losses to better-informed traders in NYSE stocks is positively related to the speed at which quotes adjust to full information levels. The speed of quote adjustment is faster for stocks with greater dealer attention, as measured by a stock’s relative prominence at its post and panel location on the NYSE floor. The level of dealer attention in turn is positively related to a stock’s probability of information-based trading. The results are consistent with a theoretical model we derive in which dealers trade multiple securities and must optimally allocate their limited attention to monitoring order flow to minimize losses to better-informed traders.     

Liquidity distribution in the limit order book on the stock exchange of Thailand

The liquidity distribution, or the shape of the limit order book, influences trading behavior and choice of order submission by public liquidity suppliers. The present study seeks to discover whether liquidity providers are concerned about being picked off by informed traders, and whether they are less willing to supply liquidity at the market or demand higher price spreads. The results show that liquidity at the market is a small portion of total liquidity, and that firm size, minimum tick size, volatility, and trading volume play significant roles in determining the liquidity distribution within an order book.     

Price discovery in currency markets

This paper examines the price discovery process in currency markets, basing its analysis on the pivotal distinction between the customer (end-user) market and the interdealer market. It first provides evidence that this price discovery process cannot be based on adverse selection between dealers and their customers, as postulated in standard models, because the spreads dealers quote to their customers are not positively related to a trade’s likely information content. The paper then highlights three factors familiar in the literature – fixed operating costs, market power, and strategic dealing – that may explain the cross-sectional variation in customers’ spreads. The paper finishes by proposing a price discovery process relevant to liquid two-tier markets and providing preliminary evidence that this process applies to currencies.     

Belief-free price formation

We analyze security price formation in a dynamic setting in which long-lived dealers repeatedly compete for the opportunity to trade with short-lived retail traders. We characterize equilibria in which dealers’ pricing strategies are optimal irrespective of the private information that each dealer may possess. Thus, our model’s predictions are robust to different specifications of the dealers’ information structure. These equilibria reconcile, in a unified and parsimonious framework, price dynamics that are reminiscent of well-known stylized facts: excess price volatility, price to trading flow correlation, stochastic volatility and inventory-related trading.     

Providing liquidity in an illiquid market: Dealer behavior in US corporate bonds

We examine market making behavior of dealers for 55,988 corporate bonds, many of which trade infrequently. Dealers have a substantially higher propensity to offset trades within the same day rather than committing capital for longer periods for riskier and less actively traded bonds. Dealers’ holding periods do not decline with a bond's prior trading activity and in fact are lowest for some of the least active bonds. As a result, cross-sectional estimates of roundtrip trading costs do not increase as prior trading activity declines. Our results suggest that dealers endogenously adjust their behavior to mitigate inventory risk from trading in illiquid and higher risk securities, balancing search and inventory costs in equilibrium such that observed spreads can appear invariant to expected liquidity.     

A study on foreign exchange dealers' bid–ask spread quote behavior

Based on a questionnaire surveying dealers in the Taipei inter-bank foreign exchange market that was conducted in March 2001, I attempted to answer the question of who initiated the wider currency spread. It was found that the risk-averse dealers of small banks quoted wider spreads in order to conceal their inferior positions regarding information and inventory or to avoid market volatility risk. Some of the dealers of large multinational banks in major financial centers who normally quote conventional spreads were found to quote wider spreads in response to the request for quotations by small Taiwanese bank dealers who widened their spread quotes.     

Trading Mechanisms in Securities Markets

This paper analyzes price formation under two trading mechanisms: a continuous quote-driven system where dealers post prices before order submission and an order-driven system where traders submit orders before prices are determined. The order-driven system operates either as a continuous auction, with immediate order execution, or as a periodic auction, where orders are stored for simultaneous execution. With free entry into market making, the continuous systems are equivalent. While a periodic auction offers greater price efficiency and can function where continuous mechanisms fail, traders must sacrifice continuity and bear higher information costs.     

A learning market-maker in the Glosten–Milgrom model

This paper develops a model of a learning market-maker by extending the Glosten–Milgrom model of dealer markets. The market-maker tracks the changing true value of a stock in settings with informed traders (with noisy signals) and liquidity traders, and sets bid and ask prices based on its estimate of the true value. We empirically evaluate the performance of the market-maker in markets with different parameter values to demonstrate the effectiveness of the algorithm, and then use the algorithm to derive properties of price processes in simulated markets. When the true value is governed by a jump process, there is a two regime behaviour marked by significant heterogeneity of information and large spreads immediately following a price jump, which is quickly resolved by the market-maker, leading to a rapid return to homogeneity of information and small spreads. We also discuss the similarities and differences between our model and real stock market data in terms of distributional and time series properties of returns.     

Option Prices Leading Equity Prices: Do Option Traders Have an Information Advantage?

Recent evidence shows that option volatility skews and volatility spreads between call and put options predict equity returns. This study investigates whether such predictive ability is driven by option traders’ information advantage. We examine the predictive ability of volatility skews and volatility spreads around significant information events including earnings announcements, other firm‐specific information events, and events that trigger significant market reactions. Consistent with option traders having an information advantage relative to equity traders before information events, we find that the option measures immediately before these events have higher predictive ability for short‐term event returns than they do in a more dated window or before a randomly selected pseudo‐event. We also find that option measures have predictive ability after information events. However, this predictive ability holds only for unscheduled corporate announcements, which suggests that, relative to equity traders, option traders have superior ability to process less anticipated information.     

Effects of frequent information disclosure: the case of daily net asset value reporting for closed-end investment companies

There are two competing hypotheses regarding the effects of increased financial disclosure. One states that increased disclosure leads to decreased information asymmetry and more efficient pricing resulting in reduced bid-ask spreads, volatility and illiquidity. The other says that increased disclosure places additional burdens on traders leading to increased transactions costs and volatility. This paper examines the effects of more-frequent reporting for the case of closed-end funds that voluntarily changed their net-asset-value reporting from weekly to daily beginning in 1998. Multivariate analyses indicate a decrease in asymmetric information following initiation of daily reporting as evidenced by lower spreads, greater transactions volume, reduced volatility and decreased illiquidity. We conclude that closed-end fund daily net-asset-value reporting provides an example of information disclosure that provides useful information to investors and reduces information asymmetry.