利率规则和经济的稳定均衡之间联系的理论研究述评

本文在文献回顾的基础上,对货币当局依照利率规则(Taylor rules),通过利率传导机制来调节经济运行,从而实现经济的稳定均衡展开理论评述。Taylor指出,名义利率减去预期通货膨胀率就是实际利率,因此,只要名义利率随着预期通胀率同向变化,就能实现实际利率的稳定。当实际的GDP增长高于潜在的增长水平时,实际利率就会偏离均衡状态,这种情况下中央银行就要运用货币政策工具,调整名义利率来实现实际利率的稳定,在维持短期实际利率稳定的目标下,央行可通过调整名义利率来稳定物价和实现经济增长。     

利率规则和经济的稳定均衡之间联系的理论研究述评

本文在文献回顾的基础上,对货币当局依照利率规则(Taylor rules),通过利率传导机制来调节经济运行,从而实现经济的稳定均衡展开理论评述。Taylor指出,名义利率减去预期通货膨胀率就是实际利率,因此,只要名义利率随着预期通胀率同向变化,就能实现实际利率的稳定。当实际的GDP增长高于潜在的增长水平时,实际利率就会偏离均衡状态,这种情况下中央银行就要运用货币政策工具,调整名义利率来实现实际利率的稳定,在维持短期实际利率稳定的目标下,央行可通过调整名义利率来稳定物价和实现经济增长。     

通胀及货币政策的不确定性对货币政策调控的影响——基于TVP-GARCH-M模型的实证分析

利用TVP-GARCH模型从通货膨胀率中分离出结构型、冲击型和稳态型通胀不确定性,然后以7天短期利率为货币政策中介工具,在通胀及货币政策不确定性的费雪效应框架下分析中央银行对名义利率的调整机制。研究发现,中央银行通过利率机制调控经济增长的效果并不明显,但对通胀及通胀预期的调控效果显著,通胀及货币政策的不确定性是引起短期利率波动的重要因素;货币政策不确定性与短期名义利率负相关,为了不致短期名义利率被扭曲,中央银行应减少货币政策的不确定性。     

负利率与通胀预期

从长期来看,无论是根据中央银行的货币政策目标,还是根据利率的市场化改革方向,央行都不可能专门针对负利率而频繁调整基准利率实际利率是经济学中一个重要概念。实际利率是名义利率剔除了物价上涨因素后计算出来的真实利率,标准的计算公式为:实际利率等于名义利率减去预期通货膨胀率。如果实际利率为负,则是我们通常所说的负利率。     

江苏城镇居民储蓄行为实证研究

在西方储蓄理论中，储蓄是未用于当期消费的那部分收入，其目的是为了应付未来消费或某些大宗支出；利息是对人们推迟当期消费的补偿；由于不同时期物价水平不同，利率有名义利率和实际利率的区别（实际利率=名义利率-预期通货膨胀率）。由此可见，收入、消费、利率、预期通货膨胀率是影响人们储蓄的基本因素，这被大多数经济学家所公认。     

提高利率水平,完善利率机制

金融体系取代财政体系成为经济肌体的主动脉以及居高不下的通货膨胀率,是经济体制改革以来我国经济中出现的两个十分引人注目的新现象。在这个大背景下,利率(本文专指银行存贷款利率)问题因其对金融体系和经济的广泛而深刻的影响而开始受到人们的极大关注。虽然从1979年以来先后六次调高利率,但在高而不稳定的通货膨胀下,这种“乌龟追兔子”式的利率调整不仅没能跳出旧的低利率模式的基本框架,反而使名义利率同实际利率,名义利率同市场利率之间的“剪刀差”日益拉大。人们开始强烈地感受到低利率(实际上是负利率)对我国社会经济生活的诸多牵制。去年以来在高达20％上下的通货膨胀率下,席卷全国各大中城市的抢购、提款、挤兑风潮和储蓄存款的滑坡,以及前所未有的银行体系的频     

一般政府对抗通胀的办法

国家中央银行,如美联储,可经由设定利率及其他货币政策来有力地影响通货膨胀率。高利率（及资金需求成长迟缓）为央行反通胀的典型手法,以降低就业及生产来抑制物价上涨。然而,不同国家的央行对控制通货膨胀有不同的观点。例如说,有些央行密切注意对称性通货膨胀目标,而有些仅在通货膨胀率过高时加以控制。     

人民币汇率变动若干影响因素的实证分析

本文采用协整和脉冲响应函数分析的方法,就国际贸易顺差、利率、通货膨胀率和外汇储备对人民币汇率走势的影响进行实证分析.检验结果表明,从长期看,上述因素均与人民币汇率之间存在稳定的均衡关系,贸易顺差越大、利率越高、外汇储备越多的情况下会促使人民币升值,但通货膨胀会促使人民币贬值.从误差修正模型看,误差修正项均具有反向调整能力,存在短期到长期的动态调整过程.从脉冲响应函数图看,国际贸易顺差、实际利率和外汇储备对汇率的冲击始终为负,通货膨胀对汇率的冲击始终为正.     

通货膨胀目标制:理论、实践及其启示——兼论我国房地产市场调控

通货膨胀目标是由官方公开宣布未来一段时间内需要达到的通货膨胀目标或区间,明确承认低的、稳定的通货膨胀率是货币政策的首要长期目标。从长期看,中央银行可以产生系统的影响的惟一宏观经济变量只有通货膨胀率。没有中央银行的默许,通货膨胀就无法扎根。虽然石油价格冲击、持久干旱、升高的税收或者新的政府法令都有可能推动物价指数上升,除非中央银行对此不闻不问,否则,通货膨胀是不可能长久存在的。     

西方国家货币政策"名义锚"实践及其启示

货币政策"名义锚"作为保证国内货币价值长期稳定的约束机制,对于锁定公众的通货膨胀预期、减弱货币政策的时间不一致性、降低通货膨胀偏差有着非常重要的作用.本文分析了西方国家实践中的三大货币政策"名义锚",认为中国目前可采用货币供应量目标.在货币政策操作中,应增加货币政策的透明度,增强中央银行长期内稳定物价的责任感,并随着货币政策操作环境的改善,不断提高货币政策操作技巧与水平.     

关于通胀预期形成模式及其管理对策的研究

该文在对通胀预期三种形成方式进行比较分析的基础上，认为不完全理性预期是较为符合实际的预期形成方式；而通货膨胀持久性、经济主体获得信息并进行有效分析的能力、中央银行信誉是影响不完全理性预期的主要因素。中央银行应在货币政策目标上赋予币值稳定更高的权重，并通过进一步加强与公众的沟通，尽量向公众提供能使其形成合理预期所需的信息量等方式来管理通货膨胀预期。     

Inflation targeting: What inflation rate to target?

In an economy with nominal rigidities in both an intermediate good sector and a finished good sector, and thus with a natural distinction between CPI and PPI inflation rates, a benevolent central bank faces a tradeoff between stabilizing the two measures of inflation, a final output gap and, unique to our model, a real marginal cost gap in the intermediate sector, so that optimal monetary policy is second-best. We discuss how to implement the optimal policy with minimal information requirement and evaluate the robustness of these simple rules when the central bank may not know the exact sources of shocks or nominal rigidities. A main finding is that a simple hybrid rule under which the short-term interest rate responds to CPI inflation and PPI inflation results in a welfare level close to the optimum, whereas policy rules that ignore PPI inflation or PPI sector shocks can result in significant welfare losses.     

央行沟通、宏观经济环境与企业投资——利率渠道、信贷渠道与预期渠道货币政策的对比分析

本文对比研究央行沟通对企业投资的短周期引导能力。结果显示:在短周期内由于传导时滞,利率渠道的货币政策难以引导企业增加投资;信贷渠道的货币政策对企业投资有一定的引导作用;央行沟通能够通过预期渠道引导企业投资,但单独实行央行沟通的引导作用仍然有限。如果在进行央行沟通的同时配合信贷政策影响企业持有现金,就可能在短周期引导企业增加投资。此外,企业财务杠杆会减弱央行沟通的效果,企业投资价值对央行沟通效果没有显著影响。     

On the optimal monetary policy response to noisy indicators

We describe a behavior of a central bank when its measures of current inflation and output are subject to measurement errors, in a framework of optimizing models with nominal price stickiness. In our model, a central bank sets the interest rate equal to its current estimate of the so-called Wicksellian natural rate of interest. This is shown to imply that the interest rate responds to the central bank's estimates of both current inflation and output gap, as advocated by Taylor (1993). It is also shown that the noise contained in the indicators justifies a degree of policy cautiousness. A reduced-form representation of optimal policy should exhibit interest-rate smoothing, which is often found in the empirical literature on monetary policy reaction functions.     

Inflation Targeting and Exchange Rate Pass-Through: The Turkish Experience

Using a vector autoregression model, we show that the pass-through from imported inflation to domestic inflation has weakened substantially and slowed after the adoption of inflation targeting in Turkey. We argue that this finding is due mainly to several features—such as enhanced credibility of the central bank, changing behavior of the exchange rate, and a shift in expectation formation—possibly acquired by the implementation of a successful inflation-targeting regime. These observations suggest that adopting an inflation-targeting regime in itself may help to reduce exchange rate pass-through.     

Are Indexed Bonds Really Inflation Proof? A Model of Real and Nominal Term Structures when Money has Real Effects

This paper studies the general behavior of the nominal and real term structures of interest rates in a general equilibrium framework. A central bank is introduced in the model as an agent facing a tradeoff between inflation and output and choosing a monetary policy variable. Prices and output are jointly determined in our model endogenously. Two multi-factor nominal and real term structure models are given as examples to illustrate the general model. In our economies, inflation indexed bonds are not completely inflation proof, but are still subject to the influence of inflation uncertainties. The models offer us an empirical framework that can be studied with indexed bond data and nominal bond data together in a single estimation.     

异质预期条件下中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的影响

在外汇市场交易者预期异质性的假设条件下,以2005年7月至2015年12月中国人民银行沟通频数和人民币汇率数据为样本,采用异质预期汇率模型考察中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的总体影响。研究发现：在异质预期条件下,中央银行沟通通过信息机制和协调机制影响外汇市场交易者的异质预期,从而对人民币汇率波动产生较为显著的影响,但由于我国外汇交易者预期向基本面预期转换的发生概率小于技术分析交易者预期,中央银行沟通对人民币汇率波动的平稳作用效力受到一定的局限。     

Monetary policy transmission in vector autoregressions: A new approach using central bank communication

In this paper, we study the role played by central bank communication in monetary policy transmission. We employ the Swiss Economic Institute’s Monetary Policy Communicator to measure the future stance of the European Central Bank’s monetary policy. Our results indicate, first, that communication has an influence on inflation (expectations) similar to that of actual target rate changes. Communication also plays a noticeable role in the transmission of monetary policy to output. Consequently, future work on monetary policy transmission should incorporate both a short-term interest rate and a communication indicator. A second finding is that the monetary policy transmission mechanism changed during the financial crisis as the overall effect of monetary policy on (expected) inflation and output is weaker and of shorter duration during this period compared to the overall sample period.     

Price‐Level Targeting and Stabilization Policy

We construct a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to study optimal monetary stabilization policy. Prices are fully flexible and money is essential for trade. Our main result is that if the central bank pursues a price‐level target, it can control inflation expectations and improve welfare by stabilizing short‐run shocks to the economy. The optimal policy involves smoothing nominal interest rates that effectively smooths consumption across states.     

Monetary policy signaling and movements in the term structure of interest rates

This paper examines how various monetary policy signals such as repo rate changes, inflation reports, speeches, and minutes from monetary policy meetings affect the term structure of interest rates. We find that unexpected movements in the short end of the yield curve are mainly driven by unexpected changes in the repo rate. However, published inflation reports and speeches also have some impact on short rates. Speeches are found to be a more important determinant for the longer end of the term structure. Our conclusion is that central bank communication is an essential part of the conduct of monetary policy.