多元化与资本成本的关系——来自中国股票市场的证据

根据期权定价模型,多元化降低了公司风险,但其受益者是债权人,而不是股东,这使得公司部分财富从股东手中转移到债权人手中,由此降低了股东财富,因此,多元化可能并不为股东所欢迎,从而多元化公司的权益资本成本可能高于专业化公司。同时,由于内部资本市场在公司内部的资源再配置作用,使得公司降低了对融资成本较高的外部资本市场的依赖,因此,多元化经营公司的总资本成本可能低于专业化经营公司。本文以2001—2004年我国上市公司为例,对多元化与公司权益资本成本和总资本成本之间的关系进行了实证检验。研究结果表明,多元化与权益资本成本正相关,而与总资本成本负相关。     

多元化企业有效内部资本市场的均衡配置效应研究

由于投资者保护不完善产生的金融市场的不完美性,从事"挑选胜者"的多元化企业发现,即使经济中有额外资本需求的高生产率项目,通过内部资本市场将稀缺资本配置给平庸项目也是最优的.即使多元化企业的内部资本市场有效,这种内部资本配置偏见也会降低配置效率,因为多元化企业的存在可能使其他公司的融资更为困难.在金融发展处于中等程度的国家,与其多元化企业相联系的负外部性成本特别高,高度多元化会产生家族企业集团控制公司部门的情形,这可能降低市场效率.     

子公司多元化、业务分布与现金持有——基于母子公司内部资本配置视角的分析

本文以母子公司内部资本配置为视角,检验了业务分布对子公司多元化下现金持有水平的影响。研究发现,子公司多元化能够降低上市公司合并整体的现金持有水平;而当业务分布于子公司的比重越高或子公司业务地域分布越广时,子公司多元化降低现金持有水平的效果被削弱的程度越高;且在母子公司间业务分布与地域分布的交互影响下,子公司多元化降低现金持有水平的效果被削弱的程度会更为明显。本文揭示了子公司经营需求和自主资产配置能力对母子公司间内部资本市场效率影响的内在机理,扩展了企业集团内部资本市场的结构化特征与机理的研究。     

中国“系族企业”分部经理影响力活动、内部资本市场及其配置效率

多元化集团内部资本市场(ICM)的资源配置效率随着分部经理影响分配决策能力的变化而改变。由于我国内部资本市场替代不完美外部资本市场以及多元化企业中更易频繁发生的影响力活动,研究中国ICM配置效率尤其是分部经理影响力活动对于ICM配置效率的影响更具意义。本文以中国资本市场"系族企业"为对象进行实证检验,突出研究多元化企业中分部经理影响力对于内部资本市场配置效率的影响作用。研究结论对于我国企业集团设计资本预算程序和薪酬激励体系提供了理论依据和标杆。     

产融结合资本配置效应的理论分析

本研究以内部资本市场理论为基础,对产融结合的资本配置效应进行了分析,得出结论:产融结合能为企业构造包含金融机构的内部资本市场,一方面可以缓解企业的融资约束,但另一方面也会使企业的组织结构复杂化,公司治理难度加大,进而对资本的配置产生负面影响。     

基于利益主体行为视角的内部资本市场配置效率研究述评

内部资本市场的运作效率在一定程度上决定了多元化企业集团的经营绩效,内部资本市场配置效率已成为公司金融理论界和实务界关注的核心问题.已有文献的研究认为影响资金配置决策和效率的因素有信息不对称、代理冲突和外部投资环境等多个方面,其本质上是通过利益主体(股东、总部、分部经理)的行为来实现.本文围绕内部资本市场配置效率,从股东行为、总部行为、分部经理行为三个视角对现有文献进行梳理和归纳,发现利益主体的行为具有机会主义倾向,正是他们的这种异化行为导致了内部资本市场的配置低效率,并进一步提出了研究展望.     

内部资本市场：组织载体、交易与租金

本文首先对内部资本市场存在于多元化企业集团的观点提出了质疑,认为多元化可以扩大内部资本市场的运作空间,但不是判断企业集团是否存在内部资本市场的必要条件；其次对内部资本市场交易按其特征进行分类,并对其与关联交易的区别进行了辨析；最后从组织租金视角研究内部资本市场的本质,界定了内部资本市场租金的内涵,提出内部资本市场的本质是租金的创造与分配。     

内部资本市场 公司绩效与控制权私有收益——以华通天香集团为例分析

基于内部资本市场理论,当企业集团对内部各成员部门不是100%控股时,资源在内部资本市场的转移会产生较大的摩擦,内部资本市场存在效率不足。在处于转轨时期的中国企业,公司治理尚不完善、代理问题比较严重,势必影响内部资本市场功能的正常发挥。本文以华通天香集团为例,分析了上市公司内部资本市场运作的主要路径及产生的经济后果,发现原本在于提高资本配置而存在的内部资本市场部分地被异化为进行利益输送的渠道。另外,在本例中没有发现企业进行明显的跨部门交叉补贴证据。     

企业集团内部资本配置对成员企业价值的影响

创造内部资本市场的能力是企业集团十分显著的特征。企业集团内部资本配置对其成员企业价值是有影响的。本文通过对中国企业集团控股公司的实证检验发现，内部资本配置对国有集团控股公司的价值有反方向的影响；对民营集团控股公司的价值有显著的正向影响。在控制权大于现金流权组，集团内部资本市场的规模越大，其对控股公司的价值影响越大；但对多元化经营和规模越大的集团控股公司的价值影响较小；在控制权等于现金流权组，其内部资本市场规模越大，其控股公司的价值越小，尤其对多元化经营的集团控股公司的价值的影响越小。     

内部资本市场效率理论综述

内部资本市场是研究企业内部资金配置最重要的理论,从二十世纪六七十年代到现在,国内外学者对内部资本市场做了更加深入系统的研究。本文将对研究内部资本市场效率问题的文献进行归纳和梳理。     

Exploitation of the internal capital market and the avoidance of outside monitoring

Internal capital markets (ICMs) provide firms an alternative to costly external financing; however, they also provide an avenue to avoid the monitoring associated with issuing external capital. We argue that firms operating inefficient internal capital markets will avoid outside financing. Consistent with this view, conglomerates that cross-subsidize divisions or engage in value-destroying investment avoid external capital market oversight by refraining from issuing both debt and equity. We further show that firms issuing bonds while engaging in value-destroying investment experience yield spreads that are, on average, 46 basis points higher than those of other diversified firms. They similarly experience yield spreads that are 18 basis points higher when they issue syndicated loans. Value-destroying conglomerates also witness SEO announcement returns that are, on average, 1% more negative than firms operating more efficient internal capital markets.     

Corporate governance and capital allocations of diversified firms

We examine how various aspects of corporate governance structures affect the capital allocation inefficiency that drives the value discounts of diversified firms. Diversified firms with more effective internal or external governance mechanisms experience more efficient investment allocations at both the firm and segment levels and show less of a diversification discount. The efficiency of the investment allocation process is better for diversified firms with high board independence, low board busyness, high institutional ownership, high outside director ownership, high CEO equity-based pay, high audit quality, and strong shareholder rights. The results hold after controlling for other potential influences. Our evidence suggests that corporate governance considerations are important in assessing the relation between investment efficiency and firm value for diversified firms.     

Conglomerate investment under various capital market conditions

This paper studies the investment of diversified and focused firms under various capital market conditions. When external capital becomes more costly at the aggregate level, investment declines in focused firms but remains unchanged in diversified firms. This investment advantage enjoyed by diversified firms could attribute to both their easy access to external capital and their ability to substitute internal capital markets for costly external markets. Consistent with the internal capital market argument, our findings show that the investment advantage exists for diversified firms even after we control for their easy access to external markets. We also find that the role of internal markets in financing investment is more important for diversified firms that are more financially constrained in external markets. Finally, we find that the segment-level investment becomes more efficient in conglomerates’ internal capital markets under depressed external capital market conditions. Overall, our findings suggest that internal capital allocation functions as a valuable and efficient substitute for diversified firms in a tightened external capital market.     

Segment Disclosure Transparency and Internal Capital Market Efficiency: Evidence from SFAS No. 131

Using the adoption of SFAS 131, I examine the effect of segment disclosure transparency on internal capital market efficiency. SFAS 131 requires firms to define segments as internally viewed by managers, thereby improving the transparency of managerial actions in internal capital allocation. I find that diversified firms that improved segment disclosure transparency by changing segment definitions upon adoption of SFAS 131 experienced an improvement in capital allocation efficiency in internal capital markets after the adoption of SFAS 131. In addition, I find that the improvement in internal capital market efficiency was greater for firms that suffered more severe agency problems before the adoption of SFAS 131 and also for firms whose managers faced stronger incentives to improve efficiency after the adoption of SFAS 131. My results suggest that more transparent segment information can help resolve agency conflicts in the internal capital markets of diversified firms, thus improving investment efficiency.     

Corporate diversification and downsizing decisions: International evidence from sharp and sudden performance shocks

While firms regularly reduce workforce following sharp performance decline, diversified firms may abstain from employment downsizing by transferring capital and labor between segments (the allocative flexibility effect). However, downsizing may be more likely if a performance shock leads to efforts to reduce inefficiency in resource allocation (the inefficient internal market effect). Using a large cross-country dataset, our results provide strong support for the inefficient internal market effect. We find that diversified firms are more likely to downsize and the national employment protection and union power laws moderate this link. We also find that diversified firms with more excess employment are more likely to downsize and that downsizing following major adverse performance shocks is associated with lower level of diversification and excess employment.     

The internal workings of internal capital markets: Cross-country evidence

We derive empirical predictions from the standard investment-cash flow framework on the functioning of internal capital markets (ICM), but circumvent its criticism by focusing on parent cash flow and investment opportunities. We test these predictions using a unique dataset of parent firms and their listed and unlisted subsidiaries in 90 countries over the period 1995–2006. We find that company and country institutional structures matter. (1) Ownership participation of the parent firm in the subsidiary plays a crucial role for the proper functioning of ICMs. The larger the ownership stake of the parent, the better the functioning of the ICM. (2) The best functioning cross-border ICMs can be found in the sub-sample of firms with parents from a country with “strong” institutions and subsidiaries from a country with “weak” institutions. (3) Unlisted subsidiaries are much more dependent on the ICMs their parents provide than listed subsidiaries. Thus, ICMs are not per se “bright” or “dark”, their proper functioning depends on how they are set up.     

The Cost of Diversity: The Diversification Discount and Inefficient Investment

We model the distortions that internal power struggles can generate in the allocation of resources between divisions of a diversified firm. The model predicts that if divisions are similar in the level of their resources and opportunities, funds will be transferred from divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities. When diversity in resources and opportunities increases, however, resources can flow toward the most inefficient division, leading to more inefficient investment and less valuable firms. We test these predictions on a panel of diversified U.S. firms during the period from 1980 to 1993 and find evidence consistent with them.     

Can growth opportunities explain the diversification discount?

We investigate the possibility that the diversification discount is due to differing growth opportunities between diversified and single-segment firms. We do this by comparing diversified business segments with individual single-segment same-industry firms of comparable growth opportunities. Using a sample of 230 diversifying firms from 1981 to 1997, we find a significant valuation discount in diversified firms even when we control for the difference in growth opportunities between diversified and single-segment firms. This result suggests that differing growth opportunities between diversified and single-segment firms cannot account for the diversification discount.     

Organizational complexity and CEO labor markets: Evidence from diversified firms

We examine whether CEO turnover and succession patterns vary with firm complexity. Specifically, we compare CEO turnover in diversified versus focused firms. We find that CEO turnover in diversified firms is completely insensitive to both accounting and stock-price performance, but CEO turnover in focused firms is sensitive to firm performance. Diversified firms also experience less forced turnover than focused firms. Following turnover, replacement CEOs in diversified firms are older, more educated, and are paid more when hired. Collectively, our results indicate that the labor market for CEOs is different across diversified and focused firms and that firm complexity and scope affect CEO succession.     

Executive compensation and internal capital market efficiency

We document that chief executive officer (CEO) incentive compensation plays an important role in determining internal capital market (ICM) allocation efficiency. Our results suggest that CEO equity-based compensation can be effective in ameliorating inefficiencies in internal capital allocation decisions. We find that while stock grants play an important role in motivating CEOs to make more efficient internal capital allocation decisions, there is surprisingly no discernible influence of stock options. Our analysis supports the view that private benefits derived by managers are increasing in internal capital misallocation. We also document a strong positive link between CEO incentive compensation and excess value of diversified firms suggesting that the diversification discount can be ameliorated with CEO incentive compensation. The study contributes to the ICM literature and the literature on conglomerate diversification discount.