Sell on the news: Differences of opinion,short-sales constraints,and returns around earnings announcements

Miller [1977. Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. Journal of Finance 32, 1151–1168] hypothesizes that prices of stocks subject to high differences of opinion and short-sales constraints are biased upward. We expect earnings announcements to reduce differences of opinion among investors, and consequently, these announcements should reduce overvaluation. Using five distinct proxies for differences of opinion, we find that high differences of opinion stocks earn significantly lower returns around earnings announcements than low differences of opinion stocks. In addition, the returns on high differences of opinion stocks are more negative within the subsample of stocks that are most difficult for investors to sell short. These results are robust when we control for the size effect and the market-to-book effect and when we examine alternative explanations such as financial leverage, earnings announcement premium, post-earnings announcement drift, return momentum, and potential biases in analysts’ forecasts. Also consistent with Miller's theory, we find that stocks subject to high differences of opinion and more binding short-sales constraints have a price run-up just prior to earnings announcements that is followed by an even larger decline after the announcements.     

Regulation Fair Disclosure and analysts’ reliance on earnings announcements

Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibits corporations from selectively disclosing material information to groups of favored analysts and institutional investors. If information previously provided is excluded by the new regulation from analysts’ information set, it is plausible that the relative importance of the other information, such as earnings announcements, which remains could increase (Arya et al., 2005). The purpose of this study is to investigate whether analysts become more reliant on firm earnings announcements in revising their forecasts after implementation of the regulation. Our empirical results show that, after the regulation, more analysts issue forecasts immediately after earnings announcements. In addition, analysts’ earnings forecasts tend to converge more after observing earnings announcements in the post-regulation period. These results, in conjunction with the finding of higher overall level of forecast errors and dispersion, indicate that earnings announcements become more important information sources in the post regulation period. These findings suggest that analysts are more reliant on earnings announcements and there is an increase in analyst herding as a result of Regulation Fair Disclosure.     

The role of corporate governance in meeting or beating analysts’ forecast

Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is a topic of considerable interest in the academic and business communities. Some studies indicate a favorable market response when firms meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, but others suggest managers opportunistically manage earnings to achieve earnings targets. We investigate the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and meeting or exceeding analysts’ expectations and find that attributes of corporate governance are related to the likelihood of consistently meeting or exceeding consensus forecasts. We extend current literature by showing that some attributes of strong corporate governance mechanisms lower agency costs associated with consistently meeting or beating analysts’ expectations. We also find that compensation committees reward managers for consistently meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.     

Chaebol-affiliated analysts: Conflicts of interest and market responses

Some Korean business groups, or chaebols, have a large stake in securities firms that issue analysts’ reports on their member companies. This structure is unique in that industrial companies and securities firms are affiliated and operate within the same group. We investigate the informational content of earnings forecasts, stock recommendations and target prices made by the chaebol-affiliated analysts, using data collected between 2000 and 2008. The chaebol analysts tend to make more optimistic earnings forecasts for the member companies. The mean EPS forecast error (5.36%) of the affiliated analysts for the same chaebol company are significantly larger than that (3.23%) of other chaebol and independent analysts. The chaebol analysts also assign better recommendations by almost one level and set target prices 2.5% higher to the member companies after controlling for company and analyst characteristics. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that chaebol analysts’ reports are biased by conflicts of interest. Stock market reactions do not differ in response to announcements of stock recommendations issued by affiliated vs. non-affiliated analysts. This suggests that capital markets do not recognize the conflicts of interest inherent in chaebol analysts’ reports.     

The stock price effects of changes in dispersion of investor beliefs during earnings announcements

Existing research provides competing theories about how dispersion of investor beliefs might affect stock prices. We measure changes in dispersion of investor beliefs around earnings announcements using changes in the dispersion of individual analysts’ forecasts. We find that the 3-day market response to earnings announcements is negatively associated with changes in dispersion, consistent with the cost of capital hypothesis. The results hold after controlling for the current earnings surprise, forecast revisions of future earnings, and reported earnings relative to various earnings thresholds. Our study provides new insight about the information contained in earnings announcements that is incremental to the magnitude and timing of cash flows.     

The information content of financial analysts' forecasts of earnings: Some evidence on semi-strong inefficiency

The paper assesses the information content of revisions in financial analysts' forecasts of earnings by analyzing the relation between the direction of these revisions and stock price behavior. Abnormal returns during the months surrounding the revisions in analysts' forecasts are computed and evaluated. The results strongly indicate that information on revisions in forecasts of earnings per share is valuable to investors. It is also suggested that market reaction to the disclosure of analysts' forecasts is relatively slow and gives rise to potential abnormal returns to investors who act upon this type of publicly available information.     

Beating market expectations and the pricing of firms’ probability of default

This study explores the impact of beating analysts' forecasts on investors' perceptions about firms' default probability. The information contained in analysts’ forecasts, both earnings and revenues, provides additional information to investors in pricing CDSs. While previous research has focused on the impact of beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, this study shows that firms that beat analysts' revenue forecasts also experience, on average, a decrease in the CDS premium around the earnings announcement date. This study also documents that the effect is stronger when firms beat/miss both earnings and revenue forecasts. When firms beat (miss) earnings and miss (beat) revenues, the effect of earnings is the dominant signal. These effects are stronger for firms with high levels of default risk.     

Pro forma disclosure and investor sophistication: External validation of experimental evidence using archival data

Insights on how ordinary, less-sophisticated investors interpret and process management-issued pro forma earnings numbers are useful to regulators because of concerns that pro forma disclosures are misleading to ordinary investors. Two recent experimental studies [Frederickson, J. R., & Miller, J. S. (2004). The effects of pro forma earnings disclosures on analysts’ and nonprofessional investors’ equity valuation judgments. The Accounting Review, 79(3), 667–686; Elliott, W. B. (2006). Are investors influenced by pro forma emphasis and reconciliations in earnings announcements? The Accounting Review, 81(1), 113–133] find that the existence of a pro forma number in the earnings press release as well as the relative placement of the pro forma and GAAP earnings figures within the press release affect the judgments of less-sophisticated investors but not those of more-sophisticated investors. Experimental and archival methodologies complement one another and results that persist in both settings are likely to be robust to both internal and external validity concerns. Therefore, we complement experimental evidence using trade-size-based proxies constructed from intraday transactions data to distinguish the trading activities of less-sophisticated investors from more-sophisticated investors. Our results suggest that less-sophisticated investors rely significantly more on quarterly earnings press releases that include a pro forma number than on those that do not, while more-sophisticated investors exhibit the opposite behavior. This result is consistent with Frederickson and Miller’s experimental evidence. Further, consistent with Elliott’s results, we find that less-sophisticated investors rely more on the pro forma figure when it is placed before the GAAP earnings number in the press release, while more-sophisticated investors’ trading behavior is unaffected by the relative placement of the two earnings metrics. We conclude that the existence of a pro forma number as well as its strategic placement in the press release generally affect the judgments of less-sophisticated (but not more-sophisticated) investors and these inferences are robust because they persist in both experimental and archival settings.     

Analysts’ forecast revisions and firms’ research and development expenses

This study examines whether reported values for firms’ research and development (R&D) affect analysts’ annual earnings forecast revisions following quarterly earnings announcements. Because R&D introduces uncertainty into earnings forecasts, analysts may benefit from additional information searches in an effort to increase forecast accuracy. Also, accounting standards mandate an immediate expensing of R&D, in essence projecting a zero value for the R&D. To the extent that R&D will produce future payoffs, the expense treatment reduces the informativeness of reported earnings for forecasting future earnings. Thus, the marginal benefit of analysts’ efforts to produce more information may increase with the magnitude of the R&D component of earnings announcements and trigger additional forecast revisions. Alternatively, if the cost of information searches exceeds the benefit, analysts’ forecast revisions may decrease. Our results show a positive relation between R&D expenses and analysts’ forecast revision activity. We also find a positive and significant association between the level of R&D expenses and the magnitude of analysts’ forecast revisions following quarterly announcements. These results point to a greater amount of analyst scrutiny when reported earnings are accompanied by high levels of R&D expenses.

Financial analysts' forecasts of earnings: A better surrogate for market expectations

The specification of the market expectation of accounting numbers is a common feature of many empirical studies in accounting and finance. Givoly and Lakonishok (1979) found that financial analysts' forecasts have information content. This study evaluates the quality of analysts' forecasts as surrogates for the market expectation of earnings and compares it with that of prediction models commonly used in research. Results indicate that prediction errors of analysts are more closely associated with security price movements, suggesting that analysts' forecasts provide a better surrogate for market expectations than forecasts generated by time-series models. The study also identifies factors that might contribute to the performance of the financial analysts'forecasts. The broadness of the information set employed by analysts and, to a lesser extent, their reliance on information released after the end of the fiscal year appear to be important contributors to their performance.     

How do financial analysts interpret industrial firms' corporate refocusing announcements?

This study investigates how analysts perceive the effect of corporate refocusing announcements on UK industrial firms' future earnings by examining current-year and one-year-ahead earnings forecast revisions, current-year target price revisions and earnings forecast errors in the five years surrounding a refocusing announcement year. The results reveal that analysts adjust their earnings forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year and the following two years, predicting that operating performance in the post-refocusing period is likely to decline relative to their former earnings forecasts. Secondly, there is no evidence that analysts issue biased earnings forecasts after refocusing announcements or that their forecasts appear less accurate. Thirdly, they adjust their earnings forecasts downward in a refocusing announcement year with downward market movement. However, they do not similarly adjust their earnings forecast upward with upward market movement. The magnitude of downward adjustments exceeds that of upward adjustments. They also adjust current-year target price forecasts downward with downward market movement in the year prior to a refocusing announcement.     

Analysts’ Earnings Forecasts for DAX100 Firms During the Stock Market Boom of the 1990s

This paper examines the reliability of financial analysts’ consensus earnings forecasts in the 1990s. Analysts are often accused of having fuelled the stock market boom with exaggerated evaluations of firms’ prospects. However, this criticism primarily refers to the analysts’ buy recommendations rather than earnings forecasts. Although biases in earnings forecasts have been reported since the 1980s, a systematic study capturing the period of ‘irrational exuberance’ until 2000 on the German stock market has not yet been published. Our data set consists of DAX100 firms, leaving out the peculiarities of forecasting earnings (or rather losses) of young technology firms. To evaluate the information content of analysts’ forecasts, we confront them with five alternative forecasting models. The empirical results reveal that analysts’ forecasts were too optimistic throughout the entire sample period. However, contrary to the increase in stock prices, the optimistic bias has declined over time. If the bias is removed, the analysts’ consensus forecasts significantly outperform all other models considered. Thus, the forecasts seem to be informative with respect to earnings differences, even if the market level of earnings is optimistically overstated.     

Sell-side analyst heterogeneity and insider trading

This study explores insider trading patterns under different earnings surprises. After controlling for stock market liquidity and earnings announcements returns, we show that insiders sell more aggressively depending on the heterogeneity of analysts whose EPS forecasts are met or beaten to camouflage their trades. Specifically, insiders sell more shares of their company sooner after the publication of earnings when top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten. Consistent with the informed trading literature, insiders strategically select these moments because the stock price impact is low and the legal scrutiny of their trades is minimal. To support this result, we employ an exogenous drop in firms' analyst coverage due to the closure or merger of brokerage houses. Furthermore, in line with the camouflage incentives, by selling after top analysts' forecasts are met or beaten, stock prices adjust slowly to insider trades. Finally, we show that the incentives of insiders to hide their trades are concentrated in opportunistic insiders and members of the top management team, who are more likely to bear the costs of selling shares after positive news.     

Do brokerage houses add value? The market impact of UK sell-side analyst recommendation changes

This paper reports on the first full study investigating the economic role of sell-side analysts’ stock recommendations in the UK market. We also explore whether UK analysts are, in practice, influenced by the same biases as that reported for their US counterparts.We find that share prices are significantly influenced by analysts’ recommendation changes, not only at the time of the recommendation change but also in subsequent months. The price reaction to new sell recommendations is greater than the price reaction to new buy recommendations and exhibits post-recommendation drift which is consistent with initial underreaction to bad news. Returns generated are influenced, cross-sectionally, by factors associated with a firm's information environment and analyst incentives such as size, same-sign earnings forecast revisions and recommendation changes that skip a rank.We find that UK analysts’ investment recommendations in practice appear less susceptible to potential conflicts of interest than their US counterparts. The ratio of new sell to buy recommendations is higher in the UK and a greater proportion of such recommendations are accompanied by same-sign earnings forecast revisions than their equivalents in the US. We find brokerage house investment banking relationships do not appear to impact (adversely) on abnormal returns.     

Market uncertainty and disclosure of internal control deficiencies under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act

This study examines cross-sectional differences in stock market reactions to the disclosure of internal control deficiencies under Section 302 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We hypothesize that the market punishment for internal control problems will be less severe for internal control disclosure that helps reduce market uncertainty around the disclosure. We also predict that such a relation is dependent on the types of disclosure and the market’s prior knowledge of the credibility of firms’ financial reporting. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find that when firms disclose their internal control deficiencies, their abnormal stock returns are negatively associated with changes in market uncertainty (e.g., changes in the standard deviations of daily stock returns) around the disclosure. We also find that the impact of the uncertainty reduction is greater for voluntary disclosures of non-material weakness, especially those made in the context of previous suspicious events. The negative impact of changes in market uncertainty on the abnormal stock returns remains intact even after controlling for possible simultaneity. An analysis using financial analysts’ earnings forecasts dispersion as an alternative proxy for uncertainty confirms the results.     

Do stock price bubbles influence corporate investment?

Dispersion in investor beliefs and short-selling constraints can lead to stock market bubbles. This paper argues that firms, unlike investors, can exploit such bubbles by issuing new shares at inflated prices. This lowers the cost of capital and increases real investment. Perhaps surprisingly, large bubbles are not eliminated in equilibrium nor do large bubbles necessarily imply large distortions. Using the variance of analysts’ earnings forecasts to proxy for the dispersion of investor beliefs, we find that increases in dispersion cause increases in new equity issuance, Tobin's Q, and real investment, as predicted by the model.     

Financial Analysts' Earnings Forecast Dispersion and Intraday Stock Price Variability Around Quarterly Earnings Announcements

This study investigates the relationship between the dispersion of analysts' earnings forecasts and stock price variability around quarterly earnings announcements. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the empirical analysis shows that stock price variability at the time of earnings announcements is positively related to the degree of analysts' predisclosure earnings forecast dispersion. Additionally, firms with high levels of forecast dispersion exhibit significant increases in price variability for longer periods prior to and following earnings announcements than do firms with low levels of forecast dispersion. These results suggest that there is information about the earnings announcement that becomes available to at least a subset of investors prior to the earnings release and that market participants take different amounts of time to process the information conveyed by the earnings announcement.     

Regulation FD, accounting restatements and transient institutional investors’ trading behavior

We examine the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure (RFD) on transient institutional investors’ abnormal trading behavior around accounting restatements. We find that while in the pre-RFD period, transient institutional investors exhibit abnormal selling of restating firms’ stocks one quarter before the restatement is publicly announced, in the post-RFD period there is no such abnormal selling. Furthermore, we find that this phenomenon is driven by (a) firms with low analyst following (i.e., firms with poor information environment), (b) firms with high stock price reaction to earnings surprise (i.e., firms with high informativeness of earnings), (c) firms where the restatements’ impact on earnings is high, and (d) firms with non-revenue related restatements.     

The implications of ineffective internal control and SOX 404 reporting for financial analysts

The mandatory reporting of firms’ internal control effectiveness continues to be debated by equity market participants, U.S. regulatory agencies and oversight committees. We investigate the implications of material weaknesses in internal control and SOX 404 required reporting of such for financial analysts because analysts are important intermediaries in the U.S. capital market and it is not known whether analysts’ forecasts or coverage decisions are affected by firms’ internal control problems or reporting, respectively. Results of our empirical tests indicate that analysts provide less accurate forecasts and there is greater forecast dispersion for firms with ineffective internal control. We also find that firms that disclose internal control problems have less analyst coverage and that analyst following declines after the material weakness in internal control is disclosed. The results are robust to controlling for potential self-selection bias and management earnings guidance. Our study documents the consequences of ineffective internal control for an important class of financial statement users and suggests the required reporting on the effectiveness of internal control is beneficial to understanding the properties of analysts’ forecasts.     

What Do Management Earnings Forecasts Convey About the Macroeconomy?

We decompose quantitative management earnings forecasts into macroeconomic and firm‐specific components to determine the extent to which voluntary disclosure provided by management has macroeconomic information content. We provide evidence that the forecasts of bellwether firms, which are defined as firms in which macroeconomic news explains the greatest amount of variation in the forecasts, provide timely information to the market about the macroeconomy when bundled with earnings announcements. Further, we show that bellwether firms provide timely information about both industry‐specific events and broader economic events. Finally, we document that the macroeconomic news in individual forecasts is more pronounced for bad news and point forecasts.