Market transparency: who wins and who loses?

This study uses laboratory experiments to determine the effectsof trade and quote disclosure on market efficiency, bid-askspreads, and trader welfare. We show that trade disclosure increasesthe informational efficiency of transaction prices, but alsoincreases opening bid-ask spreads, apparently by reducing market-makers'incentives to compete for order flow. As a result, trade disclosurebenefits market makers at the expense of liquidity traders andinformed traders. We find that quote disclosure has no discernibleeffects on market performance. Overall our results demonstratethat the degree of market transparency has important effectsof market equilibria and on trader and market-maker welfare.     

Internal control reporting and market liquidity

We investigate the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) on information asymmetry by analyzing the relation between SOX Sections 302 and 404 control reports and market liquidity using bid-ask spreads. Lower market liquidity indicates higher levels of information asymmetry implying that market participants perceive financial statement misstatement risk is higher. If SOX disclosures contain relevant information, then one would expect firms reporting internal control material weaknesses to have lower market liquidity. Accordingly, we find that market liquidity is lower (i.e., bid-ask spreads are higher) for firms reporting ineffective control compared to firms reporting effective control using either annual SOX 404 internal control reports or quarterly SOX 302 disclosure control reports, which suggests that SOX 302 and 404 reports provide useful information for identifying firms with a higher risk of financial statement misstatement. However, we do not find consistent results using two alternative liquidity measures: trading volume and market quality indices. We then examine whether changes in control reports are associated with changes in market liquidity. We generally do not find that firms with improved (deteriorated) control reports experience a larger decrease (increase) in bid-ask spreads or larger increases (decreases) in trading volume and market quality indices compared to other firms, suggesting that market participants do not discern a change in information asymmetry when the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting changes.     

A microstructure examination of trading activity following stock splits

In a study of 1,131 stock splits spanning the period 1983–1989 we observe an increase in the number of trades as well as a reduction in the mean trade size following the split. Combined with earlier reported findings of an increase in the number of shareholders postsplit, we conclude that the number of liquidity traders increases after a split. We confirm the previously observed increase in the bid-ask spread following a split, and upon decomposition of the spread find an increase in its adverse selection component in the postsplit period. This is consistent with the finding by Brennan and Hughes (1991) of an increase in the number of analysts following a stock after a split. Further, observing a decrease in market depth following a split we determine that Kyle-type models incorporating diverse private information for informed traders most correctly describe the nature of security trading. Since this decrease in postsplit market depth is not related to the trading volume or the split factor, we reject price correction explanations for stock splits.     

Liquidity skewness in the London Stock Exchange

We study liquidity on the London Stock Exchange. We find that the average bid-ask spread declines, but that the skewness of the spread increases. These results are robust to firm size, trading volume and price level. Our findings hold when the bid-ask spread is estimated utilising high frequency data. We find that the bid-ask spread prior to earnings announcements dates is significantly higher than that of post earnings announcements, suggesting that asymmetric information has driven the increase in liquidity skewness. We also find that the effect of earnings announcements is more pronounced in the 2007 global financial crisis, consistent with the notion that extreme market downturns amplify asymmetric information. Our overall evidence also implies that increased competition and transparent trading environments limit market makers' abilities to cross-subsidize bid-ask spreads between periods of high and low levels of asymmetric information.     

Liquidity,liquidity risk,and information flow: Lessons from an emerging market

This paper examines the role of public and private information flows in intraday liquidity and intraday liquidity risk in the Tunisian stock market. Our empirical results are based on ARMA and GARCH-type models and show that, for major Tunisian stocks, gradually elapsed public information together with gradually elapsed private information in the market is the dominant factor in liquidity improvements in the Tunisian stock market. Liquidity improvements are generated by a decrease in the bid-ask spread accompanied by an increase in the depth at best limit. Our results clearly indicate that the arrival of public information in a sequential manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the bid-ask spread, while the advent of private information in a contemporaneous manner is the dominant factor generating increases in liquidity risk related to the depth at best limit. Additionally, our results show that liquidity risk persistence disappears when trading volume and order imbalance are included as explanatory variables in the conditional variance equation.     

Liquidity determination in an order-driven market

We exploit full order level information from an electronic FX broking system to provide a comprehensive account of the determination of its liquidity. We not only look at bid-ask spreads and trading volumes, but also study the determination of order entry rates and depth measures derived from the entire limit order book. We find strong predictability in the arrival of liquidity supply/demand events. Further, in times of low (high) liquidity, liquidity supply (demand) events are more common. In times of high trading activity and volatility, the ratio of limit to market order arrivals is high but order book spreads and depth deteriorate. These results are consistent with market order traders having better information than limit order traders.     

The optimal bid-ask price strategies of high-frequency trading and the effect on market liquidity

We propose a model for determining the optimal bid-ask spread strategy by a high-frequency trader (HFT) who has an informational advantage and receives information about the true value of a security. We employ an information cost function that includes volatility and the volume of the asset. Subsequently, we characterize the optimal bid-ask price strategies and obtain a stable bid-ask spread. We assume that orders submitted by low-frequency traders (LFTs) and news events arrive at the market with Poisson processes. Additionally, our model supports the trading of the two-sided quote in one period. We find that more LFTs and a higher exchange latency both hurt market liquidity. The HFT prefers to choose a two-sided quote to gain more profits while cautiously chooses a one-sided quote during times of high volatility. The model generates some testable implications with supporting empirical evidence from the NASDAQ-OMX Nordic Market.     

Liquidity Provision and Noise Trading: Evidence from the "Investment Dartboard" Column

How does increased noise trading affect market liquidity and trading costs? We use The Wall Street Journal's “Investment Dartboard” column, which stimulates noise trading, as a natural experiment to evaluate models of the bid-ask spread. We find that substantial increases in trading volume and significant but temporary abnormal returns occur when analysts recommend stocks in this column, especially when recommendations come from analysts with successful contest track records. We also find an increase in liquidity and a decrease in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.     

VOLATILITY AND LIQUIDITY AT NYSE OPENING CALLS: A CLOSER LOOK

The literature suggests that the bid-ask spread is responsible, at least in part, for greater price volatility and more negative autocorrelation at the open than at the close. In this study, we find that these phenomena are not related to the bid-ask spread, but are related instead to pricing errors by specialists or limit-order traders around the open. We use George, Kaul, and Nimalendran's (1991) model, which is less biased than Roll's (1984) model, to estimate the implied spread. The results show that, on average, the implied spread earned by liquidity suppliers is lower at the open than at the close. These results refute the contention that specialists exploit their monopoly position and earn a higher profit at the opening call. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that specialists set a lower cost of immediacy to encourage trading and the release of more information at the opening call. This could reduce information asymmetry and make subsequent trades in the continuous market more profitable.     

Strategic trading and learning about liquidity

Many practitioners point out that the speculative profits of institutional traders are eroded by the difficulty in gauging the price impact of their trades. In this paper, we develop a model of strategic trading where speculators face such a dilemma because of incomplete information about time-varying market liquidity. Unlike the competitive market makers that they trade against, informed traders do not know the distribution of liquidity (“noise”) trades. Instead, they have to learn about liquidity from past prices and trading volume. This learning implies that strategic trades and market statistics such as informational efficiency are path-dependent on past market outcomes. Our paper also has normative implications for practitioners.     

Liquidity and market efficiency: A large sample study

Chordia et al. (2008, hereafter CRS) examine short horizon return predictability from past order flows of large, actively traded NYSE firms across three tick size regimes and conclude that higher liquidity facilitates arbitrage trading which enhances market efficiency. We extend CRS to a comprehensive sample of all NYSE firms and examine the dynamics between liquidity and market efficiency during informational periods. Our results indicate that although all NYSE firms experience an overall improvement in market efficiency across periods of different tick size regimes, this improvement varies significantly across the portfolios of sample companies formed on the basis of trading frequency, market capitalization, and trading volume. After controlling for these factors, we further document a positive association between a continuous measure of liquidity and market efficiency, and show that this effect is amplified during periods that contain new information, as reflected in high adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread.     

THE DEALERS' PRICE/SIZE QUOTE AND MARKET LIQUIDITY

We model trading in a competitive securities market where informed traders and liquidity traders transact with dealers. The dealers' entire published quote is modeled: bid-ask prices and the number of shares the dealer is willing to buy/sell at these prices (i.e., size quotes). We argue that size quotes are a more informative indicator of market liquidity than the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component. Moreover, the size quotes reveal several market characteristics that cannot be inferred from the bid-ask spread's adverse-selection component alone. The model generates a number of empirically testable predictions that clarify certain key elements of market liquidity.     

How and when is dual trading irrelevant?

Within a general model of speculative trade, we derive the aggregate consequences of dual traders who process retail liquidity trades and trade on their own account. We prove that dual trading reduces total expected speculator profits unless speculators process all liquidity trade and trade with the same intensity on liquidity trade. In contrast, dual trading does not affect the information content of prices. We show how results generalize when we endogenize (a) speculator information via costly information acquisition about fundamentals or costly processing of liquidity trade, and (b) liquidity trader motives and welfare via endowment shocks.     

Information dissemination by insiders in equilibrium

This paper generates an equilibrium explanation for partial disclosure of information by an insider to privileged associates. In our model, prices are set by competitive market makers in anticipation of trading volume, but not affected by the actual number of trades. Liquidity demand is not perfectly inelastic, but rather liquidity traders are sensitive to trading costs through a reservation price. Because profits from liquidity traders are bounded, the feasibility of an equilibrium depends on the balance between the number of associates, the precision of information and the number of liquidity traders. Partially, rather than fully, disclosing information alters this balance by limiting the informational advantage of individual associates. If the number of associates is exogenous, partial disclosure prevents market failure. If the insider chooses the number of associates, partial disclosure allows him to serve more associates but still increase total associate profits.     

Determinants of Trading Profits: The Liquidity Provision Decision

Theories show that liquidity provision implies negative contemporaneous correlation between trades and returns. Dealers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are granted typical dealer trading advantages without obligations to provide liquidity and, thus, are ideal to test whether these advantages lead to voluntary liquidity provision (earning bid-ask spreads) or information trading (trading in the direction of the market). We find a strong positive correlation in aggregate, implying that these unrestricted dealers prefer information trading. We also find that smaller dealers are more likely to provide liquidity and that small-cap stocks (with larger bid-ask spreads) are more profitable for liquidity provision.     

High-Frequency Trading and Market Performance

We study the consequences of, and potential policy responses to, high-frequency trading (HFT) via the tradeoff between liquidity and information production. Faster speeds facilitate HFT, with consequences for this tradeoff: Information production decreases because informed traders have less time to trade before HFTs react, but liquidity (measured by the bid-ask spread) improves because informational asymmetries decline. HFT also pushes outcomes inside the frontier of this tradeoff. However, outcomes can be restored to the frontier by replacing the limit order book with one of two alternative mechanisms: delaying all orders except cancellations or implementing frequent batch auctions.     

The Effect of Sequential Information Arrival on Asset Prices: An Experimental Study

A complete understanding of security markets requires a simultaneous explanation of price behavior, trading volume, portfolio composition (ie., asset allocation), and bid-ask spreads. In this paper, these variables are observed in a controlled setting—a computerized double auction market, similar to NASDAQ. Our laboratory allows experimental control of information arrival—whether simultaneously or sequentially received, and whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. We compare the price, volume, and share allocations of three market equilibrium models: telepathic rational expectations, which assumes that traders can read each others minds (strong-form market efficiency); ordinary rational expectations, which assumes traders can use (some) market price information, (a type of semi-strong form efficiency); and private information, where traders use no market information. We conclude 1) that stronger-form market models predict equilibrium prices better than weaker-form models, 2) that there were fewer misallocation forecasts in simultaneous information arrival (SIM) environments, 3) that trading volume was significantly higher in SIM environments, 4) and that bid-ask spreads widen significantly when traders are exposed to price uncertainty resulting from information heterogeneity.     

Market making with minimum resting times

We show how the supply of liquidity in order-driven markets is affected if limit orders (LOs) are forced to rest in the limit order book for a minimum resting time (MRT) before they can be cancelled. The bid-ask spread increases as the MRT increases because market makers (MMs) increase the depth of their LOs to protect them from being picked off by other traders. We also show that the expected profits of the MMs increase when the MRT increases. The intuition is as follows. As the MRT increases, there are two opposing forces at work. One, the longer the MRT, the more likely the LOs are to be filled and, on average, shares are sold at a loss. Two, because the depth of the posted LOs increases, the probability that the LO is picked off by other traders before the end of the MRT decreases. The net effect is that a longer MRT leads to a higher expected profit. We also show that the depth of LOs increases when the volatility of the price of the asset increases. Also, the depth of LOs increases when the arrival rate of market orders increases because it is less likely that LOs will be picked off by the end of the MRT. Finally, our model also makes predictions about the overall liquidity of the market. We show that MMs choose to supply the minimum amount of shares per LO allowed by the exchange because expected profits are maximised when liquidity provided is lowest.     

Lot Size Constraints and Market Quality: Evidence from the Borsa Italiana

Trading venues often impose a minimum lot size (minimum trade unit [MTU]) to facilitate order execution. We document changes in market quality associated with the reduction of the MTU to one share on the Italian stock exchange, the Borsa Italiana. We observe a substantial improvement in liquidity, with an average decrease in the relative spread of 10.2%, and more significant improvements for those firms for which the MTU constraint was more binding. We also show that the improvement in liquidity is mainly driven by a reduction in adverse selection; that informational efficiency is not significantly affected; and there is an increase in retail trading. We interpret our findings in light of a model of asymmetric information in which the MTU affects traders’ choice of order size.     

Asymmetric information and the bid-ask spread: an empirical comparison between automated order execution and open outcry auction

This study examines the components of the bid-ask spread on the Sydney Futures Exchange. The Exchange uses open outcry auction for daytime trading, and switches to a screen-based automated order execution system at 16:30 h for overnight trading. After controlling for proxies of order flow characteristics, the study finds that screen-based traders are more sensitive to market volatility than floor-based traders in setting the bid-ask spread. Spreads from floor trading have a smaller adverse information component but a larger order processing cost component relative to screen trading. The results suggest that floor traders can better assess the presence of adverse information than screen traders.