The liquidity risk of liquid hedge funds

This paper evaluates hedge funds that grant favorable redemption terms to investors. Within this group of purportedly liquid funds, high net inflow funds subsequently outperform low net inflow funds by 4.79% per year after adjusting for risk. The return impact of fund flows is stronger when funds embrace liquidity risk, when market liquidity is low, and when funding liquidity, as measured by the Treasury-Eurodollar spread, aggregate hedge fund flows, and prime broker stock returns, is tight. In keeping with an agency explanation, funds with strong incentives to raise capital, low manager option deltas, and no manager capital co-invested are more likely to take on excessive liquidity risk. These results resonate with the theory of funding liquidity by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).     

Does concurrent management of mutual and hedge funds create conflicts of interest?

This paper shows that conflicts of interest may exist in cases where a hedge fund manager starts a mutual fund but not in the opposite case. We compare performance, asset flows, and risk incentives to establish several key differences between these two scenarios: First, prior to concurrent management, hedge fund managers experience worse performance while mutual fund managers achieve better performance relative to their full-time peers. Second, hedge fund managers who choose concurrent management are disproportionately the ones with less experience. Their hedge funds tend to suffer a decline in performance after the event. By contrast, mutual fund managers who choose concurrent management tend to outperform their full-time peers. Based on our findings, we make important recommendations for policy makers and companies. The relevance of our recommendations extends beyond the small share of companies presently engaged in concurrent management.     

Inexperienced investors and bubbles

We use mutual fund manager data from the technology bubble to examine the hypothesis that inexperienced investors play a role in the formation of asset price bubbles. Using age as a proxy for managers’ investment experience, we find that around the peak of the technology bubble, mutual funds run by younger managers are more heavily invested in technology stocks, relative to their style benchmarks, than their older colleagues. Furthermore, young managers, but not old managers, exhibit trend-chasing behavior in their technology stock investments. As a result, young managers increase their technology holdings during the run-up, and decrease them during the downturn. Both results are in line with the behavior of inexperienced investors in experimental asset markets. The economic significance of young managers’ actions is amplified by large inflows into their funds prior to the peak in technology stock prices.     

AGENCY CONFLICTS IN DELEGATED PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM NAMESAKE MUTUAL FUNDS

Namesake funds provide a unique sample for studying the two agency conflicts that exist within a mutual fund. The first is between the fund management company and fund shareholders, and the second is between the fund management company and the fund manager. A typical namesake fund manager sits on his or her fund's board, frequently as the chairman, is the majority owner of the fund management company, and has significant investments in the fund he or she manages. Our results indicate that namesake funds charge higher fees, suggesting that the boards of namesake funds are less effective. We find that namesake funds are more tax efficient, consistent with the idea that managerial ownership helps align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. Because of fewer career concerns, namesake fund managers herd less while assuming greater unsystematic risk. We find weak evidence that namesake fund managers outperform their benchmarks and peers. Finally, we observe that namesake funds attract higher levels of investor cash flow.     

论基金管理人的股东化转型

在传统的基金治理结构中,基金管理人大多采用经理型模式,基金管理人的道德风险的发生难以避免。对基民与基金管理人的委托—代理合同进行优化,重激励、轻约束,不能从根本上消除基金管理人的道德风险。要消除基金管理人的道德风险,必须实现基金管理人从经理型向股东型的彻底转变,将基民与基金管理人的关系由传统的基金运行模式中的股东与经理的关系改造为优先股东与普通股东的关系。基金管理人的股东化转型,相对于经理型基金管理人而言,至少有两大功能:对基金管理人的机会主义行为的矫治功能;对基金管理人能力的甄别功能。     

Hedge fund incentives,management commitment and survivorship

Management ownership in hedge funds sends conflicting signals—signals which reduce investors’ perception of survivorship risk. We document that decisions on management ownership are purposely self-selected. Such decisions are most likely motivated by unique incentive mechanisms imbedded in hedge funds. We examine the impact of managerial ownership decisions on fund survivorship risk by accounting for unobserved fund manager motivations that affect both ownership decisions and survivorship risk. Our findings suggest that the conventional argument that having management commitment can reduce survival risk (and therefore align the interests between managers and investors) is significantly overstated. These results are robust to using alternative ownership measures and controlling for different samples.     

Benchmarking benchmarks: measuring characteristic selectivity using portfolio holdings data

This study proposes methodological adjustments to the widely adopted performance benchmarking methodology of Daniel et al. (1997 ) as a means of improving the precision of alpha measurement for active equity fund managers. We achieve this by considering the monthly updating of characteristic benchmarks and to ensure neutrality to the Standard & Poor's/Australian Stock Exchange 300 index. Applying this benchmark to a representative sample of active Australian equity funds and simulated passive portfolios that mimic fund manager‐style characteristics, we find statistically different and lower tracking error compared with using the standard characteristic benchmark methodology. We also find evidence that the modified benchmark statistically infers an alpha closer to zero compared with the standard benchmark methodology. Our findings suggest that improved specifications of characteristic benchmarks represent better methods in quantifying fund manager skill.     

What impact does a change of fund manager have on mutual fund performance?

Using a unique database of UK fund manager changes over the period from 1997 to 2011, we examine the impact of such changes on fund performance. We find clear evidence to suggest that a manager change does affect the benchmark-adjusted performance of UK mutual funds. In particular we find a significant deterioration in the benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were top performers before the manager exit and, conversely, a significant improvement in the average benchmark-adjusted returns of funds that were poor performers before the manager exit. Our use of the Carhart's (1997) four-factor model reveals that the improvement in average post manager exit performance is accompanied by a reduction in market risk, a slight reduction in exposure to small cap stocks, and an increase in exposure to value and momentum stocks. Overall, our results suggest that UK fund management companies have been relatively successful in replacing bad managers with better managers, but relatively unsuccessful at finding equivalent replacements for their top performing managers. We believe that regulators should therefore try to ensure that all efforts are made by fund management companies to inform all of their investors about a change in management.     

基金业绩归因与投资者行为

本文以2006年1月至2016年12月中国64家股票型主动管理基金为样本,从基金净资金流变化的角度,检验了投资者决策与基金业绩结构的关系,以期更好地理解投资者行为。本文结论有:(1)整体上,投资者在衡量基金经理能力时,更关注原始超额收益率或只基于市场风险调整风险敞口,这可能与中国市场投资工具仍然不够充分、风险难以有效对冲有关;(2)机构投资者相比个人投资者对风险敞口的识别更严格;(3)简单模型的优势集中在市场波动低、投资者情绪高的时期;(4)除基金经理能力外,净资金流变化对市场风险报酬也很敏感;(5)从alpha的角度,我国基金市场仍存在“赎回异象”,可能与“处置效应”有关,仍需提升投资者对风险的认知,引导市场形成更加科学的投资观念。     

Understanding merger incentives and outcomes in the US mutual fund industry

This paper examines the incentives of acquirers and targets in the merger market. Using data on acquisitions among mutual fund management companies from 1991 to 2004, I estimate a two-sided matching model of the merger market jointly with equations representing merger outcomes. According to the empirical investigation, although the desire to achieve a sufficient scale to attract investors is a key driver for mergers, some mergers seem to be driven by objectives other than shareholder value maximization. I find that companies that are potentially prone to misaligned incentives between owners and managers are more acquisitive than others, yet have significantly worse post-merger operating performance. I also find that these acquirers, despite their higher willingness to pay for targets, are not any more likely to match with high-quality targets, potentially due to targets’ incentive to avoid bad organizations.     

Hedge fund liquidity and performance: Evidence from the financial crisis

We investigate how share restrictions affect hedge fund performance in crisis and non-crisis periods. Consistent with prior research, we find that in the pre-crisis period more illiquid funds generate a share illiquidity premium compensating investors for limited liquidity. In the crisis period, this share illiquidity premium turns into an illiquidity discount. Hedge funds with more stringent share restrictions invest more heavily in illiquid assets. While share restrictions enable funds to manage illiquid assets effectively in the pre-crisis period, they seem insufficient to ensure effective management of illiquid portfolios in the crisis. In a crisis period, funds holding illiquid portfolios experience lower returns and alphas, also when share restrictions are controlled for. Funds with an asset–liability mismatch perform particularly poorly and experience the strongest outflows. Share restrictions are also a proxy for incentives as investors cannot immediately withdraw their money after poor performance. We show that higher incentive fees can offset the share illiquidity discount in the crisis period.     

Managerial risk-reducing incentives and social and exchange capital

This study investigates the impact of managerial risk-reducing incentives on the firm's social and exchange capital. Using CEO inside debt holdings to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with more inside debt holdings are likely to invest more in building social capital, which targets broader society and potentially offers anti-risk protection advantages, to shield the value of their inside debt. However, our results further show that managerial risk-reducing incentives have no impact on firms' exchange capital, suggesting the need to recognize the difference between social and exchange capital. These findings corroborate the view that CEOs invest in social capital as a risk management strategy. Furthermore, this paper presents an understanding of the role that institutional investors play in moderating the impact of managerial risk-reducing incentives on social capital. Our results suggest that institutional investors constrain CEOs that have greater inside debt incentives from investing in social capital. However, they are still willing to increase the investment in social capital for risk management purposes when firm risk is high.     

Optimal Carried Interest: Adverse Selection in Islamic and Conventional Venture Capital and Private-Equity Funds

In an optimal carried interest model with adverse selection, the optimal profit-loss sharing ratio (PSR) explains how the risk aversion of the two parties can affect their bargaining powers by allowing investors to detect the true risk aversion of fund managers and not their true skills. The higher the management fee, the higher is the PSR. Our simulation exercise shows that when the fund manager is more risk averse than the investor for a higher invested capital and weaker expected net profit, the optimal negotiated profit-sharing ratio will be higher.     

INVESTOR REACTION TO MUTUAL FUND PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE FROM UK DISTRIBUTION CHANNELS

Existing work on the flow–performance relation in mutual funds focuses on the average U.S. investor, obscuring the contributions of different clienteles. We analyze UK data on monthly fund sales and purchases made via seven distinct distribution channels. We show that there exist marked differences in the reaction to fund performance between different types of retail and institutional investors. These differences can be understood by considering the incentives of parties involved in each channel. Our analysis indicates that the well‐documented aggregate net flow–performance convexity in mutual funds is driven by the extreme reaction of retail inflows to favorable performance, particularly from independently advised investors.     

Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of capital, leading to higher future fees. For the average hedge fund, indirect incentives are at least 1.4 times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and managers’ personal stakes in the fund. Combining direct and indirect incentives, manager wealth increases by at least $0.39 for a $1 increase in investor wealth. Younger and more scalable hedge funds have stronger flow‐performance relations, leading to stronger indirect incentives. These results have a number of implications for our understanding of incentives in the asset management industry.     

What determines corporate pension fund risk-taking strategy?

Corporate sponsors of defined benefit pension plans generally assume low investment risk when they have low funding ratios and high default risk, consistent with the risk management hypothesis. However, for financially distressed sponsors and sponsors that freeze, terminate, or convert defined benefit to defined contribution plans, the risk-shifting incentive (moral hazard) dominates. Pension fund risk-taking is also affected by labor unionization and sponsor incentives to maximize tax benefits, restore financial slack, and justify the accounting choices of pension assumptions. Sponsors shift toward an aggressive risk strategy when their pension plans emerge from underfunding, bankruptcy risk is reduced, or marginal tax rate decreases. Overall, we show that corporate sponsors adopt a dynamic risk-taking strategy in their pension fund investments.     

Investing in mutual funds when returns are predictable

This paper forms investment strategies in US domestic equity mutual funds, incorporating predictability in (i) manager skills, (ii) fund risk loadings, and (iii) benchmark returns. We find predictability in manager skills to be the dominant source of investment profitability—long-only strategies that incorporate such predictability outperform their Fama-French and momentum benchmarks by 2 to 4%/year by timing industries over the business cycle, and by an additional 3 to 6%/year by choosing funds that outperform their industry benchmarks. Our findings indicate that active management adds significant value, and that industries are important in locating outperforming mutual funds.     

Risk-taking and performance of government bond mutual funds

This paper investigates the risk exposures of government bond mutual funds and how risk-taking behavior affects fund performance. Government bond mutual funds often outperform their respective benchmark bond indexes before but not after adjusting for bond market risk factors. We show that the risk-taking behavior of fund managers helps to explain the different performances of government bond funds with and without controlling for the risk factors. Our results suggest that risk-taking leads to higher returns relative to benchmarks in normal risk periods but lower returns in high risk periods, suggesting that fund managers consistently take risky bets in fund management. We further show that the risk-taking of government bond funds is persistent and that investors typically have no ability to differentiate between the skill and risk components of fund performance. These findings suggest why fund managers have incentives to take consistently risky positions.     

The flow-performance relationship around the world

We use a new dataset to study how mutual fund flows depend on past performance across 28 countries. We show that there are marked differences in the flow-performance relationship across countries, suggesting that US findings concerning its shape do not apply universally. We find that mutual fund investors sell losers more and buy winners less in more developed countries. This is because investors in more developed countries are more sophisticated and face lower costs of participating in the mutual fund industry. Higher country-level convexity is positively associated with higher levels of risk taking by fund managers.     

Optimal Control of DC Pension Plan Management under Two Incentive Schemes

Since the late 1990s, a performance fee arrangement has been approved as a managerial incentive in direction contribution (DC) pension plan management to motivate managers. However, the fact that managers may take undue risk for the larger performance fees and thus reduce members’ utility has been a subject of debate. As such, this study investigates the optimal risk-taking policies of DC pension fund managers under both the single management fee scheme and a mixed scheme with a lower management fee, as well as an additional performance fee. The analytical solutions are derived by using the duality method and concavification techniques in a singular optimization problem. The results show the complex risk-taking structures of fund managers and recognize the win-win situation of implementing performance-based incentives in DC pension plan management. Under the setting of geometric Brownian motion asset price dynamics and constant relative risk aversion utility, the optimal risk investment proportion shows a peak-valley pattern under the mixed scheme. Further, the manager gambles for gain when fund wealth is low and time to maturity is short. As opposed to the existing literature, this study found that the risk-taking policy is more conservative when fund wealth is relatively large. Furthermore, the utilities of the manager and members could both be improved by appropriately choosing the performance fee rate.